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
AND

HIS DWELLING PLACE.

by
James Hinton

"I have thought some of nature's journeymen had made me, and not made
them well, they imitated humanity so abominably."

SHAKESPEARE.



BOSTON:
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LIBERTY IMPOSSIBLE.

THE first article of the Constitution of Massachusetts has stood as follows since 1780; even the late free-soil convention made no effort to expunge or amend it.

"All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness."

The sovereign people are here laden with a measure of flattery quite as overpowering as the most superb ever bestowed upon other sovereigns. At different times and places there have lived monarchs, who with easy good sense could listen to plain bitter truth, as well as to the fawning of the interested or the dreams of the deluded, and could listen with no undue perturbation. That the sovereign people are thus free has not been clearly proved; and to test their powers, it is not proposed here to rely on things transcendental and new, but rather to remind men of what undeniably exists, and of things continually passing before their eyes, whether closed or open, bright or dull.

Where this stereotyped flattery originated, and how it grew to its present gorgeous proportions, it is not to the

purpose here to inquire; but there it stands, a beacon that dazzles and blinds by its glare, and bewilders by its fallacy. That the arrow hits the mark, is sufficiently obvious from the fact that the multitude is not small, who have thought, spoken and laid plans, as if all men were really free and equal. Though in carrying their plans into execution, they constantly experience much that might show that the world is otherwise constituted, the opinion is too pleasant to be easily relinquished. It is pleasant for one to consider himself equal to the most eminent man that he admires, envies, hates or fears; and it is surpassingly pleasant for a man to imagine himself free; that is, that he has the power and opportunities of rightly exercising all the faculties of a strong, perfect, high-lived man, and of immediately receiving the happiness that would consequently attend.

But no two can be found equal. All differ in bodily power, and in mental qualities; men are unequal in courage, fickleness, energy and indolence, and in the power of perceiving and thinking quickly and correctly. Every one's faculties are all of them always more or less imperfectly developed, disproportioned to each other, and in various ways disordered and damaged.

Whether the rights here reckoned be unalienable or otherwise, they are such as no one, with all possible assistance, can fully carry out, and maintain inviolate. Though such rights may be supposed to prevail in some Utopian land, they do not at present accord with the nature of this world, nor with the nature of the men who inhabit it, nor are they essential. Though man may sometimes defend his life from the various attacks of others, he cannot from the incursions of disease; for the lives of all are continually suffering from such as are degrading, and seldom if ever permit a natural termination. Instead of enjoying liberty, all men, the poorest and the most powerful, are by various means prevented from going

where and doing what they would like, and are constrained to do daily as they would not. Instead of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining happiness, most men in the civilized and happiest countries are forced by many circumstances to engage in toilsome labor, the whole fruit of which must be expended not for happiness, but to secure their existence, not existence in a state of well-being, but in a state more or less degraded, perhaps occasionally purchasing some few pleasures to render misery tolerable. But few have the power of choosing the kind of labor most agreeable to themselves, or of attending to it only so much as is most for their own advantage in every respect. Labor prevents full attention to the cultivation of the mind, and at times is detrimental to the health; but if not submitted to, the penalties of idleness are still heavier. Even those possessed of wealth, such as enables them to command the services of others to assist in seeking for happiness, are very far from being free to obtain it.

To be happy a man must be perfect in body and mind, and fitly active; every faculty must be properly developed, so that he may have the power of wanting many things; he must want all that a man justly may, and every just want must be rightly gratified. Nothing else deserves the name of happiness; nothing else is perfect happiness. To seek for happiness by repressing such desires, is to sink below the level of human nature; it is to relinquish the proper rights of man. To be satisfied with the gratification of a part of these desires, and that gratification always imperfect of its kind, or alloyed with pain, is also a mark of a degraded being; yet the privileges of man permit nothing higher. To be content with mere rest from misery is a proof of meanness, for rest is an approach to the state of non-being.

No fact is more clearly ascertained than that during the countless geological ages that have passed over this

earth, a multitude of species of plants and animals have at times flourished with luxuriance, and eventually have become extinct. Many thousand such species have been described; and probably much greater numbers have lived and passed away, and left no traces of the long periods of their endurance. In some instances they may have been exterminated in their full strength suddenly; but many species evidently ceased to exist only after having spent periods longer or shorter, perhaps whole ages, in a state of languishing and decay. This would take place whenever, from geological changes that have always been going forward sometimes rapidly and sometimes slowly, some of the many circumstances of the places of their abode became less suitable for them. Among these circumstances are the degree of heat, the quality and supply of nutriment, and exposure to things more or less poisonous or otherwise hurtful. If ever circumstances became more favorable, they must have recovered for a while, wholly or in part, their most perfect condition.

During the Tertiary age, that which immediately preceded the present, there lived many species of large land animals, generally of much greater magnitude than the existing species that most resemble them, and more powerful by far. The sivatherium of the East Indies, one of the ox kind, was above twice the size of any now living in that country; and several others grazed on our western prairies, some much larger than the buffalo. Elephants attained to more than twice the weight of any now living; and the horses seem to have been of a faster breed. The dinotherium of Europe resembled the hippopotamus, but was of more than twice his bulk; and the kangaroo of Australia exceeded the living species in a like proportion. The megalonyx, whose fossil remains were first brought to notice by President Jefferson, was not far from the size of the ox; and was protected by a

coat of mail of strong plates of compact bone, in some places an inch and a half or more in thickness. There were several other species similar, some with the same kind of armor, and others without; the most bulky and powerful of which was the huge *megatherium*, whose remains are found in Georgia, Missouri and South America, the bones of his limbs being three times as thick as those of the living elephant. The fossils of several of the beasts that preyed on these, show them to have been far more powerful than any now seen, and their offensive armor and entire aspect a more formidable kind.

The existence of such animals, and the multitudes of smaller varieties, testify to the luxuriant profusion of the vegetation from which they derived their support; and the evidence is confirmed by the vestiges of the plants themselves of this and some other periods. Hundreds of specimens of bulky fruit of different kinds have been found, all now extinct. Coal was formed in part of plants that resembled our weeds in structure, and attained to the diameter of above ten inches in the stem. There are likewise indications that in some ages, that of the New Red Sandstone particularly, extensive regions of country were occupied by arid and unproductive deserts.

At one period reptiles similar to the alligator, but above ten times his size, swarmed in the ocean, and others on the land. They were then the chief of the whole animal kingdom; but afterwards the marine species were unable to contend with the sharks which appeared among them of enormous magnitude, some of the remains of which, teeth three inches long in the part exposed for service, were deposited at Martha's Vineyard and other places.

The traces of the mollusca indicate that they flourished in some ages with much greater exuberance than in others. The shells of certain species that lived during long periods, are inferior in size to the shells of the same and of similar species, that flourished previously in other

circumstances. Other marks of disease and languishing are exhibited. These shells are often too thick and burdensome, or too thin and frangible, or deficient in rotundity and plumpness. The layers of carbonate of lime, of which they are formed, are often irregular in thickness and curve, and distorted in various ways; and the ornamental sculpture-like figures are frequently indistinct, unsymmetrical and interrupted. The corals too and other low orders exhibit similar symptoms.

A rapid survey of the present state of the earth will force us to the conclusion that, as it was formerly at times unsuitable for some of the beings which then inhabited it, so it is now very far from being a suitable place for the residence of man and the greater number of the higher animals, those especially which are most serviceable to him, and likewise that it is unfavorable for the growth of the most important of the plants by which they are sustained. It will hence be evident that only a languishing and degraded human race can here be supported, a race by no means free, a people whose might does not accord with the proper rights of human nature. Whether man and the higher orders of animals were developed from lower species, or derived their origin from some other source, is nothing to the purpose in hand; all present facts, stern unmitigated facts, are those that concern us; what may or may not have happened heretofore is of small importance comparatively.

And first the disposition of the land and sea. The greater part lies in the form of wide oceans and extended continents. The interior of the continents suffer from a scarcity of water, so that they are, throughout a great part of their extent, a mere unproductive wilderness, during a part or the whole of the year; because the winds do not carry a sufficient quantity of the vapor, which they gather from the ocean, to a remote distance from the coasts. Hence large tracts of land are nearly or quite worth-

less, which men would value so highly in other circumstances.

Water is returned to the ocean by rivers, by percolation through the soil beneath its surface from the highest and most distant mountains, and by vapor that rises from the land and is blown out to sea. By these methods it passes off with far more facility than it is now received. The prevailing winds too distribute it unequally; and there are enormous tracts of country on which rain seldom or never falls. One of these extends from the Atlantic through northern Africa, Arabia, Persia and Beloochistan, beyond the river Indus. It is more than five thousand miles in length, and carries a breadth oftener above one thousand miles than below. Another arid province includes some of the high lands of Thibet, and the great desert of Gobi in Tartary. These and some smaller districts, in all occupying a surface of above six million square miles, are nearly destitute of vegetation. Yet there are scattered over these wide regions a few oases and narrow strips of land bordering some sea or river, which in some seasons bear ample testimony to the capabilities of the soil of those places; and when compared with the surrounding desolation, appear with peculiar advantage. These deserts not only lie vacant themselves, but the dry winds blowing from them often exhaust the moisture of the neighboring countries, and reduce them to destitution.

In other regions where the supply of water is less restricted, it is still far from being sufficient, perhaps yielding one scanty harvest annually; and such places are more than three times as extensive as the deserts. But there are parts of these countries, in some instances of considerable extent, which, from certain peculiarities of situation, are watered more abundantly; and among them are some smaller places, which in this respect are equal to the most fruitful spots.

Europe, bordered as it is on several sides by seas and oceans, receives supplies of water from the whole, but chiefly from the Atlantic by means of the westerly winds, which generally prevail between the fortieth and sixtieth degrees of latitude, and counterbalance the trade winds, which nearer the equator blow in an opposing direction. These westerly winds, moving sometimes in the lower and sometimes in the higher strata of the atmosphere, diffuse their moisture at least as far as the Ural Mountains and Caspian Sea. The same winds blowing from the Pacific ocean produce a similar effect on the north-western coasts of America, and in the southern hemisphere they make the doubling of Cape Horn difficult, and drench the western shore of Patagonia with an almost continual rain.

Across the whole of South America, north of the twenty-fifth parallel of south latitude, the trade winds blow constantly from the Atlantic ocean to the Pacific. The country, though in some parts broken by hills and table lands, is not greatly elevated, even its highest peaks, until the Andes rise near the western coast of the continent. The winds come from the ocean laden with vapor which is copiously diffused, and all that they afterwards receive is carried still further inland, furnishing stores for subsequent deposits. When they impinge against the cold height of the mountains, the vapor is still more condensed, and flowing in torrents down the sides supplies the large rivers, which pursuing their course back to the ocean, drain the country. After the winds have passed the ridge of the Andes, being condensed by descent along the western slope, they tenaciously hold the small quantity of moisture till that time retained, and the low land near the coast is left arid and unfruitful; but east of the mountains the vegetation is luxuriant, and immense numbers of wild beasts and insects are maintained.

Hindustan, China, and the southeast of Asia are sit-

uated in a similar manner with regard to the trade winds, there called monsoons; and in a similar manner are by them watered, and made capable of supporting an immense population.

It is thus but a small part of the continents that are sufficiently irrigated; but islands are more bountifully supplied, receiving vapor as they do from every wind that reaches them, except such as are situated near some rainless shore, so as to partake somewhat of its character. Among the favorable specimens are Hayti, New Zealand, and especially Java and the hundreds in its neighborhood.

Places more fruitful than among these latter, the land of spices, are nowhere found. The soil is rich both from its mineral composition and from the decay of abundant vegetation. Droughts and floods being but little known, the land is always green; hundreds of species of trees are produced, graceful in appearance, as well as serviceable for many purposes; and at different heights on the mountains the products of temperate zones are found more luxuriant than elsewhere. The shrubbery and nutritious grasses are gigantic; and no country can show an equal variety and abundance of esculent roots and vegetables. Fruit which in other places is inferior, here, in favoring circumstances, comes to a high degree of perfection; and the most exquisite kinds are common. There are the mangosteen, loquat, dourio, ayer ayer, choapa, wampee, and many others not much known by name elsewhere, but there highly enjoyed. These islands on the whole give a high idea of what this earth might be capable. If the land now formed by geological revolutions into barren continents, had been moulded into green islands of a suitable magnitude, it is easy to conceive how the arrangement would have been in many respects desirable; and it is perhaps not possible to discover a single circumstance that could have been otherwise.

The temperature of islands is more uniform, the heat of summer being usually more suitable, and the cold less severe in winter. Narrow straits, if free from dangerous rocks and shoals, are more available for the purposes of intercourse than long, rapid, winding rivers, sometimes frozen, sometimes flooded, or low and shallow, perhaps with the air above loaded with dust raised by the winds from their dry and crumbling banks. A majority of the rivers, for the conveyance of merchandize, are not preferable to the rough, boggy, mountainous and sandy journeys by land. Commerce with an interior country, though but little removed from the sea coast, or from easily navigable rivers, has been nearly impossible except with the most easily portable articles; and the difficulty is further augmented by the extent of the oceans which give occasion for costly and hazzardous voyages; and the length and terror of such voyages are greatly increased by the manner in which the continents are disposed. A low neck of land between the Red and Mediterranean seas has from time immemorial been a bar to the intercourse, and consequently to the civilization of the world; and a slight depression of the isthmus of Panama would open a convenient highway for the vessels of all nations.

The unfitness of the different climates, with respect to heat and cold, depends on a variety of arrangements, some of which are sufficiently obvious; one of these, and that not the least influential, is the adjustment of the land in the polar regions and at the bottom of the ocean. It is now so disposed that the extremes of temperature are in some degree mitigated by ocean currents. A stream of cold water from the southern ocean sets against the north of Chili, and flowing along the coast till far within the tropics, it turns off into the Pacific towards the equator. A current of warm water from the Indian ocean, constantly driven by the trade winds, moves down the African coast, imparting heat to the climate of the Cape of Good

Hope which it doubles, and itself being there cooled it mitigates slightly the heat of the ocean beneath the equator, to which it proceeds along the west of Africa. Here it crosses to the mouth of the Amazon, and carries sediment from that river into the gulf of Mexico, still impelled by the trade winds; it then brushes past the coast of Florida, and its influence is felt at Iceland and the northern extremity of Norway. The winds that blow from the northern Atlantic over America and Europe, are consequently warmer and more heavily laden with vapor. Through the influence of currents and winds from the polar circle, the island of South Georgia is perpetually covered with ice and snow to the sea beach, though not more remote from the equator than Liverpool; but Terra del Fuego, which is in the same latitude, nine hundred miles westward, and within the influence of warmer air and water, shows many extensive evergreen forests. ✕

There are other currents that flow from near the polar circles to the equator in the lower depths of the ocean. In all very deep soundings in the tropical seas, the temperature of the water is found depressed nearly to the freezing point. As fast as it ascends towards the surface, from expansion by heat, or from other causes, a new supply from the colder regions occupies its place; but the transfer is slow, and probably the burning of the torrid zone is not greatly lessened thereby; yet the effect must be most considerable wherever the colder water from below is forced upwards by the motion of a current on a bottom that gradually ascends towards some coast or shoal. Were the polar oceans entirely unoccupied by land, and hence open to warm superficial currents from the tropics, the quantity of ice on their surface, and the degree of cold in the atmosphere above, would be far less than those regions at present exhibit. Encumbered as they now are by land, and completely inaccessible to warm currents, they are magazines of cold, the influence

of which is constantly felt over the whole temperate zones, miscalled temperate ; and it likewise aids in the raising of storms and hurricanes at the equator. Were they not thus enumbered, the northerly winds would here be more mild at all times, and the whole of our southern states might produce the banana and many other tropical plants, and sustain a population more than ten times above their present capabilities.

Great numbers of the most desirable vegetables take refuge within the tropics, not because an intense heat is needful, but because cold and especially frost is hurtful. Many species require rather an even than a high temperature, but can better endure a heat of 95° , than a short period of cold of 35° , or a slight frost. The tallest specimens of the palm tree, nearly two hundred feet high, together with other rich tropical plants, are found high on the Andes, beneath the equator, near the line of perpetual snow, where the air is always cool, but below the reach of frost. On the other hand, there are many plants that cannot endure the intemperate weather of the tropics, but can endure the winters of the north without perishing, yet not without damage. They flourish best where the heat is moderate and most nearly uniform, as on the mountains of Java and others of the same latitude.

While the blasts from the Arctic ocean render desolate immense regions of fertile soil in the north of Asia and America, that might otherwise support valuable forests and millions of inhabitants, the glaring deserts within the tropics make the heat of the torrid zone more intense. The wide expanse of ocean, immediately south of the tropic of Capricorn, causes those regions to be much colder than would be the fact were they occupied by land ; and that cold is increased by the presence of land still further south within the Antarctic circle.

The polar lands augment the intensity of cold, not only by checking warm ocean currents, but by affording bases

for the accumulation of glaciers of gigantic dimensions; and their mountains, by their height, exert the same bad influence that mountains do in all other regions. In every situation lofty mountains and clusters of mountains aggravate all the evils of a bad climate. Furious storms howl about their summits. Cold and blasting winds blow down from their ridges, succeeding warm breezes from other quarters; and great and sudden variations of temperature are frequent in their vicinity. Vapors collect about them, forming dense clouds, and thus rains produce destructive torrents and floods in a limited tract of country, when they would be beneficially and more equally distributed elsewhere, if the mountains were not in existence. Where they are connected with table lands more or less elevated, the hurtful influences of both are for the most part greatly increased, sometimes to such a degree as to make large tracts of country uninhabitable.

Table lands, besides being colder, are usually more dry than the regions below, because the atmosphere above, from its rarefaction, is less capable of sustaining and transporting densely laden clouds; and this cause operates in conjunction with all others that may anywhere tend to prevent irrigation. Evaporation, too, being more rapid, owing to the diminished pressure of the air, whatever moisture may be present is more readily dissipated.

Central Asia is occupied by an enormous tract of table land. It extends from near the Yellow sea westerly five thousand miles, as far as the Mediterranean; its form is irregular, the breadth varying from two thousand to scarcely seven hundred miles. The lowest lands of Tibet are six thousand feet high; in other parts the height varies from four thousand to two thousand feet, seldom the latter; and the surface is in many parts broken by hills and mountains. It occupies the most temperate latitudes, and makes them little better than a desert. On several sides it is skirted by ranges of mountains, which

intercept the vapor from the ocean, and send it back by thirteen rivers, the smallest of which are the Euphrates and Tigris. Several flow into the northern ocean, but the most considerable carry back through India and China, from the eastern border of this desert, the water carried there by the trade winds. The Brahmapootra alone, though scarcely seven hundred miles in length, windings not included, annually conveys to the sea more than ten times the volume of water that flows in the Mississippi; and together with the Ganges, whose delta it joins, it inundates thousands of square miles every year.

If these table lands and the Himalaya mountains had not been thrown up to their present position; if the whole region were overspread with a succession of low sloping plains and gentle declivities, the trade winds would not be impeded in their course; and their general direction would be onward through Persia and Egypt to the Atlantic ocean. Instead of parting with their vapor over profusely and worse than wastefully near the sources of these large rivers, it would have been distributed with an approach to uniformity in all places visited by them. When first deposited, in the form of dew or mild rain, a large part would have been again taken up by the air that followed; and this would have been done repeatedly, so that Arabia might have been celebrated for its perpetual verdure, and the oases of the desert of Sahara might have been enlarged perhaps to the covering of the whole of its surface.

Such a result in Africa might be expected with more confidence, had the interior mountains and the elevated plains from which they rise been carried to less than one tenth of their present height. But slight elevation is requisite for all needful drainage of a continent. The surface of Lake Superior is but six hundred feet high, and the elevation of the highest ridge that supplies Lake Itasca, from which flows the Mississippi, is but 1,680 feet.

The opposite side of this same nameless ridge is also the source of a stream that finally flows into Hudson's Bay, indicating that the land in that direction is yet lower. The whole area of the United States, east of the Mississippi, is considerably below that height, except a few sharp mountain ridges and peaks of little elevation; yet the water passes off all too rapidly, for the harvests are every season more or less stunted by drought, and fail of coming to full perfection.

At no great distance from the western bank of the Mississippi, the land begins its rise towards the base of the Rocky mountains, about seven hundred miles distant. So easy is the slope as scarcely to be perceptible to the waggons that travel towards the Pacific; and the prairies are but little broken by hills or considerable vallies, yet occasionally are cut by channels where rivers flow now, or have flowed formerly. Though gradually ascending, they generally appear like a broad level plain to the observer; and at the base of the mountain ridge are seven thousand feet above the ocean, which elevation they maintain from the northern bounds of the United States to the southern. The old Spanish town of Santa Fe, though in the valley of the Rio Grand, is above seven thousand feet high.

The rivers are all rapid and scarcely navigable. After ascending the Missouri upwards to the mouth of the Yellow Stone, near the British dominions, rising at the rate of perhaps a foot for every mile it winds, it is there above three hundred miles from the mountains. Every where within this distance of the base of the ridge, the resemblance of the country to central Asia is unpleasantly obtrusive; severely cold in winter, at times most intensely, and in the short summer dry and frosty. After the snows have melted in the spring, a heavy growth of grass springs up in favorable situations, which is soon withered as the season advances, enduring longest however in places

where some degree of moisture can be received by filtration from higher lands, the buffaloes then moving to distant places. Only a narrow border of Nebraska and Kansas, along the eastern boundary, can be desirable for a residence; and unless mines are discovered, those territories must remain unvalued. West of the Rocky mountains the land is more uneven, and is more or less impoverished by its elevation till within one hundred miles of the ocean.

Thus, within the bounds of the United States west of the Mississippi, an extent of surface equal to the whole east of that river, is nearly useless for cultivation, by reason of its height. All this is at least as high as the top of mount Holyoke, and hundreds of thousands of square miles are higher than the summit of mount Washington.

This same table land extends through Mexico nearly to the isthmus of Panama, in those latitudes rendering the heat more temperate. East of the mountains it is supplied with water by the trade winds, which bring it from the neighboring gulf; but though they blow almost constantly, either in the upper or lower strata of the atmosphere, the supply is far from being sufficient, owing to the great elevation.

More than half of the Spanish peninsula is raised to the height of from two thousand to four thousand feet, and the Pyrenees and other mountains and hills to an elevation yet greater. Hence the interior has long been nearly destitute of trees, and little better than a desert; and the low lands near the water are prevented from yielding a great variety of tropical productions, solely by the chilling winds that sweep down upon them in winter.

The changes of the seasons as they actually occur are highly pernicious to man in many ways. There are many places where rain falls every year sufficient for the wants of that year; but as the seasons revolve, a large quantity, much more than is then requisite, falls at one time, to be

succeeded by a long period of scarcity. In other countries, where the annual supply is insufficient, the unfitness of such unseasonable floods is yet more keenly felt.

The mechanism of the world so exists and acts, that generally in the colder climates, rain falls most copiously at those seasons when it is least required; in winter, when it is of little or no benefit; early in spring, when the soil is sufficiently moist from the rains or snows of the preceding winter, and when it often retards the growth of plants and makes their cultivation difficult; it frequently comes abundantly too in autumn, and impedes their ripening, and makes the harvest nearly impossible. In summer there is almost universally a scanty supply, but occasionally violent storms at irregular periods drench with floods some limited tract of country, and tend rather to destroy vegetation than to nourish it. There are but few places, in these colder regions, where rain is as plentiful in summer as in the seasons when it is not wanted. The British Isles and Central Europe are exceptions; and for this cause chiefly are they noted for their wealth. Almost the only instance besides is a tract of country southerly from the city of Buenos Ayres, extending to Cape Horn; unless a large part of Siberia be included, where, on account of the shortness of the season and its coldness, a smaller quantity would be more profitable.

In the warmer regions, such countries as are watered at all, usually receive the whole, or the greater part at certain seasons, with the exception of some places within five degrees of the equator, where summer continually prevails, and where consequently it is bestowed with more uniformity. Those countries are therefore scorched and desolate for long periods, in many parts for more than six months together. In some places, however, by occasional showers and scanty dews, a sickly verdure is maintained longer; and the palm and other trees, whose roots penetrate deeply, obtain moisture on which they languish

till the revolving seasons again pour forth a superabundance. The aspect and especially the fruit of plants that are alternately distended with excess and pinched by want, compare badly with those of the Indian Archipelago.

The wet and dry seasons are caused in this way. Winds from various directions, their general course being constantly from the northeast and southeast, converge towards the line near which the sun is then vertical. The clouds which they bear thus meeting at those places, the atmosphere becomes loaded with more than it can support, and they are condensed into drops of rain. As more water is exhaled by the heat of the tropics than in the colder regions, so the quantity of rain which there falls is much greater. When the sun is vertical in June near the northern tropic, that the regions there may be deluged with water, the vapor is withdrawn even as far from the south as the tropic of Capricorn, by the southeast trade winds, leaving those places destitute of rain. It moves towards the equator, to occupy the space left vacant by the clouds that go still further north. At the same time vapor is withdrawn from high northern latitudes; it moves southwardly at various heights in the air, to occupy the space left vacant by the northeast trade winds, that blow towards the tropic of cancer. The temperature of the winds being raised as they advance, they hold more and more tenaciously the vapor which they contain, until they meet with the southeast winds. Thus vapor is carried from Canada, the United States, and the south of Europe in summer, to augment the floods of the West Indies, or be spent in the ocean; but after the sun has receded beyond the equator, in September, the rains in the former places are more copious, and the land is there for six months burdened with an excess, while the West Indies are parched by drought. It is on the ocean that the operation of this mechanism is most distinctly visible, rain

being there almost incessant where the converging trade winds meet ; but on the land it is more widely and irregularly distributed, the course of the winds being modified by the variations of the surface.

As the northeast trade winds that should reach Africa are modified in their course by the deserts of Asia, they afford little nutriment to the former region ; and the moisture of the southeast winds is intercepted in part by the fruitful Island of Madagascar ; but the remainder moves towards the sources of the Nile, and being deposited in the neighboring high lands, a small portion serves to give a name to a narrow border along the banks of that river, and a much greater flows unused into the Mediterranean. The great heat of the deserts of central Africa attracts a sea breeze, with more or less regularity, from the gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic ocean, in opposition to the regular trades ; and this breeze serves to enrich the country about the valley of the Niger.

The valley of the Amazon being irrigated with sufficient uniformity and abundance, the vegetation is of the rankest kind ; but some of the branches of this river flowing far from the north, and others far from the south, they are alternately shallow and swollen. In the valley of the Orinoco, thousands of square miles may in summer be navigated by steamboats, which at other times are broad grass-covered plains. And in the valley of the La Plata multitudes of cattle sometimes perish of thirst ; and greater numbers are drowned in the freshets that succeed. For the same reason the plains of India do not yield one half their strength. In New Holland a drought of several years is at irregular periods followed by years of deluge, which convert places into swamps or large inland lakes, that at other times are dry fiery plains, where the thermometer rises to the height of 135°.

Where the verdure of summer is always present and its fruits, the richness of the soil is constantly maintained ;

and from the decay of vegetation it rather increases, rendering the productions more and more luxuriant. But during more than half the year, in cold climates, and in the dry seasons of the tropics, which often are still longer, the process of deterioration is rapid, while no fertilizing additions are naturally made. Organic substances are then decomposed so thoroughly as to become less nutritious; and the rains wash away the most fertile parts of the soil from the uplands, and deposit a superfluous quantity on the narrow intervalle of some stream, or in some sunken swamp, or at the bottom of some river, lake, or sea.

Thus while the revolutions of the seasons greatly increase the labor of man, by imposing on him the necessity of guarding against the inclemency of the weather, and of storing up provision for himself and his domestic animals, they exert their influence most powerfully in further augmenting that labor, by rendering the land barren, impeding his efforts to improve it, and destroying his works. All men are involved in these calamities, as well as the actual cultivators of the soil. The seasons too are productive of no known advantage, that might not be better secured by a different arrangement of the same mechanism.

Thus is man bound to hard labor and enslaved; and by other arrangements the chains are more firmly riveted and made more galling.

The surface of the ground, instead of being conveniently disposed, is often broken by gullies and precipices more or less steep; and the prospect is burdened by craggy hills and sunken boggs, hills difficult to travel upon or to cultivate, and swamps not to be drained, or which may be drained and kept fruitful only by great labor. Though these are often of small extent, and in some regions are seldom met with, the total amount of the whole is not inconsiderable; and they perhaps occupy above one half

the land, that is otherwise than a frozen, arid, or mountainous waste.

Though the elements of a fertile soil exist in suitable proportions, they are not so arranged as to make the land generally fertile. Sixteen of the elements make up nearly the whole of the materials yet known to enter into the composition of the globe. They are here given in two columns according to their amount as proximately estimated, the higher in each column being more abundant than the lower.

Non-Metallic Elements.

1. Oxygen.
2. Hydrogen.
3. Silicon.
4. Carbon.
5. Nitrogen.
6. Sulphur.
7. Chlorine.
8. Fluorine.
9. Phosphorus.

Metals.

1. Aluminium.
2. Potassium.
3. Sodium.
4. Magnesium.
5. Calcium.
6. Iron.
7. Manganese.

Oxygen forms about one half of the solid crust of the earth's surface, also one fifth of the atmosphere, and one third of the water; and hydrogen the remaining two-thirds of the water. Silicon is found largely in the rocks and soils, which for the most part are but rocks disintegrated. Carbon constitutes the principal part of coal, and is contained largely in limestone, and is a most important part of the atmosphere, though less than one per cent of its volume. Nitrogen constitutes about four fifths of the atmosphere, and is occasionally found solid in the earth. Sulphur occurs in mines, and is all but universally diffused throughout the soil, in exceedingly small quantities. Chlorine is contained chiefly in the ocean and salt mines. Fluorine exists in most of the rocks and soils, yet in small proportions; and still less is the quantity of phosphorus,

though almost everywhere diffused in the soil, and like the last named a most important element.

Of the metals, iron and manganese are found in mines, and are widely diffused in the rocks in small proportions. The others exist more abundantly in proportions not very far from equal to each other.

These elements first formed simple binary compounds, that is they first united by twos before they entered into further combinations. Such compounds and a small number of the definite compounds of these latter constitute about ninety-eight per cent of the surface on which we stand, and are well adapted to form its substance, and to sustain the various plants and animals. Having been mixed without order and in any irregular proportions, and subjected to the action of heat, light, attraction of gravitation, attraction of cohesion, to the continued work of chemical affinity, and in some instances to other forces that are less constant in their agency, they have assumed an endless variety of forms, and give different appearances to different quarters of the world.

To this variety the other elements contribute where they occur. They are about forty in number, and are distributed irregularly, and confined within circumscribed limits. Of some but a few pounds or ounces have been found; and the amount of the whole scarcely exceeds one per cent of that part of the world which is known. Some are perhaps fitted for the construction of its interior, and may there be more abundant. The greater number are metals highly useful when obtained in suitable quantities, which however can in general be done only with great difficulty when possible. Some of them and the most of their compounds are more or less poisonous both to plants and animals; a certain quantity of which however are no way hurtful, and at times are beneficial. Thus a considerable quantity of carbonic acid quickly destroys the life of animals; but as much as is diffused in

the atmosphere, is constantly respired by all, with no known injury or benefit to any.

The best materials of a fertile soil, for land plants at least, are the sixteen most common elements, united in their most usual compounds, and diffused with an approach to uniformity in about the same proportions as those, in which they occur in the whole superficial crust of the earth. Here are all the elements that enter into the composition of the plants, and those that serve chiefly as a foundation for their support, to which indeed they all contribute. The relative proportions of some of the compounds, that serve chiefly to increase the bulk of the soil, may be altered somewhat, with no detriment to the proper developement of the plants; and a slight excess of others, that are most essential, is as little injurious. But if there be any considerable variation, if some be altogether wanting, a lack of fertility is manifest.

It is important that a large part of the materials should have been finely pulverized, either by mechanical or chemical agency; the finer the dust the more fertile the soil, if sufficiently porous for the access of gasses. Many analyses of the most fertile alluvions, and of rather barren uplands, show little difference between the two, except that the alluvial is much the most finely powdered. Recent volcanic products soon become a rich soil, chiefly because they are easily decomposed.

That fertility continue for a long period, it is requisite that the substances which are soluble in water, and readily washed away by rain, should again be returned. This is done naturally by the slow decomposition of the sand and rocks that contain them or their ingredients, or by the ascent from below of a part or the whole of these substances, in the gaseous form, through the minute pores in the earth, and their subsequent union near the surface; a portion are likewise deposited by some of the water that comes upon the land. Generally these operations do not

take place to a sufficient extent, and some artificial remedy is required. Specimens of the fertility of which land is capable are to be seen only in a few limited spots; in the intervals of certain rivers; and in some of the most recent geological formations. In the west of Italy there are plains of the Tertiary age, where the cultivation of wheat has been carried on from time immemorial. It is sometimes said that this grain has been raised in the same fields annually for the last three thousand years by the modern Italians, the ancient Romans, and by the Etruscans who previously occupied the soil.

Usually the materials are not in the best proportions; and where they are not very far from what might constitute a rather productive surface, they usually exist in such conditions that they are not readily available for the purposes of vegetation. They are in the form of solid rocks, pebbles, or coarse sand, of those kinds which are decomposed with such difficulty as not to afford the requisite nutriment; or if the substances are more finely powdered, they are often in the form of some tenacious clay, or are closely impacted and nearly impervious to water and the gasses; and when made more porous by the plough, they speedily become solid again, especially under the influence of rain. Other soil is of a structure so loose that water percolates through it too rapidly. A degree of moisture is long retained in some kinds of land by the attraction between water and some of its ingredients, which latter are more generally deficient.

During the geological ages, the strata deposited in water were more fertile than the primitive rocks below, especially when the former contained organic remains. Such formations have been subsequently hardened into stone, and again reduced to sand or a finer powder; and this has been done repeatedly with the effect of mixing the materials more uniformly, of adding other organic substances, and frequently of enhancing the fertility, espe-

cially when deleterious ingredients were removed. But it is not all geological changes that have been attended with such results. Large beds and hills of chalk and other forms of nearly pure carbonate of lime have been raised, requiring the addition of other substances in order to be made productive; which additions geology not having since made, has left extensive regions unfertile from an excess of lime, while other places are nearly destitute of that mineral. The interstices of volcanic products have been filled with various minerals, and the whole hardened into compact stone. Rich strata of great extent have been thickly covered with other strata of a similar character, but often of inferior fertility; and thus superfluous quantities of the materials of a productive soil have been gathered into one place, have been locked up in the recesses of hills and mountains, or buried thousands of feet beneath the surface of the land or sea; while extended regions of the oldest granite, if not entirely bare, are covered only with its own barren detritus and a thin coat of the remains of the stunted plants there produced. The Plutonic rocks, which have risen moulten from below, and in their overflow have buried regions of wide extent, in many instances have made a rich land comparatively sterile. A tract in Hindostan larger than the state of Virginia is thus covered more than a hundred feet in depth; and in southern Africa is a district of still greater extent.

Geological changes sometimes take place as gradually as the banks of Newfoundland rise up from the bottom of the sea, or as slowly as the Niagara river wears away its channel; and sometimes they are wrought with great violence. In the little island of Gonung Api, of the Indian Archipelago, in a harbor sixty fathoms deep, a block of trap-rock was thrust upwards so silently, that the men who daily sailed on its water were not aware of what was going forward until it was nearly dry. In 1759 the plain

of Malpais in Mexico was covered with rich plantations of sugar and indigo. A space ten miles in diameter suddenly began to swell upward, and within three months six volcanic cones arose from a line of fracture extending across the protuberance. They sent forth large quantities of scoriae and streams of basaltic lava enclosing fragments of granite, which buried the adjacent country; and mount Jornllo, the highest peak, now holds its barren summit sixteen hundred feet above the plain where the plantations previously flourished.

There are supposed to be above two hundred thousand species of plants in the vegetable kingdom; of these but few are serviceable for man, either directly or by affording support to animals that are useful to him. Small as the area is which is situated in a suitable climate, and in circumstances otherwise favorable for vegetation, or where vegetation is possible; even that is encumbered with plants that are more hurtful than profitable, and with trees that bear no fruit or only an inferior kind. Those too which are most useful are far less so than would be the case were they organized somewhat differently, yet without any violation of the principles of vegetable physiology. In all former ages of the world, these principles have manifestly remained unchanged, amidst the frequent extinction and new appearance of species.

Of trees the palm genus is one of the most noted. The number of its species is about 440; most of which are of little value, yet a few are highly useful. No tree can well be more worthless for timber than are the most of them; yet a few yield a superior kind, the ceroxylon andicola especially, the very tallest of the genus. A large proportion of sugar is obtained from the juice of some of the species, and an inferior kind of cordage from the fibres that cover others on the trunk. One species yields the palm-oil; and the leaves of some are capable of affording a slight shelter in the places where they grow. They al

produce sago, and the *sagus Rumphii*, one of the smallest of the family, yields it abundantly from the pith of the trunk. One species yields the chocolate nut; another the betel nut, much used in the east; and another, the king palm, the most ornamental, and one of the tallest, bears a small berry which yields a small quantity of food suitable for poultry.

But the fruit of the whole is not thus insignificant. The *pandanus*, which grows on the coral atollons, throws out near its summit several branches, which support nuts of a very large size, that supply the natives of those islands with a great part of their subsistence. The date is familiar, and 150 pounds are sometimes obtained from a single tree. The *mauritia flexuosa* yields abundantly a fruit which externally bears some resemblance to the cone of the pitch pine, and which contains a palatable, farinaceous food. But among the fruit, none equal in value that of the *palma pirigao*, which grows near the cataracts of the Orinoco. It is egg-shaped, two or three inches in thickness, of a golden yellow color, which on one side is overspread with crimson, mealy, and usually without seeds. Seventy or eighty of these are crowded together, forming a rich cluster, that hangs close beneath the leafy tuft, some fifty feet or more from the ground; and three such bunches are ripened annually. They offer to the natives a pleasant farinaceous food, which is their chief support several months in the year. There is also the enormous double cocoanut, found only on the Seychelles, a small collection of islets north of Madagascar. Though of little value itself, even less than that of the small cocoanut, which is so common, it testifies to the size of the fruit which the palm is capable of bearing.

Every part and product of any plant is formed from the sap. As the sap circulates, its particles are deposited at the points where they are required, and are changed into the substances there to be produced, into woody fibre,

sugar, gum, or whatever may be needed. The change is wrought under the influence of the vital energy of the plant modifying the chemical affinity of the ingredients of the sap, and moulding the particles suitably modified into the requisite forms. Whether the sap be changed into some ponderous and exquisite fruit, or into an insignificant kind, depends on the organization and other peculiarities of the species. Were all the palms so constructed that, instead of the paltry fruit which most of them now bear, their various products were as rich and exuberant as the clusters of the palma pirigao, the warmer regions might support a population far more dense than at present. The same may be said of most other trees; though their exuviae now enrich the soil, and though their wood and other products may be applied to many purposes, for these purposes they would be none the less suitable, did they also bring forth fruit adapted to the wants of additional millions of men and of animals serviceable to them for food and other uses. The fruit of some, both in bulk and quality, shows what the whole might be capable of.

There is the bread fruit, though nutritious and bountiful, its growth in many situations is such that it is less agreeable than bread itself; and there is the large chestnut of the north of Italy, a desirable substitute for the potato. Forty thousand oranges have in some seasons been gathered from a single tree in the Cape Verd islands; but generally the harvest is less than one tenth that quantity. The boabab, *adansonia digitata*, of coasts of Africa, though of no great height, is noted for the spread of its branches, which sometimes cover an area two hundred feet in diameter; and the circumference of one hundred feet, ten feet above the ground, has been ascribed to the trunks of some of the largest. Their age has been reckoned by thousands of years, and their fruit, which resembles the gourd, is valued chiefly for its shell. The fruit of the calabash tree, *crescentia cujete*, eighteen inches or more

in diameter, is valued but for the same reason. The *Bertholetia excelsa*, a gigantic and magnificent tree, one of the most vigorous productions of the rich valley of the upper Orinoco, bears a bulky, cocoa-nut like, woody fruit, enclosing woody-seed vessels, and the whole fruit is wood except the small, almost useless kernels.

There are the cone bearing trees, comprising the families of the pine, yew and cypress; some of these, in favoring circumstances, live to the age of several thousand years, and others grow to an unusual height, especially in the more uniform climate of upper California and Oregon. The cones are usually woody and contain only a few small seeds; but those of the *pinus cembra*, of the north of Siberia and the upper vallies of the Alps, are developed in the form of a rich fruit. One species of the araucarian pine, *araucaria imbicata*, a valuable timber tree, grows on the eastern slope of the Andes in Patagonia and southern Chili, sometimes to the height of 260 feet. It produces cones which hang like a sugar-loaf, and supply the inhabitants of those places with a great part of their subsistence. It is reported that a single tree will maintain a large family a year; but perhaps this, like many other trees, bears its fruit only once in several years, though their empty husks in some instances appear oftener. There are some trees too, of which the sap yields gums and various other important products; yet it is only from a few such that the sap flows abundantly.

By a slight change of organization, every tree besides other products might yield nourishment for man; and they might yield it bountifully of the best and most agreeable kinds, bulky fruits accessible with little care or labor; and the more dense the forests, the more dense might be the population. But so far as the vegetable kingdom is concerned, man in the colder regions are driven for the main part of their support to the use of small seeds, the kind that are picked by small birds, barley, millet, wheat,

corn and the others. These are feeble of growth and must be assisted continually. They are liable to be choked by the more useless plants, which must be destroyed repeatedly. The soil must usually be made more porous as well as more fertile, and be kept in that condition. And when at length the seeds are obtained, they must be subjected to many laborious processes to render them fit for consumption; and they soon decay or become damaged.

Within the tropics too another small seed, rice, is more available as an article of provision, than the most of their other productions, which are obtained with less labor. It competes successfully with the plantain, which is indeed a gorgeous specimen of the profusion with which food pleasant and nutritious may be provided. Its beauty too is conspicuous in regions where the beauty of vegetation is familiar; the luxuriant stocks and the bright waving verdure of the long streaming leaves, together with the heavy clusters of fruit, green, yellow or red, make a rich contrast with the dun and arid wastes, on which by irrigation they are often forced to grow. In favorable circumstances being cultivated with ease, it produces three harvests a year, and yields annually above three hundred times the quantity of nutriment, that is obtained from an equal extent of wheat land; but the gluten being deficient, which is a part of wheat so important for many purposes, it imparts less strength to those who are supported by it exclusively.

The task would be unprofitable to specify the thousands of shrubs, grasses, brambles, herbs and weeds, that are injurious to man or of little known benefit; and some, besides encumbering the land while they live, impoverish it more by their growth, than it can be improved by their decay. The seeds of the greatest part are incapable from their minuteness of affording a supply of food to any order of animals; and their fruit and all their parts as generally

are of little worth. The fruit of some, though not rejected by man, is perhaps some paltry thing scarcely deemed a luxury even in the absence of all that is better; yet a small number comparatively are differently organized. The cerealia and plantain already mentioned, and the pineapple and strawberry are specimens of what is possible. There are too the various species of melon, some agreeable to those whose tastes are suited; also the squash and others which cannot indeed be called worthless, but if their fruit-bearing organs were like those of the palma pirigao, they would render gardens profitable which are now little else than ornamental, ornamented with sickly shrubbery.

Their roots are usually small or woody, and hence little used for subsistence by any order of animals; but the few exceptions lead us to desire more of a similar or better character. Among these are the edible fern, taro, potato, arrow-root, and the cassava which is much to be preferred to either of the foregoing; the bulbs sometimes weigh above thirty pounds, and are cultivated with little labor.

Of the thousands of species of grasses, but few are sought after by cattle; to them they are for the most part unpalatable and unwholesome, and from their hardness and large proportion of woody fibre, are little nutritious. Some by their flowers, foliage and straight or curving stems and branches, are ornamental to the landscape, yet not like the plantain both ornamental and productive of wealth. There are the gigantic arborescent grasses and reeds of the tropics, some of them forty feet or more in height, with stems ten inches in diameter. In general they yield no sustenance to graminivorous beasts, or only a small part of their young and most tender shoots and leaves. Some species are but too well known in Australia, encumbering extensive plains with an immense amount of crisp foliage, not eatible by any animals that

have seen it, a few insects excepted. They crowd out more useful plants, and are themselves destroyed only by great labor.

With all such may be contrasted the rich tussack grass of the Falkland islands. This flourishes best near the ocean; each full grown plant occupies about eighteen square feet of ground, and forms a hillock of matted roots rising out of the soil six feet high and five in diameter, from the top of which shoots a luxuriant tuft of foliage, the thick juicy blades drooping on all sides, and with additional plants completely overshadowing the land. Cattle are extremely fond of this grass, which is always green, and annually yields a highly nutritious support, much greater than the same extent of land would do of the rankest clover.

Many plants or some of their parts are nauseous to the taste, or possess properties that are narcotic, or hurtfully stimulating or irritating to one or more of the organs of the higher orders of animals, so as to be improper for their food, and for that very reason are adapted each for the support of different species of annoying insects. Many such plants are medicinal; and the qualities of some two dozen are such that they are much used by physicians, though each one is objectionable on some accounts; while the remainder are nowhere used or only to a limited extent, because their healing powers are found to be feeble. Many are more or less poisonous; some are so only when eaten; and substances emanate from others while growing that are hurtful to men and even to other plants. The rose so affects some sensitive persons as to cause faintness or inflammation of the lining membrane of the air passages. The barberry, *berberis vulgaris*, obstructs the growth of wheat; the neighborhood of a few bushes are sufficient to prevent its cultivation in some places, where it would otherwise be feeble and sickly.

Diseases often come upon plants from unfitness of soil

and climate, and improper irrigation ; and hence in general they are imperfectly developed. The imperfection is in some instances most observable in the fruit ; and sometimes it is equally apparent in the other parts ; occasionally too the fruit is best for use, when the other parts are affected with certain diseases. Dwarfish stalks of wheat sometimes bear the heaviest ears ; and sometimes the straw is six feet or more in height with the ears large in proportion but empty. The grain of wheat is well known to vary greatly in quality, often the result of diseased growth. The best varieties of the grape are confined to a few tracts of limited extent ; and if the vines be transplanted to other places, the bunches soon degenerate. Some one of the species of the grape-vine may be raised throughout a great part of the earth, often growing rankly while they bear grapes that are sour, harsh or otherwise inferior, or else bear none. These and other plants may be raised from cuttings in places where they can by no cultivation be made to bear fruit, or none whose seeds are capable of germinating. Seeds that may germinate and the envelopes that enclose them often exhibit marks of imperfection in the peculiar unpleasantness of their flavor. The stones of the peach and of the various plums are in some regions covered only by a dry rind ; but the kernel is then of larger size, and is sometimes used as an inferior nut. The shriveled corn of the south is proof of imperfection in growth, in favorable circumstances every kernel would be roundly filled. Parasitic plants often impair the strength of trees and smaller vegetables, seizing most readily on such as are sickly. The molds, blights, mildew and rust are plants of this class. Minute as they are they frequently appear in such numbers on wheat and other valuable plants, as to give rise to a scarcity of provision or even famine, and interfere with the plans of sovereigns, and the freedom of man.

One proof of disease or imperfect developement is the

lack of that beauty that belongs to the perfect individuals of every species of plants and animals. Though beauty is more prominent in some than in others, the appearance of all is impaired by disease. It frequently happens that the flowers are a tint too dull, the green of the leaves pale or dingy, and themselves crumpled or loaded with minute tubercles. The stem and branches grow gnarled and scraggy, or droop from feebleness; and their motions are perhaps too rigid and deficient in elasticity. The trunk of many species of the palm is seldom found straight; it usually shows some crook unseemly when slight, the result of a local disorder, wound or violent wind, and generally hastening its decline and fall. The piercing of the bark by an insect frequently leaves a scar or other effects, from which it never entirely recovers. Over wide regions even in the most favorable latitudes, none of the plants ever reach above one half or three fourths their proper magnitude; and all that are dwarfish are invariably wanting in other respects.

In some places, from too rapid growth the texture of the plant is too spongy, and the parts are imperfectly elaborated. During the rains a superabundance of watery sap is produced, more than can well be disposed of in the altered state induced by the drought that follows. It is then too speedily evaporated; and among other derangements the chrystalization of a part of the solids dissolved in the sap sometimes occurs. Chrystalization likewise occurs whenever through feebleness or disease the plant is unable to change its sap into any of its proper products; and whenever by any impediment it is prevented from carrying to the leaves, the organs of excretion, the minerals that should thence be eliminated, an excessive quantity of those minerals being sometimes imbibed by the impaired action of the roots. Irregular solids are formed in similar circumstances; hard lumps of gravel-like silica are occasionally found loose within the joints of cane.

Great part of these chrystals are composed of oxalate of lime, the same substance that constitutes some of the calculi of man. As in this latter case they cause much inconvenience, and hasten death itself, so they are hurtful to the texture of plants, impairing their thrift by rupturing their minute cells, and by the incumbrance of their presence, though generally microscopic. They are found in profusion in a great variety of plants, in the oak, mahogany, locust, and frequently in the fecula of the potato; but are less numerous or altogether wanting in the cone-bearing trees and others noted for great longevity.

The sap sometimes exudes through preternatural openings in the bark, and hardens into the gums; or it may flow into cavities within, or be diffused irregularly through a part of the wood, and become hardened in like manner, and sometimes at length be absorbed. Such cases are often noticed in the straw of wheat, and are analogous to the ulcers, abscesses and effusions of blood in man.

There are diseases of different kinds that have come upon particular vegetables at irregular and uncertain periods, and raging for a time have destroyed vast quantities, and at length have ceased wholly or in part. The epidemics, which are now hurting the potato and grape, are but solitary instances, though observed with more anxiety than others that have affected the more useless plants.

Part of the diseases of men proceed from the wrong use of their faculties, too much or improper exertion, or want of exercise; from too much food, a scanty supply, or an improper kind; and from the air of crowded cities, and of apartments imperfectly ventilated. These causes and others similar, so far as they are the result of man's own doings, may in a measure be avoided; yet frequently it can be done only at a great price. The evils of too much labor, and of sickly employments, can be avoided only by the loss of the fruit of that labor; to escape from other

causes of disease involves loss of other kinds; every avenue of escape exposes to new diseases, and the most feasible way is generally unknown.

But there are causes of diseases exterior to man, from some of which he may defend himself more or less completely, and from the remainder no foresight or prudence can preserve him; he can do little else than suffer without resistance. The manner in which some of these various causes operate is sufficiently obvious, and the very existence of others is involved in obscurity, their action being nearly imperceptible to those who examine with the greatest care. No cause makes the least hurtful impression on robust persons if it operates with little intensity, either from its nature, or because little of the deleterious force is applied, or applied for a short period only; but the case is different with regard to persons more feeble. The present state of all the climates, vitiated atmosphere, and unsuitable food and water, are among the causes of diseases that are beyond the control of man.

There are certain lakes and rivers so strongly impregnated with minerals as to be inhabited by no living thing; and the water of some volcanic and mining districts is highly noxious; but from the nature of chemical affinity water thus deleterious is confined within narrow limits, and a purer kind is usually found in the neighborhood. Yet from whatever part of the earth obtained, water always holds in solution various quantities of different inorganic substances; any appreciable amount of some of which sooner or later gives rise to disease. Certain quantities of some are beneficial, which are hurtful if the quantities are larger; some are salubrious for all, others for certain persons only; and some of these substances are salubrious always, others only for a time. Some of the salts of magnesia, lime and soda impregnate the water of extensive regions to such a degree that the inhabitants are easily affected with cholera and diarrhœas.

Bronchocele, the goitre, prevails in many parts of the world, on plains and among mountains, beneath the equator, in the north of Siberia, and in temperate climates, and either in a moist or dry atmosphere; but it is invariably confined to a limited extent of country, and its origin is distinctly traced to the quality of the water, though to what particular substances is not definitely known.

The fruit, roots and other parts of plants that are imperfectly ripened or irregularly developed are often inferior in flavor, and in their nourishing properties, and are more or less hurtful in various ways. These imperfections too are not so thoroughly remedied by the process of cooking, as those of a similar name that pertain to animal food. The seeds of many of the grasses and other plants are subject to a morbid growth, which in its advanced stages appears as the smut of wheat and corn. In some plants and perhaps all it is highly noxious. The effects of spurred rye, ergot, have been observed with most attention. When used for a considerable time in rye flour and before its noxious properties have been diminished by age, it gives rise to typhus fevers, to mortification of the limbs of a peculiar character, and to disorders of the nervous system which in their advanced stages are attended with convulsions. The scurvy incidental to long voyages and protracted sieges shows another example of the effects of improper food. Smaller quantities of such food produce slighter derangements, which though not unfelt are often little regarded, and are seldom attributed to their proper source; but they contribute their share towards general ill health, impede the progress of growth, and pave the way for the easy approach of other diseases, that proceed from more obvious causes. The cattle that feed in certain pastures do not reach above three fourths the size of others that live in pastures at no great distance, where the geological structure is different, and other circumstances of such kind, that the inferiority can be attributed only to the quality of the food or water.

The atmosphere may become insalubrious from gasses that proceed from living animals and vegetables, and from their component substances in a state of decay, and from gasses thrown off during the decomposition or new combination of inorganic matter, together with such as arise from the evaporation or sublimation of that matter. These latter in part emanate from below the earth's surface by means of crevices and minute pores as well as from volcanoes. Metallic veins have been filled by gasses that arose from below and were condensed; and the vapors of sulphur, mercury, arsenic and other substances sometimes pass into the air, and after floating awhile are deposited in a solid form on the earth. Volcanoes discharge immense volumes of different kinds of gasses, often the vapor of water; concentrated as they are near the verge of the crater they are suffocating; but a great part becomes solid or innocuous at no great distance, and the remainder have sometimes caused pestilences in the vicinity, and sometimes a general feebleness hardly perceptible and soon passing away. From the Guero Upas, in Java, the crater of a volcano long since extinguished, destructive gasses proceed. The valley contains no living plants, and is covered with the bones of animals; those which there take refuge from their enemies, and those that pursue, all perish alike.

Certain gasses of decomposing vegetables are the sole cause of intermittent fevers. These fevers endure for a long time, and at their departure always leave other diseases, especially debility of the biliary organs, which are hence liable to still other derangements. Recovery from the whole can seldom be completed in less than two years; and is seldom so perfect that a physician may detect no remaining vestiges. In many millions of cases they have continued ever afterwards, diminishing the power of enjoying life, and hastening its termination.

When the gasses that give rise to these fevers are co-

pious or highly noxious, or when other causes of febrile diseases are also present, the fevers thence resulting are more severe, and we have the class termed remittent fevers. Their character varies according to the peculiarities of individuals, and the circumstances attending different places at different times. They are the scourge of much the greater part of the habitable earth. They prevail with violence on the coast of Africa, in the tangled thickets of South America, and on the plains of India and the neighboring islands; and they are known throughout nearly all the torrid and the greater part of the temperate zones.

In many extensive regions nearly the whole population have suffered from the incursions of some form of this fever, there being but few who are incapable of contracting it. When the poison is imbibed we know not how to insure immunity; and when the disease appears remedies may mitigate, but cannot quickly curb its progress. All the circumstances necessary for forming the gasses that cause it are not discovered; but in many places vegetables are decomposed in large quantities without the production of these gasses or any others that are perceived to be hurtful; and in other places similar in appearance and situation, smaller quantities of similar vegetables send them forth in malignant abundance. In some places they are not felt, and are scarcely heard of; while other places are seldom or never free from their influence.

In some unusual circumstances, the gasses emitted from decaying animal substances are deleterious in a high degree, but such as attend their ordinary decomposition are not observed to be noxious, and some are even beneficial, among which ammonia is pre-eminently so. Its good effects are felt by those who labor where it is evolved; it promotes the regular developement of the body, gives increased strength and energy, renders men less liable to the attacks of disease, and enlarges the power of recover-

ing. It is too a most important ingredient in the soil to assist the growth of plants. Though it may be formed from the decay of vegetable as well as animal substances, the supply is far from bountiful; organic matter, in its passage to the inorganic state, enters into such combinations that it is produced but sparingly. With a slight change of chemical affinity, or of the circumstances in which decomposition takes place, ammonia and other gasses that are beneficial or no way hurtful might be evolved copiously, instead of those that are noxious. Our sunken bogs and crowded cities would then be among the most salubrious places; but now all those gasses that are salutary are yielded sparingly, and such as are deleterious are sent forth destructively.

In no part of the earth is the climate found suitable for man, the revolutions of the seasons being unfavorable; and it is difficult to point out the place where the degree of heat and cold, moisture and dryness of the atmosphere, are not productive of grave diseases, and would produce them were all other causes absent. The only possible exception must be in some elevated spot near the equator; but the density of the air is not there sufficient, and other morbid causes exist.

Excessive heat impedes the action of a part of the organs, and stimulates others too much, the skin and liver especially, which hence often become deranged, together with all other parts that sympathize with them. The organs of digestion are enfeebled, so that men are not prompted to use sufficient nourishment to impart vigor. Like a steam-engine that consumes little fuel, but little power can be expected. Within the tropics where provision may be obtained in greatest abundance, there men are least disposed to make use of it; where fruit is most exuberant, there men have least of the power of enjoying it, and there it is most liable to give rise to diseases. But in colder climates, where the productions of the earth are

yielded sparingly and with more labor, and where many of the best are never seen, there men have greater power of consuming and enjoying them, and feel their want more acutely.

Too great a degree of cold, that which kills or forces into the state of winter inactivity those plants, that contribute directly to the support of man, is hurtful to him according to its severity. The resources of the constitution being applied in too great a proportion to the production of animal heat, the moiety of nervous energy not thus employed is insufficient to maintain the several parts in their most proper condition. For these reasons and others men in the coldest climates are dwarfish and otherwise inferior. In the whole of the temperate zones, men suffer from either extreme, sometimes languishing with heat, and at the approach of cooler weather, sometimes invigorated thereby, and often the most healthful contract fevers or inflammations. Where the thermometer annually ranges from 85° to 25° , the vital powers are alternately depressed by heat in one direction and irregularly, and then in another direction by cold; and in either case a part of the organs are stimulated excessively. Where the range extends from 40° below zero to 120° above, the derangements are more pernicious. The hurtful effects of these extremes and vicissitudes are experienced not only by those who are not accustomed to them, but all families and tribes, however long they may have been habituated, are still greatly depressed, and it no way appears that the human system can ever accommodate itself to the excess.

The derangements proceeding simply from the usual prevalence of a state of the atmosphere too dry or too moist, are not sudden in their onset, nor rapid in their progress. These causes interfere with the process of growth; too much moisture, which however is uncommon, has a tendency to encumber with too much bulk, and

bring forward the various forms of scrofula ; and dryness of the air gives rise to leanness and a predisposition to inflammations, which exhaust the vital powers.

A class of diseases are spread by contagion ; those that are most common and least regarded, should not be considered trifling, for in many instances the debility and other injury occasioned is slowly or never entirely recovered from.

All the morbid causes here alluded to, affect men differently according to the peculiarities of every person. They may be complicated with each other in any possible way, and operate with varying intensity and power, at times enfeebling or tormenting the greater part of the population of some place with one of the more slight of the epidemics, or with a pestilence that slays its thousands. Some of these occur repeatedly with substantially the same aspect ; and in some instances after an almost unknown and terrific pestilence has raged for a few weeks, ages may elapse before a like train of causes shall again shed destruction.

In addition to all the foregoing, every one inherits imperfection ; no exception can be found ; an unsound constitution if not active diseases are always present. Frequently they are such as bring death speedily or in a few years ; and in other cases they, or other diseases in part proceeding from them, continue during the whole of a life protracted beyond the ordinary term.

The effect of any and every single disease is to produce more or less debility and depression in the person affected ; traces of its ravages may often long be seen, perfect recovery is always more slow than is popularly supposed, and before it takes place some other usually supervenes, which goes on for a while, and then ceases or changes to some chronic form. They or some morbid alterations caused by them in many cases remain permanently ; and the vigorous constitution of a young person or person of

any age is changed to weakness and pain, or he is reduced to rank with men of inferior abilities, above whom he will never be able to emerge.

In certain circumstances, however, some diseases in addition to the injury occasioned, produce more or less benefit by preventing the access or mitigating the violence of others, perhaps of a more formidable character; and at times they banish them completely. Thus intermittent fevers prevent the approach of consumption; and the progress of consumption is sometimes impeded by a cancer, and that of the cancer by consumption; so that a man may endure life longer with both, than with either alone.

But all diseases, if they continue, sooner or later have the effect of hastening the termination of life; some being always present from the first, they prevent the proper development of the body, and cause the body to be invariably more or less disproportioned to the mind, as well as often deficient in strength. The disproportion may be after every conceivable manner, within certain limits. It may not be visible externally to an unpracticed observer; while from the incongruity of the parts within, life can hardly be maintained. The heart may be so large and powerful as to force the blood onward too rapidly; or by reason of its debility or malformation the current may be too slow. The lungs may be of insufficient size, and hence easily deranged and slow to recover. The muscles and whole machinery of voluntary motion may be strongly developed, while the apparatus of nutrition is imperfectly so; the person may then be more disposed to action than is suitable; all the nourishment elaborated will be quickly consumed, and emaciation will be constant and obstinate. More or less emaciation is likewise the attendant of many other diseases and defects. It not only removes such parts as may most readily be spared, but it diminishes the volume of the more important organs, and impairs their strength. Persons subject to it, even in any degree, are

rendered more or less melancholy, discontented and restless; and if occasionally exhilarated, sadness is prone to follow. In all dry climates, especially if warm, it often commences before the age of five years; and if absent after the age of thirty, it is less frequently owing to health than to some of those diseases, which load some parts with burdensome accumulations, while destitution prevails elsewhere.

Any tumour or other excrescence is a useless burden to the organs of nutrition, and to all the vital powers; as much force as may be devoted to their support, is not available for other and important purposes, neither for the intellectual functions, nor for the preservation of health. One or more of the organs or some of their parts are often so largely developed as to partake of the nature of an excrescence; an ungainly length of limb, a chin too prominent, hair too profuse or too rapid in growth, and all other redundancies, not only detract from beauty, but are grave evils to their possessor, not always in proportion to their size. While nature has sported in fashioning some trifling deformity, it is frequently an indication that some important work has been neglected.

Lack of beauty is always an indication of disorder during the period of growth, perhaps a disorder inherited from many generations. During a part at least of this period, various diseases are present which, though not painful, impede the proper developement of the skeleton. Instead of being small and firm the bones are brittle, to compensate for the brittleness they become thick, and hence the whole person is unwieldy. A degree of this malformation is exceedingly common, especially in Germany; but it is not to be found in many who dwell in Italy or among the Caucasian mountains. Where the general bulk of the skeleton is not notably too great, it frequently happens that the bones are so at their moveable articulations; so that unlike the Hercules Farnese,

each joint of the limbs instead of being small and compact, presents an unsightly protuberance partaking of the nature of an excrescence, and the fingers exhibit a series of knots instead of a uniform taper. Wherever this deformity exists, motion must be less easy and graceful, and a larger amount of muscular force be requisite to accomplish any desired service, especially when some one or more of the bones display a preternatural curve.

The whole machinery of voluntary motion may be strongly developed, except that part of the nervous system which elaborates the moving power; the man will then be incurably indolent; and any disease or other cause, that in any case depresses this part of the nervous system, will be attended with sluggishness. That part of the nervous system, which is more especially concerned in the moving of some particular organ, may alone be defective; and that organ alone may be remarkably deficient in its action. The exercise of thought is irksome to some, and to others the discharge of other duties; and indolence is often the mere preference of doing nothing, or of engaging in unworthy trifles.

The brain and nerves or some of their parts may be too powerful for the general strength, and hence the person may be too much disposed to exertion. Intellectual exertions may then be preferred, which may not always be judiciously performed; other exercises may be chosen, and the person be continually unquiet and disturbed from lack of ability to perform them. Various irregularities will then attend, sometimes convulsions.

Thousands of examples might be adduced; peculiarities are continually carried to distortion, which if not excessive would serve only to make proper variety among men, to distinguish them from each other, and to render them suitably unequal, so that all might not desire to engage in the same employment, and occupy the same station.

In the most perfect specimens of the race, due powers

of resisting the causes of diseases are wanting, that kind of imperfection at least may always be noticed which leaves them defenceless to the attacks of exhausting disease, and the need of the elevating influence of wine is felt; the full import of the term high-spirited they cannot know from their own resources alone, and the knowledge otherwise obtained can never be precisely correct, and may by intoxication be carried to caricature. It was said by Bonaparte that it was the young and vigorous by whom the hospitals were lumbered, the soldiers below the age of twenty-eight; and that it was the veterans of whom the best service was to be expected on a campaign, and the most labor, those above the age of thirty-three, wrinkled and shrunk as they were, and marked with the scars and ravages of their exposure. It is well known too that in wars more die and are disabled by disease, than by battle.

It is not to be expected that the intellect, the mind, the soul of any man, intimately associated as it is with an imperfect body, can itself be otherwise than imperfect; and accordingly we see disorders of multifarious kinds in all the manifestations of its existence. Yet the parts of the body more especially connected with the mind are in some instances more properly developed than the others, and therefore it partakes of their superiority. Thus energy and genius are sometimes connected with frailty; and thus Alexander the Great was uncomely in appearance, stunted in growth, and curved in the spine; Julius Cæsar was small, thin, pale, bald-headed and bilious; and Napoleon Bonaparte, somewhat dwarfish in stature, was lean to poorness and troubled with a mangy eruption of the skin, and afterwards was burdened with fat, and wasted by cancer.

The perceptive faculties are those that apprehend the objects within the reach of human observation, such as are material, all that affect the senses, and the states or

emotions of the mind. Instead of quickly and correctly comprehending these objects of perception, a considerable degree of which power is possessed by some persons, these faculties are more or less sluggish or otherwise imperfect in their operations. From derangements in the organs of sensation, and in the mind which exercises the powers of consciousness and reflection, many events pass by altogether unattended to; other events being noticed only in part, that part may or may not appear as the whole. Certain parts or the whole may appear obscurely, as it were in fog or darkness, or else unduly bright and prominent, tinged with one false color or mottled with many. All this is the case with persons who are far from insane; in a greater or less degree it is the case with all.

The memory, if right and perfect, should enable the person quickly to call to mind distinctly and vividly every event of his experience, however long it may have passed, whenever to do so would be the most proper way to assist him in accomplishing any legitimate purpose; and at the same time it should not be burdened by the retention of all particulars concerning common trifles. In this faculty all are unhappily deficient; when consulted it frequently returns a confused idea or none, and therefore our best efforts to acquire knowledge do not yield a satisfactory result. By diligent training it may be rendered more efficient, yet never in the degree desired. Though some few have extraordinary powers of recalling each a certain class of objects, they fail in remembering others. This faculty is easily impaired by certain diseases, and by improper habits of thought, even in youth, and it is slowly restored so far as restored at all. When any of the mental powers are irregular in their movements, the memory especially, all the others are made less valuable.

The imagination, the inventive faculty, is the one by which we conceive of objects in new and non-existing forms. The more perfect the mind, the more nearly it

accords with good sense, so much the more justly proportioned the pictures of the imagination are likely to be. Wild, dreamy imaginings are indications of an ill constituted mind, as well as of a wrong education, whether that education has been derived from daily experience, or been half finished in schools of false philosophy, and the false mistaken for true. The paucity of useful inventions and discoveries is indicative of defects in this faculty, as well as of a wrong use of it, and of a neglect of its exercise. For how many ages have men suffered from ignorance of what has only lately become well but not extensively known? Who can tell what is still suffered from ignorance of what is now on the verge of discovery, and may yet remain hidden for ages to come? How many, with the book of nature before them, and aided by the model of the Iliad, have failed in their endeavors to surpass or equal the productions of Homer?

Men fail in their attempts to judge correctly concerning the nature of things both mental and exterior, their real value, their truth or falseness, and their relations to each other. It proceeds partly from deficiencies of perception and memory, by reason of which they do not always understand all that is exhibited, nor recollect all that has been perceived; also what has been added by the play of the imagination, may when remembered be considered a reality; and under the influence of feelings and passions men are led to attribute undue value, and give undue attention to certain objects, to the neglect of others; beside all which there is present, usually if not in all persons, more or less deficiency in the very power of comparing and estimating.

For these reasons men are credulous and easily deluded; they believe where the evidence is insufficient, or without evidence, and contrary to proof the clearest; and they withhold their assent where abundant evidence should command it. There are people too, that are said to be

intelligent, who persist always in mistaken notions, conceits and hobbies, whole nations in the same, often trivial to repeat, but for that cause none the less degrading to believe.

Some few are idiots; and of those who are not thus named a multitude are slightly tinged with idiocy. It reveals itself in a peculiar awkwardness, and by an expression of the eye unhappily too familiar; often concealed it obtrudes itself in times of difficulty, and then when man's best endeavors are most needed, it paralyses his powers or distorts their movements. Some have an unusual facility in acquiring particular kinds of knowledge, or an aptness for certain pursuits, while in other departments they are far below a medium. The multitude is not small who feel relief while under the immediate supervision of a guardian more or less strictly. Responsible stations are sought less frequently from the desire of incurring responsibility, than on account of some attending advantages. Men seldom prefer overmuch trouble in laying plans for their work; actually to follow the proper directions of a superior is more pleasant than the name of dependence, especially if the wages be the same. The imposition of some popular name goes far towards making the power of one's leader agreeable. The name "free government" makes people submissive and tolerant of burdens.

There are the feelings, emotions and passions of the soul, grief, content, anxiety, hope, hatred and many others. They all arise and return to rest according to the person's perception of things exterior to him, and his perception of the states and changes within himself. They depend much on previous habit, and are influenced by the association of ideas; feelings suggest thoughts, and thoughts from whatever source give rise to feelings. None ever come or depart at the mere choice of the person; yet he may more or less modify their force and periods of access

and continuance, by directing the attention to what concerns them or to other subjects.

They are exciting forces by which man is moved to the exercise of his powers, by some more especially to secure his own advantage, and by others for the benefit of other persons. Fear induces him to avoid danger, discontent to improve his condition, shame to fly from what is base, compassion to assist the afflicted, love to aid those who attract it, anger to defend from designed injury; and it assists in estimating the amount of punishment due to any offence. Others, like regret, serve also to warn against the repetition of acts that are injurious. When the emotions are right, their tendency is to move the man to do rightly; but so far as they are excessive, too feeble, or other wise disordered and wrong, their influence is less correct. Their course, strength and fitness, and whether some of the number are ever felt at all or not, depends on the health and state of the person, both of his body and his mind.

Besides these there are the bodily sensations, which in health also serve as motives for similar purposes; and no voluntary exercises depend solely on man's vigilance and wisdom, for these latter of themselves alone are not equal to the task of securing his safety. Were man unable to feel the pain of a burn, the hand would often be destroyed by fire from mere negligence; and when any of the nerves of sensation are palsied, the greatest care is not sufficient to prevent mortification of the part, or other injury, from too long continuance in one position. The pleasure of gratifying the taste not being so intense as to impel men to procure food sufficient for their support, there is the ever recurring sensation of hunger, which is so intolerable that for its relief men will endure labor that is severe, often with little remission.

Man is not free to choose what emotions, passions and sensations he will have, and which he will expel; nor can

he regulate their intensity according to his desire; his wish for courage is often unavailing, and so is his desire to banish fickleness. Were he free in this respect, did none ever come or stay except at his call, their ends manifestly could not be answered. Who would ever choose to be tormented with pain? Who would call for fear or sadness? And who would choose shame, discontent or any that are disagreeable? Or who would have any so vehement as to be annoying? And how could any man be induced to do at the proper instant that work, for the doing of which they are needed to impel him? On the other hand, gladness, content and all that are pleasing, man would have present with him in all circumstances, without the labor of doing the work for which they are the legitimate reward, and without the substantial benefits by that work to be obtained.

But it is all too evident that as the body is tortured and wasted by uneasiness and exhausting pains, so the fountain of human emotions and passions is disordered, bitter fruit of every conceivable variety flowing from thence being felt and exhibited by different individuals. The passions are not duly proportioned in quickness and strength to each other, nor to the imperfect intellect with which every one is endued. Some are often of great strength, even furious, while the intellectual powers are weak; and frequently they are deficient when most needed. In other cases, though perhaps feeble, they are excited too easily and by improper objects. Boldness is often absent when its exhilarating influence is most needed, being ousted by an unreasonable timidity; and the union of indolence and content is one of the greatest obstacles to improvement, especially where the intellect is disciplined slightly or badly. Indolent men, content with a low condition and cheerful, make few voluntary efforts to advance themselves. Indolence too is an approach to the state of non-existence; and if not resisted reduces

men to the most sluggish barbarism and the most hopeless.

In these respects whole nations and races are unequal as well as individuals. The men of every region are marked by the diseases incidental to the several places, and by traces of other peculiarities derived from other sources. The Americans deem themselves superior to the Mexicans; and the French differ widely from their neighbors of Germany. The natives of tropical countries seldom excel in bodily strength or mental energy; but the character of some of these nations is, that they will persevere with assiduity in certain of the lighter employments, and in a few instances in the more laborious. The Chinese are enterprising and industrious, even those of the southern provinces, extending as they do beyond the tropic; otherwise their land could not maintain a population so dense. Few nations exceed them in fondness for exertion; and they wander by thousands into foreign countries to acquire money and hoard it. The negro races, wherever found, are more fond of amusements than the white; and idleness is less burdensome to them than to the Anglo Saxons, and continual labor more irksome. They are not noted for seeking after and improving opportunities for accumulating property, preferring rather the momentary gratification of spending; and no people so easily content themselves with a low or subordinate station. On the other hand, when the American Indians have been subjected to restraint, their lives have been speedily terminated by excessive and exhausting melancholy. All unpleasing emotions, if not soon banished, lower the tone of the health, and prepare the way for the approach of a host of diseases; and though the exhilarating feelings and passions, when the health is robust, strengthen it still more; in many cases they tend to disorder a frame that is feeble and already disordered.

"Man's inhumanity to man
Makes countless thousands mourn."

But man's dwelling place is so arranged and fitted out, that not only gloom and mourning, but pain and agony, both bodily and mental, are inevitable even among the most humane. They or their shadow are aways present with every one to torment, or to mar the bliss of the few more happy hours that pass rapidly away.

The places most favorable for the health and full development of the human faculties are found situated in temperate climates, where the changes of heat and cold are least, and where the atmosphere is somewhat moist. Among such are the British Isles, central Europe, and New Zealand; and there the most salubrious situations are usually the steep declivities of hills or mountains of no great height, where the air is but little injured by rarefaction, and is more free from hurtful gasses than the valleys below. The Swiss, and the natives of other places that are burdened by precipitous crags, and often shrouded in mist, escape a portion of the distempers that come upon regions which are more fruitful and more easily cultivated; and the men of Patagonia, the land of almost continual storms, are superior in some respects, not because the climate is of the most congenial character, but it is free from the extremes of heat, cold, and drought; the evils of either of which are more pernicious than a slight excess of moisture.

When men emigrate to another country, they sooner or later lose some of their peculiarities, and assume such as are caused by a different climate and new habits. In certain cases these changes are, to a considerable extent, wrought speedily by some one of the long train of fevers; but the space of one hundred years renders the difference much more perceptible, whether it be improvement or the reverse. The Dutch Boers of the Cape of Good Hope have become superior to the Hollanders in stature, while

the Boschmen, their neighbors, are seldom five feet in height. The dwarfishness of these latter is however to be attributed to their habits, which are such as in less salubrious places, would soon reduce them to extinction. They do not sufficiently protect themselves from the inclemency of the weather; their food is of an inferior kind, and irregularly obtained, and they fail to avoid other causes which make them wretched; they are exceeded in stature too, and in energy, by other savage tribes of the same places, who are descended from the same stock, as appears from the resemblance of their languages.

It is not man alone who is thus harrassed by disease. Animals are subject to like vicissitudes; and for the most part are less capable of resisting the causes. When removed from the latitudes where they usually live, nearly all languish and soon perish; and, in their native abodes, their condition is often much below par. The deer, that has for ages fed on the praries of the United States, is subject to derangements of the liver, at least, in the northern half of the valley of the Mississippi. In full one third there taken by the hunters, it is found to be severe, and the flesh is often colored by the bile, giving the taste of liver to the venison, which is most perceptible in those taken after a chase. The liver is frequently found flabby, and consequently feeble, discolored with livid spots, or with large portions or the whole changed into a hardish white, dark or yellow substance, likewise ulcerated, enlarged or contracted. The cattle carried to that country from places where such derangements are more seldom seen, are soon affected in a like manner, and must be slaughtered at an early age.

Men are somewhat familiar with other diseases, and the blemishes thence resulting, that affect the sheep, camel, and other domestic animals, and make them less valuable. The horse is seldom equal to the best of his kind, few or none are up to par; but there may always be found those

that are slow, liable to stumble, easily fatigued, deficient in spirit, and uncomely to look upon.

The covering of few or no land animals is suitable for defending them from storms of rain and snow, and other inclemency of the climates, as they now prevail. Their feathers and hair are adapted only to shade from the sun, and protect from mist, dew, and a certain degree of cold; by rains they are speedily saturated with wet, and at their approach the animals fly cowering in pursuit of some shelter, which they can seldom find, at least, such as will properly defend them. If the storm continues, they are debarred from searching after food; and accordingly all are injured, but not all in the same degree. Multitudes of insects are in this way destroyed. With water-fowl the case is different; the exterior parts of their feathers secrete an oil with which they are imbued, and they lie in such close proximity to each other, that in rain, and in swimming and diving, the down beneath is kept dry. With the beaver, and animals of similar habits, the fur serves the same purpose; but man and the Newfoundland dog can expose themselves to wet but a short time without detriment.

The animals that inhabit the ocean are also burdened with disease; and some of the blemishes thence proceeding are well known to fishermen. Changes of temperature, though less than in the air, are more easily perceived, and are hurtful to many, both of the animals and of the marine plants from which they derive their sustenance, more hurtful to some than to others. The temperature of the seas surrounding the British Isles, besides the variation proceeding from the revolution of the seasons, is further changed by the irregular movements of the gulf stream, and of currents that flow from the northern ocean. Hence a small number of species of marine plants are there produced, those only that can endure such changes; and some live which do not flourish with luxuriance.

Consequently, there are smaller numbers of marine animals, those only which derive their support, directly or indirectly, from those plants, and can somehow endure life, notwithstanding such vicissitudes. The fish of those seas are, therefore, few in number, and generally of inferior kind. In a large portion of that part of the ocean, which is not too deep to be habitable, the circumstances are not widely different. But on the Newfoundland banks, where the gulf stream flows constantly, the temperature is more uniform, and abundance of plants are yielded, and furnish a rich support to the lower orders of animals, by which the larger fish are sustained there in the neighborhood. In some of the tropical seas, too, there are places that are filled with life.

From the monuments of geology, analogy may afford some ground for the supposition, that as animals and vegetables, in some ages, have flourished, and in other ages have not, so men may not always have been the puny, low-lived beings that are now every where seen. We may suppose that some of the existing species of plants and animals once grew more exuberantly, that the earth was a more salubrious, and in several ways a more suitable place for man's abode, that his faculties were more perfectly developed, and he himself more able to resist the causes of disease, and that he lived to a much greater age actively in possession of his powers. That the human constitution is capable of becoming degraded from such a state to the present shortness of life, seems probable from the fact, that persons not unfrequently appear who are still more degraded. Those here referred to are usually dwarfish, and come to maturity long before the usual time, and then as prematurely decay and die about the age of twenty-four or sooner, with many of the marks of old age. Several such cases were anciently mentioned by Pliny and others, and some hundreds have been noticed in modern times. Indeed, the present generations

of men are abased nearly to the lowest pitch, where it is possible for them to continue; if they were but slightly deteriorated below their present condition, if the earth were less favorable by some trifle, they would soon be exterminated. A number of savage tribes are known to have become extinct. The population of large cities, particularly in certain situations, is preserved undiminished only by frequent additions from the country; and if the country were equally ungenial, the progress to extinction would be rapid. The greater part of those who commence existence, pass away before the age of manhood; and of those who linger afterwards, a large proportion are incapable of procuring things barely necessary for their maintenance, unless directed, induced, and in many instances compelled by other men, their superiors. For lack of proper supervision millions perish annually, and still greater numbers live wretchedly; some need more supervision than others, and of a different kind.

All these are sunk profoundly below the most perfectly finished human standards, of whose existence we may imagine, and as profoundly below man's true and equal level. It may well have been said, that no one man could have stood as the model of the Appollo Belvidere, and that the idea must have been drawn from many that enabled the sculptor to represent him,

"The lord of the unerring bow,
The god of life and poetry and light,
The sun in human limbs arrayed, and brow
All radiant from his triumph in the fight.
The shaft has just been shot, the arrow bright
With an immortal's vengeance; in his eye
And nostril, beautiful disdain and might
And majesty flash their full lightnings by."

Childe Harold.

In some remotely future age of this earth, when many geological revolutions have passed by, an age as widely remote from the present, as this from the earliest dawn of

the Eocene; the whole aspect of nature may rationally be expected to differ as widely. Analogy will lead us to suppose that it may be somewhat as follows:

Every species of plant in the living vegetable kingdom may then be extinct, the human race may have faded entirely away, and every animal except some few of the mollusca, and others of the lowest orders, inhabitants of the water; and perhaps all may have been exterminated. The land may then stand out of the water in the form of islands of a convenient magnitude, like England, Nippon, and Formosa. Their number would be large, and they would be separated from each other by straits of no great breadth. Their shores may be indented by numerous bays, occasionally studded with islets; the surface low, gently undulating or level, nearly free from marshes, and at long intervals broken by a solitary needle-form peak, like the sugar-loaf mountain at Rio Janeiro, or raised into a rounded, green elevation, like mount Holyoke, and sometimes prolonged into a narrow ridge, yet never so high as to injure the climate. All useful building-stones, minerals, and metals may be easy of access; gold then more plentiful than lead now. There must, too, occasionally appear a volcanic cone to act as a safety valve.

The islands may be so situated as to form many direct channels to convey the water of the tropics rapidly towards the polar regions, which may be occupied by a broad expanse of ocean. From the depths of these receptacles the water would be returned to the equator; and by clusters of islands there rising out of a shoaler sea, it would be forced upwards to the surface, continually refreshing the atmosphere with its coolness, and then again flowing towards the poles.

By mechanism, of which we are ignorant, the axis of this planet may at that time have become perpendicular to its orbit, like the axis of Jupiter. Consequently, there would be no change of seasons, nor variation in the length

of day and night; and at the very poles the sun would appear perpetually above the horizon, moving daily around the whole circuit of each. No ice may ever be frozen in their neighborhood, and only a moderate heat be felt at the equator; for every island would, probably, like Java, be richly clothed in green at all times, and itself be a fountain, whence vapor might be diffused over the surrounding regions, instead of a starting point for dry, scorching winds, like the deserts of Africa. In the equatorial latitudes, the vapor may float generally in the form of numerous heavy clouds, with spaces of blue sky between, the form called the cloud of day, which then mitigates the burning, and so vanishes in a gorgeous sunset as to leave a clear sky by night. In the cooler regions, the vapor may be less visible by day, permitting the full force of an unclouded sun; and in the evening it may gather into mist or light continuous clouds, especially over the polar oceans, and impede the escape of heat from the surface below. It may every where fall in the shape of dew sufficiently copious for the wants of a rank vegetation, with seldom or never a rain, as occurs in Peru, on the western slope of the Andes. There the birds and beasts are not injured by storms, nor are the rich and soluble parts of the soil washed away by showers.

Gales and storms now arise from the antagonistic influence of the intense cold of the frigid zones, and the excessive heat of the tropical deserts and neighboring places, and from the influence of broad ocean wastes and extended continents, loaded with table lands and lofty mountains. These are continually producing confusion in the winds, which is augmented by the revolutions of the seasons, and in much less degree by the changes of the moon. By the tides which the moon raises in the atmosphere, it sometimes attracts large quantities of air and vapor towards places where other causes have already done the same, and there makes a hurricane more destruc-

tive; and sometimes, by attracting the air in a different direction, it diminishes the fury of a gale. It sometimes prolongs or shortens the duration of a storm, calm, or drought, and sometimes prevents their access altogether.

Here, doubtless, a single improbable supposition will be admitted. It is that the moon may then be removed somewhat further from the earth, to the point where, according to the calculation of astronomers, it would occupy an entire year in its revolution about the earth, and might always be in opposition to the sun, always above the horizon while the sun was below, shedding a smaller amount of light than is now at times received, yet always sufficient to guide the mariner on his voyage. The tides would then always be regular, and perhaps sufficient to cause due circulation in the water of bays and inlets, where now, owing to the position of continents, it is in some places excessive, and in others nothing.

Wind and rain are now the chief agents in effecting those changes in the atmosphere that are sometimes noticed immediately after a thunder gust; and it is not known that thunder and lightning ever assist in rendering the air in any degree more salubrious. Certain places, where these latter occur almost constantly, are remarkably pestilential; and in some of the finest climates they are entirely unknown. They are occasional attendants on storms, hurricanes, and earthquakes, rather than their cause. All the phenomena of electricity that have been observed, instead of being regular and constant like other natural agents, the influence of which is necessary and beneficial, are fitful in their movements, at times turbulent and destructive, or else weak and apparently useless, and again for long seasons they are idle. As the rainbow is a mere unproductive result of the refraction and reflection of light, so these phenomena seem to be only secondary and superfluous consequences of the machinery by which the economy of the world is conducted, of themselves

producing no benefit directly, and no injury except from excess. They seem to proceed from the jar and grating of this machinery, and should it ever work smoothly, none may then become so obtrusive as to be noticed, unless by the aid of an electrometer.

Should the earth then be free from the desolating influences of changing seasons, as it has been in some former ages, and should its surface be but little broken by rising lands, and the temperature every where not far from the same, a climate always pleasant and salubrious might be expected. The winds would consequently always be mild, and they might prevail more regularly than our trade winds on the ocean, yet somewhat interrupted by the varied surface of the land. Blowing in opposite directions or parallel courses, they might balance each other; and never converging towards a line excessively heated, they would not there drench the country with destroying floods. It is thus that we see the belts of Jupiter parallel, which are believed to be lines of clouds so disposed by regular winds; they are however, at times disarranged, in part probably by the disturbing force of the satellites.

In place of the existing plants, there may be in the ocean other species not widely differing in form but more abundant, the result of the more uniform temperature, and of the greatly increased extent of coast. Support for a larger number and variety of marine animals would hence be afforded, and the water may be loaded with active life.

On the land, weeds and other useless or noxious plants may nowhere appear. Every herb and shrub by its root, stem, foliage, flower or fruit may bountifully and frequently bestow both food and refreshment. Every new species of tree may bear fruit more exuberantly than the brightest of the palms; and it may be gathered more nutritious than wheat, and more dainty than the isles of India can show. All the land may pour forth its full strength with little or no cultivation.

The thousands of tribes of insects and worms, now so annoying and destructive, may be represented by none of their kind; but of the larger and useful animals there may be a fit variety, the horse bolder and swifter than a Persian poet ever thought.

To enjoy the whole man may be there, not as he now appears, even in his most imposing way, but of a rank somewhat higher, a new and distinct species of genus homo, not in the least related to the present. He may, however, resemble the present race somewhat as the leopard resembles the wolf, more impetuous and more powerful. He may be able completely to repel the few diseases that the climate would bring upon him, and be sufficiently wise to bring few or none on himself, pre-eminent in mental endowments as well as magnificent externally.

His perceptive powers, to observe all within their reach, may act rapidly with penetration and precision; his memory may be perfect, and so endure; his imagination rational; and concerning the true import of things present to his apprehension, he may instantly judge rightly. Hence, being always duly vigilant, he will be liable to few mistakes or delusions, and those quickly corrected; and he will rapidly acquire all desirable knowledge of himself and things around him, so far as it will assist in the proper exercise of his powers. Within his own sphere, his intellect may be as perfect as that of the eagle now is in his province; perfect, too, without the slavish discipline of the schools, now deemed so important and so inefficient.

His emotions and passions may be right at all times, fiery and serene, never too vehement nor too sluggish, always present when needed to prompt him to do whatever may at any moment be proper for his own welfare or the assistance of others, and equally ready to induce him to refrain from the opposite. Any supposable motives to do injury will be less imperious in a world where all the

wealth, that can be rightly used by any one, is within his easy reach. Perhaps, too, all disquieting and depressing feelings may be readily and quickly banished by exertions usually not of the most strenuous kind, frequently banished by removing their cause.

For a large portion of the time, various amusements may be man's employment; social intercourse with thousands. He will not be likely to waste his resources in labor that is of little or no worth, and its fruit soon destroyed. He may construct dwellings for himself both durable and elegant; the luxuriant gardens on the roofs and the vines trained on the walls, may bear fruit ample for the support of all that can be accommodated within. He may make his home on the water in vessels roomy and commodious. There he may pursue various mechanical callings, performing his work well and faithfully even the hidden parts, not with continual toil and a scant reward, but working rather for recreation, and with the ability to procure all that can be profitably applied to the personal use of the most luxurious. At the same time he may visit thousands of nations, all of one language, sailing without danger and without dread; yet always with such prudence as nowhere to assemble in numbers too great to be borne.

As there would be few or no crimes to prevent or to punish, the need of a civil government would be but slightly felt; but little governing would be required, and individuals might safely be left for the most part to their own views. The duty of the magistrate would not be the perplexing and often most disagreeable service now submitted to, nor would it be so highly important; it would resemble that of the leader of a dance, and would consist chiefly in giving well understood signals for the requisite numbers to act in concert for the performance of certain works of public utility. Should some of the people declare that they all were as nearly equal as was to be de-

sired, that every one might act freely according to his wishes, that the opportunities for so doing were most amply sufficient, and that there was no sort of restraint on any of their natural rights, it could scarcely be regarded as a discovery.

But some one may call this a Utopian structure; and in fact it pretends to nothing else; it is not supposed that it now exists, nor is the blunder here committed of imagining that any of its members accord with the present state of things. For instance, it is not imagined that the existing race of men are or can be free. It is not perceived how they can possibly free themselves from a thousand vexing restraints; nor how they can be otherwise than subject to a thousand different kinds of compulsion. And since man is confined to hard labor to obtain the fruit of the earth; since these fruits, ill adapted as they are by nature to satisfy his wants, are less valuable by reason of disease; and since in his toil he is oppressed by debility and weariness, and often by pain and indolence; since too, he is ignorant of the most fit methods of using such power as remains to him, it is but bootless flattery to call his rights unalienable. What difference between no rights and rights that can never be made available? What is the utility of such rights but to show man wherein he is deficient? If any do exist, can he more readily obtain the benefit by making himself blind to the real nature of his condition?

It may, perhaps, be said that man is really free to exert such power as he actually possesses; and precisely the same words may be said concerning a crippled prisoner shut up in a dungeon and bound with chains. Either are undoubtedly free to exercise all the powers which they have, so far as opportunities permit; and for all such to imagine themselves to be at liberty is something. If a prisoner can imagine his fetters to be jewels, it is something, and it is something for a man freezing at the pole

to dream of the burning skies at home. But is a fish free on dry land? or a horse in the midst of the waves of the sea? or a lame ox in a sandy desert? How, then, can men be free in a world like this?

Shall then this first article of the constitution be called old foggy, and be blotted from its place; or shall it be retained and explained as correct by each one according to his fancy? As many such explanations have been given, so others may yet be constructed, all plausible to a careless observer, but really indefinite and better fitted to quiet those who hear, than satisfy those who contrive them. Other matters than of civil government being treated of in the article, if not expunged it should not be left in its present half-developed form; progress should be the word, and another clause should be added fully to express what is already implied. The new clause should roundly assert that all men have most ample opportunities for rightly exercising all their powers, for completely maintaining all their rights, and for satisfying all their wants.

It must now be sufficiently obvious that men are not only destitute of freedom to gratify their wants, but also are incapable of wanting all that a talented and high-spirited man might want; and therefore the following fable being not needed for further illustration on this point, is just thrown in as a curiosity lately deciphered from the hieroglyphics of geology.

At the very height of the Tertiary age, the brightest the world ever saw, there was once sporting among the tumbling billows of the boundless ocean a crowded school of the well-known cod; all lusty, spotted brilliant, and flashing yellow, like him whose statue hangs swimming in the state house. Being chased by a swordfish, they afterwards took refuge in a deep land-locked bay, where they feasted awhile in security. When they would have retired, the entrance was found closed by a narrow ledge of

blue granite, which had suddenly been protruded quietly above the surface.

At first little inconvenience was felt, except the restraint imposed on their propensity to roam; but ere long the water became brackish, and the bait less enticing. With the lapse of time, the traditions of their proper home became confused, afterwards incredible, and finally were altogether lost, and they were even terrified when they sometimes heard the dashing of the stormy sea on the rocks without. Their splendor, too, was changed to sadness; the shine of their eyes became like lead, and they were like the cod that fishermen throw back from the hook into the water. They felt their paleness, but knew not from what sources it had proceeded, nor the height of the station which they had lost. In seeking for happiness they were far from successful in obtaining it, until at length they were found listening to a popular harangue that proceeded from one of their number, of which the following may give some dim idea:

"Courage, brothers, all of every age and aspect, misshapen and miserable though ye be. Do not all the watery tribes yield before us? None are so great as we, and we are all free and equal. Can we not go as we choose over the wide world? Do we not live on the best it affords; and do we not dance at our pleasure on its calm peaceful waters? Our condition shall be improved; let us but steadily regard our rights; none of our rights can we lose." Here he was interrupted by one universal shout. "Hurrah for liberty and equality. Reform forever. Our rights will we always maintain. As our freedom ever has been, and is now, so shall it always continue, and so shall be our equality." Every one imagined himself quite up to par, if not above. No salmon could stare at them from the ocean, to show his pride from the crest of a wave, and pity their pining while he smiled at their thoughts; and no conceit could to them have been more harmless.

What course of action the demagogue recommended, and how suitable it might have been after such an oration, is unknown; whether he spoke innocently and with sincerity, or was aware of the fallacy of his sayings, is a subject of doubt; and that he indulged in certain wild, unfeasible, philichthic schemes, is by no means unlikely; but these are all mere matters of conjecture, for the subsequent history is not yet made known by such fossils as have been examined.

The legitimate purposes of government are to protect all from the injustice individuals or combinations of individuals, large or small, to punish and restrain such injustice, and to compel each one to contribute his share towards the welfare of the community. Such is the imperfection of human things, that this neither is nor can be well and thoroughly performed, and many of its branches are never attempted, or are but little attended to by any existing civil authorities.

To call any government a free one, that does or may exist, is a most inappropriate use of the name; it is but a fancy name at the best. The real object of any possible government is to interfere with the freedom of men, it is to compel them to refrain from some actions and to perform others; and its functions must always to a great extent be conducted by force, either threatened or actually applied, the infliction of some corporeal punishment, or the deprivation of property or privilege. Because a government interferes in but few things, it is not free; for so far as it does interfere, force must be used. Because its form may somehow be changed in certain respects, and because some or the whole of its officers are appointed as freely as circumstance admit, are no sufficient reasons why it should be called free; nor are men free to choose whether they will submit to some government or live without any, for where no understood form exists, there

the strong tyrannize over the weak, the crafty turn the simple, and the influence of the whole is an impediment to the most powerful. Hence men usually acquiesce more or less cheerfully in some regular form as more tolerable than anarchy. The burdens imposed by government are always felt as evils, and anarchy is a still greater evil. A prisoner is not a free man because he selected the particular chain with which he is bound; and no government should be called free because the subjects of it choose that form of compulsion before all others. Generally, a man prefers the form under which he has always been forced to live, his preference partaking more of prejudice and patriotism than of forethought.

The manner in which republicanism works is known to many wherever it exists; democracy, too, is a fact, and it may be called free with about as strict propriety as the despotism of the most absolute monarchy. A monarch and the chieftans of a democracy may either of them exercise their power as freely as their people can by any of the thousand various means be brought to endure; and the power conferred by any possible compact or constitution may be progressively enlarged, often it has been enlarged almost imperceptibly to all concerned.

It is not the Utopian nonentity of free government or liberty that men prudently seek after; this is fitted rather to put a gloss on the leaves of a poem, than for the stern realities of life. It is a good government that is desirable; one that is good and suitable for some, is altogether inexpedient for others. The people of some nations are far more capable of guiding and restraining their executive officers, even in the absence of all prescribed forms for bringing their influence to bear, than other people would be under the most perfect constitution. A people who entertain incorrect notions of the nature of things, and who are indolent and consequently poor, are easy subjects of tyranny; those who imagine themselves to be

at liberty, who keep the word liberty perpetually sounding, may more readily be subjected to tyrannical and degrading bondage, than if they were aware of their true position. As many individuals require more than others the attention of the existing authorities to be directed or punished, so there are nations not a few who need more governing than others and of a different kind.

Those who are diligent in proper employments, and are little disposed to the commission of crime, require little of the superintendence of rulers, especially if the means of subsistence are easily obtainable; but in proportion as circumstances are different, the benefits of a government are more urgently needed, and the difficulty of governing is increased; hence more power must be in the hands of the executive, be the form democratic or any other. If there be imminent danger from foreign aggression, the whole force of a community must often be exerted with energy and unanimity to save themselves from tyranny. In prosperity little governing is needed; but in adverse circumstances, men must submit to authority that is wise and often perhaps severe, in order to escape from what would be worse than such submission; whatever the difficulty, preparation should be made to meet it. On a smooth open sea a ship might doubtless be somehow navigated under the direction of a committee of the crew elected say every third day; but among rocks, currents and hurricanes, both owners and all hands prefer something more rational. The populous country of Poland was conquered with ease, because to its king there was not given the power of compelling the people to exert themselves for its defence, many of them by reason of various notions being indifferent or in favor of some one of their enemies. On the other hand, the small republic of Holland maintained a war for their independence, of seventy-five years, with Spain at that time one of the most powerful nations of Europe, the people of Holland being in-

tensely opposed to the Spanish dominion, and noted for industry and prompt obedience to their chief men.

The degree of prosperity that prevails in this state is sometimes attributed to freedom; but it should rather be attributed to the bonds under which we live, the power that compels us to pay taxes, the constraints of family, of public opinion, of fashion, of long established customs and others, some proper and some unprofitable. It proceeds in part from many other circumstances, among which are the character of the people, their willingness to labor, their resolution in pursuing their toil with little relaxation even in the midst of fatigue, pain and weakness. A wide extent too of unoccupied country presents a field for enterprise and industry, which is unknown in any kingdom that is overburdened with population. To render a land like our own, a similar constitution is not of itself sufficient; similar manners and customs at least are also requisite. The condition of this country, which is the result of many causes, is often attributed to liberty alone.

It is not the tendency of mere liberty to improve a nation, nor to prevent its degradation. It is scarcely possible for men to live more free or more degraded than the New Hollanders, Patagonians, and some of the Indian tribes. What the most complete liberty possible for men can give, that they have; and the fruits of proper restraint and wholesome compulsion they have not. It is not liberty that suits men, but a good government; for every man and tribe, all that is best for each.

The wealth and well-being of individuals constitutes the strength of the state. Should people all pursue that course of action which is most for their own advantage individually, they at the same time would contribute most towards the welfare and eminence of the country. For a government to induce, assist or even compel each person to pursue that course, though manifestly it would be greatly for his benefit, cannot be supposed possible.

This state however attempts something of the kind to a limited extent. Certain boys who are idle and vicious, several hundred in number, are committed to the Reform School at Westboro', and there for a series of years they are confined and compelled to labor, and in a measure to do as they ought. A sentence to this school, when vacancies occur, has grown to be somewhat a matter of favor, and is an object of competition. The friends of a boy not unfrequently rake up and carry before the courts some almost forgotten fault, that may if proved against him entitle him to the privilege of being condemned to this form of slavery. This establishment has always been a pet of the leading portion of the free-soil party; and could it be done without increased expense, the accommodations would doubtless be enlarged, and many would be retained longer in bondage, as reformation is often incomplete.

For several thousand years the negro tribes in Africa have been both idle and vicious, and have trained their posterity in the same direction. An institution like our Reform School has been needed by them more than by the persons here condemned to it. The slavery of our southern states has done and is doing the work that is desired of such institutions, not precisely in the same way, but with greater success. The history of the world shows scarcely an instance of a nation that has improved so rapidly as the southern slaves. They have advanced from the ignorance and misery of barbarism to a condition bordering closely on the civilized, and are still making progress continually. They have forgotten many of their savage habits and opinions; and have contracted an almost unbounded respect for the fashions of white men. Slavery is in reality one of the various forms of government; and to them it has been highly beneficial beyond dispute. They are indeed compelled to labor, but who of the north will say they labor as much as men ought? and millions who call themselves free are also compelled

to labor, compelled by different means, but by means that often are much more galling, by means that give rise to gloom, pining and constant sadness, and by absolute want or a near and continual view of it. Families too are every where separated, in order to obtain less painful situations in which by toil to weary themselves.

But the slaves do not labor without pay ; they receive more than their ancestors could obtain in Africa ; and though not the kind which they would have chosen, it is better by far. They live in peace and are defended from enemies ; this though little regarded, would be easily appreciated by savage tribes, who are now suffering violence from perpetual wars and neighborhood quarrels. They feel little or no anxiety for present or future subsistence ; this can easily be appreciated by all who are anxious to labor for one dollar a day, and who dread the time when they will be unable. They are withheld from many crimes that would be hurtful to themselves and even productive of misery ; and they are in possession of no small amount of knowledge. Their condition is much to be preferred to that of the slaves of the Portuguese, Turks and inferior nations ; still it is not so good as may be desired, and whose condition is ?

Does there live a single man who wishes to free them ? Let the demagogue that does first become free himself if he can.

Since liberty is the lot of none, since it is not possible for slaves to be made free, it may at least be expedient to consider whether any form or kind of government better adapted to promote their well-being can at present be devised for them, or bestowed on them, or received by them ; and if any, what. It is not to be expected that men, who are but men, can or will govern or be governed in the way that is absolutely the best. Hence instances of disorder must everywhere occur, and more or less individual discomfort must be the consequence. A condition that in-

volves the smallest possible amount of evil, together with the greatest good attainable in any given circumstances, is the one to be chosen.

When labor ceases, men approach the state of the savage. Where civilization exists, there much must be done. For the great bulk of the products of labor, luxuries or necessities, men neither will nor can pay extravagant prices. Hence that they may be within the reach of purchasers, labor both bodily and mental must generally be done for low wages; and accordingly the great majority feel themselves constrained to work for low wages, with the power of obtaining for their own use only as much as their wages will buy; and they are by force of circumstances as incapable of rising above that condition as though they were restrained by law; those who make the attempt more commonly failing than succeeding. The possessors of real estate however derive more or less assistance therefrom, especially if its value be increasing. Whenever the wealth of those becomes diminished, who would purchase the articles produced, the straining of the fetters saddens the more.

While slaves are generally engaged in the most safe and healthful employments which the country affords, not unfrequently attaining to great longevity, it is not so with the workmen of the north. Their labor is not only more toilsome for the most part, but the business of many exposes to various dangers. Many trades too are detrimental to the health, always producing more or less feebleness, emaciation, paleness, sinking of the cheeks, or hollowness of the eyes, impairing the ability to endure the labor that causes such effects, diminishing the power of enjoying life, and often bringing an early but lingering death. The labor of manufacturing cotton is much more depressing than that of raising it. The shop of the shoe-maker is more destructive than the rice plantation, and confinement behind a counter scarcely less. In such employments

multitudes are compelled to busy themselves, who have the power of spending time in recreation sufficient to give only slight relief; to these employments they are tied down, and are utterly unable to exchange them for any more suitable, except at wages so inferior as to make their prospect less tolerable. Still while competing for the privilege of toiling even in the most sickening drudgery, they boast of their liberty, and dream of making others as free as themselves.

" See yonder poor, e'er-labored wight,
 So abject, mean and vile,
 Who begs a brother of the earth
 To give him leave to toil.
 And see his lordly fellow-worm
 The poor petition spurn,
 Unmindful, tho' a weeping wife
 And helpless offspring mourn."

Burns.

On a dry, barren soil, though the most free now known, it is altogether beyond the power of the rich to provide profitable employment for the multitude that are continually calling upon them for it.

In the reign of Louis Philipe, there lived in Paris several tens of thousands, a turbulent class known as the men of the blouse, men unable to procure a garment more presentible than the blouse. They then by diligence acquired day by day a scanty support. At the breaking out of the revolution, their various employments were interrupted, and they could neither obtain the opportunity to labor, nor its reward. Hunger was constantly with them, and the danger of starvation seemed imminent. They then called on the supreme authority of the nation to furnish the privilege to labor, and insisted on their right to labor. They asked for no luxuries, and hoped only for the means of existing on the lowest scale; and labor barely sufficient for this the government with difficulty granted, at a loss to itself, on certain public works. So,

during the reddest days of the last republic, while their shout continually was liberty, equality and fraternity, they eagerly grasped at the privilege of having a master to assign a task and support their strength to perform it; and their dread was that the government would emancipate itself from the connection.

There are men not only in the cities, but doubtless in every small village, who, though incompetent to plan work for themselves, are able to labor with effect under the constant direction of a superior. Many such there are who, receiving that assistance in one form or another, pass their time quietly in some subordinate station; but others not thus favored depend more on their own resources, and being able to accomplish little, their means of support are uncertain. A fixed sadness is seen in their look year after year, which no transient gladness can hide; and whether habituated to petty crime or not, their prospect for the future is depressing. Still another multitude is found elevated just one degree above, men not made to lead, unwilling to follow, and fickle in their doings and designs; if possessed of wealth it is not profitably used. A guardianship able to conduct these in the way most for their advantage, would manifestly be desirable, could it be obtained; and if considered honorable to the protected, it would be pleasantly submitted to by them.

But slavery has been said to be unjust. And surely it does not appear that men have ever managed their affairs with absolute justice; and it is difficult to say that any have ever been further from the right in this respect than the barbarian natives of Africa. They have failed to improve the peculiar natural advantages of their country. Where hundreds of millions might live, and with industry might flourish, there the land is overrun by a few, scattered, miserable, savage hoards. This condition is the result of their injustice, their unjust treatment of each other, of nation to nation, village to village, and man to

man, unjust in things done and in things omitted. It results from their unjust idleness, their neglect of labor both bodily and mental, their negligence in banishing their ignorance, and in providing things suitable for themselves and their families, thus prolonging their degradation.

In this condition of monstrous injustice the institution of slavery found them, and has been most efficient in working a reform. The reformation has been great, though such may not have been the design of all who have been engaged in bringing it forward. As other criminals ought, they have been compelled to cease from their unjust idleness, and to do a portion of their share of the work constantly necessary to make the world a tolerable habitation. Their compensation is scarcely if at all inferior to what is received by the greater part of the laborers of any country. Of these latter none receive more than sufficient for a meagre support; if that of the slaves is less in some points, it is much superior in other and most important respects. Their owners exercise over them a species of sovereignty; that it was usurped originally is no argument that it is unjust at present. Many governments, and many of the constitutional practices of our own government, doubtless once originated in usurpation. It is of more account that a government be suitable, and the most just attainable, than to speculate concerning its origin. It is not unjust for sovereigns to compel their people, if need be, to labor as they ought, at the same time giving fair compensation. Though attempted in but few cases, it is for that reason none the less just; in a measure it has been enforced in certain Fourier communities by the government there existing. But on the other hand it is unjust for men to neglect to use their influence for that thereby leaving others in idleness and in the unjust habits to which it leads.

The United States also exercise a species of sovereignty over the Indian tribes within their bounds, not indeed of

the strictest kind, but still such as is felt and respected. Were it like that which is exercised over the slaves, who does not see that it would be more beneficial to them to be restrained from wars, and from other doings that are injurious or of little profit; and even, if in their case possible, to have the arts and habits of civilization thrust upon them partly by force and partly by allurements, as the young are trained with us?

Would it be just and right for the guardians of the slaves now to leave them to themselves, half barbarian as they are? and would it be beneficial to them? The condition of the small number of such already scattered through the country affords no exact criterion for judging of the result. These latter feel the restraint of the law, and are much more restrained by our customs; but three million emancipated blacks would be a number sufficient to constitute a party nearly independent, and they might be expected to act in a great measure according to their own feelings and notions. Each one may conjecture whether they are sufficiently civilized to persevere in hard labor while oppressed by their characteristic indolence; whether the Maine law would be enforced among them, as measures substantially similar always have been; whether drunkenness, poverty, crime and their consequences would not be common; and whether their improvement would not be greatly retarded, and far more injustice be done than at present both by them and by others. There is room too to conjecture how wars among them or with them might best be brought to a close, or be prevented from perpetually breaking out. No half civilized people have ever yet refrained from petty wars and violent doings, unless prevented by force. Would it be more just to leave them to practice their own injustice, than to govern them for the present as they have been, or better if possible; for instance to govern them better by compelling them, mildly as may be, to perform an

amount of labor equal to what is done by men at the north?

Are they capable of discharging the duties of citizens of a republic? Would they be well acquainted with such duties, and be interested in performing them? and like the intelligent people of this state would they never be deceived into giving their votes so as to tell in opposition to their own interests or prejudices? Would they too always make rulers of men who see things as they are, or would they prefer others of distorted vision?

It has not been made out that they as a race are eminent for all those faculties which are essential for rapid progress in the desired direction; and that they are burdened with others of a different kind is unpleasantly obvious. Indolence seems to be peculiarly their own. The friends of Liberia complain that its traces are there all too evident. In Hayti the cultivation of sugar, though the most profitable crop there to be raised, has long been almost entirely neglected, solely because they cannot be hired to do the peculiar labor which is requisite.

Whether the course of the people last mentioned, for the next fifty years, will be one of improvement or the reverse, cannot well be conjectured. The data do not exist that might enable us to foresee which should be expected. Their island is one of the most verdant and fertile on the globe; and their wealth would now have been immense, had they been as industrious as the abolitionists of the north, or as fond of labor as the Canton Chinese of their own latitude. But actually the hard, rocky, sandy towns of New Hampshire are richer by much, though blasted by frosts both spring and fall, and dry and scorched by the heat of summer.

Since the English, in a fit of rather sickly good nature, proclaimed liberty in their West India possessions, the blacks have used the privilege of enjoying a large share of idleness. Though the fruitfulness of the country gives

them the power of obtaining large returns for their labor, they are generally content to remain in a low condition, rather than by moderate exertion to improve themselves, labor whether bodily or mental usually seeming a greater evil than degradation. That the work may not remain undone which they neglect, there have been imported from the East Indies large numbers of Coolies, a feeble race but willing to labor, while the blacks are robust and unwilling.

With that soil and climate, and under the strict government of England, they may perhaps thus continue for a time; but in the less hospitable regions without the tropics, such an experiment might show something similar to what is indicated in the following fabulous article, reputed to have appeared in the last free-soil paper.

"The whaling ship Hardsail, Capt. Soft, from Boston, bound for the Pacific, was detained six weeks off Cape Horn, at the most inclement season of the year. Sometimes they moved slowly on their voyage during a few hours of favoring wind, soon to be driven back hundreds of miles by a furious storm; and again the decks were flooded for successive days with little change for the better. The men were wearied with the unusual and severe services that were ordered; and their cheerfulness was exhausted with exposure to sleet, rain and fog. The watches by night were long and dismal, and the occasional appearance of a pale, cold sun deepened the gloom by day.

"Still the hull was sound; and no accident of note having happened, they might rationally have expected perseverance to be rewarded by success. But at length the crew were called aft, and by the captain were thus addressed. "I am grieved that your rights are thus torn from you; and I pity you for the suffering that ensues. The remedy for this most evidently is liberty, real, perfect liberty. I can no longer be a partaker of this injustice,

and therefore your liberty I give you. From this moment you are free."

"They were pleased at the novelty. The stores were plundered, every one taking according to his strength. During his hour at the helm each man acted as he chose. The repair of the rigging and other work was carelessly done, or was neglected altogether; and soon the bulwarks were washed away, and the foretopmast fell by the side.

"Ere long on the calmest morning of the season, the high coast of Terra del Fuego was seen stretching across their course at no great distance in the direction of the rising sun. Confusion was arrested by fear; and the few almost hopeless means of escape were unnoticed. As they slowly made progress towards the rocks, where the waves are always beating as they do in no other sea, he, under whose care they had been, heard shouted in his presence, "Do you call this liberty? Was it freedom that you gave? better have done your duty."

Slavery is sometimes said to be wrong in principle. A straight rule applied to a plain surface readily gives the measure; but not so with a surface irregularly waving and studded with pits and protuberances. Other instruments must then be used; and the problem is long and complex. So, the principle that every man should be left to follow his own inclinations, is a rule both simple and pleasing, and one that doubtless would apply most excellently in some Utopian land; but it cannot bend to the rough asperities that here beset us, and it is nowhere followed, though often flourished in political speeches.

In the states most forward in boasting of liberty, it is deemed proper often to restrain it. The incompetent and the young feel the authority of the more capable members of their own families, or if left to themselves they manifest the need of proper coercion; also the idle and vicious are confined to houses of correction or other prisons, and every offence or failure in duty is considered

legitimate ground for imposing more or less restraint on the person's freedom, if justice could be strictly executed. Even the mere disposition to do wrong is not disregarded; malice aforethought augments the blame of a crime. In strictness of principle, the least disposition to do wrong, or to fail in the right, is worthy of punishment. Though the tribunals of men are incompetent to enforce justice completely, no alteration of principle thence ensues. In strictness of principle, no one has the right of following his own way who is disposed to go wrong. A tiger has no right to walk free in the streets of Boston; and to our authorities there is given some power to curb tiger-like men, even before the commission of any indictable act. None are more eager to enforce all preventive laws than the bulk of the free-soil party.

There are persons who suppose the number not large of those who are rightly disposed at all times, or at any time in all respects. There are persons too who say, *Fiat justitia, ruat coelum*, let full justice be strictly done, though destruction instantly follow. Well it is for themselves that no magistrate can rationally attempt it.

Originally the slaves were amenable to justice because idle and vicious. Being so constantly, they were constantly amenable, "filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity." When a whole nation is delinquent, is it less deserving of punishment than a wretched individual? But who has the right to bring them to justice and reform? and who has the right to rescue a man floundering in deep water? In the latter case, any who happen to have the power; and in the former, why not any nation possessed of the power, enterprise and other qualifications requisite? If any such nation there be, why is it not that nation's imperious duty to give their attention to the work without delay? and what can be more unjust than to neglect it? Why ought it not

to use sufficient force mildly to reduce them to subjection, superintend all their affairs minutely, persuade and compel them to act as they should, and so from the first confer benefits previously unknown? When at length the work of civilization is half completed; when faults are still constantly present with them, which in principle render them unworthy of following their own ways; would it be just to leave them to their own care, and permit them to fall back to barbarism? The correctness of any principle may well be questioned, the following of which would reduce them from a secure state of improvement; and some flaw may well be suspected in any special pleading that would consign them to the certain evils and doubtful benefits of emancipation. The errors appear, first, in the dreams of those who imagine liberty attainable, though themselves continually burdened by the irremovable chains that hamper them; and second, in their arguments for the gift of that unattainable object to those, who from their disposition and doings are like others unworthy of it, and therefore have not the right to it, if strict principles be regarded.

The advantages of the proposed gift are exaggerated. Emancipation is not rescue from bondage, but the substitution of one government for another, whether more just, more agreeable, and attended with fewer abuses, would depend less on the formalities of that government, than on the character of those concerned, people, chiefs and neighbors.

Every one who in fact stands in the place of a sovereign has a duty to perform, whether he be voter, parent, master mechanic, or any other in any manner established. It is not his duty in all cases to resign his power as soon as received; but often he should retain it, and act with energy and justice to urge his dependants forward if they fail, and to punish when they offend, acting without tyranny, with due mildness, and due severity. The

strong should often assist the weak; and the weak and vicious require somewhat more than mere assistance.

It has not yet been clearly manifested that the men of the north are anxious for their labor to be increased, and its profitable returns be lessened, in order that the southern blacks may live in idleness generally refusing their share both of bodily and mental labor. Such to the former would undoubtedly be the consequence of living associated in the same nation or neighborhood with an emancipated, half civilized population like the latter.

When a people are living under a government more suitable than any other which they are capable of receiving, it is clear that it should be supported by all concerned, however disagreeable some of its provisions may be to the governed or to others. No less clearly it is for the general interest that it should be supported; and that those who desire its overthrow should not succeed. Especially should they not succeed, when the best, that could be substituted in its place, would inevitably in its working be more unjust in many respects and otherwise inferior at present, and probably in future would be less adapted to promote their progress in the proper direction. Therefore for the purpose of preventing a revolution that will prove deeply disastrous to all concerned, it becomes us to consider the expediency of making a treaty with Great Britain, for them to restore all slaves who may hereafter escape to their dominions.

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ADDRESS

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REV. W. A. HOOPER.

THE YOUNG MEN OF AMERICA—their noble Inheritance—their excellent Opportunities—their grave Responsibilities, and their peculiar Dangers.

*Young Gentlemen of the
Columbian and Monongalian Literary Societies :*

While conscious of no little diffidence in undertaking to perform the duty to which you have so kindly invited me, I can assure you that I do, nevertheless, feel a warm and cordial sympathy with you as students. The years that have passed since I, too, was a student at academy or college have been too few and too fleeting for me to forget the peculiarities of your situation, the studies that engage your attention, and the desires, aspirations, and hopes that fill your hearts. Well do I remember the keen zest, the lively excitement, the generous emulation of the class-room, the society-hall, and the contest, and how eagerly I threw myself into the arena of competition and strife for prizes and honors. Well do I recollect the intense satisfaction that I enjoyed in communing with my instructors on the most delightful and ennobling subjects, and in being introduced by them to the familiar acquaintance of the historians and poets, of the orators and philosophers, of the heroes and martyrs of ancient history—the wisest and best men of every country and every age. It requires, therefore, but little effort of imagination to transport myself across the narrow space of a very few intervening years, and to place myself on a common footing with you, having the same eager desires, youthful impulses and intellectual employments that you now have.

The feelings that I have, in thus glancing backward over my school days, are at once peculiar and delightful; and while I do, and ever will, remember with pleasure the excitement and zest of studies and competition for prizes and honors, and the roseate hue of hope and glory with which all the future appeared to be gilded, I can not but think now, that my views of life then were too fanciful and unreal for the great, practical purposes of human existence in this busy, stirring, energetic age. Slowly, however, under the influence of the sober, practical realities of life, these fanciful ideas have vanished, and truer views and trusts of life taken their place. Now, I would have you, young gentlemen, anticipate this mature period of human life, and form, even now, true and just views of the sober, practical world into which you expect shortly to enter, and of the difficulties you will encounter, the labors you will have to perform, the struggles that you will have to make in your future lives. You will excuse me, then, from any hazardous attempts at brilliancies of diction and oratory, with the view of tickling your fancy and of stirring your sensibilities. My object is not merely to please, but also to instruct and benefit you—to utter, from a sincere heart, some earnest words about things that concern you as young men, soon to enter upon the responsibilities and labors of life—things that link themselves closely with your individual interests and outward relations—things upon which I cannot but feel you must reflect if you would honorably acquit yourselves in the great life-conflict through which we are all passing. Allow me, then, to announce as my theme—THE YOUNG MEN OF AMERICA, THEIR NOBLE INHERITANCE, THEIR EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITIES, THEIR GRAVE RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THEIR PECULIAR DANGERS.

I. CONSIDER THE NOBLE INHERITANCE TO WHICH THE YOUNG MEN OF AMERICA ARE THE HEIRS, AND OF WHICH THEY ARE SOON TO BECOME THE POSSESSORS.

Such an inheritance, young gentleman, as this, whether we consider its vast extent, its unexampled growth, its inexhaustible resources, or its teeming population, no other rising generation in the world's history ever received from its forefathers.

1. *Think of its vast extent.* What a mighty sweep of territory? What millions upon millions of square miles are embraced within its boundaries? How gigantic are its proportions compared with the size of many of even the largest kingdoms of Europe? Why, the great empire of France is not so large by more than twenty-five thousand square miles as the single State of Texas. The empire of Aus-

tria, with the two kingdoms of Italy and Prussia, would altogether only make *four* such States as California, Oregon, Kansas, and Wisconsin. And even the colossal empire of Russia might be set down west of the Mississippi, and there be room to spare beside. Considered in its national outline, our country comprises three grand groups of States—the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Central or Valley States. Anticipating some territorial divisions soon to be made, and overlooking the temporary difference between States and Territories, we have sixteen Atlantic, eight Pacific, and twenty-four Central—forty-eight in all, embracing an area of more than three millions of square miles! An intelligent conception of this immense extent of territory is almost impossible. Figures avail but little to give us a just idea of it. We can, it is true, estimate it in square miles; but, like our measurements of the distance to the fixed stars, our minds are oppressed and confused by the attempt to conceive of an extent of territory so prodigious. An adequate idea of its vastness may perhaps best be obtained by comparison. And when I tell you that all Europe, with its *fifty-four empires, kingdoms, principalities, duchies, and other states*, is but a trifle larger than our own national domain, you will perceive that in respect to its extent, at least, yours is a noble inheritance.

2. *Think of its unexampled growth.* The lifetime of nations is ordinarily counted by *centuries*! But ours has passed but little the allotted period of human life—its four-score years, and yet, what astonishing progress!—what unexampled growth! See our country as it appeared only four generations ago, when the Pilgrims of Plymouth and the colonists of Jamestown landed at our shores. Then it was an unbroken wilderness, inhabited by savages and wild beasts. Scarcely a vessel visited its shores. Not a sail cheered its inland waters. Not a city was to be found in all its broad extent. To the rest of the world it was practically an unknown land. Look at it again when the thirteen feeble colonies threw off their allegiance to the mother country, published to the world their “Declaration of Independence,” and took their place in the scale of nations as an independent State. Inherently weak, and trembling with exhaustion from eight years of terrible strife with the gigantic power of England, the new republic could scarcely stand alone. But behold it now, standing in the foremost ranks of the nations of the earth—leading them, indeed, in all that constitutes enterprise, progress, and greatness; respected and feared by them all, and serving at once as the source and the bulwark of all that is most pure, generous, free and

happy in modern civilization! Thirteen States have increased to forty-eight, including the Territories. Three millions of people have increased to forty millions. When our fathers come to these shores, they were poor; one small vessel carried them and all their fortunes. There is now an amount of wealth not less than fifteen thousand millions of dollars. They came to a wilderness; there was not a city worthy of the name from ocean to ocean. There are now about one hundred and twenty cities of considerable size; the largest containing within itself and suburbs nearly a million of people, and full a dozen containing more than one hundred thousand souls. When they came there were no schools; now there are more than ninety thousand public schools, more than six thousand academies, to say nothing of one hundred and sixty colleges and theological seminaries. When they came there were no churches; there are now forty thousand churches dedicated to the worship of God, with accommodations for not less than fifteen millions of people. This progress is, indeed, astonishing—this growth, unexampled, when the brief space of time in which it has all been made is duly considered. There is nothing like it in the history of the world. Until you come to our own country, there has been but one nationality worth speaking of, set up during the last thousand years—Russia. The great forces that now exist on the earth are the growth of ages. America alone is an exception. It has grown to its present prodigious size within a comparatively few years.

3. *Think of its inexhaustible resources.* We can, indeed, but think of them. To estimate them were impossible. They really transcend all power of intelligent conception. We have only begun to develop them, and enormous as they appear from discoveries already made, new revelations of their richness and extent are being made every day. Why, the coal fields of our country, so far as already known, cover an area of at least two hundred and fifty thousand square miles—a space broader and longer than the empire of France, and containing fuel amply sufficient for the world for two thousand years. The supply of iron seems almost as inexhaustible. Saying nothing about the immense deposits of this valuable ore in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Michigan and Ohio, there are in Missouri two considerable mountains that are composed almost entirely of iron: one, "Pilot Knob," containing, as is supposed from careful computation, thirteen millions, nine hundred and seventy-two thousand, seven hundred and seventy-three tons of pure iron; the other, "Iron Mountain," containing of the same

metal, two hundred and thirty millions, one hundred and eighty-seven thousand, three hundred and seventy-five tons. These mountains have been discovered within only a few years; how many more there may be of equal or greater magnitude there is no knowing. And what shall we say of the gold of California and of the silver of Nevada?—what *can* we say that would be equal to the glowing representations of reliable scientific gentlemen who have explored these States, and who have come home with the conviction, that the silver and gold already found is but a tithe to the vast amounts of these precious metals that may yet, and will yet, be brought to light by enterprising miners with proper machinery. Time would fail me were I to attempt to speak adequately of the availability of our country for agricultural purposes, and the immensely great and ever enlarging resources we have in the three great staples—wheat, corn and cotton—products raised by us in such prodigious quantities as both to supply all our own necessities and furnish the material for an extensive and lucrative commerce.

4. *Think of its teeming and ever-increasing population.* There is not another movement of modern civilization so remarkable and prophetic as the rapidity with which our country is filling with people. It is positively astounding to witness the vast tide of human beings that is incessantly pouring into our land from every quarter of Europe. The good and the bad, the intelligent and the ignorant, the grossly superstitious and the sneeringly infidel, the poor exile and sharp speculator, along with the industrious artizan, all are swelling on these shores in a constantly augmenting stream. And there is nothing in the physical condition of this country to check this living tide for centuries to come, but there is everything to encourage it. There are vast regions yet unoccupied, and vaster resources yet to be developed. It is almost overwhelming to contemplate the prospective millions who are to inhabit this broad land. We have now forty millions of people in the United States; and, at the present rate of increase, within the life-time of some of you, young gentlemen, we shall have one hundred millions, or three-fifths as many more as we now have! You smile, and shaking your head incredulously at this, inquire whether it is possible for the land to hold and comfortably sustain so many? I answer, "yes, and more than five times as many more." Do you doubt it? Here, then, are the figures. The territory of the United States contains, as has been said, more than three millions of square miles. Deducting from this, for those portions not susceptible of cultivation, one-third of the whole—a large allowance, we

have yet remaining an area of more than two millions of square miles, adapted to the highest agricultural improvement. "On the soil of Massachusetts, in 1850, there were more than one hundred and thirty-seven inhabitants, on an average, to every square mile. When, therefore, the whole country shall have become as densely settled only as Massachusetts, the United States will contain two hundred and seventy-four millions of souls. But a large part of our soil is much better than that of Massachusetts. Its average excellence is fully equal to that of France. The population of France is now more than two hundred and seventy-eight to the square mile. This density in the United States will give *five hundred and fifty-six millions* as the number of inhabitants which this country is capable of sustaining with entire comfort. Doubtless *this* estimate falls short of the actual capacities of our soil under the perfected arts and inventions of our people. But we are not seeking *possibilities*, but *certainly*. It is, therefore, as certain as any event lying in the future and known only by the power of human reasoning, that, unless wasted by an angry Providence—unless given over to the blight of unbridled sin, the limit of *five hundred and fifty millions* of people—more than twice the present population of Europe, and fourteen times our own present population—will be reached in this country in *one hundred years from this day*. It will not do to set this down to the hyperbole of American declamation, and dismiss it with a smile as a specimen of spread-eagle oratory. It is a sublime and portentous *fact* which every American citizen—particularly every American youth—should solemnly ponder. This vast country, young gentlemen, with its brilliant *prestige*, its inexhaustible resources, its enormous wealth, its teeming population, is your inheritance, along with the other young men of America. Is it not, indeed, a noble one? Aye, it is—noble in all that constitutes vast extent, a glorious history, mighty resources, and numerous people—*nobler, in this respect, than any that ever a rising generation received from its forefathers! And it is yours!* To it you are now the heirs, and of it you will soon become the possessors. In a little while, according to the ordinary course of nature, the generation of *men* that now holds the power, owns the wealth, works the resources, and guides the destinies of this mighty nation, will be dead, and the on-coming generation of young men will succeed to its place.

II. CONSIDER THE EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITIES THAT THE YOUNG MEN OF AMERICA WILL ENJOY IN THE POSSESSION OF SUCH AN INHERITANCE.

Never, in the history of the world, was there a finer field

open to talent, to enterprise, to energy, than that one into which you are soon to enter. It glows with the most inspiring hope. Opportunities of winning fame, or riches, or political power, of very invaluable character, are far more numerous in this fair, favored land than in any country the sun ever shone on. There is positively no limit to the gratification, on the part of any and every one, of the highest ambition, that comes not in conflict with our national constitution. "One of the great principles, lying at the foundation of our government, is that of perfect equality of political rights. It sanctions no inherent or hereditary claim of superiority of one man over another. It sanctions no distinctions, except those founded upon superior worth and talent. And, as every citizen has a voice in the designation of public agents, so all have an equal right to be made the subject of official preferment. In so far as office leads to honor and distinction, the way that leads to it is open to all. There is none so humble or obscure, that he may not laudably aspire to, and honorably compete for, the highest public stations. And here I cannot forbear the remark, that the practical operation of our republican system is beautifully illustrated by the fact, that, from our earliest history, a large proportion of those who have been most conspicuous in the various departments of science, theology, jurisprudence and politics, have risen from the humbler walks of life. If we pass in review the most distinguished statesmen, jurists and preachers of this day—those who have attained the highest eminence in the estimation of their country, and shared most largely in its honors—it will be found that by far the most of them have been the artificers of their own fortunes, and have risen by their own talents and merit, independent of the adventitious circumstances of wealth, or family, or hereditary respectability." Here, then, in this fact, we have the proof that the young men of America do enjoy opportunities of promotion and honor of an exceedingly rare and invaluable character—such opportunities, indeed, as the young men of no other nation under Heaven possess. Such golden opportunities they have had ever since the foundation of our government, and such they may still enjoy so long as our republican institutions continues to exist.

In the providence of God, however, a particular and momentous juncture sometimes occurs in the history of a nation, that furnishes opportunities of advancement and honor of an *extraordinary* character, and makes it a comparatively *easy* thing for a man of energy to gain success and win renown. It is that particular juncture of happy and

propitious events that Shakspeare describes, when he says:

"There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune."

Such a juncture as this is, I firmly believe, just now occurring to this nation—one in which there is a concurrence of several most fortunate and auspicious events of such magnitude as to form a new epoch in our country's history, and to send it forward on the track of national greatness and glory with new impulse and momentum. The "*tide*" of our national prosperity is just now "*at the flood*," and those who are so fortunate as to live now do enjoy, by reason of this fact, opportunities of a most extraordinary and invaluable character for embarking on the way "*to fortune*." "*Upon such a full sea are you now afloat*," young gentlemen. Your entrance upon the responsibilities and labors of life will be at a juncture of such auspiciousness and brilliant promise, as never happened before in our national history—never in the history of the world. The ship that now, with rudder fixed and sails spread, "*takes the current when it serves*," and is borne onward in its voyage with the outsetting tide, sails "*on to fortune*." The mighty struggles of our late civil war over, slavery forever abolished, and the national authority restored in all our borders, the country seems to be instinct with new life to be inspired with a loftier purpose and nerved with a mightier energy than ever. Never before was enterprise so active and vigorous as now. Never were men so intent and eager in all the activities of secular life. Never were bolder schemes devised, or more colossal works executed. These facts, considered in connection with the tide of immigration that is setting toward our shores from the countries of the old world—a tide that is swelling in volume every day, make it evident that we are commencing a new era in our national existence. You are living, young gentlemen, near the fountain-head of tremendous influences. You are coming on the stage of action at a most fortunate juncture of our nation's history—a juncture whence are springing, quick as lightning, exceedingly rare and valuable opportunities for gaining success and winning renown in arena of human life. Do you realize this momentous fact? Have you discerned the signs of the times? Do you know the value of the noble inheritance to which you are now the heirs, and of which you will soon be the possessors? And do you appreciate the golden opportunities of success, advancement, and honor it affords you—*thrusts upon you*, indeed, in this auspicious period of our national history? Never, I tell you, were such opportunities ever enjoyed

before! not by the young men of the old world; for, excepting a small and privileged class, they are practically shut out from access to the path to honor and greatness: not by the young men of any former generation of this country; for, great as their advantages have been, they were not so fortunate as to live, as you do, at a period in our history, when a gigantic political and social revolution has communicated a mighty impulse to our national life, and sent it forward on the track of greatness and glory with greatly increased momentum; and when new enterprises were being inaugurated, new avenues to wealth being opened up, new opportunities for promotion and honor being offered, in variety, number, and splendor, such as the country nor the world has ever seen before! But,

III. CONSIDER THE GRAVE RESPONSIBILITIES THAT REST UPON THE YOUNG MEN OF AMERICA IN THE POSSESSION OF SUCH AN INHERITANCE, AND IN THE ENJOYMENT OF SUCH OPPORTUNITIES.

It may be laid down as a moral axiom, that advantage always implies responsibility, and that the responsibility imposed is always commensurate with the advantage enjoyed. This is a principle on which God acts universally: not only as the judge of "quick and the dead" at the last day, but also as the Governor of the world now. "*To whom much is given, of them much shall be required.*" This being so, what mighty responsibilities rest upon the young men of America to-day, growing out of the possession of so noble an inheritance and the enjoyment of such rare and invaluable opportunities as they now have! Such tremendous interests so shortly to devolve upon them, how vast and mighty their responsibility! how needful for discharging it aright is intellectual and moral training of the highest order?—and how intent and earnest they should be to fully prepare themselves to grapple with the stupendous social and political problems which they will be called to solve? Believe me, young gentlemen, there is a gigantic work to be done in this country during the next half century, that will require the highest order of talent, the most consummate wisdom, and the most untiring diligence that were ever applied to the solution of any problem, or the performance of any task. Think of the perplexities and difficulties of the work of adjusting our national polity, so as to make the machinery of our republican government work smoothly and efficiently in the *new situation* into which the force of a mighty social and political revolution thrust the country. Think of the many conflicting claims of those two portions of the country lately arrayed against each other in terrible civil war, and of the exceeding difficulty

that the wisest and best men of the nation have felt in attempting to adjust and satisfy those claims. Think of the three millions of freedmen so recently emancipated by the government, and of the hard questions of political economy and moral responsibility which this action has thrust upon the people for solution. Think of the abnormal condition of our national finance, and of the consummate wisdom and exquisite skill required to bring the currency of the country back to a specie basis, without precipitating ruin upon the land. Think what a heterogeneous mass of human beings, from all grades of society, from all quarters of Europe, with every variety of false religious and political theories and prepossessions, is constantly flowing to our shores, and how wise and skilful must be the legislation that will harmonize these conflicting elements in the bosom of our republican and protestant society, and make them coalesce with our native American population in a healthy and advantageous manner. These mighty questions, young gentlemen, are, as yet, all unsettled. You may depend upon it, they will be handed down to you, in common with the other young men of America, for your study, and, if possible, solution. You are born to this high responsibility, and nothing but death will free you from it. The force of events, now rapidly culminating, will thrust the consideration and decision of these momentous questions upon you in a very little while. For their solution, depend upon it, you will need intellectual power and practical sagacity of the very highest order. There will be need of *giants* in those days. Make the best, I pray you, therefore, of your happy advantages, and of your excellent opportunities. Let the golden moments of your youth be filled up with diligent and earnest attempts to qualify yourself for your high responsibilities. Accept, and act upon, the solemn fact, that the solution of these great social, political, and financial problems will largely devolve upon you and the other young men of America, who shall be, during the next half century, on the stage of action, and prepare yourselves by a thorough education, by extensive reading, and by forming habits, thought, and reflection, to grapple with them in good earnest. Do not, I pray you, dismiss this subject from your minds with saying—"let the future take care of itself." Do not adopt the chilling philosophy of one who affirmed, that as posterity had done nothing for us, we are under no obligation to provide for posterity! Such a doctrine, young gentlemen, is unworthy of the age—unworthy of the high lineage of which we boast—unworthy of the Pilgrims, who endured such toils and privations in planting the germ of

this great empire—unworthy of those political martyrs, who poured out their blood that they might transmit this heritage to unborn and unnumbered millions. We must act well our part in this grand experiment of a free government. We must hand down to posterity the rich bequest which we enjoy—not only undiminished, but greatly increased in value. The future spreads out before us with a degree of interest and brilliant promise which the laboring mind struggles in vain to appreciate; and conscience, reason, patriotism, and the voice of God, call earnestly on us to provide for that future. And it is for the present generation of young men to say what that future shall be—whether our free institutions, chastened, purified, and elevated by the benign influences of learning and religion, shall be handed down unimpaired to posterity—and whether the teeming millions that are to occupy our widely extended territory, shall sustain the character of virtuous and enlightened republicans, or, degenerating into the licentiousness of a corrupt civilization, shall call down upon the nation the withering curses of Jehovah, and it, like the doomed nations of antiquity, be known only in the records of the historian. Graver responsibilities, therefore, devolve upon you, young gentlemen, in common with the other young men of America, than ever, in the history of the world, rested on a rising generation of youth. Never before has the experiment of a republican form of government been tried on so grand a scale, and in circumstances at once so favorable and unfavorable—so auspicious and threatening—so full of brilliant promise, and yet of terrible foreboding.

Never before were such tremendous interests staked on the result of any trial, as are involved in the issue of the grand experiment that we are now making of the practicability of self-government. Never before did a nation pass through a more momentous crisis than that through which we are now passing. Never has such a multitude of questions—questions social, political, financial, and moral—questions, many of them vital to the very existence of government, and very difficult, at the same time, to answer—been precipitated upon a people for solution, as have been precipitated upon us by the mighty revolution from which we have just emerged. Never, therefore, did a generation of young men succeed to the possession and control of a country under circumstances of deeper interest and of graver responsibility, than those under which the present generation of the young men of America will soon enter upon the possession, and assume the control, of this country.

IV. CONSIDER THE PECULIAR DANGERS TO WHICH THE YOUNG MEN OF AMERICA ARE EXPOSED IN THE POSSESSION AND CONTROL OF SUCH AN INHERITANCE.

To turn from a contemplation of the vast extent, the unexampled growth, the inexhaustible resources, and the teeming population of that noble inheritance of which you, young gentlemen, in common with the other young men of America, will soon have possession and control, to a consideration of the peculiar dangers to which you and they will then be exposed, is, neither to you nor to me, a pleasant thing. As Americans, we are accustomed to scout the very idea of danger. "Our destiny is manifest—our glory is inevitable,"—thus we are accustomed to talk. It is pleasant to talk thus, and it is unpleasant to talk otherwise. Yet we ought to desire to see and know the truth. If there be dangers, to shut our eyes to them because a contemplation of them is disagreeable, would be both a folly and a crime. Is our destiny, then, manifest? Is our glory inevitable? Has God so conspicuously favored us, that he cannot but continue to bless? Ah! it is one of our great national follies to think so. So far from our prospects being cloudless and brilliant, there are dangers, which if duly estimated, would make us shudder in view of our possible or probable future—dangers to which our young men, who are the strength and the hope of the nation, are particularly exposed—dangers growing out of some of the peculiarities of their national character, out of the vast extent and the prodigious wealth of their inheritance, out of their growing habits of extravagance and luxury in common with the rest of our population, out of the myriads of infidel and licentious publications that flood the land, out of the prevalence of party strife and corruption, and out of many other pernicious and destructive influences.

1. *There is danger of the young men of America failing, from love of ease and pleasure, or from an overweening confidence in their own native abilities, to thoroughly qualify themselves for their grave responsibilities and high destiny.* The national character and habits of a large proportion of our young men are not such, I am sorry to say, as are calculated to inspire hope for the future. The cant expression—"Young America"—describes too truthfully the precocity, the forwardness, the extravagance, the recklessness that characterizes a large part of them. As a general thing, they live too fast and too high; they are too little accustomed to habits of self-restraint, self-denial, and self-command; they are too apt to be carried away with sudden impulses and to think themselves equal to any responsibility and competent to any task.

The disposition to run to these excesses is constantly increased, too, by the general "fastness" of the age, the abundance of money, and by the increased momentum given to every department of our national life by the force of the mighty revolution through which we have just passed. A thousand different influences, indeed, coming from as many different quarters, conspire to hurry us along, with ever accelerated speed, in the path of extravagance, luxury, and "fast living." Conscious of great strength, possessed of prodigious wealth, and firmly believing that our destiny is manifest, we will not recognize the existence of danger, or the propriety of sober reflection, or the wisdom of self-restraint and self-command; but rush fearlessly and thoughtlessly on in our eager chase of the excitements and follies of the day. It is needless to say that the formation of such a character and of such habits is not calculated to qualify our young men for coping with the tremendous responsibilities so shortly to devolve upon them. The danger of their forming just such a character and just such habits, and of slighting, in consequence, these tremendous responsibilities is, I am convinced, one of the greatest dangers to which they and the country are exposed.

2. *The moral character of the young men of America is in great danger of sustaining infinite damage from the myriads of licentious and infidel publications with which an untrammelled press, in Europe and America, is flooding this free land.* The peril to our young men from this quarter can scarcely be overestimated—so invidious is it in its workings, and so fatal in its consequences! I hesitate not to declare boldly, that no greater calamity can befall a nation, than that the moral character of its youth generally should suffer serious damage; and I declare as boldly, that nothing will more surely lead to this, than a general reading, on the part of our youth, of the licentious and infidel publications that are turned off in thousands by the press of our own country, and that are brought over by ship-loads from Europe, and scattered broadcast over the land. These books, many of them at least, are pregnant of irreligion, of infidelity, and even of atheism; and the living fruits they bring forth are terrible to behold. Would you know what these fruits are? You may witness them in the turbulence, the anarchy, and the fearful massacres of the great French revolution; for it is believed, on good grounds, that the writings of Rousseau, Voltaire, and Mirabeau were more effective than any other cause in producing this mighty convulsion in France. And who can tell to what extent the dissoluteness and licentiousness, so fearfully characteristic of modern French society, may be

indebted for their existence to the productions of such men as Eugene Sue, George Sand, Alexander Dumas, and Victor Hugo?—men whose writings exert a most pernicious influence in corrupting the minds of youth and undermining the foundations of public virtue and morality, by throwing an air of romance around libertinism, profligacy, and crime—the certain effect of which is to sink religion and exalt vice. Precisely a similar effect would be produced upon our American society should these books, or others of a kindred character, come to be generally read by our young men. We are already, indeed, beginning to reap the bitter fruits of our familiarity with them, in the abounding immorality and vice of high life and low life in our larger cities; in the persistent attempts that have been made of late to overthrow the sanctity of the Sabbath, and abrogate all laws requiring its observance; in the enormous number of divorces granted annually, and the great facility with which they are obtained; and in the numerous infidel clubs of young men established in every quarter of the land.

3. *There is danger that the moral character of the young men of America may be corrupted by the intrigues, the falsehoods, and the frauds of party strife for ascendancy and power in the government of the country.* In no other nation does partizan spirit run so high as in this; and in no other is it productive of such great evil. There is positively no estimating the damage done to morals and religion in the excitement, strife, and struggle of political parties in our great national contests. To this danger our young men are particularly exposed. Quick, impulsive, earnest, ambitious of distinction and honor, and carried away with an imaginary patriotism, they easily become influenced with partizan zeal, and throw themselves into the arena of political strife with an ardor that knows no bounds. At such times the triumph of party becomes the paramount consideration, and everything that tends to promote this end is freely and unscrupulously used. Patriotism, morals, and religion are, for the time being, almost wholly lost sight of; and intrigue, falsehood, and fraud rule the issues of the hour. The inevitable result of such principles and practices is to break down the barriers of honesty in both private and public life, and to undermine the very foundations of national virtue—thus doing incalculable damage to both morals and religion. There is nothing so essential to the growth and prosperity of a republic, as public virtue and morality; there is nothing so fatal to the existence of these qualities of national life, as the intrigue, the falsehood, and the fraud that are born of party strife for political ascendancy and power; and

there is nothing that threatens so greatly, as these things, to arrest our prosperity, and extinguish our existence, as a nation. A people may trample upon civil law and violate its own constitution, and continue to exist and prosper. But no people has ever yet trampled upon the laws of God with impunity. Other evils may exist in a nation, and it flourish in spite of them; but no nation has ever flourished—none *can* flourish—at the sacrifice of public virtue and morality. Truth and falsehood, purity and corruption, honesty and fraud, will not—*cannot*—continue side by side in perpetual peace and coalescence. They do it *nowhere*! There is no instance in all history where religion and irreligion have advanced side by side for a long period of time. The supremacy of public virtue and morality *must be maintained at all hazards*, or, “pride, ambition, luxury, sensuality, profaneness, blasphemy—frightfully intermingling with poverty, crime, debasement, guilt, and shame—will lash with a whip of scorpions the enslaved and abject population.”

“Such is the moral of all human tales,
 ’Tis but the same rehearsal of the past:—
 First freedom, then glory,—when that fails,
 Wealth, vice, corruption, barbarism at last,
 And history with all her volumes vast,
 Hath but *one* page.”

For examples of this, we need not go to the crumbling ruins of ancient Greece and Rome. We may find them in abundance on this very continent, all over which there are scattered the memorials of a fallen greatness and vanished glory that are full of instruction and warning to us, treading as we do in the footsteps of the perished nations that have left their memorials, which, like Charles the First addressing from the scaffold the soldiers and adherents of Cromwell, raise the admonitory finger, and speak the one word of warning—“*Remember.*” They are the gigantic graves of some strange and unknown people; the barbaric fortresses of defensive and offensive war, grand enclosures for traffic or pleasure; lofty temples of their idolatrous worship. These hoary messengers of a far-off age utter their admonitory voice in our ears to-day. They bid us mark how, on this very continent, where we are now trying the experiment of self-government, and attempting to maintain a national existence, a mighty civilization has perished so utterly as to leave no tradition even behind. They teach us emphatically that a glorious country, teeming myriads, and a high degree of civilization merely, will not preserve us from a similar destiny. By a law as unerring

and as universal as that of gravitation, that nation must perish, in which the laws of public virtue and morality are generally trampled on, and God's authority set at naught. I care not what else it may have—it may possess vast extent, enormous power, prodigious wealth, a high stage of civilization, and a teeming population, if social extravagance, political corruption, infidelity, and immorality abound it *must* come to an untimely and dishonored end.

Such, young gentlemen, is your noble inheritance, such your excellent opportunities, grave responsibilities and peculiar dangers. Prize, I pray you, that inheritance; embrace those opportunities; feel and worthily perform those responsibilities; and shun, as you would the fangs of a viper, those dangers. So shall you be successful, prosperous and happy as individuals; so will you be an honor and a blessing to your country; so will you maintain its existence among the nations of the world, and hand it down to unborn millions, as the grand bulwark, on this continent, at once of liberty and christianity.

If this humble address shall inspire in your hearts, young gentlemen, a purer patriotism, and send you forth to the responsibilities and labors of life with a firmer resolve to do *your* part, at least, to make our country's history thus beneficent and glorious, I shall be amply repaid for my service to you to-day.

How I Found My Brother

How I Found My Brother



YOU see, it was about like this: I was 'leven years old, going on twelve. Our folks lived at the village of Hudson, McLean County, ten miles from Bloomington, which is in the state of Illinois. My father was a doctor, and being a country doctor did not roll in wealth any to speak of. In those days every one in Illinois was poor, no matter how much land he owned. How-

ever, we owned our farm, had four horses, five cows, a dozen pigs and a flock of hens.

There were always vegetables in the cellar, smoked meat in the wood-shed, and pickled beef in the kitchen. At the back door was a keg of soft soap. In the garret where I slept, in the winter the snow drifted cheerily in thru the cracks and covered the buffalo robes that covered me. But I didn't lie awake nights thinking about it—country boys who work all day begin to pound their ear as soon as they hit the pillow.

I was the only boy, and you know what that is in a family where there are four big sisters! I had to make the garden, milk the cows, bring in wood, and churn. Of course there was a lot of fun about it all—more

than I knew of at the time. In the winter I hunted rabbits with an old army-musket, and brought home so much bunny-meat that the whole family went on a strike, and declared I should study my books more and not hunt rabbits quite so much.

In the spring and fall, when the prairie ponds were full of water, the wild ducks on their regular trips north or south got stop-overs and remained with us a few days—thousands of them—and a few of them neglected to go on. Ducks are harder to kill than rabbits. I used to load the old musket up so heavy that when I would fire it off, if I did not look out sharp, I would get kicked end over end. Then I would get up and look for ducks, and usually they were flying away on “the far and distant horizon,” as the poets say.

In the winter I went to school. We used to play “Anteny Over,” with a yarn ball. That is, we chose sides; one gang stood on one side of the schoolhouse and the other half on the other. You yelled Anteny Over and threw the ball over the schoolhouse. The boy that caught it yelled Anteny Over, but instead of throwing it, he sneaked around the corner and soaked the first fellow he saw, and usually the ball was soaked in water, so when you got hit you knew it. Then the fellow that was hit had to go over on the other side. When the bell rang, the side that had the most men was the winner.

Then we played one-old-cat and three-cornered-cat. Saturdays there were boys playing ball on the prairie

back of the church all day, and if I could sneak away I was usually one of the players. I was a genuine Son of Swat *How I Found My Brother*

This brought me many scoldings, and a few mild lickings, because I neglected my work.

As a ball-player I was a bird—I used to take a piece of a barrel-stave and when that yarn ball came anywhere around I gave it a wallop you could have heard a mile. We pitched underhand, and I could certainly do up the town on pitching as well as crossing 'em out. I became a three-cornered-cat fiend.

Everything that came on the first bound, I gathered in; the flies I caught in my hat. When my big sister played, she used to catch 'em in her apron.

Finally, I almost forgot how to curry a horse, and the girls had to milk the cows, carry in the wood and hunt for the eggs, because I was off playing three-cornered-cat *cat*.

Our folks took two papers, weeklies: the "Baptist Standard" and the "Weekly Pantagraph." I read the "Pantagraph."

Now, one day I saw in the "Weekly Pantagraph" that a man calling himself the agent of the Children's Aid Society of New York was to be in Bloomington the next week with twenty-five children, and that respectable farmers and such who wanted to adopt children should be on hand and make their selection.

I spelled out that item four or five times, and then carried it to my mother asking what it meant. And she

explained to me that these children were orphans, and there were people who had no children of their own, or not as many as they wanted, who adopted them. ¶ And then a great idea came to me—I needed a brother, and here was a chance to get one. The three brothers I once had died while very young, and altho I could remember them but dimly, there were three little mounds in the graveyard that we used to visit on Sunday afternoons, that kept their memory green.

When I suggested going to Bloomington and picking out a brother for myself, my mother tried to laugh, but I saw the tears running down her cheeks, and then she threw her apron over her head and went out to bring the clothes in off the line.

The next day I brought up the subject at the table. Everybody smiled—they thought it was a fine joke. ¶ Father concluded that we had all the children he could feed, but I argued that I got fifty cents a day when they were running the Brown cornsheller for driving on the horse-power, and in harvest-time I could get a dollar a day. If we had another boy, I could work all the time and the other boy could do the chores. “And give you time to play ball,” chimed in my big sister ♣ ♣

I loftily waived her remark, but clung to the argument that I needed a brother.

Sis felt a little sorry for what she had said, so she came over to my side and suggested that these orphan children were sent out for a month first, and then adopted

if all parties were willing. ¶ "Sent on suspicion," said father ♣ ♣

*How I Fought
My Brother*

"It is better than the other way," I argued, "because if you don't like 'em, you don't have to keep 'em, and the other way you can't send 'em back after they have been used."

"The garden work is behind, you know," I continued, "and I can never do it alone."

There was a little more parley with instances by father where orphan boys had set fire to hay-stacks, turned the cows in the corn, stolen chickens, and cooked them on wire fences by making a fire beneath.

But Sis offset all this by naming three adopted boys who not only worked well, but had joined the Baptist Church and been baptized by cutting a hole in the ice in the creek, only a few months before ♣ That last settled it. I was given permission to go and pick out a boy. Father and mother would make no promises—if I could get him on a month's trial, all well and good. ¶ And right there I ceased all agitation and talked of other things ♣ I was afraid the permission would be revoked. Not a peep did I give forth on the subject of brothers, but I thought about it all day and dreamed of it by night. I wanted a brother who could work, who could fight and who could play ball.

The day arrived when the orphans were to be at the Ashley Tavern in Bloomington.

Did I say anything about it?

Not I!

w I Found I was up at daylight without being called. I tried to
My Brother eat breakfast, but had no appetite. So I just made a bluff at it, and then sauntered out into the garden and began to hoe.

Soon father took his saddle-bags and went off to see patients. Mother began baking. The girls started for school ♣ ♣

I ran to the barn, stood in the manger and put a bridle on Ol' Molly and backed her out, first fastening her colt in the box stall ♣ I climbed on her bare back. Instead of taking the road that ran in front of the house, I cut across the fields and struck the creek road a mile out of town. Then I dug my heels into the old mare's sides and gave her the gad.

I rode the ten miles in a little over an hour, jumped off at the court-house, tied the horse and made for the Ashley Tavern.

I knew what I wanted.

I walked into the office, looked around and asked, "Where are them orphans?"

"Parlor—up-stairs," said the clerk.

I climbed the stairs, two steps at a time, and entered the parlor.

It was not yet nine o'clock in the morning, but there the children were—washed, dressed and seated all around the walls of the room.

Several men and women were standing around, looking at the children and talking. Two women in black, and a man with long whiskers and upper lip shaved, seemed

to be in charge of the orphans. ¶ "How old are you, *How I Fo*
sonny?" said an old man to me, patting me on the head. *My Broth*

"'Leven, going on twelve," I answered.

"Can you work?"

"I guess so," I answered.

He called his wife over and they both looked at me earnestly. Then the old man said to one of the widows in black, "We think we will take this one," at the same time giving me another pat on the head.

"I am already took, you'll not get me," I roared, "I'm here to pick out a brother. I want a boy that can work, and who can play ball!"

This centered attention on me. Most everybody laughed, including several of the orphans.

The boys were dressed in gray and the girls in red. They all seemed quite content—not near as miserable as I thought children should be who had no parents. ¶ I walked twice around the room looking at these orphans, just as I had often looked at pigs at the McLean County Fair.

None of them seemed to answer—all were too yellow, and several of them whispered together and made fun of me. I was in my bare feet and they wore shoes and stockings. All at once I saw in the corner a boy with tow-head and freckles. He had settled down in the corner trying to hide. He was so homely he was attractive. I walked over to him, and asked, "Can you work and play ball—I want a brother!"

I did not say anything about fighting for I had suddenly

v I Found noticed he was a hunchback. ¶ He just looked at me
y Brother and gulped, scared-like, he was that embarrassed. "I
want a brother—will you come with me and be my
brother?" I asked. I omitted all qualifications this
time—my heart went out to this boy—he seemed so
scared and half-sick. I could work, fight and play ball
for both ♣ ♣

"Is your name—your name Mudsock?" he whispered.

"No, I'm Bert Hubbard," I said.

"Are you any relation of Si Mudsock?"

"Nobody around us by that name," I answered.

"Then I'll go with you and be your brudder," he
whispered.

He stood up. He only came to my shoulder. "I'm
fifteen," he said as if in apology. "I'm fifteen—I'm
not sick—it was spinal complaint—but I'm all over it
now. I am strong—I can work and I can play ball."

I took him by the hand and led him to the nearest
widow and said, "If you please, Missus, I'll take this
one!" ♣ ♣

Then the woman asked me who I was, where I came
from, who sent me and explained that if my parents
wished to adopt a boy, or take one on probation, they
must come and sign the papers.

Just then in walked Uncle Elihu Rogers. I referred to
him. Uncle Elihu assured them that I was the son of
Doctor Hubbard and that I knew as much as my father,
or thought I did. All the time I held my boy tight by
the hand ♣ ♣

It was finally agreed that if Uncle Elihu would go out and get Dr. Crothers, and both of them would sign for the boy, I could have him on a month's trial, to be adopted then by my parents if they so desired.

Dr. Crothers came over, smiled, asked me a few questions. He then gave me and my new brother each ten cents, and signed the papers.

I walked out of the parlor rapidly, down the stairs and over to the court-house, leading my new-found brother. He carried a bundle tied up in a big red handkerchief. ¶ I unfastened Ol' Molly, climbed up on the hitching-rail, and jumped on her back. ¶ Then I held out my hand, stiffened my foot, and up climbed my brother. He was nimble and strong—I felt better.

As we jogged along I asked, "Why did you ask me if my name was Mudsock?"

"He's the man that had me last—'dopted me—he lives near Peoria. Is that near here? He used me to bat up flies—beat me, starved me, and then when I ran away he tried to get me arrested. He said I stole a horse!"

"Did you?" I asked.

"Never, I just ran away and stole rides on the railroad clear back to New York—it took me six weeks. There they put me in the Home and brought me out West again to be 'dopted. I don't mind being 'dopted by you. I can work, I can—but I want to go to school a little, to read and study and be a man. I like you—but if Mudsock comes for me, what will you do?"

"Kill him," I answered.

v I Found Mother was just putting the dinner on when Ol' Molly,
y Brother Brudder and I reached the front gate.

I led the boy in, holding him by the hand, "I've got him," I announced.

Mother turned and stared. "Who?"

"My brother!"

"What?"

"I've found my brother."

"Land sakes, are you crazy!"

She looked at me and then at the boy. It seemed a full minute *Δ Δ*

Then she walked right over, put her arms around Brudder and kissed him.

THE month of probation passed, and father and mother straightway adopted Brudder, all without any coercion from me. It was very funny—at first they thought it a calamity, then they got to telling the neighbors how they sent me after him.

The lad was alert, obedient, willing. He was grateful for everything; whereas I was a Grabheimer from Grabville.

Again and again my sisters would say to me, "Now, why don't you try to be gentlemanly like Brudder, and not hang your hat on the floor and talk back!"

I had intended to select a boy who looked like myself—this being the highest type I could imagine *Δ* Instead I picked my opposite. I was tall, slender and had black hair and brown eyes. Brudder was short, and

a genuine blond. I was saucy—he was polite. Instead of picking out the strongest and likeliest boy I could find, I chose the smallest, the sickliest, the homeliest one in the bunch. My judgment was in the ditch, and I was carried away on the back of sympathy. It was head against heart, and heart made a home run.

In spite of his physical disability Brudder was very strong, and he could do fully as much work as I. In his books he was a bit deficient, but the girls taught him evenings, and in long division I had to call upon him to help me out. He used to hold the hank of yarn for mother to wind and would do this without either snarling the yarn or mother's temper. Once I heard mother say that Brudder was just like my brother Charley who died when he was nine years old.

We worked together, got jobs at the station unloading lumber, drove on the horse-power and sold corn-cobs to the section men for fuel. Saturday afternoons we played ball. This was Brudder's passion, as well as mine. We found a big chunk of solid rubber on the railroad, that had served its purpose as a car-spring. Or did we work it out of the car with a crowbar? I really can not say. But anyway Brudder got busy cutting out a solid rubber ball with his knife. Very patiently did he work cutting and paring. At last the ball was done. Oh, it was a daisy! With a round club you could knock it a mile. We then quit playing three-cornered-cat, and my Brudder showed us how to play baseball. He sent away and got the "Rules." He was

always sending for catalogues and sample copies of magazines. We made him captain of our team, and when the Bloomington Giants came up to play we beat them forty-nine to twenty-three. We were making plans to go out as professionals when something terrible happened. It was one Saturday afternoon. Brudder had been with us just six months. He and I had dug potatoes hard all morning, and mother had told us we could have the entire afternoon. ♣ We were playing the "Invincibles" from the Normal.

Brudder was pitching, and the way he sent that solid rubber spheroid over the plate and around the plate was marvelous. He could throw a curve that circled the batter's neck—or nearly so. ♣ The "Invincibles" were n't in it. They had a cloth ball with a piece of rubber in the center, but we kicked on that and insisted on our own or nothing. Things were coming our way. I was catching. The way I picked that ball right off the wood was marvelous.

All at once I saw a strange man coming across the diamond with a blacksnake whip in his hand. He was big and had red bushy whiskers. Brudder saw him and turned pale—he was so scared that he just held the ball in his hand and stood first on one foot, then on the other. I was paralyzed.

The big man in his ragged, dirty clothes with his blacksnake whip was walking right toward Brudder, yelling, "So I've found you at last—I've found you at last!" ♣ Brudder ran across the diamond toward the field.

The man followed after him. Suddenly Brudder stopped —his hand with the solid rubber ball shot up, over, around, his knee came up to his chin, and the ball flew forward! . . .

It caught the man square on the mouth. He dropped the whip, threw up his hands, reeled, staggered and fell on his back, the blood streaming from his nose and mouth . . .

The crowd was around him in a minute. We thought he was dead.

Father was sent for and came with his case of instruments ready to cut off a leg, but before he arrived some one had thrown a bucket of water in the man's face. By this time he was sitting up. He had spit out a mouthful of teeth and was trying to talk, asking for that dam boy who tried to murder him, when he had n't done nothing to nobody.

I began looking around for Brudder. He could not be found. No one had seen him. We searched the house, and the barn. We looked in the wheat-bin and under the hay. Then we discovered that our three-year-old bay colt was gone. A scrap of paper in the oats measure told the tale. On it was scrawled:

DEAR BERT: If I killed Mudsock, they will hang me. If I did n't kill him he will kill me, for he says I am his. I have to leave you. When I score I'll pay for the colt. I am not bad—God has forgotten me, that is all.

BRUDDER


IT was a lonely household after Brudder had gone. We thought he would be back in a few days. We put a notice in the "Weekly Pantagraph," but no one had seen my brother. One of our neighbors at church, once said to mother: "So he stole your horse, did he—they are all alike!" And mother said something to the man he did not soon forget. Sunday afternoons we still went up to the graveyard, and I wondered why there were not four mounds instead of three. The graves kind of seemed very near, and dear and close.

Four years passed, and I secured a job in Chicago. I was as big as a man and did a man's work, even if I was only sixteen years old. I was down home on a visit and a letter came. I hold the letter now in my hand as I write. It is yellow and soiled, but still is legible. Here is what it says:

DEAR BERT: Here is a draft for two hundred dollars to pay for the colt. Give it to your father with my love. The horse was worth the money to me, but I had to sell him. I am secretary to the Manager of the White Sox. I get twenty-five dollars a week. I play shortstop. I got a walk to first, then I stole second, and a small bunt put me on third, and I'll not die here. When I score you will hear from me. The Great Umpire, I guess, has n't entirely forgotten me.


Yours truly,
BRÜDDER

I am fifty years old. Brudder is fifty-three. I saw him last week when I lectured at the Academy of Music in Philadelphia. He was right in the front row "rooting,"



The Boy From Missouri Valley

**Being a Preachment by
ELBERT HUBBARD**



**DONE INTO A BOOKLET
BY THE ROYCROFTERS AT
THEIR SHOP WHICH IS IN
EAST AURORA, NEW YORK**

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1904
By Elbert Hubbard**

The Boy From Missouri Valley



ELL, it was n't so very long ago—only about twenty-three years.

I was foreman of a factory, and he lived a thousand miles away, at Missouri Valley, Iowa. I was twenty-four, and he was fourteen. His brother was traveling for the Firm, and one day this brother showed me a letter from the lad in Missouri Valley. The missive was so painstaking, so exact, and revealed the soul of the child so vividly, that I laughed aloud—a laugh that died away to a sigh. ¶ The boy was beating his wings against the bars—the bars of Missouri Valley—he wanted opportunity. And all he got was unending toil, dead monotony, stupid misunderstanding, and corn bread and molasses.

There was n't love enough in Missouri Valley to go 'round—that was plain. The boy's mother had been of the Nancy Hanks type—worn, yellow and sad—and had given up the fight and been

left to sleep her long sleep in a prairie grave on one of the many migrations. The father's ambition had got stuck in the mud, and under the tongue-lash of a strident, strenuous, gee-haw consort, he had run up the white flag.

The boy wanted to come East.

It was a dubious investment—a sort of financial plunge, a blind pool—to send for this buckwheat midget. The fare was thirty-three dollars and fifty cents.

The proprietor, a cautious man, said that the boy was n't worth the money. There were plenty of boys—the alleys swarmed with them.

So there the matter rested.

But the lad in Missouri Valley didn't let it rest long. He had been informed that we did not consider him worth thirty-three dollars and fifty cents, so he offered to split the difference. He would come for half—he could ride on half fare—the Railroad Agent at Missouri Valley said that if he bought a half-fare ticket, got on a train, and explained to the conductor and everybody that he was 'leven, goin' on twelve, and stuck to it, it

would be all right; and he would not expect any wages until he had paid us back. He had no money of his own, all he earned was taken from him by the kind folks with whom he lived, and would be until noon of the day he was twenty-one years old. Did we want to invest sixteen dollars and seventy-five cents in him?

We waxed reckless and sent the money—more than that, we sent a twenty-dollar bill. We plunged!

¶ In just a week the investment arrived. He did not advise when he would come, or how. He came, we saw, he conquered. Why should he advise of his coming? He just reported, and his first words were the Duke's motto: "I am here."

He was unnecessarily freckled and curiously small. His legs had the Greek curve, from much horse-back riding, herding cattle on the prairies; his hair was the color of a Tamworth pig; his hands were red; his wrists bony and briar-scarred. He carried his shoes in his hands, so as not to wear out the sidewalk, or because they aggravated sundry stone-bruises—I don't know which.

"I am here!" said the lad, and he planked down

on the desk three dollars and twenty-five cents. It was the change from the twenty-dollar bill. "Did n't you have to spend any money on the way here?" I asked.

"No, I had all I wanted to eat," he replied, and pointed to a basket that sat on the floor.

I called in the Proprietor, and we looked the lad over. We walked around him twice, gazed at each other, and adjourned to the hallway for consultation.

The boy was not big enough to do a man's work, and if we set him to work in the factory with the city boys, they would surely pick on him and make life for him very uncomfortable. He had a half-sad and winsome look that had won from our hard hearts something akin to pity. He was so innocent, so full of faith, and we saw at a glance that he had been overworked, underfed—at least misfed—and underloved. He was different from other boys—and in spite of the grime of travel, and the freckles, he was pretty as a ground-squirrel.

His faith made him whole: he won us.

But why had we brought him to the miserable and dirty city—this grim place of disillusionment!

“He might index the letter-book?” I ventured.

“That’s it, yes, let him index the letter-book.”

So I went back and got the letter-book. But the boy’s head only came to the top of the stand-up desk, and when he reached for the letter-book on the desk he had to grope for it. I gave him my high-stool, but this was too low.

“I know what to do,” he said. Through the window that looked from the office to the shipping room, he had spied a pile of boxes. “I know what to do!”

In a minute he had placed two boxes end to end, nailed them together, clinched the nails, and carried his improvised high-stool into the office.

“I know what to do!”

And he usually did; and does yet.

We found him a boarding place with a worthy widow whose children had all grown big and flown. Her house was empty, and so was her mother-heart: she was like that old woman in *Rab*, who was placed on the surgeon’s table and

given chloroform, and who held to her breast an imaginary child, and crooned a lullaby to a babe, dead thirty years before.

So the boy boarded with the widow and worked in the office.

He indexed the letter-book—he indexed everything. And then he filed everything—letters, bills, circulars. He stamped the letters going out, swept the office, and dusted things that had never been dusted before. He was orderly, alert, active, cheerful, and the Proprietor said to me one day, “I wonder how we ever got along without that boy from Missouri Valley.”

Six months had passed, and there came a day when one of the workmen intimated to the Proprietor that he better look out for that red-headed office boy

Of course, the Proprietor insisted on hearing the rest, and the man then explained that almost every night the boy came back to the office. He had seen him. The boy had a tin box and letter-books in it, and papers, and the Lord knows what not!

Watch him! ¶ The Proprietor advised with me because I was astute—at least he thought I was, and I agreed with him.

He thought Jabesh was at the bottom of it.

Jabesh was our chief competitor. Jabesh had hired away two of our men, and we had gotten three of his. "Jabe," we called him in derision—Jabe had gotten into the factory twice on pretense of seeing a man who wanted to join the Epworth League or Something. We had ordered him out, because we knew he was trying to steal our "process." Jabe was a rogue—that was sure.

Worse than that, Jabe was a Methodist. The Proprietor was a Baptist, and regarded all Methodists with a prenatal aversion that swung between fear and contempt. The mere thought of Jabe gave us gooseflesh. Jabesh was the bugaboo that haunted our dreams. Our chief worry was that we would never be able to save our Bank Balance alive, for fear o' Jabe.

"That tarnashun Jabe has hired our office boy to give him a list of our customers—he is stealing our formulas, I know," said the Proprietor. "The

cub's pretense of wanting a key to the factory so he could sweep out early, was really that he might get in late."

Next day we watched the office boy. He surely looked guilty—his freckles stood out like sun-spots, and he was more bow-legged than ever. ¶ The workman who had given the clue, on being further interrogated, was sure he had seen Jabe go by the factory twice in one evening.

That settled it.

At eight o'clock that night we went down to the factory. It was a full mile, and in an "objectionable" part of the town.

There was a dim light in the office. We peered through the windows, and sure enough, there was the boy hard at work writing. There were several books before him, a tin box and some papers. We waited and watched him copy something into a letter-book.

We withdrew and consulted. To confront the culprit then and there seemed the proper thing. We unlocked the door and walked softly in. ¶ The boy was startled by our approach, and

still more by our manner. When the Proprietor demanded the letter that he had just written, he began to cry, and then we knew we had him.

¶ The Proprietor took the letter and read it. It was to Jimmy Smith in Missouri Valley. It told all about how the writer was getting on, about the good woman he boarded with, and it told all about me and about the Proprietor. It pictured us as models of virtue, excellence and truth.

But we were not to be put off thus. We examined the letter-book, and alas! it was filled only with news letters to sundry cousins and aunts. Then we dived to the bottom of the tin box, still in search of things contraband. All we found was a little old Bible, a diary, and some trinkets in the way of lace and a ribbon that had once been the property of the dead Nancy Hanks.

Then we found a Savings-Bank Book, and by the entries saw that the boy had deposited one dollar every Monday morning for eleven weeks. He had been with us for six months, and his pay was two dollars a week and board—we wondered what he had done with the rest!

We questioned the offender at length. The boy averred that he came to the office evenings only because he wanted to write letters and get his 'rithmetic lesson. He would not think of writing his personal letters on our time, and the only reason he wanted to write at the office instead of at home, was so he could use the letter-press. He wanted to copy all of his letters—one should be business-like in all things.

The Proprietor coughed and warned the boy never to let it happen again. We started for home, walking silently but very fast.

The stillness was only broken once, when the Proprietor said: "That consarned Jabe! If ever I find him around our factory, I'll tweak his nin-compoop nose, that's what I will do."

Twenty-three years! That factory has grown to be the biggest of its kind in America. The red-haired boy from Missouri Valley is its manager. Emerson says, "Every great institution is the lengthened shadow of a single man."

The Savings-Bank Habit came naturally to that boy from Missouri Valley. In a year he was get-

ting six dollars and board, and he deposited four dollars every Monday. In three years this had increased to ten, and some years after, when he became a partner, he had his limit in The Bank. The Savings-Bank Habit is not so bad as the Cab Habit—nor so costly to your thinkery and wallet as the Cigarette Habit.

I have been wage-earner, foreman and employer. I have had a thousand men on my pay-roll at a time, and I'll tell you this: The man with the Savings-Bank Habit is the one who never gets laid off: he's the one who can get along without you, but you cannot get along without him. The Savings-Bank Habit means sound sleep, good digestion, cool judgment and manly independence. The most healthful thing I know of is a Savings-Bank Book—there are no microbes in it to steal away your peace of mind. It is a guarantee of good behavior.

The Missouri Valley boy gets twenty-five thousand a year, they say. It is none too much. Such masterly men are rare; Rockefeller says he has vacancies for eight now, with salaries no object,

if they can do the work. ¶ That business grew because the boy from Missouri Valley grew with it, and he grew because the business grew. Which is a free paraphrase from Macaulay, who said that Horace Walpole influenced his age because he was influenced by his age.


Jabesh has gone on his Long Occasion, discouraged and whipped by an unappreciative world. Jabe never acquired the Savings-Bank Habit. If he had had the gumption to discover a red-haired boy from Missouri Valley, he might now be sporting an automobile on Delaware Avenue instead of being in Abraham's Bosom.

We shall all be in Abraham's Bosom day after tomorrow; and then I'll explain to Jabesh that no man ever succeeded in a masterly way, excepting as he got level-headed men with the Savings-Bank Habit to do his work. Blessed is that man who has found somebody to do his work.

There is plenty of iron pyrites, but the Proprietor and I know Pay Gravel when we see it.

I guess so!


Elbert Hubbard



The Boy from Missouri Valley

A HUNDRED POINT MAN

BY ELBERT HUBBARD



Done into a Booklet by The Roy-
crofters at their Shop which is in
East Aurora, New York, U. S. A.

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1909
By Elbert Hubbard



THE other day I wrote to a banker-friend inquiring as to the responsibility of a certain person. The answer came back, thus: "He is a Hundred-Point

Hundred
Point Ma.

man in everything and anything he undertakes." I read the telegram and then pinned it up over my desk where I could see it. That night it sort of stuck in my memory. I dreamed of it. The next day I showed the message to a fellow I know pretty well, and said, "I'd rather have that said of me than to be called a great this or that."

Oliver Wendell Holmes has left on record the statement that you could not throw a stone on Boston Common without caroming on three poets, two essayists, and a playwright.

Hundred-Point men are not so plentiful.

¶ A Hundred-Point man is one who is true to every trust; who keeps his word;

Hundred
Point Man

who is loyal to the firm that employs him; who does not listen for insults nor look for slights; who carries a civil tongue in his head; who is polite to strangers, without being "fresh;" who is considerate toward servants; who is moderate in his eating and drinking; who is willing to learn; who is cautious and yet courageous.

¶ Hundred-Point men may vary much in ability, but this is always true—they are safe men to deal with, whether drivers of drays, motor men, clerks, cashiers, engineers or presidents of railroads.

Paranoiacs are people who are suffering from fatty enlargement of the ego. They want the best seats in the synagogue, they demand bouquets, compliments, obeisance, and in order to see what the papers will say next morning, they sometimes obligingly commit suicide.

The paranoiac is the antithesis of the Hundred-Point man. The paranoiac imagines he is being wronged, and that some

one has it in for him, and that the world is down on him. He is given to that which is strange, peculiar, uncertain, eccentric and erratic.

Hundred
Point, M.

The Hundred-Point man may not look just like all other men, or dress like them, or talk like them, but what he does is true to his own nature. He is himself.

He is more interested in doing his work than in what people will say about it. He does not consider the gallery. He acts his thought and thinks little of the act.

I never knew a Hundred-Point man who was not one brought up from early youth to make himself useful, and to economize in the matter of time and money.

Necessity is ballast.

The paranoiac, almost without exception, is one who has been made exempt from work & He has been petted, waited upon, coddled, cared for, laughed at and chuckled to.

The excellence of the old-fashioned big

Hundred
Point Man

family was that no child got an undue amount of attention. The antique idea that the child must work for his parents until the day he was twenty-one was a deal better for the youth than to let him get it into his head that his parents must work for him.

Nature intended that we should all be poor—that we should earn our bread every day before we eat it.

When you find the Hundred-Point man you will find one who lives like a person in moderate circumstances, no matter what his finances are. Every man who thinks he has the world by the tail and is about to snap its demnition head off for the delectation of mankind, is unsafe, no matter how great his genius in the line of specialties.

The Hundred-Point man looks after just one individual, and that is the man under his own hat; he is one who does not spend money until he earns it; who pays his

way; who knows that nothing is ever given for nothing; who keeps his digits off other people's property. When he does not know what to say, why, he says nothing, and when he does not know what to do, does not do it. We should mark on moral qualities not merely mental attainment or proficiency, because in the race of life only moral qualities count. We should rate on judgment, application and intent. Men by habit and nature who are untrue to a trust, are dangerous just in proportion as they are clever. I would like to see a university devoted to turning out safe men instead of merely clever ones.

How would it do for a college to give one degree, and one only, to those who are worthy—the degree of H. P.?

Would it not be worth striving for, to have a college president say to you, over his own signature: "He is a Hundred-Point man in everything and anything that he undertakes!"

TAIREIDO

A NEW REVELATION

Showing
THE TRUE SYSTEM OF LIFE

An
Outline
only



We believe in the nature of Tairei
which consists in being free from
the limitation of time and space,
existence and non-existence.

TAIREI

太

Hand
Writing of
Tanaka
Morihei

靈

甲午年



TANAKA MORIHEI
Founder and Leader of Taireido



TAIREIDO

A SYSTEM OF NEW THOUGHT

1.—A New Idea

The System of Thought and Life known as TAIREIDO is the most original and effective ever revealed to the mind of man. It has come into the life and thought of Japan like a new revelation and now has a far-reaching influence throughout the Empire. It is a Power giving rise to a movement for the complete reconstruction of civilization: to regenerate nations, society, politics, finance, industry, religion, art, morals, the thought and tendency of the age, and all that pertains to social phenomena. The Power and Direction of the thought and movement is REI, or Spirit, obedience to which brings about a new world.

The fundamental basis of this new system of thought is



TAIREIDO, or the Way of the Great Spirit, a new and original evolution of thought, quite independent of any other thought system known to man, and developed from the mind of Mr. Morihei Tanaka, of Tokyo, Japan. Though no more than three years have elapsed since this new revelation came to Mr. Tanaka the new doctrine has been quickly taken up by people everywhere and the disciples of **TAIREIDO** now number thousands. For so brief a time the spread of the new system has been nothing less than marvellous, on account of the fervent devotion of its followers and ardent zeal of their propaganda.

2.—Wonderful Art of Reishi

REISHI is the power of the Great Spirit, **TAIREI**, in action. **TAIREI** is not taught simply as a system of thought: it is the spirit or life at the center of all thought and life. The method of applying this force to life is called **Reishi-jutsu**, or the Art of the Practice of **Reishi**. This Spirit-action is the source of all life and power in the universe: the essence of existence. To appreciate it and to be able to apply it one must be familiar with the science of **Reiri-gaku**, the method by which the action of the Spirit manifests itself in matter, to understand which is to apprehend how every phenomenon originates in and proceeds from **REISHI**, or the Spirit in Action. This new science reveals many truths so wonderful as to seem quite miraculous to those who study the Art of **Reishi**, explaining even what science has failed to elucidate.

— 2 —

The Art of the Practice of Reishi reveals the secrets of all wonders recorded in the past, the mystical phenomena mentioned in the writings of the ancient philosophers and sages, such as the healing of disease by communion with the Divine and the laying on of hands, how mind can work upon matter and so on. What the wise men of the past saw but faintly after long years of study, research and experience can now be clearly revealed by no more than ten days training and initiation in the principles and rules pertaining to the Art of Reishi as taught by Mr. Morihei Tanaka. This ten days' instruction can be received without any inconvenience to the pupil; there are no ascetic practices required, no painful endeavors necessary: it is open to all who desire it on the same terms, even without prayer or any system of mental concentration. One may be made familiar with the marvellous functions of the Great Spirit, or TAIREI, simply by coming under the instruction offered by Mr. Tanaka, the founder of TAIREIDO. For those who by reason of distance or otherwise are prevented from being present at the lectures given by Mr. Tanaka. There is the volume known as TAIREIDO, being a transcript of the lectures of the founder on the subject of practising the Art of Reishi, which gives a simple and lucid account of the science and its mysteries. Being a divine art, intended for the good of all mankind, REISHI offers no difficulty of apprehension when once the system is fully explained: it comes to every mind as a manifestation clear as the sunlight. No human being on realizing the working of the Art of Reishi can fail to perceive



something really miraculous or supernatural, and yet nothing that is not truly natural to Reishi.

3.—How the Art of Reishi was Revealed

One of the most interesting and important aspects of the new system of thought and life is the way in which Mr. Tanaka first became conscious of the science of the Art of Reishi, as a bodily experience which he was able to reveal to others and teach them also to experience. This power to let others into the apparent secret of the Art of Reishi, and how he came to feel it incumbent on him to transmit the wonderful power he had himself become aware of, the reader may discover by perusing the following pages.

The founder of TAIREIDO had always been a man deeply moved by patriotic enthusiasm. When the Liaotung peninsula was ceded to Japan at the close of the war with China the whole nation rejoiced with patriotic ardour; but when Japan was forced to relinquish the fruit of her victory through the intervention of three Powers the retrocession brought tears to every Japanese eye. After this humiliation it soon became clear that Russia was pursuing a policy of aggression in East Asia, for she took advantage of the Boxer Rebellion to send large numbers of Troops into China controlling the railways and erecting barracks which betrayed intentions of permanent occupation of the territory. China later obtained from Russia consent to a treaty of evacuation, and the principle of the 'open door', but Russia failed to live

— 4 —

up to the terms of the Agreement, and in 1903 Russia did not hesitate to announce her intention to remain in Manchuria for good. Accordingly she established a Far Eastern regime under a Governor-General, Alexief being the first to hold this office, an incarnation of Russian jingoism. To Alexief the Tzar granted supreme power in the Far East, and he took command of Russian diplomacy and military matters. Thus the promise to evacuate Manchuria and to observe the principle of the 'open door' was absolutely ignored by Russia, and the other Powers were practically given to understand that Russia intended permanently to occupy the territory. Japan objected to this aggression on China, but Russia only assumed a provocative attitude toward Japan, and the situation soon assumed a threatening aspect in East Asia. At first the attitude of the Japanese authorities toward Russia was rather one of irresolution and indecision, against which inactivity there was loud complaint in Japan where the people insisted that war was inevitable.

At this very critical juncture in Japan's foreign relations Mr. Morihei Tanaka was only twenty years of age, and an official in the Government bureau of statistics, attending sometimes the School of Foreign Languages. He had been carefully studying the situation in Manchuria and the problem arising out of it, and came to the popular conclusion that there was no way to ensure peace in the Far East save by prompt action on the part of the Government in dealing with Russia. To neglect the matter was to sow seeds of calamity for the future of the Empire. But what could a

youth of twenty do under the circumstances? For a time he could do no more than watch with anxiety the increasing war-cloud gathering over the Empire. Unable to restrain his patriotic feelings longer, Mr. Tanaka resolved to act; and to do this in the most emphatic way, he planned the gravest and most imposing of all methods, a direct appeal to His Majesty the Emperor. Accordingly, when His Majesty was returning to the Imperial Palace after attending the military maneuvers, young Tanaka boldly took his life in his hands and interrupted the Imperial procession to present his appeal to the Emperor.

This ever-memorable day was the 19th of November, 1903. The sky was clear and the autumnal breezes were blowing gently, as His Majesty emerged in the usual imposing procession from Sakurada Gate, when suddenly a youth was seen to rush toward the Imperial carriage, and shouting that he desired to present a petition to the Emperor, he reached the Imperial carriage before any of the guards could stop him, and handed the document to His Majesty. Just as the Emperor glanced at the lad, an official seized him and bore him away under arrest. He had succeeded in presenting his petition, however: and the following is a translation of the now famous document:

"A common citizen of the Empire, Morihei Tanaka by name, most humbly and reverently begs to report to the Imperial Throne, as follows: YOUR MAJESTY, THE EMPEROR, whose civil and military virtues are everywhere renowned, has achieved the Imperial Restoration and

brought prosperity to the Empire, for which all subjects are moved to tears of gratitude, and for this gracious Imperial benevolence we desire to make adequate return to Your Majesty. I am persuaded that to establish the Empire on a firm foundation is not more important than to preserve the nation's dignity and right. Therefore if any would encroach up on the dignity and right of the nation that enemy should be opposed with all our might. The Manchurian situation now facing us threatens to dishonour the nation and to trespass on the rights of the Empire. Nothing can be more dangerous to Japan than to leave this problem unsolved. Half a year has elapsed since this menace arose, and our Ministers of State ought to have reached a decision long ago ; and yet hesitation and indecision mark their course and threaten our future. This is not a time for compromise ; peaceful and timid negotiations can never ensure peace to the Far East. Russia has ignored the treaty concluded with China, and any treaty she concludes with Japan will prove equally ineffective. All our negotiations, even those leading to a treaty, will prove a blank page in our history. Yet, we are told, the responsible Ministers are determined to solve the problem peaceably. If this be true, nothing can be more regrettable, for nothing can prevent our national ruin.

What the present situation needs is a decisive attitude ; we must be prepared to assert our dominant influence and be ready for the last resort. Unless this be done disorder and not peace will be the lot of East Asia, and the future of our Empire will be very unhappy. All this must be fully known

to the subjects of Your Majesty, and even to foreign countries. Failing at this critical moment, the forty millions of Japan, and the hundreds of millions in Asia, will be threatened. The time-serving peace now suggested by the officials of the Government will bring perpetual unrest to the Far East. The only way to peace is through present war! This is not the only time that our Empire has been dishonoured by Russia. Through her we lost Saghalien, and through her we lost the Liaotung peninsula after the war with China; and now Russia is again threatening us with further disgrace and intruding upon our rights. Shall Japan endure this insult or not? If we submit to this nothing can save us in future!

Japan has sufficient defences if she has but the courage to use them. All we have to do is to act promptly and success is ours. If we fail properly to chastise the enemy now the Empire will lose its dominant influence and fall a prey to the Russian eagle. This is the most crucial moment ever reached by the Empire. I humbly beseech and pray that Your Gracious Majesty will issue an edict that we may act upon and save the nation from eternal regret. I, a youth of but twenty years, am compelled by burning patriotism and loyalty in connection with the present unfortunate situation, so that I can neither sleep nor eat, to make this request. I therefore have dared to interrupt the Imperial procession and intrude upon Your August Majesty, thinking of the fate of our Empire and the eight hundred millions of the Orient. May Your Majesty ever continue to grant us enlightenment; and may it please Your Majesty to hear and heed this humble

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petition from a common citizen, Morihei Tanaka, conveying his sincere solicitude for the Empire."

The Imperial History Association, in its history of the Russo-Japanese war, referring to the incident of Morihei Tanaka presenting a petition to the Emperor, says: The petition thus presented to the Throne was quite pertinent to the situation, and was no exaggeration of the national voice. Even youth could not refrain from taking so irregular a step, moved by indignation over the situation. His move was, therefore, approved by the public."

The various references to the incident in the daily press were favourable to the motive of young Tanaka and spoke highly of his zeal and patriotism under the circumstances. He, therefore, received no further punishment than to be sent his native province for the time being. Thus onfied to his native place young Tanaka gave himself up to contemplation, preparing the way for the marvellous tevelation of new thought that came to him later.

4.—Influence of the Mountains

After young Tanaka was returned to his native place for daring to make a direct report to the Imperial Throne, he was kept under constant surveillance by officers of the law, and his life was practically deprived of freedom. He established himself in a small cottage in the mountain village of Takenami, which he called the Somoan. There he put in a time of contrition and penitence, giving still greater atten-

tion to the international problem that had been troubling him and had got him into difficulty. The year 1904 passed without any incident of importance, but relations with Russia were on the verge of rupture. Mr. Tanaka was still greatly disturbed that the authorities still took no decisive step in regard to Russia. But he could do nothing on account of being constantly watched by the police. Before the year was over, however, the outcome was what Mr. Tanaka desired, and the war with Russia began, the first stroke of the fight being the attack on the Russian warships at Chemulpo and Port Arthur. The Imperial declaration of war was at last issued and the whole nation was united as one man to die for the glory of the Empire. In this patriotic enthusiasm Mr. Tanaka duly joined, but as he was under military age he was not allowed to proceed to the front; and in any case being under police surveillance would have prevented it. He could only hope, and pray for victory. At this time we find the following reference to Mr. Tanaka in the *Aichi*, a daily newspaper:

Beginning with the heading: Information about the youth who attempted to appeal to the Throne, the article proceeds: "Mr. Tanaka, after being sent to his native place, has been spending his time in penitence and meditation for having offended against the rules pertaining to Imperial processions, and has built himself a small cottage in a mountain village where he does a great deal of reading. On the outbreak of the war he was so delighted that at once he sent off a congratulatory letter to all his friends and acquaint-

ances. In this letter were the following words: 'In defiance of the Government regulations I dared to appeal directly to the Imperial Throne, blinded by zeal for the good of my country. My delight on hearing that the Imperial Declaration of war had been issued was simply indescribable: I was almost mad with emotion. Now the Imperial army and navy have advanced upon the enemy and victory is reported even from the beginning. A series of victories on the part of the army and the ultimate submission of the enemy may duly be expected. I therefore sincerely offer my congratulations on the proclamation of war by the Empire.' Mr. Tanaka is really a man of admirable spirit, most gentle and upright in all his ways, and his assiduous habits of study are the admiration of the officers watching him."

The founder of TAIREIDO thus lived quietly in this mountain retreat for several months, meditating on his condition and on life in general. He came finally to this conclusion: There is no doubt that victory to Japan is certain; but victory over Russia will not be enough: it is after the war that the main difficulty will arise. He foresaw that the ability of Korea and China to maintain independence would be very difficult, and on this would depend the future of the Japanese Empire to a great extent. The situation evidently implied that there would be annexations by Japan. Under the influence of such thoughts Mr. Tanaka wrote a long essay on the subject entitled: The Annexation of East Asia, which was published in the *Nihonjin*, the essay incurring the displeasure of the Government, which led to its author being

placed under still stricter official surveillance.

In the course of time the character and real motives of Mr. Tanaka became understood by the officials of the Government and he came in for more generous treatment. After gaining further liberty he ascended the sacred mountain of Ena, where the Sun Goddess is reputed to have been born, and there for a time he practised strict religious austerities. This was the turning point in his career. It was then that he first began to realize the meaning of TAIREIDO, and to experience the practice of the Art of Reishi. The fundamental Spirit within him then first began to manifest its functions. There in the silent recesses of the great mountains he remained secluded until TAIREIDO became fully revealed to him, and he saw that he could solve all the problems of life by virtue of the revelation, even the problems that no metaphysical study could approach.

5.—Effect of Asceticism

The year 1904 was marked by Japan's victories over Russia, and especially the fall of Port Arthur. When news of the famous victory came it found Mr. Tanaka in the fastness of the mountain, and inspired him with still grander thoughts, to which his sublime surroundings added not a little. He felt a divine enlightenment descend upon him in the sacred mountain where the Sun Goddess shed her divine rays. The great peaks around him soared into the heavens, clothed in mysterious mist; the deep verdure of the lower

altitudes environed him and seemed to shut in secrets never revealed to man. Out of the vast abyss ripping the mountains the key to knowledge was handed to him ; as he solemnly took it he could hear only the music of the streams in the depths below. The rising sun unclothed the mountain and revealed its true beauty and power. The garments of mist again descended with the evening, and before the moonbeams they again lifted, the silver light penetrating every crevice and ravine. The birds and insects slept and peace reigned : peace, and power, and beauty ! The night dissolved away ! All this was in man too : this peace, and power and beauty. Thus Mr. Tanaka meditated in the recesses of the giant hills and communed with the Spirit that produced them, experiencing thoughts and emotions transcending the universe. Thus did the Great Spirit, the Spirit of God Almighty express itself.

Among the more compelling thoughts of these sublime moments were these : Man is a self-conscious being ; he is aware of his own existence. What then is the basis of his life : its real essence ? Life is a combination of matter and spirit, of body and mind. Nothing spiritual can exist without its material counterpart, and *vice versa*. Idealism is one side of the shield, and materialism is the reverse side. These are not contrary, the one to the other. The mind and the body mutually exist in each other ; and there must be something that is the origin of these. What is that Something ? What is its fundamental nature and essence ? Can man utilize it ?

Human life as we know it is maintained by taking food and breathing air ; and therefore these two things must contain the essence of man's existence, since on them it mainly depends. Of the two, the air is the more important, for though one can live several days without food, one cannot live even several minutes without air. Air is, therefore, the first element in the maintenance of life ; and food comes second. This gave rise to the question of what would be the effect on human life if only air were supplied and food withheld. Would any change be experienced in the mind and in the body ? How long can a human being live on the first element essential to his existence, air ? To this experiment Mr. Tanaka devoted himself, in order to obtain one of the fundamental answers to the problem of life.

He accordingly give himself up to a period of fasting. The period commenced on the first of February, 1905 and ended at the beginning of June, a space of ninety days, which may be regarded as record duration in abstention from food. The fasting, however, was the least important part of this experiment ; for he experienced spiritual realities beyond all words to describe. The most important of the revelations that then came to him was that concerning the Art of Reishi, the working of the Spirit. He had other mysterious experiences, such as power to see things in the dark, and the ability to run as swiftly as one flying, to see great and unusual distances, and to hear sound far beyond the normal distance.

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6.—Welcome Home

After a period of some six months solitude in the sacred mountain Mr. Tanaka returned to his native village, the time being about the beginning of July. It was apparent to all his old friends and acquaintances that he was a changed man. His long contemplation in communion with the forces of nature and the wonderful spiritual experiences that came to him during his period of fasting had worked a miraculous effect on him, which all could see. The revelation of TAIREI, its full meaning and significance, had come to him. Not only so, but he had the power to put into practice the truth that was his, to the wonder and admiration of all who came in contact with him. His action in irregularly presenting a petition to the Throne had already made him a marked man ; but the powers he now revealed in a spiritual way made him far more distinguished among those who knew him. Many gathered around him to hear his experiences and to learn his art. The supreme moment of his realizing the good effect his new knowledge was to have on his fellow men came just when he heard of the great victory of the Japanese navy over Russia in the battle of the Japan Sea. He said nothing of it until the people began to tell him the news ; which was no news to him, as he had realized the truth of it all before. When it became known that he knew of the victory of the battle of the Japan Sea before it was reported in his native village the thing seemed nothing less than a miracle.

After this he began to feel the Spirit of prophecy, and he began to predict that peace with Russia would be restored through the intervention of the President of the United States, with a result disadvantageous to Japan; and the prediction came true. The peace negotiated at Portsmouth resulted just as Mr. Tanaka had foretold. People might say that such predications were no more than shrewd guesses; but there are facts in relation to Mr. Tanaka that cannot be so regarded. A woman who had suffered for years from rheumatism, on hearing of the powers of Mr. Tanaka, came to him for relief and he completely cured her. Again a girl who suffered from chronic toothache was fully cured by him simply by touching the affected part. These facts the people were obliged to believe because they could not be contradicted. Such miraculous deeds evoked the wonder of the community, and excited the utmost curiosity among the people, until the agent of them began to be visited by people from far and near, all of whom deeply admired his wonderful art.

7.—Miraculous Experience while in the Spirit

As already indicated, after his experiences in the mountain, Mr. Tanaka became aware of his possession of more than ordinary powers over nature, enabling him to apprehend the truth of TAIREI and to apply it by means of Reishi to his fellow men. These supernatural functions inherent in the human body first revealed their ex-

istence to Mr. Tanaka during the fasting period of his meditation in the mountain; and he was convinced of the power and use of functions which he believed had never before been revealed to man. This power over nature he saw to lie in the command of Rei, or Spirit, the essence on which all life depends. This power it is that causes the ability to think, to will, to decide, to feel, to know, to exercise muscular action and command the action of the body. It is, moreover, the entity on which Creation depends, from which all matter organic and inorganic comes, and the author and giver of life. TAIREIDO is the method by which this essence functions. Even from remote ages it has been admitted that man can somehow come in contact with the essence of things, and touch the mysteries of the universe, and fasting has long been regarded as the gateway to this experience.

In the Buddhist sutras we read that Amida ate but one grain of hemp seed every day for six years. While the statement is no doubt an exaggeration it is obviously intended to denote the extreme asceticism of the founder of Buddhism before he could achieve his great life purpose and come to his spiritual awakening at the foot of the bo-tree. Jesus Christ was led up of the Spirit to be tempted in the wilderness by the Devil, and there he fasted forty days and forty nights after which he suffered from hunger. He was able to reject the temptations of the evil spirit and to prove himself the Son of God, and then angels ministered to him. After this he did many wonderful things for men. Buddha practised an

ascetic life for six years before he reached the period of his awakening, though he partook of some food; and Jesus attained his awakening after forty days and nights of fasting, but Mr. Tanaka fasted ninety days, which is unprecedented; yet all agree in the conviction that by fasting and meditation the highest enlightenment can be attained. The teaching of such sages as Buddha and Christ have prevailed widely since their death; but they left the world without showing the secret of their achievements. Man has not learned the way to command over the powers of nature. He has seen wonderful deeds but has not acquired the art of doing them. The sages have shown the way of prayer and taught the benefit of self-denial in order to reach spiritual enlightenment and awakening; but the founder of TAIREIDO has achieved quite a different triumph. He has acquired not only the secret of command over nature and man but also the ability to impart this gift to man, even through his ten days' instruction in the elements of TAIREIDO, to all who desire to receive such knowledge.

The best way for beginners, instead of taking up at first a technical study of TAIREIDO, is to attend the lectures of Mr. Tanaka and see this wonderful power practised before their eyes, so as to be convinced of its truth and reality. This can be done any time at the headquarters of the office of TAIREIDO, where the Art of Reiki is constantly won in practice.

At these lectures Mr. Tanaka usually begins by giving a careful explanation of the way of meditation to all present.

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Only fifty persons are permitted to attend each lecture as they must always sit in ten rows. It will be interesting if we describe the scene at one of these lectures. When the instruction begins there is a stillness that is breathless. One can almost hear the throbbing of his neighbor's heart. Mr. Tanaka appears and stands in the midst of the hall, and at once begins to transmit to those present the force of Rei. There is at once a stillness and solemnity like unto the depths of a great forest. This quietness is the center of a spiritual typhoon which is nevertheless airless. But the stillness is but the foretaste of something better still, something very unusual that strangely looms upon the vision of all present.

The hand of the clock covers one minute, two minutes, three minutes, when a gentle tremor is experienced by the audience. After a brief space one of the members of the class in front begins to show violent physical perturbation in the way of a tremor, which seems to affect his neighbors, and soon all those present feel similar pulsations, until a commotion of some violence takes place. The body moves up and down, then to right and left, now forward and now backward; and everyone feels that something very marvellous has been experienced. What is the secret of this violent surging and moving within the body of each one present? After a period the audience recovers its former quiet and stillness. Then the tremor is repeated and the same commotion takes place again. The tremor imparted to the whole class is thus repeated five times or so, taking some twenty minutes; and

then the instructor announces the end of his first lecture and practice of the Art of Reishi.

8.—First Step in Acquiring the Art of Reishi

The first step in acquiring the art of Reishi is experiencing the tremor of the Spirit described in the preceeding paragraph. Within the body and spirit of man there is the Action of the Spirit, or Reishi, the origin and essence of life and being. The form by which it manifests its presence is known as the revelation of Reishi in action. To bring about this manifestation all the members of the class in the room are made to stand and take hands; whereupon Mr. Tanaka, taking his place in the circle, and holding the hands of those on either side of him, at once transmits the Action of Reishi to the whole circle. The hands which he touches begin to reveal the tremor of the Action and move to and for, until the motion circulates throught the class. Sometimes this motion grows so intense that the individuals of the circle jump as high as eight inches from the floor, and some even as high as from one to two feet. When all are thus affected they are required to release hands and drop them by their sides and the motion ceases. As the jumping is straight up without bending the knees or legs it is clearly not intentional but the result of the Action of Reishi alone. All are not affected just the same, and when any individual shows a tendency to be too slow he is assisted by just a touch from the hand of Mr. Tanaka, when he will at once respond to the Action of Reishi, by violently jumping.

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9.—Transmitting Reishi Action to groups or Numbers

In commencing instruction Mr Tanaka usually first transmits the Action of Reishi to individuals, and after they have acquired the art of receptivity he transmits the Action to groups thus first instructed individually. By having been taught in this preliminary manner how to receive the Action of Reishi they naturally respond readily in group action. When groups are fully under the influence of the Reishi Action the jumping is so violent that the room resounds with their commotion. An interesting feature of these lessons in the transmission of the Action of Reishi is the fact that so long as Mr. Tanaka remains in contact with the group circle the Action of Reishi in them is strong even to violence, but as soon as he releases contact with the circle the Action of Reishi perceptibly weakens.

This movement of the body resulting from the transmission of the Action of Reishi is fundamental to the method by which human life and health are strengthened and improved in the briefest space of time. *A few minutes practice of the Art of Reishi several times a day will soon restore one's health, promote physical robustness and develop the natural beauty of the body, eliminating all disease.*

10.—How to Apprehend the Meaning of the Action of Reishi

The mental and spiritual process involved in receiving the thought and action of another is something too wide for

discussion here, but the popular conception of it is that the thought in A's mind becomes action in B's mind; or in other words, B acts what A thinks, when their hands are in contact. This method has been at time practised in western countries, too.

But the art of apprehending what is in the mind of others is not the highest development of the Action of Reishi; yet it is none the less very interesting and of much benefit to those studying the Art of the Action of Reishi. This art is specially taught by Mr. Tanaka as conducive to a more apt and intelligent apprehension of Reishi Action. It is an art that can be readily acquired and practised by anyone who has studied the internal Action of Reishi.

The students begins by practising the Art through hand contact, and when successful in this way, he is moved on to a higher way. The contact of hands might be supposed to have some hint of the thought passing in the mind of another, and thus suggestion might pass from A to B; and moreover, as any change in the manner, such as grasping the hand lightly or tightly might tend to confusion or distraction in the case of those not fully acquainted with the Art of Reishi Action, a higher form of the experiment has been introduced.

By this method an individual is placed between the agent who thinks and the agent who is to receive and act on the thought, so that the thought has to be transmitted through a second party to the third party, who is to act upon it. After succeeding in transmission of thought by this means a third, fourth and fifth intermediary are introduced between

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the transmitter and the receiver. Mr. Tanaka is the only agent that has ever succeeded in this complex method of thought transmission. As the intermediaries between A and B do not know what is in the mind of A, and have no idea of the thought transmitted, they do not cause any confusion in the mind of B, and thus B apprehends the thought of A without any hint or suggestion from any source. Four gentlemen notably successful in this action are Mr. Asataro Sakurai, Mr. Mikitaro Iijima, Mr. Sekita Oyama and Mr. Shosuke Ikeda. These have been able to transmit thought by every combination of their number, acting as A and B. Those who have witnessed the phenomenon of mind-reading will have noticed that it is always done in a solemn and grave manner that tends to make one smile. To anyone the scene is something to excite the most profound interest, quite beyond words to describe.

For example, six men are placed in a line, with hands in contact. The man at the left of the row of men becomes the thought-transmitter, A; and A secretly determines who of the number is to become the receiver of his thought and lets the individual know. None of the others are aware of the decision. Then A concentrates his thought on what he wants his agent to do; and the agent does what A decides. All have their eyes closed except A. In practising this experiment the thought of A must be firm and clear; but B, the receiver, need not have any special state of mind or will. The receiver, or mind-reader, stands at the right side, or end of the row, with all the others between him and A, the

transmitter. We have seen this experiment successfully practised with seven men in the row. During the experiment the following results were obtained :

1. B went into another room and brought out a chair ;
2. He placed the chair before the Altar of Rei, the Great Spirit ;
3. He brought a cushion from the corner of the room, dropping it and picking it up on the way ;
4. He went to the office and summoned Mr. Fujimoto who was attending to his duty and unaware of the experiment, three rooms away ;
5. He asked him to sit on the chair ;
6. He brought in the tea things from the servants' room ;
7. He took up a cup and handed it to Mr. Tanaka ;
8. He then poured out a cup of tea in the proper manner and quantity ;
9. He replaced the teapot on the tray ;
10. He put his hand on that of Mr. Fujimoto and assisted him to raise the teacup to his mouth.

The above actions were done by B in the most offhand manner without mistake, his eyes closed from beginning to end. The success of such an experiment in such complex action depended on the clearness and strength of A's mind in transmitting his thought to B. In such a case B acts strictly in accord with A's thought. It will be noticed that B dropped the cushion when bringing it into the room ; this was due to the determination of the agent that this action should happen by B's losing the Action of Reishi for the moment. At this moment Mr. Tanaka, was standing apart from the line of men. But B promptly picked up the dropped cushion by stooping ; which was also part of Mr. Tanaka's predeter-

mined thought. Thus Mr. Tanaka by the Art of Reishi was able to interfere between A and B and cause B to drop the cushion and pick it up again, neither A nor B being privy to his intention. This proves that B was influenced by an agent outside the row through which the Action of Reishi was being transmitted, because the art of Mr. Tanaka was so powerful. Now all this Action of Reishi, which seems so mysterious in this experiment, is nevertheless being unconsciously practised by everyone in daily life ; which fact shows that no particular study is required in order to be able to utilize the art in a special manner for higher purposes.

Take another example. Make seven men stand in a row and cause the Action of Reishi to circulate violently through them, all going round with the action. In this experiment the trasmitter was able to cause the receiver of the thought to bring a man into the room and have him stand there ; to bring in another man and have him stand beside the first one ; in all seven men were brought in ; then he caused the seven men to take hands ; then he made the first man take the hand of the seventh man to form a circle ; and then he caused them all to go round in a ring. While this experiment may seem rather simple, it was not so easy to make the men go round rapidly in a circle, as was done in this case. To be able to receive the thought transmitted in a definite manner and quickly to transmute it into action without mistake is not so easy as it may seem ; yet it has been practised with complete success. Such an experiment is quite an easy one for a master like Mr. Tanaka ; but in the

case above mentioned it was accomplished for the first time by members of his class in the Art Reishi of Action.

A further example consists in taking a sheet of paper from a certain room and placing it on the table in the practising room, and then causing the receiver to go again to the first room and bring a brush for writing, dip it in the ink and cause the holder to write a word or ideograph. This experiment was successfully practised through the medium of six men. In this case B under the influence of A's mind went into another room which was three rooms distant; took a piece of paper on a table there; returned to the practising room with it; placed it on the table; went back to the room; took a writing brush and dipped it in the ink; brought it to the practising room; and wrote the ideograph desired.

Though this experiment also looks simple it is nevertheless quite difficult. A Belgian scientist, Dr. Johann, who saw this experiment, thought the most difficult part of it for thought transmission was the writing of the ideograph by the art of Reishi, especially as the eyes of B were quite closed. But B's consciousness has nothing to do with what he does; he is wholly under the influence of A. The relation between A and B is not the relation of mind and body; it is closer than that, a fusion of minds for the moment. But B cannot always act exactly as A wants him; for the fusion of thought is not so perfect as to be a fusion of mind. When A thinks of a certain ideograph, say the figure one, he determines B shall write that character. If A wants to have B write a dash or a line it is not so difficult, for the action is one

merely of space and time ; but for a more complicated figure, the mind of A has to concentrate on when the writing brush must be applied and when it must be withheld, through every movement necessary, since the action is not the action of B's mind at all but of A's mind, B having really no mind but A's for the time being. The figure reproduced here is taken directly from the one written by B at the instance of A under the Action of Reishi. In such a proceeding, speaking strictly, B does not know himself that he is acting at the instance of A, or ~~that he has a brush in his hand at all~~. The whole process is due to the power of A's mind over B.

The above experiments will show some aspects of the power of Reishi ~~once one has acquired~~ the Art of using it. It is not the art of thought transmission by contact of hands or other physical method of suggestion, as it is done without such means. Neither is it a system of hypnotism ; for this requires entire abstraction of mind on the part of B. The Art of Reishi requires connection between the mind of A and the body of B resulting in action on the part of the latter. It differs from hypnotism in that in the Art of Reishi A does not appropriate the consciousness of B. The only explanation is that Rei, the essence of being, causes the action desired. Consequently the power manifested in this action is the same as that manifested in the usual Action of Reishi, as when the agent has the power to cure sickness or disease at a distance from the patient.

II

ART OF THOUGHT TRANSMISSION MAKES REMARKABLE PROGRESS

I.—Result on Social Life

The term, Thought Transmission, does not quite accurately denote what the Art means, but the meaning thereby conveyed is as near as human language can probably approach it.

When the body is under the power of the mind man is said to lead a conscious existence ; but when one's body is governed by the will of another and acts accordingly, there is present the Art of Reishi, as seen to some extent in daily life. All the social activities of mankind are but the result of the automatic action of Reishi, which is fully explained in the volume on the doctrines, principles and teaching of TAIREIDO. As human society is the result of the mechanical action of Reishi all of us are more or less unconsciously under the will of others in thought and action. A man's mind and

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body are ever in close relationship ; and it is, therefore, but natural that an expert in the Art of Reishi shall be able quickly to receive what is in the mind of another or others and act accordingly. The practice of the Art as seen at the initiation meetings of TAIREIDO students is not simply a manifestation of remarkable spiritual phenomena ; for the members present physically experience the Action of the will of others on them ; and this proves the possibility of using such action for the welfare of society. To accept the outward manifestation of will is merely to lose one's own individuality ; but to understand a proper use of this power by the Art of Reishi gives one a spiritual strength and steadiness that are necessary for true life. To be firm and steadfast in life one must know the power of mind over matter, of spirit over body, both in regard to oneself and to others. In this way one knows the truth and can penetrate into the essential nature of human society. This is what TAIREIDO does for a man. It gives him the knowledge and the power necessary to enable him to maintain his own individuality and at the same time to adapt himself in the best way to the needs of society. He is susceptible to all influence and has the power to decide what he shall submit to. Such principles of TAIREIDO as that of mainting inflexibility of spirit and individual self-respect indicate what a man must be susceptible to, and the principles of adaptation to change show how he must meet the negative aspect of life. Thus the thoughts and principles involved in TAIREIDO touch the loftiest altitudes and the profoundest depths of existence, at the same time

showing how they may be practically applied to daily life. This is possible through marvels of the Action of Reishi, which enables man to put into practice the principles revealed in the Action of Reishi.

2.—Fuller Development of the Art of Reishi

After gaining complete experience in the art of transmitting thought by the action of Reishi the student goes on to a fuller acquirement of the principles of TAIREIDO. The student already understands how thought is transmitted by contact of hands, then by direct action of the mind of A on the body of B without physical contact, with several individuals between, or even with no more than a string between them. Having perceived how the Action of Reishi may be apprehended and appropriated the students should proceed to fuller knowledge and practice of TAIREIDO, in which so many have attained great success.

At the thirtieth lecture of Mr. Tanaka on the Art of Apprehending the Action of Reishi, this Spring, proof of remarkable progress in the knowledge of TAIREIDO was given by some practical experiments. At a similar meeting held in February, 1919, the photograph shown here was taken. First the common method of apprehending what is in the mind of another was practiced by joining hands. At the meeting in the Spring the experiment was tried of having A and B stand some twenty feet apart with a string between them. This experiment was a complete success. A desired

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B to bring a chair, to select a certain individual from a group, to fetch him, to make him sit down on the chair; and all the actions were carried out without mistake. In this experiment Mr. Hakurei Kurihara acted as A and Mr. Shinji acted as B, Mr. Kwaimoi Kinoshita being the individual selected to sit on the chair.

Another interesting experiment at this meeting was to place six persons between A and B, these knowing nothing of what A intended to transmit to B; and yet B acted wholly in accord with the mind of A without variation. In this experiment B went and brought three cushions, placed them correctly, selected one of the guests present and had him sit on one of the cushions, brought in the tea things from a table in another room, poured out tea in a cup and gave it to the guest on the cushion: all was done exactly as Mr. Tanaka, who acted as A, had determined mentally. In this experiment Mr. Kenzo Sugizaki was the agent acted upon by Mr. Tanaka, while Mr. Matsusaburo Hino was the gentleman acting as the guest.

These successes achieved in the art of transmitting and apprehending thought by the Art of Reishi were achieved by the persons named after only ten days instruction in the art from Mr. Tanaka. So astonished were these pupils at what they had received from Mr. Tanaka's teaching that they thought it nothing less than miraculous.

At a special lecture given by Mr. Tanaka in March, 1912, some 26 persons submitted to experiment, when A at one end of the row, and B at the other, succeeded in transmis-

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
sion and apprehension of thought without difficulty or mistake. This experiment was different from all preceding ones in that the transmitter wanted to transmit his thought to all of the other 25 men. The thought was this. A transmitted to the last man in the row the thought to leave the row and proceed around the class from the inside, and then he transmitted to the next last man the same idea, and so the same idea to all in turn until reaching himself; and thus the whole class of 25 men was set moving in a circle, A concentrating his thought now on the men until finally they were all like a solid ball unable to move, save in a violent whirling motion, the man in the center being so pressed by the others that he went up in the air screaming as if from suffocation.

3.—Practising the Art over a Distance

At the thirty-third meeting for instruction to students of TAIREIDO great interest was taken by the members in some new experiments in transmission of thought at greater distances. No connection at all was permitted between the transmitter and the receiver of thought. The thought in A's mind was that B should put on his hat, take his cane and walk three times around a pine tree near the entrance to the chamber, and stand by the stone step and strike it seven times. B did all this exactly as A wished. The next experimented consisted in A desiring a chair to be brought and placed before the altar of Rei, to have a guest sit on it, to bring in the tea utensils and to offer the guest tea: all of

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TRANSMITTING REISHI ACTION TO GROUPS

which was accurately done by B as shown in the illustration. In this photograph Mr. Yosaburo Honda is acting as A and Lady Masago Yui as B. Then Mr. Honda decided by thought transmission to have B take a pot of chrysanthemum from an outer chamber, hold it for a time, pass along the path before the chamber, enter the garden facing the lecture room, and stand on the stone step ; all of which was being accurately done, when the photograph reproduced was taken. After the picture was taken B came down from the stone step, placed the flower pot on the veranda and did all that A had planned. After this experiment was thus successfully completed Mr. Honda decided to act on Mr. Yui, whom he caused by mental action to proceed slowly along until he passed by the pine tree, reached the gate, stooped down and picked up five pebbles, returned along the same path, came to the entrance and entered, laid the pebbles on the left side of the room, just as Mr. Honda had decided. All this time Mr. Honda was standing at the entrance, the space between them at times being over one hundred feet ; but distance seemed to have no weakening effect on the power of B to apprehend the thought of A. This was a record-breaking experience in the TAIREIDO class. In all this operation the eyes of B were quite closed, yet in none of the complex actions performed, such as the picking up of pebbles and returning to the house, there was not the slightest mistake made. B did not even stumble as he stepped over stones and went out to the street. It was evident that in this action A's eyes must have been used by B.

4.—Art of Self Defence by Reishi

The art of overcoming others by Reishi has also been successfully practised by students of TAIREIDO. Some interesting experiments in this art were successfully carried out at the meeting referred to in the foregoing paragraph. A determined to practise on B; and was so successful that simply by holding out his hand A made B fall to the ground like a stick, or like a tree when felled. At one meeting when sixty members practised this art the scene was a most lively and interesting one. Members that began to practise as A next time acted as B, and were acted upon with complete success. It took but a short time for all the students to become familiar with the art. After the art of throwing an individual by Reishi is understood the student next tries his hand at throwing groups, when A holds out his hand and exerts the internal action of Reishi and all the members of the group at once fall down.

The picture here inserted shows how the method is practised. The members first stand all in a row, with eyes closed. Mr. Tanaka, acting as A, then takes a deep breath, exerts the internal action of Reishi in his abdominal region and holds out his hand. At once all the members of the class tumble down like a surging wave. The scene presented indeed is a very remarkable one.

For beginners, however, it is advisable to practise on individuals. Let A have B stand upright with eyes closed; and then A, by inhaling deeply and charging the abdominal

muscles with the internal action of Reishi, breathes strongly toward B, and the latter will fall to the ground, usually backward. Nothing in the way of other action or any suggestion is necessary. At first in such experiments the space between A and B should be about two or three feet; and as one advances in mastery of the art one may extend the space to from 20 to 30 feet, B always falling like a log. Achieving success in this way the number of those to be acted upon can be increased to 3, 5, 8, and 10, as A can act upon as many as ten persons at once when he gets to be proficient in the art. Of course great care has to be taken in the practice of such an art. A has to be careful to breathe properly and to exert properly the action of Reishi in his abdominal muscles and then to breathe out strongly in the proper manner upon the persons to be thrown down, who, within a few seconds, will all tumble over, as desired. It is difficult to take a picture of groups falling in this way, like the photograph of a single person falling like a tree. The picture reproduced above was taken by one of the most expert of rapid photographers.

5.—Theory of the Art of Exercising the Power of Reishi on Others

From what has already been said one may gain some idea of how Reishi is utilized in the art of self-defence. Many will be disposed to ask, however, why such phenomena are possible? It is due simply to the fact when one has acquired the art of the action of Reishi in the abdominal

region he can so exert it through breathing outward as to bring it to bear on the object or objects determined upon so that these objects lose all self-control. It is accomplished just in the same manner as when A causes B to go round and round in a circle. All such phenomena are caused by the power of Reishi. Of course the theory of such action is too profound for definition in words. One has to see it really to appreciate its marvellous significance and reality. Two fundamental principles, however, are involved, known as the Internal Action of Reishi and the External Action of Reishi, which one gets to apprehend fully after a course in the principles and doctrines of TAIREIDO. So important a part of the teaching cannot be fully elucidated in this short introduction to the system. For full information the reader must obtain the volume entitled TAIREIDO by Mr. Morihei Tanaka.

6.—Experiments Bordering on the Miraculous

At the lectures delivered by Mr. Tanaka on TAIREIDO many incidents take place which cannot be accounted for by any ordinary explanation of the application of the laws of nature, and many regard these as instances of the miraculous or supernatural element. One of the most mysterious of these facts is the art of apprehending the thought of another, mentioned above. To be able to know what is in the mind of another is truly a remarkable power. In addition to this, there are many other instances of the truly

wonderful and even miraculous in connection with practising the art of Reishi, details of which cannot be given here. How this power may be utilized for the good of mankind is outlined in the succeeding chapter.

We believe that a community
is the real form of the
existence of things and
partakes of the power of
the Almighty.

III

APPLICATION OF REISHI ACTION TO DISEASE

The revelation of TAIREIDO and its practical application in the Action of Reishi were not given to mankind simply for the sake of performing interesting not to say wonderful experiments in regard to the power of spirit over matter, and of mind over body; but for the amelioration and removal of human suffering and the improvement and happiness of human life. One of the most useful applications of the Action of Reishi is in the cure of sickness and the healing of disease in every form. Without use of medicine or any assistance whatever, the Action of Reishi may be used to cure sickness. Disease of every kind may be removed likewise without drugs or the resort to doctors or surgery. And the application of the Action of Reishi to the cure of sickness and the healing of diseases is effective independently of the faith or mental state of the patient. The practitioner can effect a cure or bring relief even if the patient

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does not believe in Reishi treatment, and even if there is absolute doubt or aversion to it.

The following is an account of the experiences of Mr. Taro Shinozaki as to sensations caused by the application of Reishi Action in surgical cases.

1.—Use of Reishi in Medical Treatment

It is hardly necessary to say that the effect of the Action of Reishi in the treatment of disease differs according to the temperament, constitution and general condition of the patient as well as according to the nature of the disease to be cured. The most important condition, however, is the degree in which the power of Reishi is manifested in the practitioner. We know of a certain gentleman in Tokyo who was cured by Reishi treatment. He was 35 years of age and suffering from bronchitis as well as pleurisy; and although he had spent much time and expense in a sanatorium he was nothing bettered. He was deeply depressed on account of his illness, about the nature of which he had read in some medical book, and his future seemed hopeless. He resorted to Buddhism for consolation in his declining health, but his pessimism continued and his condition did not improve. At this time he was also suffering from extreme nervous debility, with headache and much exhaustion. He had a bad cough and could not sleep at night. Finally in his extremity he sought the assistance of TAIREIDO, through the advice of relatives.

At first he had no faith in the Reishi treatment, and paid little or no attention to the advice given him. As he passed through the early stages of the treatment he thought there was no benefit to his health, but the practitioner could see that the patient was already beginning to show signs of improvement. During the second day of treatment the beneficial influence of Reishi was clearly revealed. There was a sudden movement of the head and hands and he could feel that the process of recovery had begun. The patient said he had been suffering extreme exhaustion from the previous day; but on the third day from the time treatment commenced he felt impelled to a sudden movement while in bed after which he felt better; then he slept two hours of unbroken comfortable sleep, to the surprise of all around him, and awoke feeling renewed and refreshed. From that time the progress of recovery was steady and rapid. Reishi was having its sure effect. It was seen that at times during the treatment the patient used to move violently and sometimes wept. Asked if he could explain why he wept he said that he did not know just why, but such a feeling of relief and gratitude came over him that he could not help it. Day by day his state of exhaustion grew less. The first time of treatment he came to the practising room in a *jūnikisha*, but on the third day he walked, so rapid had been the response to Reishi. On the third night he had his first four hours of quiet and consecutive sleep for a long time.

With the process of treatment during the fourth and fifth days his recovery continued to be most satisfactory, as he felt

renewed and was gradually regaining his former strength. His shattered nerves were also beginning to feel natural again. His speech, action and general appearance had much improved, and he was calm and normal. On the sixth day it was decided to apply a special Reishi treatment, such as is used for curing illness at a distance. At first he suffered a little from the change, the first two days showing some mental confusion; but from the third day of the new treatment exactly at the appointed hour for treatment *in absentia* he experienced a sudden, powerful influence working upon him and then fell into a condition of cheerful repose leading to some hours of the most peaceful and refreshing sleep. This treatment went on for a week, after which he was about as well as a man could be, and resumed his official duties which illness had forced him to abandon.

2 — Wonderful Response to the Power of Reishi

The patient described in the preceding paragraph, after some ten days of treatment at a distance, again visited the office of TAIREIDO and requested direct treatment once more, to which he submitted for about eight days. During this treatment he frequently revealed symptoms of the powerful effect of Reishi on his whole physical and mental condition; his body showed certain mysterious tremors and remarkable action. When the Reishi practitioner stood about two feet from him and applied the Action of Reishi the body of the patient indicated violent movement, with commotion with-

in. He was then lying on a couch, face upward. When the finger of Mr. Tanaka moved nearer to him, at a distance of two or three inches from his body, the limbs of the patient moved violently; and when Mr. Tanaka retired to an adjoining room and treated him mentally at this distance the body of the patient showed violent movement. It was thus obvious to both the practitioner and the patient that the Power of Reishi was something transcending space and time, the very essence on which all existence depends. On the fifth day of the renewed direct treatment the patient at a certain moment suddenly clasped his hands, as if in devotion; and afterwards explained that the action was not intentional, but the result of the Action of Reishi in his body.

A further remarkable phenomenon of the result of treatment on this patient was that on the second day of resumed direct treatment he began to have a habit of moving both hands unconsciously during the operation of Reishi, rubbing his breast down toward the abdomen, and then his nose up to his forehead, patting his body whenever Mr. Tanaka's hand touched him. Since that time he always massaged or rubbed his body this way during Reishi treatment; and after it was over he invariably experienced a feeling of wonderful physical and mental refreshment and renewal. The fact that he rubbed his nose was due to the application of the Action of Reishi to his bronchial trouble.

3.—Power of Reishi over all Ailments

After finishing his eight days of treatment under the Action of the Reishi the patient above described returned and went about his usual avocations as if he had never suffered from any serious affection. Sixteen days later he returned and had four days more of direct treatment, so as to maintain progress toward immunity to the return of his illness. By this time it was noticeable that he had ceased to massage himself and rub his breast and abdomen. He told Mr. Tanaka that whenever the latter touched him in the Reishi treatment he felt an indescribable sensation as of a some powerful spirit taking possession of his mind and body, penetrating to his inmost being, which thrilled him and refreshed him so that he could not restrain his emotions, sometimes to weep, but more often toward a feeling of abnormal refreshment and physical pleasure. The above is but the merest outline of some of the more interesting phases of this remarkable case of recovery from a chronic and dangerous disease.

After doing all that Mr. Tanaka could see to be necessary to the complete recovery of this patient Mr. Tanaka brought him for examination to the head of a hospital, who carefully subjected him to the regular physical examination and diagnosis, after which he pronounced him cured of the disease and in a perfect and sound state of health, save in one place where the lung adhered to the pleura, though this in no way seemed to affect the action of the lung or to interfere

with the health of the patient. The nervous debility, too, had quite disappeared. The above is a true and unvarnished account of a case that may be taken as an example of the usual result of the Action of Reishi in the treatment of illness and disease. No one but those who have suffered and thus been recovered can appreciate what Reishi means to the relief of mankind in restoring health and happiness.

We believe that *Tairei* is
the perfect unity of the
thinking subject and the
object thought of, and is
the final cause of all the
powers of numbers or nulty.

IV

REISHI INDEPENDENT OF TIME AND SPACE

The power of Reishi to cure disease or to effect the desired result of the practioner is quite independent of time or distance, as may be seen from the following account of the expeience of a surgeon now 'a distinguished colonel in the Imperial army, Shogo Kasajima by name.

I.—A Remarkable Patient

The patient hereinafter described lived in a place far remoyed from the practitioner and suffered from Myelitis. She was a woman named Miye Tsuji, 39 years old, and living in the village of Yamaguchi in Saga-ken. In the month of November, 1916 she was taken with myelitis, and womb trouble, and obliged to give up work in April of the following year. Her illness was so severe that she could do nothing but lie constantly in bed, unable to move. The

upper portion of her body had much pain, while the lower portion was more or less paralyzed. She submitted to the usual medical treatment without beneficial effect. All such treatment having failed to cure her the woman was in despair. Then she happened to read a brief account of the benefits of TAIREIDO in a magazine, and she asked our office to treat her. As she could not come to us she was content to have treatment at a distance. This began on August 4, 1917 and was to continue for a week. The treatment proper did not, however, begin until August 10, as we had in the meantime to give her proper directions. Through a mistake on her part, however, she thought the treatment was to begin on August 7; and consequently remained quietly in expectation of it and the resulting benefit. But for three days she felt no relief at all. On the 10th as she was lying in bed still hoping for some benefit, she learned that the treatment did not actually begin until that day. About eight o'clock that evening and by half-past eight she fell into a deep sleep, just at the time when the treatment was being applied a long distance away. All of a sudden the woman felt aroused from sleep as if awakened by someone; and she asked the attendant what time it was. He said it was just half-past eight. She requested her nurse to withdraw; and then tried to sit up in the bed, removing her upper garment and facing the south, as if being treated by a physician actually in the room. After thus waiting a few minutes she felt the lower part of her body begin to experience tremors and then to move more violently, and she

thus trembled as if the life would tremble out of her, as she said. At first the result was a feeling of something grotesque and fearsome; but her brain became quite clear and she felt something like electricity shooting through her fingers, and ran like pins and needles all over her body. In places she felt as if an insect had stung her. Then came a queer pain in her loins, and she felt unable to sit up for the required half hour, the period appointed for her treatment. This pain was at the beginning of the treatment; but no sooner had the latter begun than the pain vanished and she felt no further discomfort. For the thirty-minutes of Reishi treatment the woman was absolutely comfortable, save for the strange feeling resulting from the application of the Action of Reishi.

The second period of treatment was to be from 8 : 30 to 9 p.m. on the following day; but the nurse had forgotten to inform her of this; and consequently at 8 o'clock when she was expecting to experience the effect of the treatment she felt nothing unusual, and asked the attendant what time it was. Then at 8 : 40 she suddenly felt an unusual commotion in her body and asked the nurse again what time it was, and was told that it was forty minutes past eight. During the period of treatment on this evening the woman experienced exactly the same feelings as on the previous evening under treatment; and on the third evening the same feelings and experiences were likewise repeated. On the evening of the 13th, however, she felt rather an unusual movement that caused her to clasp her hands in wonder. Her fingers moved and were beyond her control. They

moved of themselves. It was impossible for her to remain sitting in bed under such emotion and movement and so she had to lie down, simply feeling that she was being treated by the Action of Reish, as agreed upon. Her hands remained clasped and her fingers continued to move convulsively as before. She unclasped them again, and they began to move of themselves, the motion growing stronger and stronger, the space of their movement being at times over one foot.

Thus her experience went on to the 24th of the month, the treatment proceeding over the hundreds of miles between Tokyo and Saga, and then the woman wrote that she had wonderful experiences and she felt much better already. She could now get out of bed and walk with the assistance of a cane, remaining up from two to three hours at a time. Under the application of the Action of Reishi this woman continued to recover, the pain departed and her natural complexion returned; and after five weeks of treatment she considered herself as well as ever, only she had still to be careful as to diet. She wrote to the office of TAIREDO a letter couched in the most courteous terms and filled with gratitude for the benefits our treatment had bestowed upon her.

2.—Fifteen Years of Illness

The following is an accurate description of a case of gout from which Mr. Zenji Tanno, aged 60, had suffered for over 15 years. Mr. Tanno lives at Terauchi in Fukushima ken, and was very ill with the above mentioned

ailment. He entered the Tokyo University Hospital for the usual treatment, one of the most famous hospitals of the empire, but without benefit; and he tried other good hospitals, with the same unsatisfactory result. His ailment was in no way made better. Abandoning all medical treatment as hopeless he went to various mineral springs to take the hot baths; and this he did for years, only realizing that with time he was getting worse instead of better. It was an obstinate disease that gave him much pain and constant discomfort, especially during changes of season, and changeable weather. His physical condition was gradually weakening and the flesh of his limbs growing flabby. He at last heard of our Reishi treatment and decided to submit to it from a distance. After two weeks he was completely cured and able to go about his work as if he had never been so ill.

We have on record another case of a man who had suffered from cancer of the stomach and who was cured of the dread disease by treatment by Reishi for only 13 weeks. This patient, Mr. Choemon Sosaki, lives just in front of Kogota station at Oudagori in Miyagi ken. At the age of fifty he found himself suffering from cancer of the stomach, and for years spent much under the treatment of various physicians, some of them great experts, but instead of being cured he felt the disease gradually growing worse, eating out his life. The case is worth special consideration since cancer is considered incurable. It certainly is incurable by the ordinary medical treatment. Yet it responded to Reishi without difficulty.

In his great disappointment and distress Mr. Sasaki

wrote to the office of TAIREIDO asking for long-distance treatment. This was on the 12th of August, 1918. At the time he was in great torment and unable to eat anything. His stomach was swollen and pain was constant, with great irregularity of the system. He had constipation and dysentery alternately. His appearance was emaciated and anaemic, and he was fast losing weight. He could not walk to his room. But after thirteen weeks of treatment from the action of Reishi he was perfectly cured, and we have a courteous letter from him gladly acknowledging his marvellous recovery under our treatment.

3.—Other Cases of Marvellous Recovery

Some time ago a medical student named Mr. Kenichiro Shimada came to the office of TAIREIDO suffering from a grave nervous ailment. This gentleman was a student at the Tohoku Imperial University Medical College at Sendai, and lives at 166 Kamisugiyama-dori, Kitagoban-cho. in that city. Being obliged by illness to give up study Mr. Shimada appealed to us for treatment. It was a very troublesome case of nervous exhaustion. He could not use his head at all, and was very irritable, suffering from insomnia as well. He had severe indigestion and general inactivity of the system. As his university examination was coming on he felt rather depressed and hopeless; and as a last resort he asked for Reishi treatment. After only one week of the application of Reishi at a distance he was quite reover-

ed and in normal health, and after another week he was better than ever. In this case there was a very remarkable tremor of the body during treatment.

There is another case where we have the thanks of a doctor for complete recovery after treatment by the application of the Action of Reishi. Dr. Tani is a physician living at Wakayagi, Kurihara-gori in Miyagi ken. He came to the office of TAIREIDO one day with his wife and grandson. Without giving any indication as to the ailment of his wife he simply asked us to examine her. It was soon discovered that there was a growth about four inches in diameter near the womb, the tumor being filled with liquid. The doctor was obviously surprised at our rapid and accurate diagnosis of the trouble. He then asked us if we could undertake to treat the woman, and said his grandchild also needed treatment.

The history of the case is interesting, in view of the cure obtained. This woman was 73 years old and suffered from pythisis for some twenty years. She also had asthma and heart trouble, having been treated by physicians for many years, without receiving benefit. After three weeks treatment by our office she is almost cured, having now only a little cough at times. Soon she will be as well as ever.

Kumiji, her granddaughter, is 23 years old, and had long suffered from stomach and bowel disease, receiving no benefit from medical treatment. She could eat little or nothing and had obstruction in the intestines. Her only relief from pain was from morphia injections. She had to be

fed artificially in order to prolong life. Then she came under our Reishi treatment at a distance. Within ten days the vomiting stopped and she could take food, the pain in the stomach gradually stopping. The case in fact responded to the Action of Reish and will soon be completely cured, to the great joy of the woman.

The cases above mentioned are only those where cure from ordinary medical treatment was manifestly impossible. Cases of recovery from ordinary illness through Reishi treatment are so numerous and common that we forbear to cite any of them; but the above instances of complete recovery from apparently incurable maladies under the application of the Action of Reishi are so remarkable and extraordinary as to be marvellous if not miraculous. They prove the effective power of Reishi under all circumstances; and yet there is no real wonder about it for the power that caused all things to exist must be able to effect all good for mankind when properly used. If any desire further information as to cases cured and treatment offered they may correspond with the TAIREIDO Association.

TAIREIDO has its system of teaching the fundamental principles of the Art of applying the Action of Reishi for all purposes of improving human life and existence. Instruction may be either by attending the classes in our office or by correspondence and reading our literature. Any one may easily acquire the art by applying to us and following our directions: We fit the pupil thoroughly for the practice of such arts as Reishi, including the art of apprehending what

is in the mind of others, of thought transmission to others, of apprehending physical condition, spirit photography, prophecy, and many other occult arts of which the human mind and body are capable under due instruction from experts.

For fuller information as to the whole system of TAI-REIDO and all it does for mankind, one should read the volume entitled TAIREIDO, A New Revelation for the elimination of diseases and the improvement of life, by Morihei Tanaka, founder of TAIREIDO, published by our Association and to be had by applying to our office in Tokyo. This volume gives a full statement in detail of the secrets of Art of Reishi.

**We believe that the life of
an individual is a gift from
Tairei.**

TAIREIDO

We have received a new volume entitled TAIREIDO explaining a unique system of thought and life revealed to the author Mr. Morihei Tanaka. This gentleman has for some time been attracting wide attention in Japan and the Far East as the Expounder of Taireido, which now has quite a large number of disciples. The new system of thought is certainly one of the most remarkable guesses at the Riddle of the Universe that we have come across in recent years. To Mr. Tanaka and his followers, however, it is no guess but a revelation of the fundamental truths of existence. It would, of course, be quite impossible in the space at our disposal to give any adequate account of this wonderful system of thought as laid down in the volume under review. Mr. Tanaka has himself contributed various articles to our pages with reference to the subject, and his remarks have elicited wide interest, judged by the number of inquiries received. It will be sufficient at this time merely to say that the founder of TAIREIDO claims to have had revealed to him, after a long period of bodily discipline, the secret of all existence. It was a revela-

tion from the Great Spirit who is the author of all things. From this experience the author of Taireido saw that the essence of things is neither material nor spiritual but a fusion of these ; and that man, the highest product of this fusion, has within himself the power of the Spirit to regulate his body, his soul, as well as human society and civilization in harmony with the law of the universe, without which evil must prevail. Once man has acquired the secret of this inherent power, by instruction in Taireido, he can regulate his physical, mental and moral functions in accordance with the laws of the universe, or in harmony with TRUTH, as Mr. Tanaka says ; so that all irregularity and disease are eliminated from mankind. Man can wield this divine power both for himself and for others. By the same power all creation has been produced ; and by this power man can bring his life into unity with creation. The power can be exercised everywhere at all times, unlimited by distance or circumstance. The author claims that this new system of thought and life supercedes all the spiritual and intellectual knowledge so far acquired by mankind. Needless to say such teaching has created no small interest in Japan, where Mr. Tanaka has attracted much attention during the past few years ; and considerable numbers of people are not only displaying keen interest in it but are placing themselves under the instruction of the author of Taireido, including all classes from the highest to the lowest. Some quite wonderful results of the effect on individuals have been recorded, and the book itself gives numerous examples, as well as explaining lucidly the general principles of the system.

This volume, thus compiled out of the author's marvellous experience, is intended for students of Taireido living too far from the author to come personally under his instruction. Particulars as to the volume, or as to Taireido, itself, may be had by applying to the office of the Japan Magazine. [*Review in the Japan Magazine.*]

We believe that the universe
is the product of one principle called *Reishi* Which
is an emanation of *Tairei*,
true and good.

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
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BY
E. A. REPASS.**

The Importance of Home Training.

For I know him, that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord.
—GENESIS xviii. 19.

The Lord here expressed great confidence in Abraham, that he would bring up his children and his whole house in supreme love and obedience to Him. The circumstances under which He gave expression to this confidence are peculiar. The Lord was about to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah for very grievous sin. For a time, in close personal association with Abraham, both in his tent and by the wayside, the Lord withheld from him His purpose regarding the wicked cities of the plain: but finally told him unhesitatingly and plainly of their impending destruction; assigning as a reason for such ultimate communication that Abraham was a faithful and righteous man, and, therefore, altogether worthy of such divine confidence and trust, "for the secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him."

This Scripture brings to our attention a very important subject, namely, "Home Training," or "Family Discipline," because, after all, it was this for which the Lord commended Abraham in the text.

This subject is of *importance* because of the position

occupied by the home as the beginning and foundation of all society and order. The family is the basis of social, religious, and political life, and not the individual, as maintained by Kant, Fichte, and others. From the family, and the family alone, has grown the idea of Church and State. It follows, then, that as the family is, so will the nation be, in its religious, political, and every other aspect. The family makes or mars society in all its relations and doings. It is the home training that fixes and determines, with iron hand, national weal or woe. Keep pure the fountain of the home and ours will be a clean and vigorous country; but taint that spring and all will be bitterness and death. Strike the average of the family, and you have the mean standard of the nation, for the stream cannot rise above its source. In the home and training of to-day you have the inevitable life and times of to-morrow. The boys and girls of to-day will be the men and women of to-morrow. It has been beautifully but truly said that our strongest national defense is not army and navy, guns and forts, but the boys and girls of this land—the homes of our people are our strongest forts. It is not the public school, college, university, or military and naval academy alone that fits and trains men and women for public place and responsible position; it is done in large measure before they leave the parental roof. Schools can only give touch and tone to what has already been done in the home. The one defect in all education to-day is that it is practically done before

we think it scarcely begun. In tenderest years life impressions are made, habits are fixed, and characters are formed. The home is the world's great and greatest training school, and who neglects that neglects all. The importance of home training cannot be overestimated. May the God of Abraham, who commended the Father of the Faithful for making them faithful, preserve the homes of this nation, that it may be spared under God to fill an honorable place in the sisterhood of nations, and to accomplish its divine mission among men.

This subject is of *importance now*, because of the alarming extent to which the home life of our people is being broken up. Once we were a home-loving and home-abiding people, but this, alas! is the age of the boarding-house and the club. Country people are moving into town, and town and city people find it more convenient or cheaper to take meals away from home. Men, and frequently women, are away during long business hours, and the club and society take up the evening, so that only a few hours remain for the home—a few hours of darkness for sleep. Sometimes the quiet of the home is altogether given up for the noise of the apartment and the glare of greater publicity. The Sundays, too, are often proscribed by sport and pleasure, so that there is little or no home life left in many instances. In the general breaking up of the home life, family discipline is altogether destroyed or shorn of its strength and power, and if this continue, I have only

gravest apprehensions for the future. Club or society life is an unsatisfactory substitute for pious home training and old-fashioned godliness. If business cares are immoderate and unreasonable, had we not better slap business full in the face, and take time to save the homes and the children? Can we afford, even in this commercial age, to sell such values for a few paltry dollars?

This subject is of *great importance* now, because of the gross and growing neglect of family discipline. Too often, in the average home of to-day, the parents do not control the children, but the children have control over the parents. The child is either allowed to have its own way, or has it over parental protest; and yet the parents do not seem to be alarmed about it. The insolence and the impudence of the average child of to-day is a matter of growing concern among thinking people. There is little respect for parents, none for elders and superiors, and scorn and derision for all others. Not once, but many times, I have heard the child defy and curse the mother who brought it into the world. In short, the average child of to-day has no superior; he is lord of all, but subject to none. Only recently, in one of our important cities, a respectable and inoffensive man was murdered for upholding the impudence and rudeness of some children. The murderer was a prominent and influential business man, but he had been goaded on to madness and desperation by the mockery and insolence of the children. Those

children were murderers no less than the man they drove to the crime. No wonder our jails are full, and the hangman is busy ; and parents help furnish them their ghastly and terrible work by neglecting their duties in the home. Do you know, dear parent-hearer, that you are delivering up your own child to the executioner by failing to discipline it as you should ?

But we turn from the contemplation of this dark picture to the study of the life of Abraham, and find it most refreshing and delightful. The testimony of the Lord concerning him was, he will command his children to keep the way of the Lord. He was not one to advise and suggest ; he believed in compulsion. With him it was not a question whether his children wanted to serve the Lord or not, he made them serve Him. Individual wants and wishes were not consulted in matters of faith and religion—there was but one thing to do here, and that to obey the Lord God in all that He required. He no more asked the young man Isaac whether he wanted to serve God than he asked the babe Isaac whether it wanted to nurse or sleep. He decided what it was best for his children to do, and he made them do it.

And not only the children of that godly man, but servants and all his house were brought under his immediate control and direction. Every herdsman, huntsman, camel-driver, and domestic was commanded to serve the Lord. These all looked to him in temporal things, and he felt responsible, before God, for the

wants of their higher and spiritual nature. Knowing what was best for them at all times, and greatly feeling his responsibility for all dependent upon him, he did not hesitate to secure their best interests, even by constraint and authority. No wonder God was pleased with the man, took him into loving confidence, and made of him a great nation.

But not Abraham alone, of the patriarchs, was faithful ; he was but one of many zealously devoted to the service of God. Israel, as a nation, was scrupulously careful in the training of her young. Most refreshing, indeed, in these times of fearful neglect, is the study of the patriarchal life and home. The father was the unquestioned head of the family, and as such for hundreds of years was rendered an almost servile obedience from the humblest servant to the proudest son. There was no turning aside from his instruction or toying with his command. All disputes and questions were referred to him as absolute arbiter, and his was a decision from which there was no appeal. Still, he was not a cruel tyrant, but a gracious and loving father, wise in all his counsels and just in all his ways. The patriarch was *prophet, priest, and king* at once, in the administration of his household affairs.

As *prophet*, his chief duty was the religious instruction of his house. The patriarch was the teacher, the children and servants the pupils, the word of God the text-book, and every opportunity and unoccupied moment, school hours. At the noon or evening hours,

while the family was not otherwise engaged, the master of the house was teaching them the word of the Lord. This the daily task when done with field or flock. And after the rest at noon, as they were going to the field or walking by the way, still they talked of the Lord. The evening quiet of the home was pervaded with religious duty, and the retiring and rising hours were saturated with the word. The morning, evening, and daily devotions were beautiful beyond description, and well might Israel say, "Thy word have I hid in mine heart." The divine instruction was most carefully obeyed: "Thou shalt teach my words diligently unto thy children, when thou sittest in thine house and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down and when thou risest up; yea, thou shalt write them on the door posts of thy house and on thy gates" (Deut. vi. 7).

The word was the theme of all instruction, and the burden of all conversation. There was neither time nor disposition in such homes for card-playing, dancing, novel-reading, gaming, or other pastime, innocent or otherwise; they were full of and busy with the word. No time for amusement or diversion; time for the word only. No wonder they had Samuels and Davids and Elijahs then! No public schools or professional teachers; but such fathers and homes! That father was still prophet in the home!

But the patriarch was *priest* as well as prophet. He not only taught his house how it ought to keep the way of the Lord, but he was also priest to purge away actual

transgressions, the besetting sin of the holiest child of God upon earth. In patriarchal times, the father himself offered the sacrifice with his own hand and upon his own altar, for himself and his house. When the waters of the flood were gone, Noah built an altar unto the Lord and offered burnt-offering upon it. Whether Abraham pitched his tent by Bethel or dwelt in the plains of Mamre, he built an altar and called upon the name of the Lord. The patriarchal encampment or wanderings could be plainly followed by Jehovah altars that dotted the way.

Job said : " It may be my sons have sinned and renounced God " ; so he rose up early in the morning and offered burnt-offerings according to the number of them all. And this, perhaps, was a daily precaution, a daily sacrifice for daily sin. Beautiful, indeed, is the picture of the priestly patriarch, with an ever-smoking altar, a deep concern for sin, and a yearning love for the souls of his house. Oh, for such piety in the home to-day, such love for the souls of the children, and such consuming desire for their salvation !

But the patriarch was more than prophet and priest ; he was *king*, also. There was no government then but that of the home and tribe, and the patriarch was the sole guardian of temporal as well as spiritual interests. Life was simple and wants were few, and such government as was needful could be very well administered by heads of houses, or father-princes.

The military of the home was called out to drive

away the robber, punish the thief, or avenge the family wrong. Punishment was meted out to the offender within the home, and reward bestowed upon the deserving by the head of the house. The father selected a wife for the son and arranged for the marriage of the daughter. The council of the home was the law of the land, and the will of the father was supreme.

In extreme cases, extreme measures seem to have been resorted to. The power of life and death was unquestionably exercised by the patriarch, and sometimes, it would seem, very arbitrarily. Isaac offered no resistance on Mount Moriah, because he conceded to his father the right to take his life. It was not an empty boast when Jacob declared that whoever had stolen the gods of Laban should not live. Judah commanded that his daughter-in-law, Tamor, should be stoned to death, when told that she had sinned grievously. Saul declared that Jonathan should certainly die, because he had unwittingly violated the royal command to observe a certain fast during one of the Philistine wars. Jephthah probably sacrificed his daughter in a foolish vow, because he had the power of life and death.

I refer to these instances of the death sentence, not with approval—for they were the rash acts of foolish men—but to show how positive, stern, and absolutely unyielding the old patriarch was in the management of his home affairs, and what rigid discipline and severe training he maintained.

There are some, however, who would rise up with the

fires of indignation burning to denounce Abraham as a fierce and bloody tyrant, while they would brand his household as stupid and senseless slaves of barbarian times. But let us remember that that home was a divine institution, overshadowed with the divine presence, and that Abraham was specially commended by the Lord for faithfulness in the training of his house. I can face a frowning world, but not an angry God.

It is true, there is a painful contrast between such a home and many at the present time, but the advantage is with the patriarch, and the shame with us. It is to our awful shame that children grow up to do as they please, when it is our plain duty to *command* them to keep the way of the Lord. They may only tread upon our toes now, but ere long they will trample upon our hearts. We spare the rod, but spoil the child, and make it impossible for it to succeed in life, by neglecting that training which alone can bring success. It is sad to see hosts of children growing up for the barest treadmill of existence, to hang like a millstone upon the community, or for the penitentiary or death-chair—all because parents do not do their duty. Has it ever occurred to you that many a father hangs his own son because he does not keep him off the gallows?

It is in the towns and cities that children seem to have grown most alarmingly away from parental control, and to have waxed grossest in their impudence. This is due in large measure to parental carelessness, consuming idleness, dangerous companionship, and pestilential

herding together of children. The father is so busy that he has no time to keep his children out of the way to hell. The mother lets them run the street, or leaves them in the care of an ignorant nurse, while she devotes her time and attention to dogs and novels. Down with the dogs and servants, and more personal attention to the children, or the hand that rocks the cradle will cease to rule the world. Allowed to live on the streets, to become familiar with the slang, profanity, and indecency of the streets, with the basest companionship of the city—what can you expect of a girl or boy growing up under such circumstances as these? If they escape the penitentiary and house of infamy, they will not owe it to parental care and concern. Find something for the children to do, and keep them off the streets as you would keep them from the Evil One himself. Do not let them come and go unattended when and where they please, and at any and all hours of the day or night; but watch for their souls as you would guard them from legions of vile and openly-attacking devils. If the devil goes about as a roaring lion seeking whom he may devour, you need not feed him your children. If you live in the city, it is more likely to become the home of your child; and you need to give him the more careful and prayerful training that he fall not away in the hour of awful temptation. "Train up a child in the way he should go"—or, as it is in the original—"Catechise a child in his way: and when he is old he will not depart from it."

But not all the bad children are in the city ; the country has its share, also. In the quiet, country home, where the child is constantly overshadowed by parental presence and love, conditions are but little improved. Here it is not idle hands for which Satan finds employment, or bad companions that mislead ; the poison seems to be in our very life and times. Here it is the most common thing to hear children speak in the most disrespectful way of those whom they have been divinely commanded to honor and obey. When parents attempt to advise or reprove, the children laugh at them as old-fashioned and ignorant. Parents are frequently responsible for this. When they were growing up they had to clear away the widespread forest, fight the murderous Indian, wring out a frugal living from an unkindly soil, or do battle for their country, and had no time for schools and education. Not so the children, for the poorest have the advantages of the common school, if not the privileges of the high school, and parents often feel that the children know more at ten than they do at fifty. Hard-working people, who have fought their way from poverty to competence, encourage their children to a life of ease and idleness, and point them to better things than they have had. Such children soon become impressed with a sense of vast superiority to their plodding parents, and taking the reins into their own hands, drive the old family chariot whithersoever they will, with father and mother attached to it.

My dear parent-friend, no matter how much or how

little you know, God has placed you over the home, and He expects and requires you to control it. If you never saw a book or placed your foot in a school-house, you have learned many lessons in the school of common sense, and had many sessions in the hard academy of experience; you know what is best for your child; make it do what it ought to do. Compel it to grow up honest and honorable, and in the love and practice of all that is good; command it to keep the way of the Lord, and save it from the malarial poisons of the times in which we live.

We need to revive and restore proper discipline in the home for two most excellent reasons: for the sake of the child itself and the good of the nation.

The best interests of the child demand that it be brought under the most careful training in the home during formative years, that it may be fully prepared for the duties of responsible and intelligent manhood and womanhood. Childhood is not only a time to laugh and to play, but to grow and to develop, till one shall come into full use of all the powers and faculties of mind, soul, and body, for the great conflict of life.

It is the solemn drill hour for the serious fray of life that will so sorely try the souls of men. If every opportunity of the home be not carefully improved and the child fully trained and disciplined, he is at woeful disadvantage, and must halt through life because of parental neglect. For the parent to fail here is to be guilty of the grossest criminal negligence, to smite the child with

his own hand or to slay it before his very eyes. For bread will he give it a stone? for a fish, a serpent? for an egg, a scorpion?

But let the child learn the lesson of loving obedience in the home; and in deferring to the will and wish of others it will learn to control itself; and when one has learned to rule the kingdom of self, he is not far from the kingdom of God. Better is he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh a city. Obedience is not only the first, highest, and only requisite of the soldier, but of every calling known among men. When one has learned obedience, courage, confidence, self-respect, and self-control, storms may howl and tempests rage, but the step is unfaltering, the purpose true, courage unshaken, and success more certain than the sun. "Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice," said Samuel to sinning Saul, "for rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness is as the sin of iniquity and idolatry." And because Saul obeyed not he was put out of the kingdom. We, too, lose kingdoms, treasures, and souls because of our disobedience to God.

The child may resent and resist parental firmness and control for a time, but it has refused medicine in its sickest hour and grasped the dangerous knife in its tiny hand. The sting of the rod is often more severe for the parent than the child, but we dare not weakly turn our face from duty, or sinfully betray a divine trust.

"Without discipline, the favorite child,
Like a neglected forester, runs wild."

In the great workshop of varied industries, and the complicated business world to-day, there is room only for the man who has learned to control himself and obey others. Without these he can but fail. With them there is no giving way or breaking down at the crucial moment, for in the home life has been tempered true to every purpose, adjusted to every circumstance, and prepared for every emergency.

But the welfare of the nation also demands the utmost care in the training of the home and the discipline of the family. Carelessness in the home is not only reflected in the individual, but also in the nation; for the life of the nation is the life of the combined homes of the nation. The homes make the nation, and not the nation the homes. If there is a preponderance of good men and women in the nation, it is because good homes are in the majority. If the state and national leaders are true and honorable men, it is because they had faithful, praying fathers and mothers. If the time shall come when this nation shall forget God and be turned into hell, it will be because the parents in the homes are untrue to God and do not command the children to keep His way. If men are taught honesty and uprightness in the home, when they become citizens of the State, in private capacity or official position, they would rather sacrifice their right hand than do wrong or pervert justice or judgment. If they are taught to obey the rules and regulations of the home, they will yield a cheerful obedience to the laws and

requirements of the nation. But if they despise and scorn the discipline of the home and rebel against its authority, they will be anarchists and revolutionists and terrorists in the nation. If they are taught to love the right and to frown down the wrong in the home, they will stand at the polls as the guardians of national purity and integrity. But when the child is allowed to lie and steal in the home, and rule and plunder there, do not blame him for pursuing a similar course on a larger scale in the affairs of the nation. If money, for its own sake and irrespective of the way in which it is procured, is the ruling passion of the home, do not blame the nation for covetousness, dishonesty, and wrong-doing. Let not him who would sell his birth-right, in the home or at the polls, find fault with him who is on the pay-roll of the trust or corporation.

At the present time the nation is in disgrace because of scandal and corruption in important position and high life. Graft is on every hand, and the trusts are filling the land with portentous shadow.

But the day of visitation and judgment seems to be at hand, and arousing themselves to a sense of the great national insecurity, the people are disposed to resort to extreme measures and methods, and to make an example of some as a warning to the many. Some, however, would herd together all corruptionists, high and low, and put them behind the prison bars for long periods of time. They would punish, alike, the railroad president and the trackman, the trust magnate and his

office-boy, and pen them all up together to sorrow for their sins. And why should they not? Will gold outweigh justice in the honest balances of God? But when we have done all these things, we are still unprofitable servants; for we have left altogether untouched the prime cause that has produced such dire effects. We have only cut away the prickly thorns, but left the roots in the ground to bring forth a still more impenetrable thicket. The roots of the national evil run back into the home, and the only way to entirely eradicate the sin and shame of the nation is to uproot it in the home. The right way to make an honest man is to make him honorable before he becomes a thief. The one sure way to reform and reclaim is to begin before there is any need for it. If you would abolish corruption, fraud, misrule, anarchy, and every other evil in the nation, break it up in the home, and it will trouble you no further. Make your homes clean, and the nation will be clean; keep your homes pure, and the nation will be pure forever.

And what is true of the State is also true of the Church. The carelessness and the indifference, the lukewarmness and lack of vital godliness in the Church to-day is directly and abundantly traceable to the Christian Home. The Church is sick and dying because of pestilence in the Home. Our love is so cold and faint in the Church because we live at such a poor, dying rate in the home. The family altar has been broken down, the Bible is a neglected book, the catechism has

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been put aside, there is no time for prayer and meditation, no time for religion and God in the home. Few children, I fear, can truthfully say they ever heard their parents pray. Verily, verily, these things ought not to be. We have forgotten God, sold ourselves for naught, and our foolish lamps are going out, when, behold, the Bridegroom cometh, and the door will soon be shut.

The earliest church was the church in the home, both in its Old and its New Testament forms. Again and again in his epistles, Paul sent greetings to the "Church in the house." We want the Church in the Home, and until we get the *Church* in the *Home* we will not get the *Home* in the *Church*. "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it." Like faithful Abraham of old, command your household to keep the way of the Lord, that the blessing of the Lord may also rest upon you, and that a wise son may make glad the heart of his father. Be faithful in the home, then, because duty demands it, the welfare of your child depends upon it, and the good of the Church and State requires it. And in the hour of death, when you come to lay down the work of the Home and the burden of life to meet your God, may He commend you for faithfulness here, saying unto you: "Well done, good and faithful servant, thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things; enter thou into the joy of thy Lord." "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world."

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Character

The Foundation of Successful Business

by

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, JR.

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
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26 BROADWAY
NEW YORK

Character

The Foundation of Successful Business

audley
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, JR.



*An address delivered before the
Twenty-Six Broadway Club
December 1, 1927*

Character

The Foundation of Successful Business



Mr. Chairman and Friends:

MRS. ROCKEFELLER and I hold so pleasantly in memory the evening spent with you four years ago that we are more than glad to be here tonight and to have the opportunity of repeating an experience so wholly delightful. As I look into your faces and reflect upon what your company is doing, I am very proud of this splendid family and a bit envious of those who are really related to it. Just what qualifications are requisite for membership, I do not know, but assume only those are eligible who are in the employ of the company.

While it is true that neither Mrs. Rockefeller nor I are on the payroll of the company, we are nevertheless both working for the promotion of the company's interest—Mrs. Rockefeller in Bayway and Bayonne and I wherever opportunity offers. Will Rogers recently offered to bet Mr. Arthur Brisbane \$5,000 that Presi-

dent Coolidge would run again. In the course of his letter he said, "I know you writers write one thing and think another, but a man always bets the way he thinks." It is a truism that one's interest follows one's investments. Therefore, the fact that Mrs. Rockefeller and I have quite a snug little nest-egg tucked away in the securities of your company speaks perhaps more eloquently than anything I can say of our belief in the company, which means our belief in you.

Service the Pathway to Success

In the few words which I had the privilege of saying to you four years ago this evening, I called attention to the fact that that company which renders service efficiently and satisfactorily is following the surest path to financial success. In this connection I was greatly pleased to have brought to my attention recently a newspaper story concerning this company which ran as follows:

"When one drives into a Standard service station these days a youth in uniform approaches the car from the front. He carries a water can with a long snout. He opens your radiator cap

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and pours water in the tank. Then he closes the cap, takes a rag, wipes off the nickel trimming, after which he attacks the windshield with the rag and removes all evidences of the previous night's fog. In the meantime he nods a cheery good morning or good evening to you, and without more ado raises your hood and examines the status of the oil in your crankcase.

"All of this before you have a chance to say a word. Later, when you have ascertained the condition of your oil, and, if necessary, remedied it, he stands by respectfully to learn your desires in the matter of gasoline.

"All of this time you are thinking what a thundering nice fellow he is to fill your water tank, examine your oil and ascertain your gasoline needs. The thought immediately arises that here is a fellow who deserves an adequate tip, and while you are pondering in your mind whether it should be a quarter or a half, your eyes fall upon a bright red sign which informs you that tips are not acceptable, that the service you have received is gratis.

"In the meantime your gasoline needs have been tended to and the young man stands attentively at your car window. You ask him how much, he tells you and, after counting your change, waves you goodbye and you drive off.

"Somehow you feel, as you drive away from one of those stations, that your old car doesn't look so badly and that, after all, the winter isn't going to be so hard. That is, you have something of the feeling of a man who upon inquiry at the bank learns that his balance is larger than he expected it to be.

"If everybody in your line of business in this town would go half as far to be nice and pleasant to people as do these boys of the Standard Oil Company, then we expect this would be a much pleasanter place to live in, and, in the long run, a much more profitable one."

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THIS story well illustrates the fine type of service which this company is rendering. In the days when my father was active in affairs, the great problem with

which business was grappling was how to organize on a scale commensurate with the growing demands for service made by the ever increasing population. Now the gigantic corporate form of business, suspected and harassed during the years of its evolution, is accepted as not only useful but indispensable. Business also has turned its attention to the development of better relations between employer and employe and, while much remains to be done, marvelous progress has been made along that line.

*High Standards of
Business Ethics*

Today the vital matter to which business must needs address itself is the re-emphasizing of *high standards of business ethics*, for upon such a foundation only can business be permanently successful. This company was a pioneer in the first two of these fields and made a contribution of immense value. Here again in this third field can it render to business a further inestimable service by the example which it sets. Feeling as I do that this question is of basic significance, I should like to say a few words tonight on the subject—

“Character—the foundation of successful business.”

Of course other qualities besides character are also necessary—ability, persistence, industry, thrift—but character is indispensable. Some people confuse reputation with character. Reputation is what people think we are; character is what we really are. A good reputation for an individual or business concern is to be desired; far more so a character that is beyond question.

Four Qualities of Character

May I mention briefly four qualities which go to make up character. The first is integrity. We put our money in a bank with a sense of security because we believe in the integrity of those in charge. A man may speculate in the hope of making a lucky turn, but he invests his money in enterprises conducted by men of known integrity. Integrity in business means a trade as good for one party as for the other. A man may get the better of you in a bargain once, but you continue to do business with those people only who you know are looking out for your interests as well as their own.

Last summer three of our sons were traveling with us in Europe. Each was assigned some particular task in connection with the business of traveling. One at-

tended to the auditing and paying of bills and the handling of funds; another to the baggage; while the third did errands. Each received weekly pay commensurate with the service rendered. As a result of this experience, the boy who paid the bills came to realize that the reason for carefully auditing and adding any account before paying it, whether for a meal, hotel accommodations or goods purchased, was quite as much to make sure that full payment was rendered for the service received as to guard against the possibility of paying more than the exact sum due. The amount of error on either side of the account was not the significant thing, but rather the principle of absolute integrity and accuracy.

Obedience to Law

In the second place, character implies obedience to law—irrespective of whether one likes the law, believes in it or is opposed to it. How well known to all of us are instances of law breaking like the following: Here is a woman who says, "I don't believe in the customs law. It is foolish and unwarranted. Therefore I feel perfectly justified in smuggling." With equal propriety says the footpad, "This law against highway robbery cramps my style and forces

me to the unwelcome alternative of earning an honest living." And he holds up the next automobile that passes.

Another illustration of this same attitude is the feeling on the part of many people that the 18th amendment is an infringement of personal liberty and therefore its observance is purely optional. To my way of thinking it is absolutely on all fours with the cases cited above.

And again the same disregard for law sometimes shows itself in connection with the operations of business. There are a large and increasing number of laws regulating business. The great majority of them are undoubtedly wise and in the interest of the people. Some unnecessarily hamper and restrict business and do not serve the common good. Here, as in any of these other instances of regrettably common lawlessness, one has respect for the man who seeks by every legitimate means to bring about the repeal of a law which he honestly thinks to be contrary to public interest. But law is law, whether it affects personal liberty, social well-being or business; so long as it remains the law of the land it should be obeyed both by individuals and by corporations. The alternative is anarchy.

A third requisite of character is clean living. With the changing point of view of modern times in regard to moral questions, one almost wonders whether there is any such thing as fixed moral standards. And yet, with all due allowance for legitimate differences of opinion, way down within us all we know that those things which keep us physically fit, mentally vigorous and spiritually sensitive make for clean living and fine character, while whatever tends to defile the "house beautiful" in which our spirit dwells, to dull the power of our minds, to lower our ideals, is unworthy.

Clean Living

In these days of unprecedented and widespread prosperity in our land, with self-indulgence growing, individual liberty too frequently becoming license, and will-power weakened by the less virile conditions of life, there is serious need of re-emphasizing the underlying importance of clean living as a requisite of business success. The good mixer, the hail-fellow-well-met is an asset in any business, but when he feels it necessary to "go the pace," whether from personal inclination or ostensibly to maintain his business contacts, he becomes a distinct liability to his company, and a positive menace to its public standing and its morale, both of which are

of basic importance. A new emphasis on high ideals of personal living is greatly needed in business today, also, may I add, men with the courage to live up to their convictions.

Singleness of Purpose

The fourth and final quality which I would mention is singleness of purpose or loyalty. Nothing truer was ever said than that "no man can serve two masters." So obvious is this fact that it has been embodied in law, which forbids the receiving of a commission from both buyer and seller. Often, however, in so insidious a way is influence brought to bear to break down one's singleness of purpose that the approach is not easy to recognize.

When I first sought to be useful to my father in business ways, I had occasion to suspect that a certain employe who was buying supplies was taking commissions. I questioned him carefully but was unable to draw out the fact of which I had outside proof. Ultimately when I asked him point blank if he had ever received any money or presents from a certain concern, he said, "Why, yes, they sent me a Christmas present, but I did not suppose that had anything to do with my buying of them."

One's value to an employer is in large measure dependent upon singleness of purpose. If in considering advice given or an opinion expressed one must always wonder whether it is disinterested or whether personal advantage enters in, its value is seriously discounted. To be worthy of the complete confidence of our associates, to know that they can put a hundred per cent reliance in the disinterestedness of the opinions which we express, is one of the finest things in life. No gain to be derived from undertaking to ride two horses at the same time can begin to equal the satisfaction thus realized.

~

THESE then are certain of the fundamental qualities that underlie character—*integrity, obedience to law, clean living and singleness of purpose*. Is there any one of them that can be omitted or ignored without hazarding continuing business success? It is true that money is often made by trickery and sharp practice, but successful business is not established on a foundation so shifting.

Regretfully must we admit that instances are not lacking of corporations and individuals who set them-

selves up as superior to law, but when condemned, as they are sure to be, in the court of public opinion, even the most worldly minded is bound to ask himself, "Does it pay?", and to admit that no business can be permanently successful which is not law-abiding.

The Best Chance of Winning

As for clean living, is it not obvious that that man stands the best chance of winning out in any sphere who is sound in body, alert of mind and fearless of heart? Singleness of purpose, the loyalty of those with whom we are associated, gives us confidence in our fellows and makes great enterprises and achievement possible.

But, someone says, the pressure of competition is so tremendous that it is not always practicable to maintain these standards, much as we may believe in them. I answer that no honest stockholder wants profits derived from compromise with right, nor would he wittingly permit, much less expect, any act to be performed by anyone representing the company, from the president to the office boy, which he would not himself be willing to perform. This is a position which cannot be too strongly stated. It is a platform on which I have always stood like the rock of Gibraltar.

*To Make a Life,
Not a Living*

Every ambitious, self-respecting individual wants to make a living. That he should do, and as much more as his services to society justify. But in this money-mad age we do well to remind ourselves that after all the real purpose of our existence is not to make a living, but to make a life—a worthy, well-rounded and useful life. In the long run, therefore, anything that defeats that purpose is not worth the cost.

Years ago my father received a letter from someone in the Middle West who said he had been charged an exorbitant price for kerosene in a small country grocery store. His immediate assumption was that the president of the Standard Oil Company approved and authorized such overcharge; hence the bitter letter which he wrote the then president. In other words, the president of the company was being judged by the unwarranted and to him utterly unknown act of the grocery clerk.

*No Man Can Live
Unto Himself Alone*

Each one of you to a degree holds in his hand the reputation of your associates in this company and of the stockholders as well. Where the man at the service

station renders efficient, cheerful service, he is bringing direct credit upon everyone connected with the company. Where an employe, of whatever rank, fails to live up to the highest standards in his individual business life, he is bringing discredit upon his associates and his employers.

Truly has it been said that no man can live unto himself alone; our lives are too intimately interwoven, human relations are too interdependent. It is because I believe so profoundly in this Standard Oil family, because I am so proud of what it is and what it is doing, that I covet for it the best in personal character, in ideals as well as in business success.

*A Letter to the
Twenty-Six Broadway Club
from Mr. John D. Rockefeller*

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER
KIJUKUIT
POCANTICO HILLS
NEW YORK

November 24, 1927.

Dear Mr. Phelps:


I thank you for your very kind invitation to be present at the Sixth Annual Banquet of the Twenty-Six Broadway Club, to be held at the Hotel Biltmore on December 1st.

Nothing would give me greater pleasure than to attend, and to mingle with the old representatives of the Company, and make the acquaintance of the new, on that occasion. I regret, however, that I shall be unable to do so.

Please extend to the Club my heartiest felicitations, with the hope that every member may attain to the highest niche to which he is entitled, and the utmost usefulness, in connection with the Company, not only, but in all the varied relations of life, wherever duty and service may call, and that each may be keenly sensitive to the call, remembering that in this way, only, can we find our highest happiness and satisfaction.

With appreciation of the kind thought of the Club in desiring me to be with you, I am

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "John D. Rockefeller". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal line extending from the end of the name.

Mr. A. G. Phelps, President,
Twenty-Six Broadway Club,
26 Broadway, New York.

N.L.CC

MR. TAPP'S SEX INTER-
PRETATION *of the* BIBLE
as a MEANS *of* PEACE *and*
PREVENTION *of* CRIME,
INSANITY *and* DISEASE

ARGUMENT *of the* COMMITTEE *as*
PRESENTED *to the* PRESIDENT *of the*
UNITED STATES, *and to the* SENATE
and the HOUSE *of* REPRESENTATIVES



THE SIDNEY C. TAPP INTERNATIONAL
" PEACE LEAGUE
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

True "Preparedness" and the Court of International Peace

Where is war, within human nature? It is within the Sex. What fills your Insane Institutions, Hospitals, and Jails? It is Sex. Why was Jesus Christ the Perfect Man, the Life and the Prince of Peace? Because at thirty years of age he overcame Sex, in Thought, and Consciousness.

What is Christian Education? It is man mastering the Sex instincts and brute within himself. Who is the Christian? He that has overcome Sex-Lust, in Thought and Consciousness as did Jesus when he became the Christ. Then he healed the sick and the mentally deranged, "bowed down by Satan"---Sex-Lust. Would the nations have peace, and empty the Insane Institutions, Hospitals and Prison Cells of the world? If so, let them teach men that they must master the Serpent and Brute within themselves.



SIDNEY C. TAPP, Ph.B.,

(Lawyer)

Author of "The Truth About the Bible," "Why Jesus Was a Man and Not a Woman," "The Sexology of the Bible," and other Works on the sex and interpretation of the Bible. In these Works the Author shows that insanity, disease and crime, and strife and war, within human nature, are within the sex.

JOHN J. HYDE, Att'y at Law, Pres. Judge E. M. BARTLETT, 4th Vice-Pres.
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THE SIDNEY. C. TAPP INTERNATIONAL PEACE LEAGUE

Object:- The Preservation of Peace and the Prevention of Crime
Disease, and Insanity by Dissemination of Mr. Tapp's
Writings on the Sex Interpretation
of the Bible.

P. O. Box 710

Offices 1033-34-35 Scarritt Building
KANSAS CITY, MO.

ARGUMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON MR. TAPP'S SEX
INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE AS A MEANS OF
PEACE AND THE PREVENTION OF CRIME,
INSANITY AND DISEASE, PRESENTED TO
THE PRESIDENT, THE SENATE
AND THE HOUSE.

*To His Excellency Woodrow Wilson, President of
the United States, and to the Senate and the
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.*

Sirs:—On Sunday night, December 12, 1915, at a mass meeting of citizens held in Kansas City, Mo., at which time and place The Sidney C. Tapp International Peace League was organized for the purpose of disseminating the Writings and sex interpretation of the Bible by Sidney C. Tapp, as a means of preservation of peace and prevention of war, crime, disease and insanity, the undersigned, and Sidney C. Tapp, as Author of said Books, were appointed a committee, and authorized and instructed to visit Washington, D. C., and present to Your Excellency, and to the Senate and the House of Representatives, Mr. Tapp's sex interpretation of the Bible, as a means of pre-

vention of war and preservation of peace; and as a means of prevention of crime, disease and insanity. Instead of visiting Washington in person and presenting this Idea for the purposes named, to you in person, and to the committees of the House and Senate having under consideration the bill for "Preparedness," we beg to submit this argument as covering the Idea and principles involved for your consideration.

May we say to you that war and peace are questions of metaphysics—a state of mind—and that the sex controls the mind of mortal man? We beg to submit that this world war now raging in Europe is a sex question, and that all wars are sex questions. Not only this, but that all economic, social, industrial and political questions are sex questions; and that all greed, avarice, ambition, malice, hatred, murder and death have their origin in the sex, and are controlled by sex; and that the mortal and carnal mind of man is sex; and that in soul life there are no sex, war, strife and death. If the world is to have peace it must come to realize this truth and solve every problem from this viewpoint.

Standing armies, men of war ploughing the bosom of the mighty deep, arsenals and forts cannot produce peace. They are the results of thought, and the thought that produces them leads individuals and nations to war, strife, murder and death; that peace, industrially, politically and otherwise, is a process of education, and that this education consists in leading men out of their animal and sex instincts into soul and spiritual thoughts, which will enable them to overcome the animal within them and thus live in peace with mankind. Armies will never cease fighting, and wars will continue, until man becomes conscious of that within human nature which produces war, namely, the sex, and masters the sex and the animal instincts within human nature. All nature is founded on sex, and all nature is at war; and, if the voice of peace is to be heard, man must be taught the source of strife within human nature, and how to overcome it. The Man of Galilee, at thirty years

of age, at the age when science shows that the male comes into his supreme sex power, overcame sex—the Serpent and the animal within human nature—and thereby overcame death and became The Christ—The Life—and hence had the power to come out of the grave. After his resurrection he said, “My peace I leave with you.” If the world understood the peace that he left with the human race, wars would cease and peace and good will would rule the human family. The peace that he left was soul peace, and he was not the “Prince of Peace” until he overcame the sex, at thirty years of age, in thought and consciousness. He never became the Christ until he overcame the sex at thirty years of age. A Christian nation is a nation that has conquered the sex and the animal within human nature; a Christian world is a world in which mortal man has overcome the Serpent and the animal within human nature, and is living unto the soul. This world war which rages today is of paganism—the sex within human nature—and not of Christianity—the soul.

Mr. Tapp, in his sex interpretation of the Bible, shows that the Bible is a Book of sex as well as of spirit, and that all evil is within the sex, and that which makes men kill and destroy each other is of sex, and that if the Bible were understood—from the law of sex—and lived by the human race, that wars would cease. We beg here to quote from page 258 of his “Truth about the Bible” (second edition): “All pride, strife, conflict, envy, jealousy, malice, hatred, murder and death are within the sex. Peace is within the soul that is conscious of God as Reality and Life.” Again we beg to quote from the same book, page 49: “All evil of the material creation originates in the sexual organs—mortal mind—and is controlled by the sexual laws.” Again we beg to quote from the same book, page 47: “The material creation is sin—it is sex—there is not anything in it but sin and sex, and there is not any sex in soul life. We have this truth thoroughly written in the history of man by art and literature. We have the picture of man painted in all ages, marching in

armies to conquest—wading in blood to victory over his fellowman. At the same time we have the other picture painted on the canvas beside the picture of murder and death, and rivers of blood—the picture of the spiritual man singing hymns and praying to be released from the bondage of the physical man. We have in poetry, the songs of marching armies—the war cry of the victor over the victim—on the campground where the victim of the victor lay moaning and groaning and dying—we have the songs going up to the Great I Am That I Am, from the spiritual man crying out for the union with the spiritual universe, and to know God.”

Again we beg to quote from page 119 of Mr. Tapp’s “Sexology of the Bible”: “Every bleeding back of the slave marts; all the suffering and torture of the oppressed and poor; the bitter tears of the fallen daughters; the sickness, disease and suffering of material man; the belching cannons of conflict and war; the bleeding, suffering and dying on the battlefields of the ages; and all the cries, tears, wailing, moaning and suffering and death of this world are the inheritance of material man, bequeathed to him by his father, lust and sensuality—sex, the devil, the prince of this world.” Again we beg to quote from page 247 of Mr. Tapp’s Work, “Why Jesus Was a Man and Not a Woman”: “Jealousy is the life of this mortal creation. The unfoldment of the life of the Serpent is the life of this mortal creation. This is jealousy, strife, hatred, murder and death. It is the law of the senses and of the flesh.” We might quote page after page of Mr. Tapp’s Writings to this effect, as authority, that it is the sex and the sex instincts, and the brute force within man that causes him to kill and to murder. We think that you will see, after due consideration, that Mr. Tapp, in his sex interpretation of the Bible, is in accord with the teachings of the Man of Nazareth; and that the human race, in days to come, when men have come to understand the sex interpretation that Mr. Tapp has placed upon the Bible, will realize the source of war within man, and will disarm the nations of the

earth. May we not ask that if this man has not given the true interpretation of the Christ, when the Master said, on the night before his crucifixion, "Nation shall rise up against nation and kingdom against kingdom, and there shall be wars and rumors of wars"? Matthew 24:7-8. Was not the Master here interpreting the true meaning of the Serpent as the cause of all war and sorrow of the race? We beg to invite an honest investigation. It was the Serpent—sex—that caused man to be driven out of the Garden of Eden, and from that day until this, strife, conflict and death have been the results, and will be until the Serpent—sex—is overcome in thought and consciousness. Man must master the animal within himself—sex—and must daily crucify the brute force within himself, if he would come into soul life, and have peace with himself and love for his fellowmen.

Every question in nature and life are involved in the struggle of the Serpent that was in the Garden of Eden; and man must come to realize this truth, if he would solve the problem of man's existence. Not only are all strife, war and death within the Serpent; but disease, crime and insanity are within the Serpent, and war itself is the essence of insanity, disease and crime. The Man of Nazareth, after he overcame the Serpent and became the Christ, was not only the "Prince of Peace;" but The Life, and healed the sick everywhere he preached, and restored the insane to their right minds wherever he went. His mission was teaching the Gospel of Life to human men and women bowed down by Satan—diseased from lust and mentally deranged from sex. He healed them and restored them to their right minds as he preached. Today this nation and the nations of the earth are expending great sums of money for scientific and experimental investigations for the purpose of relieving the insane and the diseased physically, and to diminish crime—yet the insane institutions, hospitals and prison cells of the world are filled. There have been crime, insanity and disease since the day that the Serpent deceived

our first parents, and will be until the human race masters the Serpent within human nature. Insanity, disease and crime are within the sex, and, as Mr. Tapp shows, the Bible must become the textbook of sanity, health, and finally the enemy of crime. And to do this, the sex of the Bible must be taught the race, as the final and correct source of all living. Why not begin now?

We are sorry to say that the Bible has become to be commonly accepted as a Book for children and the feeble minded only. This false conception is due to the false interpretation that has been placed upon it. Mr. Tapp, in his Works on the sex interpretation of the Bible, demonstrates that the Bible is not a Book for children and the feeble minded; but that within the sex law of the Bible are involved all science and philosophy of nature. In fact, if his sex interpretation of the Bible were understood, the Bible would become the textbook of all science and philosophy and the key to all nature, and life itself. There was no struggle for existence until the Serpent deceived our first parents, then man was told that he should live by the "sweat of his face." From that day until this, every economic and social question has been a sex question. This war in Europe today is an economic question, and, therefore, a sex question—the Serpent is selfishness and greed. The "Beast" (sex) controls the natural man. The "Battle of Armageddon" is within every human being. It is the Battle between the "Beast" (sex) and the Soul.

Our first parents were told to "touch it not (the Serpent) lest ye die," and from that day until now, the Serpent (sex) has been the father of disease, insanity and crime, and death itself. Man, controlled by the Serpent (sex), has marched to conquest, producing sorrow and death as he marched. May we not ask the nations of the earth to halt from this insane struggle, and carnage of death, and be sane for one moment? May we not ask that the mind of the Serpent be still for one moment in the consciousness of men; and that the mind of the

Christ rule for one minute in the consciousness of men, that the world may have peace?

We do not wish to be understood as presenting Mr. Tapp's sex interpretation of the Bible as a religious creed; or as criticising or condemning any denomination, sect or church. We know that this government is founded on the principle of separation of church and state. We are not presenting Mr. Tapp's ideas as a religious creed, but as a solution for the ills and sorrows of mankind, for, as he demonstrates, they all originate in the sex. We are presenting his views, not for the purpose of establishing a creed or creeds or for the purpose of uniting church and state, but as the solution of the problems of human existence. Crime, insanity, disease, and industrial, economic, political and international conflicts will never cease until men understand that within human nature which is the cause of all suffering and sorrow of human existence, and this is within the sex. The process of relieving these evils of human nature is the process of educating man out of his animal and sex instincts and brute force, into a higher state of mentality and spiritual life—it is the process of educating man how to overcome the sex, animal and brute force within himself. This is Christian education. And we had as well begin now. Why not let this nation, the First Republic of the earth, set the example? The road is long, the journey is far, but the end can be reached. Man through the centuries has struggled up through the night of brutal force, governed by the sex instincts, slaughtering, killing and murdering as he came. Along his journey blood has flowed; and human bodies have fallen, dead and cold. We might as well begin now a new route. Let him travel the road that the Man of Nazareth went; and this highway leads to Peace and Truth; but to reach its end, man must conquer the brute and sex within himself and crown the soul as the citadel of Life and Peace.

Does the road lead up hill all the way?

Aye, to the very end.

Will it take the whole live-long day?

Yes, to the very night, my friend."

The Serpent is self-destructive. Sensuality has destroyed the Republics and Empires of the ages. Sex, either through disease or on the battlefield, has depleted the nations of the past. Shall this Republic go the way of all the nations of the earth? Its only hope of salvation is to educate its citizens out of the sensual into the spiritual. Armies and Navies will not preserve the Republic—they are of the Serpent, and will finally destroy it, as they have all the nations that have gone before. But, if we begin now to teach the true source that must save the nation, if it is to live, the coming generations will profit thereby, and her sons will know that the sensual cannot save her, and will look to a higher source, and master the sensual, and this Republic will live to lead in the disarmament of the nations of the earth and to bring them to the Court of universal peace. This process of education is the business of the nation and the nation should make it its business. It is the work of all the people.

It is significant that as men of wealth come to the ending of their days, they begin to distribute their worldly goods to philanthropic uses. Is it not because they see that only in soul life is peace, and that the wealth gained here and the power and ambition realized, are but the fruits of sex and therefore evil?

We not only invite, but we request the discussion of this question that Mr. Tapp has presented, on the floor of Congress and in the Senate, and a due consideration of it by Your Excellency, as President of the United States, as a means of arresting the attention of the nations now at war, and other Powers, that they may have peace. We respectfully submit that if Mr. Tapp's sex interpretation of the Bible were understood, by the intelligence of the world, that war would be impossible and the nations of the earth would have peace. Why not begin now, its discussion and consideration, as a means of peace? An Idea is power, and an Idea of Truth lodged in the consciousness of the soul is all power to man. Mr. Tapp has given to the world the Truth of the

ages in these Books. Why not begin now to lodge it within the consciousness of the soul of mankind, that peace and good will may rule and govern the human race?

Instead of calling into use the ideas of Mr. Edison and other men of science, as a means of cursing and destroying the human race, why should not this Nation and the Powers of the civilized world invoke the Idea of Mr. Tapp, to bless the human race, and to preserve peace with the nations, and brotherly love for mankind? We submit that this is no dream of the fanatic, but the reality of the most vital truth of the ages. We do not object to this government, for the time being, making all necessary and proper "Preparedness"—the state of thought of the world requires it, but the necessity should not exist. If men understood the nature within them that makes them fight, war would not exist. While this Nation prepares, for the time being, for all necessary defense, why should it not be the first to inculcate the Idea that will disarm the nations of the earth? Why should nations continue to destroy each other? Why should empires and the republics be depopulated by the sex and brute force within man? Why not begin now to inculcate the Idea that will bring universal peace?

The contention that Mr. Tapp makes in his sex interpretation of the Bible, that all strife and war are within the sex of human nature, is established, not only by the Bible, but by the law of nature. Even the agnostic and the man of science, who does not believe in the inspiration of the Bible, must accept this Truth, for it is written in the law of nature. All animal life is at war, and this conflict is within the sex. It is as true of the lower animal creation as it is of man. Man is a creature of reason and his reason should control his actions. When he masters the brute and sex within, his better nature comes into force and controls his actions. This is not true of the lower animal creation—it is controlled by the animal and instincts of sex.

Our appeal, therefore, is to nature, as the court of final resort, as to the Truth of the Idea that all

strife and conflict within animal life are within the sex. This is the Satan that "Walketh up and down in the earth, like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour." And this sex instinct must be mastered for men to live at peace with each other. Not only does nature corroborate and sustain the law of the Bible, that all strife and conflict are within the sex; but science and nature corroborate and sustain the sex teachings of the Bible, that all disease, insanity and crime are within the sex. We, therefore, appeal to the laws of nature to sustain the Truth of Inspiration. The Bible studied from this viewpoint is no longer a Book for the feeble minded and children, but becomes the Book for the philosopher and the man of science, and the textbook of all nature.

May we here suggest, that if this government would spend one-hundredth part of the money that it proposes to spend in equipping a larger army and navy, in printing Mr. Tapp's Works on the Bible, and disseminating Mr. Tapp's sex interpretation of the Bible, not only in this country, but in foreign countries, that the day would not be far hence when war would be impossible. Ere long universal peace would come, and the teachings of the Man of Nazareth would be the code of international law, and the international court of final resort would be right and not of power, of soul and not of sex.

By the consent of the Author, we beg to offer to this government, without charge, as many of Mr. Tapp's Writings as it will have printed and distributed to the people, free. Our purpose in doing this is to educate mankind away from the brute force and his sex nature, into a higher conception of justice, and a state of peace that the Christ taught. We trust that the Government will accept the good offices that we herewith tender, and will have the Truth, as Mr. Tapp has discovered it, placed in reach of the people of this Nation, not as a religious creed, but as the truth of the law of nature; and that the other governments of the civilized world will do likewise. Future generations will profit thereby, and in the

end we will develop a stronger race physically and mentally; a better race morally; and a race with too high a sense of justice to kill and to murder each other. With his sex interpretation of the Bible read and studied by the human race, wars will come to an end.

Will this Government aid in bringing about this result? That is the question that we now submit to you and beg of you to consider. If you refuse, others who will come after you and will fill your honorable places, will not decline. The day will come when the Truth, as he has given it to the world, will be accepted by mankind. An Idea so universally true, and written in all nature and in the very soul, mind and conscience of man, must finally be accepted as the Truth, by the human race.

Most respectfully submitted,

JOHN J. HYDE,
Attorney, at Law,
Chairman.

G. E. CLARK, D.C., M.C.

THEO. F. CLARK, M.D.

GEO. T. WASSOM, A.B.,
Attorney at Law.

L. A. KNOX, A.B., LL.M.,
Attorney at Law.

E. M. BARTLETT,
Attorney at Law and Ex-Member
of the Bench.

I concur, with the other members of the committee, with exception of the personal allusions to myself.

SIDNEY C. TAPP, Ph.B.,
(Profession, Lawyer),
Kansas City, Mo.
Committee.


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CO-OPERATION.

THE BISHOP OF SALFORD, who was much applauded, said: When your excellent chairman invited me to attend this meeting, I said to myself, "What on earth have you got to do with the Co-operative Union?" I did not feel drawn to take part in this great public movement. Two objections pressed rather strongly upon my mind, and I may as well tell you what they were, because, after all, I am a convert. My first objection was this: I have a great feeling of sympathy and interest in the large class of small shopkeepers that are to be found all over the country. We are a nation of shopkeepers, as Buonaparte told us. A great mass of our people live by distributing the products that have to be sent to all the homes of the country, and their livelihoods depend upon their little shops being supported. I said to myself, "I will not put a hand to any movement which is going to supplant and extinguish the little shopkeepers of England." Well, I laid this objection before your president, and discussed the matter with him, I examined the literature which he put before me, and I have become convinced that if you are true to your principles, your Union will not destroy the small shopkeepers of England. First of all, you have a principle which safeguards their interests—you refuse to undersell any man; you do not desire to crush those who are already engaged in the shop-keeping trade. Moreover, even ~~if~~ you did desire it, you could not do it; but you don't desire it. ~~Let me~~ tell you why you could not do it—because you have a principle which lays it down as imperative that every ~~man~~ who buys at your



stores shall pay ready money. Now, there always will be a large part of the community that will wish to buy upon credit, and as you cannot supply them upon credit, you leave the field open to those who wish to do so; therefore, my friends, the principles you put forward safeguard the small and independent shopkeepers. They offer a fair reply to my first objection. My next objection was this—I said “You are a trading concern, and what has the Bishop of Salford to do with money-making, speculating, trading concerns? that is not his business!” Well, I examined a little further, both with your president, and from the published records of your Co-operative Union, and I found that you are something far higher and more important than a mere trading society, that you have undertaken the propagation of principles which are not only economical, but which are of a high social and moral order. Now, is there need for the propagation of such principles as those I am alluding to? Certainly, for the history of the human race shows that we have received from our first parents a very bad inheritance in the shape of a spirit of greed and selfishness, which quickly develops into a habit of oppression, tyranny, and cruelty. It was the spirit of greed and selfishness that at a very early period of the world reduced the greater part of mankind to a state of slavery. The spirit of greed and selfishness, cropping up continually in every century and in every country, has poisoned society wherever it has grown and spread. We are not free from this spirit of greed and selfishness among the inhabitants of this island. When we examine the great trading and commercial occupations of the English people, we find that they are open to two special temptations, which practically may be called two principles, from the respect which they have received, and the way they have been established among us as rules of conduct. The first is—“We must make all the profit we can; we must take advantage of the need of the people, of the ignorance of the people, of the poverty of the people; we must make our profit, and must make it large. That is good business.” Well, the other principle of action is one for which not the traders and the producers alone are responsible, but for which the people themselves

are also to blame. They say—"We must buy as cheaply as possible, and whatever is asked we must get it for less." And what is the consequence of this craving for cheapness, which also springs from the spirit of greed and selfishness? The consequence of this is adulteration and the grinding down of the wages of the labourer. If the people must ever have their goods cheaper, either the material or the labourer must suffer. These two false principles of action have unhappily got possession, to a large extent, of the public in this country. The result of these principles, in course of time, if you allow them to develop, would be to bring the people of England to the verge of ruin, and the people would then endeavour to right themselves by recourse to such acts of violence as disgraced the French revolution in the last century. Now, such being a general view of the position, we find that a certain number of law-abiding and intelligent men, knowing from experience that these two evil principles were getting too strong a hold of the trading class of this country, have determined, as far as they can, to check and uproot the growth of these destructive principles. And with this intention they have formed what is called a Co-operative Union. To be quite sure that I have not mistaken the principles upon which this Co-operative Union professes to work, I extract this sentence from the preface to that excellent book, the "Manual for Co-operators," which I look upon not only as an excellent, but also as a thoroughly Christian work. This work, emanating from the Co-operative Union, marks off your society from all those societies which are tinged and tainted with the subversive Socialistic principles which are in vogue in Germany, in France, and other parts of the world. Well, your Manual says:—"The Union is formed to promote the practice of truthfulness, justice, and economy in production and exchange;" and your general secretary, in an address delivered at Newcastle a few years ago, summarised the objects of your Union as, "first, moral, to promote truth, just dealing, and equity; and second, economical, to prevent waste in production and exchange." Now, what does the promotion of truth and equity, of justice in dealing, mean when you bring


it to its last analysis? It means simply this—Do as you would be done by; or to put it in the Christian formula, in the words of Christ our Lord, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.” My analysis, therefore, of the preface to your Manual and of the speech made by your general secretary is this—that you desire to love your neighbour as yourselves. This assuredly was the cardinal teaching of Christ himself—the love of God and your neighbour. And the Church of Christ in all ages has urged this great duty upon the people. The Christian Church for centuries warred against the whole doctrine and system of slavery; it has always been the friend of the poor and of the oppressed; it has stood up against kings and princes and tyrants, and has opened out careers of usefulness and of honour to the poorest classes by offering to them the blessings of education; it has everywhere taught the rich and all classes that they must do as they would be done by, that they must love their neighbour as themselves. When in various countries this plague of greed and selfishness has asserted itself and begun to work ruin, what do we find? To come to our own country, we find that in the old Anglo-Saxon times, when, for instance, the inhabitants of the towns were oppressed by the lords in the country, when their liberties were outtailed, when their rights were withdrawn from them, when robbers oppressed them, we find that the people formed themselves into associations, or unions, or guilds, as they called them. And the Catholic Church blessed and protected the guild merchants and the craft guilds. Why were these guilds formed? They were formed by the people, who felt that they were being oppressed by those who were monopolists, by those who were too strong, and the Church blessed their endeavours. All these guilds had a religious character; though they were meant for the temporal benefit and protection of the masses, they were all based upon and sanctioned by the precept of religion. Well, now, that which was done in past centuries is being done in the present century; and I hold that in spite of all the miserable, wretched religious divisions which unhappily exist amongst us, the English people is at heart a Christian people, and that the Christian principle has been taken hold of by the members of this

Co-operative Union, and that it is embodied in your professions and in your legislation. It seems to me, by what are declared to be the principles of your Union, that your members practise and teach one another thrift and self-denial; you teach one another to look upon each other as brethren, to do to each other as you would be done by; you wish to give to every man a fair day's wages for a fair day's work; you wish to have articles for sale that are truthful and genuine; you do not patronise "shoddy;" you do not like the sugar to be mixed with sand; you like to have your articles that which they profess to be; you condemn adulteration as you condemn defrauding a labourer of his wages. It may be said, "O, but after all, Mr. Johnston and his friends are the enemies of the capitalist; they wage war against capital." On the contrary, my reading of your society is this, that you are multiplying the capitalists; that you do not wish to limit the capitalists to three or four hundred thousand, but to have capitalists by the million. When profits are made by trade—and fair, honest, legitimate profits must be looked to—what is to be done with these profits? Are they to go into one pocket, or may they not, if you please, be poured into the pockets of a hundred thousand men? Your principle is not war against capital, nor war against capitalists. You are the friends of capitalists; you are the friends of capital; you are the enemies only of monopoly, of oppression, of greed, of selfishness; and, therefore, it seems to me that, while you undersell no man, while you pay a fair day's wage, while you are just in your dealings, sell good articles, teach thrift, and fairly distribute your profits, you deserve and ought to command the respect of all the men, support of the people, and the blessing of the Church.

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no. 100

CO-OPERATION.



AN ADDRESS

BY THE

Brooks Foss

RIGHT REV. DR. WESTCOTT

(LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM).

On the occasion of the Co-operative Demonstration at
Lynemouth, Wednesday, Sept. 3rd, 1890.



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CO-OPERATION.



WE have all, I believe, found in our personal experience that a time of success and prosperity is, in an especial sense, a time of trial. Success, though it must of necessity be incomplete, tends to satisfy us. It leads us to substitute a part for the whole, to acquiesce in the less which we have gained, and to forget the greater at which we aimed—perhaps to rest contented with material profit, and to lose the spiritual aspirations, which have been, indeed, the very soul of our efforts. It is with societies also as it is with men. And in studying the records of co-operation, I cannot but feel that the movement is, in fact, endangered by the great, continuous, growing success of its distributive organisation. No one, indeed, can fail to rejoice at the economic and moral results which have been obtained by the stores, retail and wholesale. They have largely confirmed and extended uprightness and trust; they have stimulated and they have sustained thrift; they have secured economy in exchange; they have accumulated a large capital, which is available for fresh enterprises; they have influenced trade beneficially beyond their immediate range. But, however highly we rate these results, we must confess that in themselves they do not touch the real problem which lies before co-operators—the problem of the age, the problem

of capital and labour. And therefore, gentlemen, if you pause here, though you may multiply your gains of this kind a hundredfold, though you may reach the utmost possible limit of cheapness and of purity for the benefit of the consumers, you will have to acknowledge that a great hope has been defeated and a great work has been abandoned. You will have confined yourselves to commerce and exchange, and have left untouched the weightier and more difficult matters of industry and production. You will have ministered abundantly to individual interests, but you will not have effectually quickened the spirit of social service. All that you have done will be capable of being adequately explained from motives of enlightened or even superficial self-interest, and may at last actually increase the spirit of competition, which is the most directly opposed to the spirit of co-operation.

I venture then—and you will pardon the boldness of an outsider who necessarily regards your mission in its widest range—to ask you to turn once again to the programme of the Rochdale Pioneers, the heroic founders of living co-operation, who clearly foresaw what was involved in the full realisation of the principle which they had grasped. The reform of distribution was for them the first step; and it was, in fact, the only possible step towards the reform of production, the extension of education, the development of the whole man for the service of all men. They recognised, with far-seeing faith, that co-operation—the active association of man with man for truly human ends—embodies an idea of universal application to life, that it is the foundation of a social and not merely of a commercial structure—the watchword of a new order. And the great leaders of co-operation have always guarded this noble tradition. They have had the courage to do the little work which lay before them, and still

have kept their eyes steadily fixed upon the distant goal. They have indeed mastered that lesson which is difficult to our half-generous impatience—that that which is permanent must grow slowly, and I trust that they have also abundantly experienced that which is the most enduring joy of man—the realisation in the future of the fruits of their own travail.

At the same time these, your great leaders, have known how to use opportunities. They think—and, as far as I can judge, most rightly—that the decisive time has come now, and that you are required to face with resolute energy the problem, not of co-operative distribution only, but of co-operative production. And I am glad that at the beginning of my work in the north I am allowed to take part in this great meeting, which you are resolved “to make memorable in the annals of northern co-operation,” and memorable in this particular aspect.

I am well aware of the difficulties which beset the problem of co-operative production. I know something of the failures which have disappointed former leaders. I can measure the immediate sacrifices which will be required of those through whose willing concurrence the effort for which we look must be made. But I have also been allowed to read, at least in part, the history of human progress, and I have seen written over all that stirs us with gratitude and enthusiasm in the chequered annals of the past this legend: Learning through suffering; fruitfulness through sacrifice; life through death. While, then, I do not presume to indicate how the central question of co-operative production will be solved, or whether there will be varied solutions under different circumstances, I do say, without a moment's doubt, that if you accept the duty of solving the problem, the problem will be solved. I do say that you are in a position to claim the prerogative of approaching it with commanding

forces, and I will add also, more to encourage than to warn, that the victory will not be won without delays and losses, and that in bearing these you will pay a debt which you owe to your fathers and leave an endowment for your children.

But that the co-operators may be disciplined and inspired to fulfil this office it appears to me that they need an education more thorough, more systematic, more liberal, than they have yet received. Calm, sustained, harmonious action is not directed by sentiment or by instinct, but by resolute choice, and wise choice comes from education. "Education," as Professor Stuart said—and he has been my teacher in this work for twenty years—"is desirable for all mankind, but it is the life's necessity for co-operators." By education I do not mean that which enables us to read a journal or to write a business letter or to keep a ledger—and Professor Stuart did not mean that. I mean that which enables the student to realise the eternal meaning of the world; to follow the laws of personal and social and national development; to distinguish the present lines of salutary action; to gain the power of vision for those revelations of science and art which tend to establish a true proportion between the pleasures of life; to master great ideas in order that we may find an embodiment for them, stable at once and expansive; to see the whole in the part, and so to measure the dignity of all labour; to see the part in the whole, and so to deepen the chastening sense of our own littleness.

It is hard to express in a few words the thoughts which I desire to convey. But let me endeavour to make my meaning a little plainer. Co-operation, as I understand it, and as its founders understood it, deals with the final principles of life. It lays down that the co-operator's rule of conduct is not each for each, but "each for all, and all for each"; that his aim is not in itself personal pleasure or profit, but effective service;

that his reward is not wealth but character. The educational demands of co-operation will, therefore, necessarily concern the spirit of work and the social relationships of men. There will be an education for co-operation, and there will be an education through co-operation.

There will be, I say, an education for co-operation. True co-operators, to begin with, must be men of faith. They must, I mean, be assured that there is a progress in things, and that they are called to further it; that there is—in the language of the Christian faith—a divine order and a divine government of the world, and that men are called to be fellow-workers with God. To this end they must become familiar with the main facts, the main laws, as we speak, of industrial life, and of personal life. And there is, I think, nothing more inspiring than to feel, when we look back over a great space of time, that even to our eyes there are sure traces of a purpose fulfilled in spite of—yes, even through—social revolutions and individual crimes, though successful violence leaves a terrible legacy of retribution. But if in moments of depression we are constrained to falter in our proclamation of progress, still, there arises in the heart at the very moment of denial, the still voice which whispers that “the moral world does move”—that good once gained can never be lost, though it may be transformed; that all things, in the long run, favour orderly advance.

Under such teaching as this, hope can never be extinguished, and patience can never be exhausted. Institutions and ideas, we perceive, have their day, and they cannot long survive the period of their beneficent action. The sun rises in the most true sense every morning upon a fresh world prepared for fresh labours. Each day, each generation, has its peculiar work. We could not, if we would, transplant ourselves into the past. We misinterpret old relations if we endeavour to

restore them. Our task is to find out what corresponds to them. And it is in this sense, you will notice, that co-operation assumes its immediate importance at the present time. Association for good and for evil is the characteristic of our age; it needs to be inspired by a moral force, and that need, as we trust, will be supplied. Co-operation, in other words, answers to the position which we have reached in social evolution.

During the last three centuries—in England, at least—there has been the most complete enfranchisement of the individual. And it is now pressed upon us that he cannot stand alone. The man has won his independence and his self-reliance that he may serve the State the better. We have learnt that freedom can only be realised in self-devotion; that the duties of brotherhood are the measure of our common obligations.

Now, he who has been trained by a living study of history to grasp these principles, will be ready to become a true co-operator, and then his education through the work itself will begin. And to take part in a great organisation—in your Wholesale, for example—is an education. To labour for a public cause, to be inspired by wide interests, is ennobling. The duty brings a sense of responsibility in the use of power. It trains in the exercise of authority, and at the same time it reveals the dignity of small things. It shows to us that the wealth of a life does not depend on the abundance of private means. It brings into details the powers of a larger being: it disciplines man in the fulfilment of citizenship through his natural occupation.

And I lay great stress on this fact: the endeavour to embody and extend the spirit of co-operation does not take men from their ordinary work, but gives their ordinary work a new meaning and a new power. And our ordinary work, let us remember, is the staple of our lives. It does not, as we too

commonly suppose, furnish the means of living : it is living. And there is no delight comparable to the delight which comes from a sense of doing one's best in one's common duty. No necessary work can be incapable of being made truly human. No doubt there is a great need in many cases of improvement in the conditions of labour. But the labour itself offers scope for the exercise of all that is best in man ; and when once the common labour is recognised as the mould for character—the character which affects us all together—we shall provide that the conditions shall be worthy of the issues which they influence.

Such lessons as these, I repeat, lie in the path of the co-operator as he goes on his common work. And I emphasise them because I believe they provide for the solution of the problem of co-operative production ; for the difficulties by which this problem is beset are moral and not economical. They are, as one of your great veteran leaders has pointed out, from within rather than from without ; they are due to jealousy, to suspicion, to self-assertion, to want of generous confidence and courageous enthusiasm. But real familiarity with the history of human progress, true insight into the grandeur of present opportunities, the education that is for co-operation and the education through co-operation, will bring to the cause the offerings of service and experience, the glad readiness to work for a great, if it be a distant end, and the clear perception of the next step which is to be taken. And when the leaders are resolved, I cannot for one moment think that the hosts will waver or hang back.

This double education, this education through the past and through the present, this education which interprets our place in the whole course of human life and our immediate office, co-operators are bound to seek, and to prepare, that they may make their partial success

a step to higher endeavours, and keep their ideal before them as the call to increasing effort. Something, no doubt, has been done by co-operative societies for education, but those whose judgment cannot be gainsaid deplore the inadequacy of the provision which has yet been made for these higher works. This is the peril which comes from material success, and unless it is met resolutely—let me say it—co-operators will continue to have cheap goods—perhaps they will even have cheaper goods—but they must give up their name. And, as I said before, those who have hoped most will have to mourn over another lost cause, and increased cheapness in distribution may mean only suffering in production.

I cannot, however, contemplate final failure. The principle of co-operation—"each for all, and all for each"—is easily grasped. And it is enforced and applied in papers which are accessible to all of you, and a little reflection will show you all that it demands now a fresh application. And if it be that, for the present, comparatively little will be done by co-operators for co-operative production, yet experience will be gained, confidence will be inspired, and employers and employed will come to understand one another a little better, for they will be members of the same body. Ideals will be brought into common business; the example will spread; and, mark this, new springs of capital will be available, for there is a strange, silent force of moral pressure towards an enterprise which is seen to be beneficent. There is, I know, an untold eagerness on the part of many to use wealth for common purposes if only it can be shown that the good which is within their reach will not be outweighed by permanent harm. The union of capital and labour will be accomplished, not in one way, but in many ways; for co-operation is not so much an organisation as a principle, not so much "a state within a state" as a spirit which

quicken, and moulds every member for the most effective service of the whole body.

Thoughts crowd upon thoughts, and hopes rise beyond hopes, but I must leave them unuttered. I have trespassed too long on your patience with the speculations of a student, and I cannot deal with the details through which they must be made practically effective. But the subject on which I have spoken is one to which I am drawn not only by the office to which my life has been given, not only by the traditions of the See in which I have been called to serve, but even more by the earliest associations of my school life, and by the convictions which have grown firmer through years of busy and varied toil. I have dared to express great aspirations, because I do believe that men are moved by lofty motives. For me, co-operation rests upon my faith. It is the active expression, in terms of our present English life, of the articles of my creed. Viewed in the light of the facts which I hold to be the central facts in history, I recognise in it an inherent tendency to complete man, to guard the family, to unite the State, to harmonise nations. It is, as I regard it—and you will allow me to speak out my whole heart—it is, I regard it, man's spontaneous welcome given to the promises of God. It is a proof on the scene of our working world that the Gospel is not an illusion, but an ideal brought into the homes of men. It is—may I not say it?—a special call to England; for, as we have been reminded by one who two years ago was your president, England led the way in the industrial evolution of modern Europe by free and self-determined energy and will. It is, then, for England to overcome the secondary evils which have arisen in this period of transition by a fresh exertion of the same national characteristics.

I ask you, then, to accept joyfully the part which has been entrusted to you. In order to fulfil its highest

W. P. W. A.

possibilities — and I know none higher — you do not need to compass violent changes, you do not need to countenance class animosities, you do not need to call for State intervention, you do not need to lessen one whit the responsibilities of individual men; but you *do* need to be penetrated by the spirit of co-operation, you do need enthusiasm and faith—the enthusiasm which recognises that the highest blessing is realised, not in being ministered unto, but in ministering—the faith which looks far beyond the mountain tops and the clouds which often cover them to that light of heaven from which they draw their transitory glory.

Do I seem to have indulged in dreams? I cannot admit the charge for one moment. I have been taught to pray day by day that the Kingdom of God our Father may come on earth. And I believe that He who enjoined the petition wills its fulfilment through that service of men which He has made possible—a service in which each man with all his powers, all his endowments, all his possessions, recognises that he is the servant of his fellow men, working with them for one end—the reign of righteousness.



The Human Perspective

Being an Interest Theory of Value

This study is based on a dissertation entitled, "The Role of Pleasure in the Theory of Value," submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan.



BY

GARDNER WILLIAMS, Ph. D.

Instructor in Philosophy at the University of Michigan

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PREFACE

My obligations to many previous writers will be evident to anyone who reads both the following pages and the standard works on value mentioned in the foot-notes.

Professor De Witt H. Parker, Professor Roy Wood Sellars, and Professor John F. Shepard, all of the University of Michigan, have guided my studies and have suggested many of the ideas which I have here set forth.

I am indebted to the editors of the International Journal of Ethics for permission to print the last chapter.

GARDNER WILLIAMS.

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CHAPTER I.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF AN INTEREST THEORY OF VALUE.

I—The Human Perspective—Axiological Ego-centrism.

It is well known that the natural universe has no center. It needs to be emphasized that the heart of man is the center of the value universe. Or, more accurately, the heart of each man is the center of his own value universe; for each personality constitutes such an axiological cosmos. The good (if any) or goods, which the heart yearns after, are not the key concept in the theory of value. The feelings in the soul or the feeling-attitudes emanating from it as a center are the prime factors in every value situation. The objects toward which attitudes may be directed are peripheral and possess a value which is only secondary. Objects cannot draw upon themselves the focus of attitudes which ignore them; and without some intent or interest aiming at them from near or far, but necessarily from without, objects external to the value experience are devoid of value. Even objects which are good merely on the score of being useful, without being the objects of any interests and thus having no value in the proper meaning of that term, like vitamins before they were discovered, are good only thru some indirect causal relation to some living interest or to its object. For ages vitamins have been a necessary part of the cause of all human achievements, since without them the race would have wasted and died. Vitamins were good before we knew them and thus before we could take any interest in them, but that goodness even then was relative to our interests which they supported. In the absence of any interest, either to support or to be the object of, a vitamin is axiologically neutral.

This ego-centric principle applies in art and in morals and thruout the value field. 'There are nine and sixty ways of constructing tribal lays, and every single one of them is right'. They are all right for those that like them. And there are still more ways of living a good life. Any way that satisfies deeply in the long run is a right way. There are as many ways as there are natures of men. All men have certain similarities, and obviously where two men desire the same type of thing, one man's kind of happiness will do for another. But no two men are exactly alike. And a good cannot be imposed on an unwilling nature ab extra without a greater or less mutilation. In its new unwonted home the good is no longer good, but evil. The philosopher who takes any object, ideal, or rule of conduct, or anything except a value experience, and calls it an intrinsic good, is committing an egregious error. An external intrinsic good is an utterly self contradictory and impossible notion. Attitudes select things external to them and make them good or bad. The crucial fact in value theory is the heart of man, i. e., his affective-volitional nature; it is his feelings and interests and desires and propensities. In values man is the measure of all things. The values of external things loom and dwindle, not as the things do in their own right and

nature, but as they seem or appear (not visually but affectively and emotionally) to him. With internal pleasant or unpleasant experiences the nature of the thing is as it appears. The value of everything is as a man feels it or regards it. In values *esse est percipi*. To be is to be realized or felt. There is nothing either good or bad but feeling makes it so. We are dealing, not with the nature of objects external to us, but with the perspective in which they appear to us who have or are the point of view which generates the vista. Human axiology is a study of the human perspective.

II—Primary vs. Secondary Value.

The term 'positive value' should be used for the value of what is good; 'negative value' should mean the value of what is evil or bad. Positive and negative value might also be called 'value' and 'disvalue' respectively. For the present however I shall use 'value' in the wider meaning to include both the positive and negative forms. Taking it so, it still has two very different senses. In the former it is simply the affective or feeling aspect of experience. In the second it is the meaning or relation of the object of an interest, to the interest. These two kinds of value are very different; and they exhaust the field of value. There are no other kinds of value except subdivisions within these two major classes. It is obvious that in the former sense value is purely subjective. I shall call this primary value. Other names for it are intrinsic value, intrinsic goodness-badness, intrinsic agreeableness-disagreeableness, intrinsic pleasantness-unpleasantness, subjective value, subjective goodness-badness, subjective agreeableness-disagreeableness, subjective pleasantness-unpleasantness, feeling, affect, positive-negative feeling-tone, hedonic tone, the feeling of satisfaction-dissatisfaction, and pleasure-unpleasure or pleasure-pain considered as a feeling. This is a mental process without special sense organs. I do not mean by it tickle, itch, thrill, ecstasy, excitement, cutaneous pain, or any sensory aspect of experience. It is an ultimate way in which configurations of experience differ. It is a quality or attribute or aspect or element of some total experience. It is the only intrinsic value there is, and it is always an intrinsic value. It may in addition have secondary or objective or relative or extrinsic value (these all mean the second great type of value). While primary value depends for its existence upon certain neurological processes, it is axiologically absolute.

It may have intent or sense or transcendent reference. Probably most and perhaps all feelings are not self contained. They point outward. They have a reference to something beyond themselves. We probably have some feeling, positive or negative, toward everything that we know about. Most or all feelings are feeling-attitudes. To express the phenomenon of a feeling with direction, significance, or 'sense', we use such phrases as 'to delight in', or 'to care for', 'to be pleased or displeased with', or 'to be satisfied or dissatisfied with', or 'to like or dislike'.

A feeling-attitude combined with some idea of the object makes what I call an interest. The object of an interest or feeling-attitude has, from the very fact of its being such an object, secondary value. The quantity of this secondary value is determined by the strength of the feeling. The more we like a thing the more value it has for us. This second type of value is what is generally meant when the word 'value' is used without qualification. It is what R. B. Perry meant

when he said that value is a function of interest. It's what Urban meant when he said that value is the affective-volitional meaning of an object. Most writers on moral philosophy, when they have said 'value', have meant the value of some object in which some living thing was interested. Occasionally they have sensed the presence of something properly called value at the source of the interest, and have spoken of this as value, but without distinguishing this sense from the more ordinary one. They have tried to apply their concepts of secondary value to the very different thing which I call primary value. It is important to keep these things separate. The feeling at the source of the interest is, and does not have, primary value. The total experience in which the interest occurs, and also the interest itself, has primary value; that is, it includes or possesses positive or negative feeling-tone. The object of the interest has, and is not, secondary value. The meaning of the object to the interest is the secondary value. The primary value is absolute and intrinsic. The secondary value is purely relative. This secondary value, being the value of the object of an interest, may be called 'objective value'. Using the word objective here is a matter of convenience in terminology and is not to be taken to imply that the curse of subjectivism has in any sense been removed (if it is a curse). Objective value is always relative to a subjective feeling-attitude, and is wholly dependent thereon for its existence. Objective value is one form of objective goodness-badness. (The other form is utility-disutility or the service or disservice which anything is or does to any living being, without necessarily being known to that being, and thus not necessarily being the object of any interest). Objective value is synonymous with objective pleasantness-unpleasantness, or the satisfactoryness-unsatisfactoryness of objects to interests taken in them. It is the meaning, significance, or importance of the object of an interest to an interest. What the object means to a positive interest is that it will satisfy it; and what it means to a negative interest is that it will not do so. The value of an object A to an interest B then is simply 'that A will satisfy B'. 'To satisfy' here does not mean 'to produce a feeling of satisfaction'. It means 'to be the object of the intent of an intent-feeling of satisfaction', or 'to be the object of a positive intent-feeling'. A is not a means to the production of pleasure. It is the object of a pleasure with an intent, or of a 'delight in'. Secondary value may be called indifferently a relation between the object and the interest, or that tertiary quality of the object which consists in the fact that the interest is taken in it or has it for its object.

III—The Treatment of Feeling in Urban and Perry.

In contending that the secondary value of a thing depends upon the quantity or strength (either metaphor you like) of the actual feeling directed toward it, and that this feeling is a primary intrinsic value, and constitutes the axiological absolute, I come into conflict, in some degree, with the views of both R. B. Perry and W. M. Urban, which I wish now to examine. And the reason for our differences is, I venture to think, that these men use feeling in a different sense from that in which I use it. Perry says that he means organic sensation, and sticks to it. Urban is ambiguous, but in places I am convinced that this is what he is thinking of. I shall deal with Perry first.

Perry's book¹ is a synthesis of neo-realism and behaviorism. He is thus opposed to mentioning consciousness or awareness or experience. What one might be inclined to call the content of consciousness is for him just the environment,² and mental processes are neuro-muscular motions. This manner of thinking is a healthy exercise for the purpose of getting rid of ancient errors; but it seems to me that the same end can be achieved without denying the existence of experience as something which is identical neither with the neural events upon which it depends, nor with the environmental factors which stimulate and in a measure control these neural events. Perry however does not recognize consciousness, and thus ignores feeling-tone which can only exist in consciousness. If it were only a sensation he might, with some plausibility, identify it with the environmental object which constituted the stimulus. But in the case of an affect there is nothing outside which it might even seem to correspond to or be identified with. There is no special stimulus for this kind of a mental process. It is not referable to any afferent nerve endings. There is no place for it in the scheme of things as conceived after either the behavioristic or the neo-realistic manner. Neo-realism must ignore it. Behaviorism makes it identical with certain neural happenings, thus depriving it of its essential nature as a feeling.

Perry defines interest in as purely behavioristic a manner as he can. According to his view there could be no interest without a motor element (p. 305). He defines interest no differently from interested action. "Interest means—response governed by an accompanying expectation" (p. 523). "An act is interested—when it is performed because of what is expected of it" (p. 434). One of his formal definitions which gives the gist of the matter is as follows: "Interested or purposive action is action adopted because the anticipatory responses which it arouses coincide with the unfulfilled or implicit phase of a governing propensity" (p. 209).³ Here of course there is some room left for conscious processes. The adoption of the action would seem to be a conscious act; and the recognition of the coincidence of the anticipatory responses aroused by the act, with the implicit phase of the governing propensity, would seem to be more than a mere neural event, however much it may be, as it certainly is, entirely dependent upon such. Thus Perry does not wholly succeed in ignoring consciousness. He does, however, in all the deliberate formulations of his theory, succeed in ignoring the feeling aspect of it, and particularly the feeling aspect of interest. He discusses at length what he calls feeling (p. 276-305), but this turns out to be merely organic sensations. He then rightly concludes that this feeling is only remotely related to value theory (p. 304-305). Feeling in this sense can acquire value by becoming the object of any interest, as he rightly insists, and also, as he fails to recognize, by itself just being pleasant with a subjective pleasantness or a feeling-tone of its own. In either case it is something that has value, and is neither value nor something that gives or lends value. The thing

1—General Theory of Value; R. B. Perry; N. Y., 1926; Longmans Green.

2—Ibid p. 31, 315, 403.

3—For other statements about the nature of interest see p. 163 especially, and also p. 355, 359, 434, 439, 521, 523, 567, 568, 586.

that in the first case gives secondary value, and in both cases is primary value, is the feeling aspect of experience, which Perry ignores. And I contend that interest and value cannot be adequately described without mentioning it. As an intent-feeling it is an essential aspect of the experience of every interest. As a non-intent-feeling it is the primary value of every configuration of experience, or part of a configuration, which is devoid of attitude or transcendent reference (if there are such. I do not dogmatize. I think that probably there are such experiences).

Perry twice uses the word 'apathy' to signify the absence of any interest (p. 230, 568), and since this term generally means the absence of feeling he might be interpreted as meaning that an interest necessarily involved a feeling. But he must not be so interpreted in view of his very definite statements to the effect that to be interested is not to feel interested (p. 141), and that feeling is a sensation and is not the value fundamental (p. 304-305), and in view of his definitions of interest which ignore the affective aspect completely.

In short, his view of the importance of feeling differs from the view herein maintained because he is a behaviorist and I am not, and because he means by feeling organic sensation, and I do not.

Urban's view of feeling is in some respects more difficult to interpret than Perry's. Certain aspects however are fairly clear. He follows Meinong in asserting that feeling is the value fundamental.⁴ He says that kinaesthetic sensations are irrelevant (p. 38), though in a measure forgets this later on. He shows that desire always implies the existence of feeling (p. 37), and that Ehrenfels, who said that desire was the value fundamental, really falls back on feeling to account for its strength and direction (p. 36-37).⁵ But he recognizes that the feeling aspect of a feeling-attitude is not essentially different from the non-intent-feeling-tone of an attitudeless experience. True he says that there is a 'fundamental' distinction between these, but the distinction which he makes is bound up with his erroneous view that one generates value or "contains the worth moment" and the other does not. Really they both do. And he rightly regards them as made of the same stuff. "A fundamental distinction seems to exist between feeling which is a mere feeling-tone, accompaniment or effect of a sensation or revived image, and feeling-attitude which is characterized by the direction of the feeling toward the object. Feeling-attitudes alone seem to constitute the worth-moment. It is undoubtedly true that feeling-tone of presentation, when it reaches a certain degree of intensity, gives rise to a feeling-attitude, to the presentation of the cause as object and the direction of judgment toward it, and thus to feeling of worth" (p. 40). This feeling-attitude, he adds, is distinguished from feeling-tone by the presence of additional presuppositions. His notion of presuppositions, which he gets from Meinong, amounts to a recog-

4—Urban, Wilbur M., *Valuation, its Nature and Laws*, p. 36, 38. Macmillan, N. Y., 1909.

5—See Ehrenfels, C. von, *System der Werttheorie*, p. 38, 65. Leipzig, 1897, O. R. Reisland. Ehrenfels, like Urban and Perry and many others, seems to me to misinterpret feeling thru not sufficiently distinguishing it from kinaesthetic sensations. See Ehrenfels, *op. cit.*, p. 15, 16, 35, 38, 39.

inition of the necessity of some idea of the object of the attitude in any value experience involving an attitude. The important thing in this quoted passage is his use of the word *feeling* in the same sense in both the expressions *feeling-tone* and *feeling-attitude*. The former is a feeling not directed toward anything. The latter is a feeling directed toward something. We are dealing with one thing, feeling, which can be directed and have intent, or not. The distinction which he makes, that the intent-feeling has direction, has presuppositions (an idea of its object), and generates value, whereas the non-intent-feeling does not have or do these things, is not fundamental if one is concerned with the nature of feeling. It is only important if we are interested in the question of whether or not some object external to the value experience gets value from it. And he overemphasizes the importance of this because he thinks that this is none other than the question of whether or not value is present at all. He admits no value unless there is an attitude. The only value of which he formulates a definition is secondary value. What I call primary value in an intent-less experience he denies is a value, and he denies that the experience, as such, has value. The mere feeling-tone of a presentation (he means an intent-less experience) is not, according to his view, a worth experience,⁶ and furthermore, what I call the primary value in an interest, the feeling aspect, he never speaks of as value.

In one place at least he speaks of it as having value, and he implies that the value that it has is the same that its own complementary object has. He says that some cognition of the object must occur in addition to feeling or desire in order that there should be a value for the object to have, and then adds that this process of valuation, as aided by cognition, "gives to the feeling or desire that meaning described as worth" (p. 95). And he makes no distinction between this worth and the worth of the object. But if the object gets value from its relation to feeling and desire, then the value that it has is not possessed by that or any other feeling or desire. The process of valuation does not give to the interest itself any value, using value as Urban defines it. The feeling aspect of the interest is primary value, and the only value that is conferred on anything is a secondary value which is conferred on the complementary object. But Urban, like Perry, in spite of a definition of value that covers only the secondary variety, occasionally moves it over into the subject or source, and tries to make it do the work for both varieties. Thus Urban denies that any feeling, either intent-feeling or non-intent-feeling, is value. He does not admit that primary value is a legitimate concept.

And in the passage which I quoted on page 7 from his page 40 there is another point which I wish to criticize. He says that when passive intentless feeling-tone becomes strong enough it becomes a feeling-attitude. Nothing could imply more clearly the truth that an interest is just a feeling which has been directed toward something. But still it is not true that an increase in the strength of the passive feeling turns it into an attitude. Probably an attitude-less experience may be extremely vivid and intensely pleasant. I imagine that some mystical experiences are of this order. And a

6—Valuation, Its Nature and Laws, p. 39, 40, 54, 63, 93. See also 14 Psychological Review, 1907, p. 21.

feeling-attitude may be weak. The difference between the two varieties of feeling is the difference between the case where a man ignores anything that transcends the immediate experience, and the case where he considers some of it. This is determined by a number of factors; by neural events in the central nervous system, by the clamor of stimuli at the sensory end organs, and perhaps by other things; but it is determined very little, if at all, by the strength of the feeling-tone.

I wish to emphasize, however, the truth enunciated in the quoted passage, that non-intent-feeling and intent-feeling are not essentially different sorts of things. Urban expresses this truth in other places. He justifies his use of the expression 'affective-volitional meaning' as the equivalent or definition of value (he means secondary value) by maintaining that affect and volition (feeling, and will or conation) are essentially the same thing (p. 33-34). The only difference is that will implies an attitude, and feeling does not necessarily do so. Conation and will are active feeling-attitudes. "Feeling as passive is—not to be separated from will as active" (p. 77).⁷ "The entire vital or worth series is one" (the progress from anticipatory thru present to retrospective interest in a given object) "with a continuity of affective-volitional meaning. Each phase may be interpreted as conation or feeling according to the point of view from which it is observed" (p. 92). "Feeling and desire (desire is will and conation) are—relative differences of functional meaning, not of content.—The affective-volitional meaning, or worth, of an object," is "its relation to desire and conative disposition as interpreted by feeling" (p. 95).

An attitude, then, is a feeling. But, according to Urban, not all attitudes or interests give value to their complementary objects. "Fleeting desires do not attain to the level of valuation" (p. 39).⁸ Only with some constancy of interest, he thinks, does the object get value. Here he betrays a tendency to use value in a eulogistic sense, and thus to forsake the ideal of defining value itself. He does not wish to talk about low and ephemeral values.⁹ These of course are just as much values, tho not as much value, as the greatest. He admits, what I would deny, that a feeling-attitude is possible which does not give value to its complementary object.

He also affirms that feelings may be present in a value experience which are irrelevant to the values therein determined. He mentions Brentano's doctrine of 'hedonic redundancies',¹⁰ and points out that in valuing anything we may feel some strong emotion and have a mass of organic sensations which are perhaps pleasant when the feeling toward the thing is negative. Some people enjoy the process of scolding others and would be quite at a loss what to do if there were no one to err and to be upbraided. These people are not wholly pleased with the others whom they scold, but they are pleased with the emotional thrill of it, and with themselves for being able to do it, and with the others only instrumentally, considering them favorably

7—See also 14 Psychological Review, 1907, p. 117.

8—See also Ibid, p. 20.

9—Compare what Perry says of S. Alexander in regard to the latter's limiting value to one branch only of the field. Perry op. cit. p. 120.

10—Urban, Valuation, p. 74-75, and 14 Psyc. Rev., 1907, p. 114-115.

only as a means to the ends which they desire directly. Urban rightly points out that we have here a situation in which one thing is pleasant and another is in a certain aspect unpleasant; he sees that there is no great difficulty in distinguishing one from the other. There are two or three value experiences, and not one. But by calling the pleasant organic sensations which make up the emotional thrill 'hedonic redundancies' he is implying by the word 'hedonic' that they are feelings, and thus he slips over into a use of the word feeling which can only serve to confuse a value theory. And by mentioning them at all in this connection he is implying that they somehow belong to that unpleasant experience which is the negative interest in the person who is being scolded. But this is not true. No part of the feeling which one has toward a thing is redundant or irrelevant to that value of the thing which is given to it by that attitude. Any other feeling is irrelevant, but is no part of that value experience. In the value experience which generates any given secondary value in an object there is no hedonic redundancy so long as 'hedonic' means 'affective'.

Urban also gives the wrong impression of the role of feeling in valuation when he speaks of intensity-less appreciation and 'affective generals'. This is the same problem as 'hedonic redundancies' only from another angle. Unless one examines his work rather carefully one might suppose that he meant that an attitude could occur in which the intensity of the feeling was zero, that is, in which there was no feeling. I do not think that he means this. But he asserts that as the value of a thing grows on one the feeling-element in the valuation process gradually drops out in a manner analogous to that in which the particular imaginal content is dropped out in the development of an abstract cognitive concept. "As the means of the concept develops,—the particular presentation becomes less and less significant, until what is practically imageless apprehension may appear. So also with the development of the selective meanings of feeling-attitude, the hedonic resonance may become less and less significant until relatively intensitiless appreciation of the worth of the object appears."¹¹ Does he mean by 'hedonic resonance' what he meant by 'hedonic redundancy'? Does he mean by it organic sensation? If so, what he says is true, but the feeling aspect of the feeling-attitude is left, and this will have some intensity, or else the object will have no worth. These organic sensations are no part of the value experience which gives worth to the object. They function in a value experience of their own, and their disappearance abolishes this experience but does not make the main value experience intensity-less in any proper meaning of that expression. If he means that the feeling aspect of the feeling-attitude can drop out and the attitude can still be an attitude and its object have value, he is wrong. Some of his discussion is suggestive of this interpretation. However I should say that his predominant view is that it is only organic sensations that drop out in the formation of the affective general. If this is so his assertion that the 'hedonic resonance' drops away is misleading, since it never was any part of the value experience which he is talking about. It functions in another one which may stand in more or less intimate relations with the first.

He has a few other sentences which bear upon this question. "If then by 'intensity we mean not the broader Kantian conception of any modification of degree of inner experience, but that particular degree which applies to sensation and feeling-tone of sensation, there can be no question but that worth feelings, as determined by judgment and assumption, may be practically intensitiless.'"¹² If they are still feelings when they have no intensity I cannot avoid the conviction that he is contradicting himself. When a worth feeling, a feeling-tone, ceases to have any degree of intensity it ceases to be a feeling-tone, and no longer is or supports any value. One sentence would indicate that the 'intensity he speaks of might cover nervous excitement or even muscular tension. "A quiet sense of obligation may reveal a degree of worth of an ideal object which the intensest passion and emotion does not suggest."¹³ True enough, but then there is a very strong or great or intense or deep (any metaphor you like) feeling present in the sense of obligation. It 's not noisy. It is not responsible for any nervous excitement or muscular tension. It does not give rise to any visceral reverberation (i. e., intense passion and emotion). But its strength and intensity is proved by its control of behavior. The test of intensity is not boisterousness but control of behavior in the face of conflict with other powerful feelings. And again we find that "—the term intensity-less appreciation means that the degree of intens'ty of the sensitivity in which the feeling is embodied is irrelevant for the worth suggestion of the feeling" (Valuation, p. 129). What does he mean by sensitivity? Is a feeling ever, in any sense, embodied in sensitivity? Aga'in the most likely interpretation is that he is referring to the organic and kinaesthetic sensations which often accompany a feeling-attitude, but which are no part of it, and in which it is not really embodied in any proper sense of the word. Note that here, as in the first quotation in this paragraph, he speaks of the feeling as being intensity-less, rather than speaking of an attitude without any feeling. If there were an attitude without any feeling then there would be something which should properly be called intensity-less appreciation. The feeling would be at zero. There would be no feeling. As long as there is a feeling it is not at zero. And this is the feeling that I am talking about, and maintaining that in a value experience it is always present and has an intensity which corresponds with the value of the object. Its strength or intensity or magnitude is the cause and the measure of the secondary value of the object.

IV—Some Further Distinctions and Definitions.

A distinction should be drawn between direct and indirect secondary value, and the interest which generates the former should be called a direct interest, while one that generates the latter should be called an indirect interest.

Direct secondary value is the value of economic consumption goods. It is what is often very inaccurately called intrinsic value. (No secondary value is ever intrinsic). A direct interest is one which is taken in an object on account of such qualities belonging to the object as would, on a common sense view, be called intrinsic to it. Direct interest is not concerned with the instrumental char-

12—14 *Psyc. Rev.*, 1907, p. 116.

13—14 *Psyc. Rev.*, 1907, p. 16.

acteristics of anything, nor with the fact that the thing may be connected with anything else in any way, as, for instance, if both were parts of one whole and always went together. A direct interest is concerned with the size, shape, smell, behavior, etc., of the object itself.

All instrumental value is indirect value. This is the value that economic production goods have. An indirect interest is one that is taken in an object on account of the object's connection (causal, part-whole, or what not) with some other object that is the object of a direct interest. If a means to an end has value qua means to that end, it is the object of an indirect interest. A man has a direct interest in the fruits of his garden if he intends to enjoy eating them, and he is interested in plowing and weeding indirectly. He may be interested in these latter also directly: if he enjoys the activity and the fresh air and the sunlight, but he will still have some indirect interest in them so long as he regards them as a means to the production of the directly and enjoyably consumable fruits. The existence of indirect value implies the existence of a direct value which belongs to the end. But its existence also implies that the person or value-subject is not exclusively interested in the end. There must be a genuine interest in the means also, considered as a means. Otherwise it has no value. If the man knows that something is a comparatively efficacious means to what he wants directly, and if he is a normal person, he will take an indirect interest in it. There is no real necessity of his taking an interest in it if he is not inclined to do so, as there is no necessity of his taking an interest in anything at all if he is not so inclined. Only if a man does not care about the means to getting what he wants he is a very abnormal sort of person; and in this case the means is valueless to him as a means. I think that many people misunderstand this matter of instrumental goods, asserting that the only genuine interest is in the end, and that the means has value but is not the object of any interest. My phrase 'indirect interest' may tend to confirm this error if the precise meaning I have given it is not kept clearly in mind. The word 'indirect' suggests meditation; but there is no more meditation between the value-subject and the object of such an interest than there is between the same in the case of a so-called direct interest. One is just as direct as the other so far as things lying between interest and object are concerned. But in calling an interest in a means qua means an indirect interest I simply intend that the object is regarded as an instrumentality. I am naming the interest after the way in which its object is regarded. This may be taken as no more than a somewhat arbitrary tag.

I propose to use the word goodness in a wider sense than value, and to make it cover both value (all value, primary and secondary) and utility. 'Utility' I shall use somewhat in the economic sense of the word. Utility is the service which a thing renders or has rendered in the production of some valuable object or of some positive interest. It is usefulness. It is efficaciousness in establishing someone's welfare or happiness, by aiding in the creation either of the object of his liking, or of his positive feeling-attitude itself. A thing can be useful without being known, like vitamins before they were discovered, or like the astronomical and geological changes which, before their existence was suspected, made the earth and made it

inhabitable by man, and made man. Probably everything in the universe and thru all past time has utility, since if it were or had been different from what it is or was, some good and some favoring interest of somebody would be less than they are. Our knowledge of what effect anything has, or has had, upon what good, is unnecessary to its having that effect and thus to its having utility. Knowledge is of course absolutely essential for the existence of secondary value, if this is a function of interest. One cannot be interested in what he does not know anything about. To be an object of interest is to be known. All unknown objects are valueless. But clearly many of them are good, and many are bad. A million unknown and therefore unvalued things and forces operate now, and have ever operated, and will operate in the future, directly or indirectly upon the lives of the higher animals for weal or woe; and what does good for us is good for us, and what does ill is bad, whether or not we or anybody knows about the fact. Probably there is nothing in the universe, nor, probably, has there ever been anything, but has done some good to someone, and most likely to many, and also some evil to many. Probably everything that ever has been is both good and bad on a multitude of scores, since, if everything had been different from what it was, a multitude of people would not have been quite as well off, nor would a multitude have been quite as poorly off, as they actually are. These two multitudes may partly or wholly coincide, one causal factor being a blessing to most or all individuals in one aspect of their lives, and a curse to the same individuals in another aspect.

While goodness and badness are characteristics which are not confined to the objects of interests or to interests in objects, they are nevertheless always either a feeling or else relative to some feeling-attitude. Primary value, a feeling, is subjective goodness-badness. Secondary value, a meaning, is objective goodness-badness. And known or unknown objects possessing utility have a goodness which is related indirectly thru a causal or other physical connection with some intentless feeling or else with some interest-object. Useful things are good and useful because they are connected causally or in some other way with a primary value, or with something that has secondary value, or with both. However remote a good may be from the feeling upon which its goodness depends, there is nevertheless invariably some interest which supports it. The roots of all goodness are subjective. Value and utility are incurably infected with subjectivism. To attempt to escape from this is folly.

I should here note and attempt to avoid certain ambiguities in the use of the words good, goodness, value, and valuable. The adjective 'good' may modify, among other things, any noun which signifies the object of a positive interest. The book that I like is a good book because I like it. 'Good' is also a noun standing for such an object. The book is a good. To say that a good is good is not necessarily to use the word 'is' in the sense of identity. To say that goods are physical objects is acceptable common usage and acceptable economic usage. Dry goods and wet goods and production goods and consumption goods are for the most part either solids or gasses or liquids. Goodness is the abstract tertiary quality possessed by these objects, and consists in the fact that they are the objects of positive interests. Goodness is also a quality possessed by all useful objects even if they are not the objects of any interest. And objects having that form of

goodness which is utility are goods, as well as good. Value is all goodness that is not mere utility. It is a tertiary quality or a meaning or a relation of the objects of positive interest; or else it is a feeling. The word 'valuable' means the same as the adjective good, except that good can modify nouns standing for things which have mere utility, while valuable should modify only those which stand for things that are actually the objects of positive interests.

There is now a widely prevalent usage which makes 'value' a name for the valuable object, as well as for the quality of goodness which the object possesses. People talk about values when they mean goods, or good and valuable objects. This is not strictly parallel to the double use of 'good' as noun meaning the valuable object, and as adjective modifying the name of the object, for 'value' is not an adjective modifying the name of the object. Value is the quality, and corresponds, not to good, but to goodness. Good is being used for the thing and also as adjective to modify the thing. Value is being used as a name for the thing and as a name for the quality of the thing. This ambiguous use of value has become especially prevalent among philosophers, and has led to much confusion. Urban and Perry both define value as the tertiary quality, and both use it occasionally for the object which has the value, without pointing out that they are changing the meaning of the term. In his chapter entitled "Value as any object of any interest," Perry is at great pains to show that value is not the object of any interest at all, but is a quality or relation that any object of any interest has. If value ever becomes the object of any interest, as it does, in this chapter, become the object of Mr. Perry's theoretical interest, the interest that it is the object of must necessarily be different from the original interest that generated the value by having some other object, which has the value, as its object. The character of value may have value. Then it will both be a value and have a value. And the value that it is and the value that it has are two different values. If a man has blue eyes he is not blue eyes. If he has a grandfather he is not that grandfather. He may be another grandfather. If a man has courage he is courageous but is not identical with courage. If a thing has value it is valuable, but, even tho it be a value, it cannot be identical with the value that it has.

Perry criticized Dewey in 1917 for mixing up the object valued with the value of the object and calling them by the same name.¹⁴ Dewey continued to use the word in the two senses.¹⁵ In 1923 he invented the barbaric word 'valuity' to stand for the quality when he used 'value' for the object that had it, but he did not stick to this distinction even in the article in which it appears.¹⁶

My contention is not that 'value' should not be used to mean a good object. I simply insist that if it is so used it should be so defined. And if it is to be used in two different senses, both should be defined with utmost care.

The word 'valuable' is also used at times rather loosely to mean the thing which is valuable. A man may check his valuables at the office when he goes swimming. This is like the extension of the

14—14 *Journal of Philosophy*, 1917, p. 170.

15—34 *Philosophical Review*, 1925, p. 324.

20 *Journal of Philosophy*, 1923, p. 618.

16—20 *Journal of Philosophy*, 1923, p. 618, 620.

terms 'intellectual' and 'religious' from their original use as adjectives modifying the nouns which stand for people having these qualities, to the status of nouns standing for the people themselves. In the tradition of Catholicism a 'religious' is a person of a certain type. And today in Anglo-Saxondom a so-called 'intellectual' is a person of another type. But it will only confuse philosophy to use the word 'valuable' interchangeably as an adjective modifying the name of a good object and as a noun standing for the object itself. And the double use of the word 'value', to mean both the good object and the quality of goodness that th's object has, will also, in the absence of two very precise definitions, serve only to confuse a value theory.

When I say value I mean a quality or relation of an external object unless I am talking about primary value, in which case I mean a feeling. Value is an object of interest only in the most exceptional circumstances.

V—Intrinsic Value.

It should be clear that secondary value can never be intrinsic. What is loosely and popularly called intrinsic value is nothing of the sort. It is what I have called direct value. The objects of direct interests are often called intrinsic goods, or things 'good in themselves'. I do not know what the word 'in' means in this latter phrase. The whole expression means that the things are valued on account of qualities which they possess that would, on a common sense view, be called intrinsic or non-instrumental. But there is no excuse for calling the values of these things intrinsic, unless the word is a mere arbitrary tag. The word 'intrinsic', when applied to any quality, is properly used as G. E. Moore has used it, to mean that the thing can still possess the quality even if it exists quite alone.¹⁷ No external good can possibly exist as a good quite alone. There must also be an interest which has it for an object. If it exists quite alone the interest does not exist and it is not a good. The adjective 'intrinsic' is only and always strictly and properly applicable in the value field to primary value or subjective goodness. Given a positive feeling-tone, whether or not it is an aspect of what is or pretends to be an attitude toward something, and it is always a value experience, even if nothing else exists, not even the th'ng that it pretends to be an attitude toward. It is always and invariably just the value that it is and nothing else. Ontologically, of course, it is always, so far as our experience shows, dependent upon certain neural events. But axiologically it is absolute. Its value quality is intrinsic and non-derivative. On this view only a living being or his experience can have intrinsic value. And this value which he or she has is not a value to anybody, not even to his or her self. It is part of his or her self. It is not moral goodness or virtue. It is the subjective feeling of pleasantness and a part of the value experience.

Mr. Ralph Barton Perry has attempted, I think in vain, to retain intrinsic objective value in a general theory of value with which I am in substantial accord, and to which I am indebted for much that here appears. He is replying to Mr. G. E. Moore's contention that on such a view as his, value is always borrowed and never owned, and that it

17—Moore, G. E., *Ethics*, p. 65, 162. Henry Holt, N. Y., not dated; probably about 1910. See also Blake, R. M., *Why Not Hedonism?* in *International Journal of Ethics*, Oct. 1926, Vol. 37, p. 2.

shines with a reflected glory only. He asserts that a thing may be intrinsically valuable if you consider it together with the interest that is taken in it.¹⁸ "—the primrose as enjoyed is intrinsically good". The "object desired for itself — does possess value in itself". But Moore's charge, that if value is a function of interest it is always borrowed and never owned, surely expresses the exact truth about the value of all objects of interest qua objects of interest. The value that Perry defined in his chapter entitled "Value as any object of any interest" is necessarily a borrowed value.¹⁹ It is secondary value, the value of external objects. We do not predicate value broadly and indiscriminately of the whole composed of an interest and its object. We say that the object has objective value. And I say that the interest has primary value. If we do somewhat arbitrarily create a unity of an interest and its object, then it is true that that whole possesses value within itself, which it could still retain even if it existed quite alone. Indeed it contains both kinds of value, primary and secondary, the former in the interest and the latter imputed to the object. Perry seems clearly aware thruout his treatise of only the latter. This is the one that he defines. The former he never mentions specifically or attempts to define or distinguish from the latter. But on occasions he recognizes that there is some sort of value in the interest itself, and, like Urban, he tries to read over into this experience the same value that he finds in its object.

The object of an interest can only possess what is strictly intrinsic value if it is alive, which it may be in addition to being the object of the interest. This intrinsic value does not depend on the interest being taken in the object; it is a quality belonging to the object itself. It is the quality of subjective pleasantness-unpleasantness, or positive-negative feeling-tone. This intrinsic primary value may be only very remotely and indirectly related or not related at all to the secondary value possessed by the object. As such the primary value is never the object of a favoring interest. It is a major blemish in the work of many hedonistic writers that they have said or suggested that primary value (pleasure as a feeling) is as such and necessarily the object of such an interest. Neither primary value nor anything else is ever necessarily the object of any interest. What shall be the object of an interest depends upon the selection of the interest itself. So far as the theory of value is concerned a man can want anything at all that he likes or nothing at all if he does not like. An object cannot require a disinclined interest to pursue it. There is then nothing of which it can be truly said that it necessarily possesses secondary value or objective goodness. A primary value is not, as such, good. It is subjective goodness. The thing that possesses it, the total pleasant experience, is, as such, good. This is a subjective good. This alone is an intrinsic good and has intrinsic value. Nothing except such an experience can ever be an intrinsic good, or have intrinsic value.

18—General Theory of Value, p. 132-134.

19—Ibid, p. 124.

CHAPTER II.

A RE- INTERPRETATION OF HEDONISM.

As S. C. Pepper has said,¹ the theory that value is based on interest is just hedonism in a new dress. It is what ancient and modern hedonists have had on their minds and have somewhat inadequately expressed. Their more formal pronouncements are not strictly in accord with it. But it can be discerned in their writings and is the core of truth in these. This core of truth may be summed up in the two doctrines (1) of axiological ego-centrism, and (2) of feeling or hedonic-tone as the value fundamental. I shall attempt to show that the Epicureans and Utilitarians, in spite of much confusion of thought, did mean to teach these two theories. Their slogan that 'pleasure is the good' is an odd and ambiguous way of expressing them. Pleasure has many meanings. In one of these, where it means feeling-tone, the slogan is false if taken literally, but the real truth is nevertheless suggested in regard to the nature of the value fundamental; and in both this sense and another, where pleasure means any object of any favorable interest, the notion of ego-centrism is expressed or suggested.

There are eight or more meanings for the word pleasure.

(1) It is the contrast term for work. Any total activity and experience which is carried on by way of recreation is pleasure. Vacation activities, such as sport, dancing, music, travel, and all kinds of gay festivities such as participating in water carnivals with displays of fire-works, are pleasure in this sense.

(2) It may mean thrill or ecstasy, a complex of organic sensations.

(3) It may mean sensuality, which, it must be remembered, includes some legitimate forms among the many wicked ones. If indulged in at the right time and place, and in the right manner, a hot shower or an application of bay rum is not subject to moral condemnation in spite of its appeal to the senses.

(4) Pleasure has been used to mean simply the absence of pain. Epicurus so used it part of the time, presumably in his more saintly and ascetic moods.

(5) It may mean positive feeling-tone.

(6) It may mean any total experience having a positive feeling-tone or subjective pleasantness. It is so used by Woodworth² and Sidgwick.³

(7) It may mean any object of any positive direct interest. Thus our work becomes a pleasure as soon as we prosecute it, not merely as a means to our livelihood, but also because we enjoy the thing itself apart from all instrumentality. Here a pleasure is anything

1—U. of Cal. Pub. in Phil., Vol. 4, p. 110, Berkeley 1923.

2—Woodworth, R. S., Psychology, p. 173. Holt. N. Y., 1923 (first edition 1921).

3—Sidgwick, H., Methods of Ethics, p. 127, 129, 397. Macmillan, London, 1907. Seventh edition. (First edition 1874.)

which is objectively pleasant by reason of being the object of a direct interest. It is anything which has direct secondary value or direct objective pleasantness. A thing is not a pleasure by reason of having indirect secondary value.

(8) In the last sense that I shall mention, which includes the seventh sense, pleasure is any object of any positive interest whatever. It is anything that we like on any score, whether because of its efficacy or because of so-called intrinsic qualities. It is anything which has secondary value, direct or indirect. Using pleasure in this sense, and using the word good in the narrow sense in which the hedonists used it, it is true that pleasure is the good. ('Good' should also cover what has utility and what has subjective goodness or primary value.)

In this last sense we simply mean by pleasure that which is objectively pleasant, just as in the sixth sense we meant that which is subjectively pleasant. Calling pleasure pleasant is an inartistic use of language and should not be recommended except for the fact that the usage has been established as customary. It is not courage that is courageous. But in certain senses pleasure is pleasant without self contradiction. That is, pleasure in the sixth sense is pleasant by reason of the presence in it of pleasure in the fifth sense. And pleasure in the seventh sense is pleasant by reason of its being the object of a pleasure in the fifth sense which has intent and which is directed toward the seventh-sense-pleasure on account of properties of the latter which would, on a common sense view, be called intrinsic. And pleasure in the eighth sense is pleasant by reason of its being the object of a pleasure in the fifth sense which has intent and which is directed toward the eighth-sense-pleasure on account of any properties of the latter whatever, intrinsic or instrumental or what not. It is self contradictory for a pleasure to be pleasant only if it is so by reason of the presence in it, or by reason of its relation to, pleasure in the same sense.

It should be noted here that in view of (6) and (8) pleasantness is synonymous with positive value and unpleasantness with negative value. Subjective pleasantness is primary value and objective pleasantness is secondary value, and there are no other kinds of value or of pleasantness than these.

The legitimacy of using pleasure in the eighth sense may be denied on the ground that it is a common experience to find that the means to a good and valuable and pleasant end is itself often no pleasure at all. Is the drudgery pleasant which is instrumental to a man's holding his job? This apparently is an unpleasant means to a pleasant end. It is certainly good and valuable as a means. Then is pleasure really the good?

We must admit that drudgery is partly unpleasant. And to that extent it is evil. It is a bore. It is tiring. It is the object of a negative feeling-attitude. It is bad. Hedonistically speaking it is a pain. But if it serves to keep a man's job for him it is also a pleasure. He knows that it is the best way to hold on to his position. And his position enables him to have a certain amount of money, which pleases him, and a certain social eminence, which also pleases him. Thus he has two (at least two) interests in the drudgery which are in conflict. He tends to shun it as a bore and he tends to embrace it as a means to wealth and honor and social position. The question as to which interest is the stronger is determined

by which one wins in the conflict. If he performs the drudgery, that means that he has a greater (or deeper or more intense or higher or even wider) positive instrumental interest in the drudgery as a means to the ends which he likes directly, than a favorable direct interest in avoiding-the-drudgery-and-losing-the-wealth-and-eminence. I am of course assuming that he knows that the drudgery is the most efficacious and least unpleasant means to the directly desired end. The drudgery and the end are then linked by a natural necessity over which he has no control. Being intelligent he sees the connection and treats the two as a unit, and prefers taking both to going without both. If there were any more efficacious or less unpleasant means that he knew of to the same end he would of course be unwise not to take this. But in the absence of such, if he is rational he does have a positive instrumental interest in the drudgery, due to its connection with the wealth and eminence. This interest has a positive feeling-tone. It is a favorable feeling toward the drudgery. The drudgery in this aspect as an instrumentality surely does please him. He may not talk much in glowing terms about this aspect of it. As he lets his imagination play over it he may be chiefly concerned with its other aspect, its dullness which displeases him. But he actually stays with it voluntarily for hours, week in week out, every day except Sunday. This, it seems to me, proves his positive interest in it. And it must satisfy or please this interest. It must satisfy or please him as this interest (these two sentences mean the same thing. He is all his interests. Each is an aspect or subordinate interest included under his personality interest. To have an interest and to be an interest are the same thing; tho to have a value and to be a value are not the same thing). If it did not satisfy his interest he would not do it voluntarily. As long as he keeps at it without being put thru the motions by some superior physical power he is doing it because he predominantly likes to do it; he prefers to do it; doing it is a pleasure, and is pleasant, in the sense that doing it satisfies or pleases his predominant interest. If this were not so he would stop. He is also displeased with it as a bore, but not so much as he is pleased with it as an instrumentality. It must not be supposed that in the means-end situation the only interest is in the end. There is one interest which selects the means as its object and one which selects the end. There are two easily distinguishable interests, one dependent upon the other.

The object of every choice that a man makes is invariably the greatest pleasure to him at the time. If he is wise it is also the greatest pleasure to him in the long run. To use the quaint language of Bentham, he will choose the pleasure which is most intense, long enduring, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure, and extended; this he will do to the extent that he is sane and rational. But everybody always chooses what is the greatest pleasure at the time of the choice; for a choice expresses the strongest interest, in a conflict, and the object of the strongest interest is by definition (by the eighth definition) the greatest pleasure. The greatest pleasure (in the eighth sense) is so constituted by the direction at it of the strongest positive feeling-attitude in the soul at the time; that is, by the most intense fifth-sense-pleasure endowed with an intent directed at the eighth-sense-pleasure. Choice is not determined by the quantity of pleasure as feeling in the end or object. If a man is rational the pleasure as feeling in the object of interest will be taken

into consideration; but this is not the sole determining factor even then. Choice is always determined by the quantity or strength of the fifth-sense-pleasure in the interest which is taken in the object, that is, which has the object as its object; which interest is actually located in the soul of the interested personality. The key fact in value is the pleasure at the source of our interests. Value is utterly impossible in the absence of feeling. Feeling is one-dimensional, and is either subjective pleasantness or unpleasantness. Positive value is always pleasantness of one kind or another. And pleasures in the sixth, seventh, and eighth senses are the only things that have it. These pleasures, together with such things as have mere utility, make up all the goods in the universe.

In the Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill states that pleasure in the seventh sense is the good. He also regards pleasure in the fifth and sixth senses as the good. He never seems to realize that he is expounding more than one doctrine. Power and fame, he says, were originally desired primarily as a means to pleasure or happiness. Virtue and money were originally desired purely as such a means. But by association with pleasure these things became part of the end. They are now desired for themselves and are parts of or ingredients in happiness.⁴ Happiness then, which is supposed to be just the sum or perhaps the system of the pleasures of a man's life, has as elements in it certain solid objects like money, which are not feelings at all, and other less tangible things like power, fame, and virtue, which also are not feelings. These things, then, must be pleasures, and pleasure is evidently being used for the complementary object of any direct favorable interest, whatever that object may be,—an experience or a material object or an ideal or what not. This is pleasure in the seventh sense.

He also says in his notes to his father's *Analysis of the Human Mind*,⁵ that wealth, power, and dignity, which are not in their own natures pleasures but the causes of pleasures, become so closely associated with pleasure and pain that they are desired for themselves. If pleasure were a feeling it would seem superfluous to say that they were not in their own natures pleasures. And the implication of his words is that these things become pleasures by becoming the objects of direct interests instead of being merely the objects of indirect interests which they were at first. And on the next page⁶ he says that a concern for others is an ultimate fact of our nature, and that, assuming the presence in us of this moral feeling, the good of others is itself a pleasure to us. This good of theirs is not, of course, the moral feeling in us. Their good and our feeling are different. Therefore our pleasure and our feeling are different. Our pleasure is the object of our feeling here. It is a pleasure to me to find Mill recognizing, in this passage, intent-feelings at the source of interest. Most hedonists do not see very clearly that a feeling can have an intent.

4—Utilitarianism, p. 33-35. Everyman. Dutton, N. Y., 1922. The first edition of the Utilitarianism was 1863.

5—Mill, James, *Analysis of the Human Mind*, Vol. 2, p. 307-308. Longmans Green, London, 1869. Edited by J. S. Mill (references are unchanged in edition of 1878. The first edition of the *Analysis* was 1829).

6—Ibid, 309.

And in the Utilitarianism Mill says "—any given pleasure, as music for instance".⁷ Does he mean that music is a pleasure because we have a positive feeling toward it, or because the immediate experience of it is pleasant? Is this the seventh or sixth sense of pleasure? I think that he probably has both meanings in mind.

He also says "—to think of an object as desirable (except for the sake of its consequences) and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing".⁸ This reiterates his refusal to admit that pleasure in the eighth sense is pleasant. And so he would not call it pleasure. But he could hardly say more clearly that what I have called pleasure in the seventh sense is 'the pleasant'. He is saying that everything with direct secondary value is pleasant. Since he uses pleasure and 'the pleasant' interchangeably, this is the equivalent of saying that my seventh sense of the word pleasure is legitimate. And it must be remembered that the extension of the seventh sense is identical with a large part of the extension of the eighth.

Thus it is clear that Mill uses the words pleasure and pleasantness in an objective sense, in which they do not signify a feeling nor anything like a feeling. He also uses them in the sense of feeling. Tho he says that these various objects of interest are identical with pleasure and happiness, he also asserts that life would be ill provided with sources of happiness if nature had not provided that things originally indifferent, but "conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure".⁹ Nature does not then provide that these things should become pleasure itself. From the way in which he speaks he does not seem to know that he has changed the meaning of the word pleasure from the sixth or seventh senses to the fifth. He seems to think that he is hammering home the doctrine which he enunciated above, that things are identical with pleasure and with parts of happiness. He emphasizes this by saying that it is in themselves that the things become sources of happiness. But of course happiness and what is in itself the source of it are not quite identical.

And in a number of places pleasure is used to mean feeling, while pleasant and pleasurable characterize the thing which has it, or, as we say, gives it, or is the object of delight. I have already noted that he says that any object of any positive direct interest is pleasant. He also speaks in the Analysis of the pleasure afforded by music,¹⁰ tho he spoke in the Utilitarianism of music as a pleasure. He also says that acts beneficial to others become pleasurable in themselves, and that the idea of pleasure is intrinsically pleasurable.¹¹ And the end is something pleasurable.¹² And all desirable things are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.¹³ In all these cases pleasure means feeling.

That so many critics, with the conflicting theories before them in

7—Everyman, p. 34.

8—Ibid, p. 36.

9—Everyman, p. 35.

10—Analysis of the Human Mind, II, p.241-242.

11—Ibid, p. 308.

12—Ibid, p. 373.

13—Utilitarianism, p. 6.

the hedonistic canon, should have thought that the only thing meant by pleasure was feeling, which is subjective goodness and not 'the good', and should have ignored the view that pleasure is the object of a positive interest, which really is the good, is perhaps natural in view of the extremely unsympathetic attitude that most of them took toward hedonism. They could not contemplate with equanimity any theory which gave non-eulogistic titles, like pleasure and interest, to fundamental moral facts. And it is not only the enemies of the pleasure philosophy who have failed to understand it. The friends and allies too have been led astray. Both Green and Sidgwick fail to get Mill's idea in chapter four of the Utilitarianism, where Mill says that music and virtue and power, *etc.*, are pleasures and are elements in happiness.

Sidgwick says in a note,¹⁴ "It is more remarkable to find J. S. Mill—declaring that 'money'—no less than 'power' or 'fame'—comes by association of ideas to be 'a part of happiness', an 'ingredient in the individual's conception of happiness'. But this seems to be a mere looseness of phraseology, venial in a treatise aiming at a popular style; since Mill has expressly said that 'by happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain,' and he cannot mean that money is either the one or the other." Sidgwick adds that Mill probably meant to make the distinction, in his talk about things becoming pleasures when they had not been pleasures before, between direct and instrumental goods. This is correct, but it is not all that Mill meant. Mill does say that money is a pleasure, and I think that he meant what he said. It is ordinary usage in the English language to say that a thing that we like is a pleasure to us. If Sidgwick insists that he cannot mean it because he has just used pleasure in a different sense, and does not point out any change in the meaning of his word, I reply that that is no proof. Many a man has used his words very precisely in several senses without noting the fact. And when a man does this there is no law to the effect that there is only one of the senses that he means. And if there were, the seventh sense of pleasure might be the one, and not the fifth. Mill is so clear, in spots, that he means pleasure in the seventh sense, and it is so true that pleasure in this sense is a good, that I cannot dismiss the passage as a mere lapse, venial or otherwise. It is perhaps a lapse from the more official formulations of hedonism. But *sub specie aeternitatis* it is no lapse at all. Rather it is the divine truth bursting forth thru the mists of error and of intellectual confusion.

Green in one place sees more in Mill's chapter than Sidgwick does. Green admits that Mill really means that the complementary objects of positive interest are parts of the man's happiness, and that if pleasure means them, it is really and truly the good. And, what is more, he says that this is perfectly true. But then he goes on to assert that this is simply the equivalent of his theory that a good object is one in which we seek self-satisfaction.¹⁵ If that is actually what Green means by seeking self-satisfaction in things, why that is fine. But I think that he is just as ambiguous about his self-satisfaction as the hedonists are about their pleasure. He uses it in sev-

14—Methods of Ethics, p. 93.

15—Green, T. H., *Prolegomena to Ethics*, sect. 167-171. Oxford Press 1924 (first edition 1883).

eral senses without realizing that he is doing so. Self-satisfaction in the last analysis is simply the hedonists' pleasure with the colored light from a cathedral window falling across it, tho Green denies this.¹⁶ He says that the hedonists identify the good with the pleasant, while he makes it that which satisfies some desire.¹⁷ I think that he meant by desire any positive interest. And it should be clear that anything that satisfies any positive interest falls within the extension of 'the pleasant', as he virtually admits in another place.¹⁸ He says that the hedonists maintained that the good was the pleasant,¹⁹ and half a page farther on he says that they meant that it was pleasure. He thus would seem to have all but recognized that they were using pleasure to mean the pleasant, and that their theory was no different from his own. But his dominant notion is certainly that when the hedonists said pleasure they meant feeling. He says in one place, like Sidgwick, that Mill confuses the pleasure which ensues upon the satisfaction of desire with the object of desire.²⁰ He thinks here that Mill's use of pleasure in the seventh sense was a mistake from Mill's point of view. But it is only a mistake from the point of view of the most official formulations of hedonism. It is the plain truth of the matter, as Green himself admits;²¹ and this ought to be emphasized.

Green shows how Butler refuted the hedonists,²² and does not see that therein his own moral theory is equally refuted. Butler said, what is perfectly true, that some interests terminate in their objects. The man wants the beef steak, not as a means to any pleasure, and not as a means to anything; not for the sake of anything; not in the hope of finding self-satisfaction in it. He is just hungry and wants the beef steak itself. This is no desire for pleasure. Hedonism (taking pleasure in its fifth sense) is refuted. But so is Green's theory. Green's negative criticisms are fine as applied to hedonism in the fifth sense and so are Butler's. But these very criticisms are applicable and fatal to some of Green's own doctrines as well as to some of Butler's. Green's oft repeated proposition that we seek self-satisfaction in the object of desire means most of the time that the self-satisfaction is the object of direct interest and that the object itself is an object of instrumental interest. It is the self-satisfaction which we are always primarily seeking. Sometimes it is in one object and sometimes it is in another. But the object is only good so far as it contains this sacred essence. The object is merely desired as a means to this further end, and in Butler's words, the interest in this case never terminates upon its apparent object. Of course, Green may be using self-satisfaction metaphorically, and there may be a sixth, seventh, and eighth meaning for it besides the fifth one. I simply wish to show that Green cannot explain the difficulties and ambiguities in hedonism; his own doctrine contains these very same difficulties and ambiguities, unnoticed by him as theirs were by them. Doubtless he and the men of his school had a certain truth in

16—Green, *Prolegomena*, sect. 222.

17—Ibid, sect. 171.

18—Ibid, sect. 168.

19—Ibid, sect. 171.

20—Ibid, sect. 165.

21—Ibid, sect. 167, 170.

22—Ibid, sect. 161.

the back of their heads which they failed perfectly to express, and doubtless it was not essentially different from the one which the hedonists had, for the most part in the back of their heads. And doubtless this truth was that a man's self, that is, his feeling-attitudes or interests, is the source of all desire and of all valuation, and that the process of living a good life (not just the end of the process) is the process of realizing or satisfying or pleasing this self. The Hegelians however spoil their value theory by treating the relation of the individual personality to society and to the universe as if it were analogous to the relation of subordinate interests in a personality to the total personality itself. They have no proper sense for the limits of the personality nor for its dependence upon its biological basis. The aberrations of their metaphysics render their ethical theories of very little genuine assistance to the moral philosopher.

The use of the word pleasure in the sense of the object of a positive interest, which object is generally no feeling at all, is to be found in a number of other writers.

Aristotle suggests it in the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*,²³ when he states that the pleasures involved in the exercise of the different faculties vary greatly, and illustrates this by the fact that a man prefers gold to hay, while a donkey prefers hay to gold, and by the fact that different things please different men. In order to illustrate how pleasures vary he can only point to how the things that please vary. And none of the things that he points to as things that please are feelings.

Herbert Spencer does substantially the same thing in his *Data of Ethics*.²⁴ He argues that people do not agree as to the nature of happiness, contrary to Bentham's assertion. He contends that since different people like different things, it follows that happiness is a different thing for each. Happiness then must be the things that people like, and not necessarily feelings, and generally not feelings.

Bentham's words, which Spencer thinks he is contradicting, are as follows: "What happiness is every man knows, because, what pleasure is, every man knows, and what pain is every man knows"; while there is much dispute as to what justice is.²⁵ Justice is only a means to happiness. When a man talks like this he is driving at the approximate truth that people know what they want. When a man is pleased he knows it. When he is pained he knows it. And he knows roughly what will please him and what will pain him in the future. The pleasure and the happiness to which Bentham here refers are simply whatever objects please him. Of course Bentham is conscious of his official formulation, that pleasure as a feeling is the good, most of the time. He does not let the real truth slip out very often.

Spencer thinks that he disagrees with Bentham, but really he does not. People disagree as to what objects shall make up their happiness, as Spencer says, but they all agree that whatever each man likes is happiness for him, as Bentham says. And the genuine dis-

23—See Peters trans., Bk. 10, Ch. 5, sect. 7-9.

24—Ch. 9, sect. 61.

25—Bentham, Works, Vol. 9, p. 123, col. I. Collected and edited by John Bowring. Edinburgh, 1838. This quotation is from the Constitutional Code, Book I, Ch. 16.

agreement which Spencer notes would not lead to any conflict if everyone would mind his own business and if there were enough goods to provide for all.

In one other place Bentham seems to step aside from the doctrine generally attributed to him. At the beginning of Chapter four of the *Principles of Morals and Legislation* he says that the value of a pleasure is its force. Its value or force in influencing conduct is the means thru which the legislator controls the behavior of the citizen. Either he is slipping over into a theory of teleological causation which is foreign to his general view of things, or else he is not using value as he himself uses it when he speaks of the value of things other than pleasure. The value of things other than pleasure is for him what I call secondary value. This is no force. It is importance and meaning. Pleasure as a feeling is a force that controls voluntary action. But it is at the source of the interest and is not generally the object of interest. It is primary value and is not ordinarily what has secondary value. And Bentham may have caught a fleeting glimpse of this truth in saying that the value of a pleasure is the force of it.

Bowring, or whoever wrote the *Deontology*, suggests this same view when he asserts that the value of a pleasure depends upon its intensity, duration, and extent, while its magnitude depends upon its intensity and duration.²⁶ Then by the worth of a pleasure he does not mean anything very different from its quantity or strength. If pleasure is a feeling and if its value means its quantity or strength or force, then this value is not what most people mean by value. It is not the secondary value which even hedonists mean when they are talking about the value of anything else but pleasure. If the value of pleasure as a feeling is its strength, then it is not valuable as the object of any interest. It is not the goal of our efforts. It is not the good. It is primary value located at the source of interest. Bowring certainly verges somewhere near this view.

Other statements in the *Deontology* are significant. We find that no man can let another decide for him what is pleasure.²⁷ That is pleasure which a man's judgment "recommends and recognizes to his feelings as pleasure".²⁸ Then pleasure is what the man himself really wants. It is what he has a certain feeling toward, and not the feeling that he has toward it. Here pleasure in the seventh or eighth sense is recognized as the object of an intent-feeling. And again we find that every person is the only proper judge of what, with reference to himself, is pleasure, and what is pain.²⁹ All this is just saying over again what Bentham said in the *Constitutional Code* about everybody knowing what happiness and pleasure and pain were.

John Hill Burton, a disciple of Bentham, and a lawyer by profession, says, in an introduction to Bentham's works, of which he was one of the editors, that even self-sacrifice is "the pursuit of pleasure—the doing of that which it pleases a man to do,—the doing that which volition suggests".³⁰ Then the phrase 'pursuit of pleasure' is

26—*Deontology*, Vol. 2, p. 20. By either Jeremy Bentham or John Bowring or both. 1834.

27—*Deontology*, Vol. 1, p. 29.

28—Ibid, p. 29.

29—Ibid, p. 59.

30—Bentham's Works, Vol. I, p. 23, col. 2.

a metaphor to express the truth that a man pursues whatever he is interested in; and then to say that pleasure is the good is to say that what I like is the good. Burton also says that the best equivalent of pleasure is will.³¹ This looks as if pleasure were being shoved back into the source and used there properly as an intent-feeling. And Burton also says that the events of Bentham's life were "a recourse to elements of pleasure and satisfaction for which vulgar and selfish minds have no appreciation".³² Then the complementary objects of Bentham's interests were elements of pleasure, i. e., were particular pleasures, and pleasure here does not mean a feeling but is used in the seventh or eighth sense.

If we turn to the ancient Epicureans we find that they used the word *voluptas*, which is translated pleasure, in several different senses, without seeming to realize what they were doing. The basic truth in their moral theory was the salutary axiological ego-centrism to which I have already referred. They borrowed a metaphysics to agree with this notion, and the formulations of their moral theories give it at least a metaphorical expression. They might have been clearer than they were. They should have been clearer than they were. But they were on the right track and deserved more credit than they got.

They saw the necessity of escaping from the Aristoteleo-Platonic scheme of things which located the heart of the value problem up in heaven. They adopted, with reservations, the Democritean system as by far the best alternative then available to this majestically spiritual ontology. They required a metaphysics which would leave the spirit free to blow whither it listed, untrammelled by the imposition *ab extra* of the higher intuitions of a seer of Plato's caliber. They lacked his vision and his ability and his genius. Their notion of the content of a good life was a poor thing in contrast with his. They cultivated in their garden the tender flower of moral philosophy, encompassed and threatened by a society which, so far as free citizenship and a rich and full life were concerned, had gone infinitely more to the dogs than had the society of Athens during the century which preceded Alexander's death. Change and decay were visible in and about and everywhere. Reflective and virtuous souls were definitely on the defensive. They were all but beaten in life's struggle. They were on the point of becoming saints. What they wanted was peace and quiet and rest. They were always tired. Considered as men they were a puny lot compared with the giants who preceded them. But the hard knocks of life had hammered securely into their heads one truth which never lodged permanently in the heads of any of the three greatest philosophers of Greece. And this truth was that the heart of man is the center of the moral universe. Their sense for this fundamental truth, so indirectly and circuitously expressed by their dogma that pleasure is the good, has recurrently won them followers among men of good sense, like Gassendi and Hobbes and the Utilitarians, in a world of European culture almost completely dominated by Platonic and Aristotelian and Christian orthodoxies.

The exact words and doctrine of Epicurus himself are difficult or impossible to discover. Doubtless he was less exact than most

31—Bentham's Works, Vol. 1, p. 22.

32—Ibid, p. 24.

hedonists in his thought and expression so that his very words are not worth discovering. We simply know from Diogenes Laertius that he taught that pleasure is the good, that virtue alone is invariably connected with pleasure, and that the absence of pain is the greatest pleasure.

Cicero's *De Finibus*, Books I and II, gives the most complete account we have, not perhaps of the doctrine of Epicurus, but of Epicureanism in the first century B. C. Cicero is little more than a translator who recasts a continuous discourse into the form of a dialogue. He says himself in the twelfth letter to Atticus that the thought is the thought of others, and that he only supplies the words, of which he has a copious flow. He points out the existence of at least two hedonistic *summa bona*, one the absence of pain, and the other positive pleasure.³³ We also find a number of rather vague statements as to the meaning of *voluptas* which suggest, I think, that this word is taken ambiguously in the senses five, six, seven and eight, in addition to sense four, which senses I have enumerated above in regard to the English word pleasure. These meanings are at least adumbrated, tho there seems to be no clear recognition of the distinctions between them, nor of the fact that the word is being used in more than at most two senses.

Voluptas is regarded as the value fundamental and also as the supreme end (of course no one thing could possibly be both of these at once). The only word that is used consistently for primary value is *iucunditas*, or the feeling of pleasure and delight. *Voluptas* sometimes means this, which is the true value fundamental, and sometimes it means the total experience which includes this, and sometimes it means the thing which stimulates this experience and thus would normally be the object of a favorable interest; such a thing is an objective good, a good in the sense in which the Epicureans meant good.

There are four statements as to what the word *voluptas* means, all highly ambiguous.

(1) "*Quia voluptatem hanc esse sentiunt omnes quam sensus accipiens movetur et iucunditate quadem perfunditur.*"³⁴

(2) "*Omnes enim iucundum motum quo sensus hilaretur Graece hedonen, Latine voluptatem vocant.*"³⁵

(3) "*In eo autem voluptas omnium Latine loquentium more ponitur, cum percipitur ea quae sensum aliquem moveat iucunditas.*"³⁶

(4) And Aristippus meant by *voluptas* that which even dumb cattle would mean by it if they could speak, "*id est qua*" (this refers back to *voluptas*) "*sensus dulciter ac iucunde movetur.*"³⁷

Cicero's ambiguities are repeated in substance in Hobbes's Latin *Leviathan*. A comparison of this with the English version will serve to emphasize the truth of my contention that it is unwise to

33—Cicero, M. T., *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*. Loeb Classical Library. Putnam's, N. Y., 1921. Trans. and Int. by H. Rackham. (First printing of this volume 1914.) Page 100-101.

34—Ibid, p. 84.

35—Ibid, p. 86.

36—Ibid, p. 92.

37—Ibid, p. 100.

credit the hedonists with too single and precise a meaning for *voluptas* or pleasure.

The English rendering was published before the Latin.³⁸

Hobbes gives 'delight' as the equivalent of *voluptas*; "*Itaque appetitus omnis amorque conjunctus est cum voluptate aliqua*", which re-echoes the English version, "And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied by some Delight, more or less". This *voluptate* looks very much like feeling-tone. Here pleasure is delight and might have been rendered by *iucunditate*. Again, "*Voluptatem aliae ab objecti praesentis sensatione oriuntur, quae vocari possunt voluptates sensuales*", was first uttered as, "Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object present; And these may be called Pleasures of Sense". Pleasure is still delight, and we are still dealing with a feeling. But in the next sentence pleasure means that which is pleasant. "*Jucundum ergo est apparens bonum*". *Jucundum* means pleasant. But the corresponding sentence in the English *Leviathan* reads, "Pleasure, therefore (or Delight) is the apparens, or sense of Good". Pleasure and delight still have the same meaning, but they no longer refer to any feeling. They are 'the pleasant', i. e., that which has value, either subjective or objective. This is the good itself. What appears good is, at the time, good. It can only really be evil by appearing, either in itself or in its consequences, badly at some other time.

Thus it appears that many hedonists have used the word pleasure to mean feeling, which is the value fundamental, and also to mean the object of positive interest whether or not it be a feeling, which is the good. These are utterly different things, and the vice of the hedonists lay in mixing them up. There are also some expressions of the hedonistic doctrine which, when taken literally, mean the false view of pleasure in the fifth or sixth senses as the objective good; but these must not be interpreted literally unless we are to commit the horrid sin of taking a man's metaphors to mean precisely what they say.

I think that an illustration from a non-philosophical writing will suffice to show that people commonly use the phrase 'I do it for the sake of pleasure' as a metaphorical expression to mean 'I like to do it'. In the *New York Times* for May 25th, 1928, there appears a dispatch from London which states that a medical missionary, Mr. K. G. Frazer, F. R. C. S., on furlough from the southern Sudan, appeals thru the *London Times* for contributions of used safety-razor blades to take back to his woolly-headed friends in Africa. These folks, he says, are experts at shaving each other's heads with dull blades. "If anybody wishes to post blades to my Edinburgh address I will take them back with me in the Autumn to the Sudan, where they will give real pleasure". Now I doubt if he means that the blades are literally to be used as a means to the production of positive feeling-tone, tho this is literally what he says. He means that the Sudanese like razor blades, and here they like them instrumentally. In the eighth sense the blades are a pleasure. Metaphorically they will be used for the sake of producing pleasure. But strictly

38—Hobbes, Thomas, *Latin Works*. Edited by Molesworth, Sir Wm., Vol. 3, p. 42-43. London, 1841. John Bohn pub.
Leviathan, p. 25. Everyman. Dutton, N. Y. No date (first edition of *Leviathan*, 1651; first edition of Latin version, 1670).

the blades will be used as a means, not to the excitation of any feeling, but to the removal of aesthetically superfluous wool. The removal of this wool is itself a pleasure in the eighth sense, but doubtless Mr. Frazer was not thinking of it in this light. The whole expression which he uses simply means 'These people will like the razor blades'. The forms of language must not be taken too seriously. An entire sentence may have a meaning when certain words in it cannot be said to stand for anything real in the outside world, just as a word may stand for something outside of us, when the individual letters in it do not. The individual word pleasure in the last quoted sentence does not stand for anything in reality, unless it is used in the eighth sense, which probably it is not. But the whole sentence does stand for something in reality.

There is of course a pleasure as feeling involved in the liking of the Sudanese for razor blades. Their feeling toward the blades is a delight in the blades. It is a positive instrumental interest with the blades as its object. It is a pleasure with an intent. But the blades are not used as a means to give this pleasure. They do not 'give' it in any proper sense of the word give. If pleasure is a feeling, then to say that the blades give pleasure is simply a false proposition. And so are many statements by hedonists about people doing things because the doing of them will give pleasure. And so are Green's and Bradley's statements about people pursuing self-satisfaction and self-realization. It is only on special occasions that moral philosophers can be taken to mean exactly what they say. The true home of most of their deliberately formulated basic principles is the realm of metaphor. In this potentially charming sphere they may generally flicker and glow dimly with the light of truth.

I will note two glaring examples of failure to catch the inward meaning of hedonistic principles and metaphors. Paulsen argues that a people or nation will desire, say freedom, and will desire it absolutely, and not for the sake of pleasure or happiness. They will serve their ideal irrespective of any considerations of feeling-tone. "True", he says, "all action tending toward the realization of the ideal yields satisfaction. But no one cares whether this represents the greatest amount of pleasure obtainable by the whole. A nation does not reckon the cost of its ideal, it does not compute how much happiness may be won or lost in a war for its freedom or its honor, or even for its position among other nations. In order to realize its controlling ideal it recklessly sacrifices the interests and lives of individuals. And the individuals themselves desire it; even tho they dread the sacrifice as individuals, as members of the nation they desire that their country remain true to itself and to its ideal".³⁹ And, as a hedonist would say, this freedom or honor is, for this nation, and at this juncture, the greatest pleasure, or what gives the greatest pleasure. The nation's major interest is in freedom or honor. It is sacrificing its interests, but only its lesser interests, to this greater interest. It is thus sacrificing what gives less pleasure, metaphorically speaking, to what gives more pleasure, at the time. It has weighed this pleasure against the pleasures of its other interests, and found by comparing, weighing, and calculating, that this pleasure is greater than the sum of all the pleasures of or in the interests to be

39—Paulsen, F., *A System of Ethics*. Trans. by Thilly; p. 272-273. N. Y. 1899, Scribners.

sacrificed to it. That is, this one predominating interest is stronger than all the interests that conflict with it. The proof of its strength is its control of behavior. The nation goes to war simply because it is its pleasure so to do; that is, it does it voluntarily. No nation ever went to war except voluntarily, that is, except for pleasure. (I have followed Paulsen's terminology in saying that the nation pursues pleasure, when the more strictly accurate way of expressing what happens is to say that the individual people in the nation, who are determining its course of action, are all pursuing their own pleasure, i. e., acting voluntarily).

And the other example is in Rashdall.⁴⁰ He argues that desire is not merely for pleasure *qua* pleasure, but that pleasures vary in quality or kind, as well as in degree, and that at certain times we desire certain kinds of pleasure irrespective of their intensity or nearness or other advantages enumerated by Bentham. "The average wife-beating ruffian would probably admit on reflection that the pleasure of beating his wife on one particular occasion was not worth a pot of beer. But tender him the pot of beer when he is angry, and will the uplifted hand inevitably be lowered to grasp it?" No it will not, says Rashdall, and he is right. Nor would it be lowered if any pleasure however great were offered as an alternative. Then is it true that the man is engaged in the pursuit of pleasure? No he is not, if pleasure is a feeling and if we are not speaking in metaphor. But if we are speaking in metaphor, or if pleasure is not a feeling, perhaps yes. As the hedonist would say, when he is in that mood, nothing else is so great a pleasure as to strike. There is no pleasure in the whole universe, or out of it, so intense or strong (any metaphor you like) as that of striking his wife. You could not tempt him by offering him a greater pleasure because there is no greater pleasure, at that moment. Later on the situation may be different. The pot of beer may then deter him from doing something. But now the sympathetic section of his autonomic nervous system is inhibiting the cranio-sacral division, and beer is a mere irrelevancy. What is a pleasure and what is not a pleasure for a man depends upon his interest. A thing is no pleasure to a man if he does not like it. And instead of saying that striking his wife is the greatest possible pleasure at the time, using pleasure in the seventh or eighth sense, we might have said, in metaphorical language, that it gives the greatest possible pleasure, and that the man is pursuing this pleasure. Rashdall is taking this metaphor literally and thereby misunderstanding the essential hedonistic insight.

The more orthodox formulation of the hedonistic doctrine, in which pleasure in the fifth sense is regarded as the good, may, when taken literally to mean exactly what it says, be stated in a fairly plausible manner. It is, nevertheless, fallacious. The economists have adopted it and defended it and made it a corner stone of some of their theories. The gist of their argument is given rather neatly in the introduction to Wieser's *Natural Value*, in English translation. This introduction is by William Smart.⁴¹ We discover that

40—Rashdall, H., *The Theory of Good and Evil*. Oxford U. Press, 1924. (First edition 1907). Vol. I, p. 13-15.

41—Wieser, Friedrich von, *Natural Value*. Macmillan, London, 1893. (First German edition Prag, 1888). Trans by C. A. Malloch. Preface by William Smart. p. VI.

no external objects are intrinsically good. Their value is relative to man. We have here ego-centrism in values. Men do not desire goods in so far as if they could get satisfaction without the goods they would not bother with them. Smart concludes then that man's ultimate desire and sole direct interest is for and in satisfactions, and that other things are only valuable instrumentally. Satisfaction is the same as pleasure, and this is simply the argument for hedonism with pleasure taken in the fifth sense. This conclusion seems to flow directly from the ego-centric principle. But really it does not. Ego-centrism in values is basic and true, but pleasure as feeling is not the end.

We must admit the truth of Smart's assertion that if we could get satisfaction without any external objects we would not want them and they would be valueless. But the words 'if we could get satisfaction' are a metaphorical way of saying 'if we could get what we want', or 'if we could get the thing that will satisfy our interests'. This complementary object of our interests does not give satisfaction in the sense that it is a means to satisfaction; which, I take it, is what 'to give satisfaction' strictly speaking does mean. It does give satisfaction if, and only if, 'to give satisfaction' means 'to be the complementary object of a positive interest and thus to satisfy the interest'. To take the expression in this latter meaning is to take it somewhat metaphorically, and only when so taken is it true. When so taken it is clear that it does not imply that our ultimate direct interest is in satisfaction or pleasure itself.

It is quite true that if we could get satisfaction, i. e., if we could get what we want, without any external objects, we would not value them and they would have no value. This simply means that if we had no interest in external objects we would not value them, which proposition is a tautology and thus necessarily true. We might be interested only in our internal experiences or we might have no interests at all. But since we cannot get satisfaction without external objects, that is, since we are interested in them, they do have value. This value is not intrinsic. But neither is it always instrumental. Instrumental vs intrinsic is not a true antithesis when applied to values. The value of external objects may be a positive direct secondary value. We may be interested in the object itself, apart from any instrumental character which it may have. I do not say that we may be interested in the object 'in itself' nor 'for itself', because both 'in' and 'for' here are redundant. If we are interested in the object itself, a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction is involved, but this feeling is not the object of any desire or other interest. It is the feeling aspect of the interest itself. It is in the value subject. It is at the source of the interest. The interest is double ended, and Smart, and the hedonists in much of their philosophizing, simply put it at the wrong end. This is a venial error, because when their formulations of doctrine are taken, as they should be, metaphorically, they mean the eighth theory, which is the true one.

What I say of taking what look like expressions of the fifth theory metaphorically so that they mean the eighth, applies also in many cases to what look like expressions of the sixth. Hedonists, especially Sidgwick, have said that pleasure as a total pleasant experience is the good, and is good in proportion to its pleasantness. This is asserting that subjective pleasantness is the same as the value of a thing considered as an end, which is really secondary value. I am

sure that this is at times an inaccurate and metaphorical expression of the truth that the value of a thing as an end or object is its objective pleasantness. Subjective and objective pleasantness, primary and secondary value, are mixed up due to a failure to appreciate the double endedness of interest.

The fifth doctrine of hedonism, that pleasure as a feeling is the good, has been refuted, in its literal sense, by the Hegelians, to almost everybody's satisfaction. Their criticisms are sound as applied to the doctrine as they understood it. The defect of these dissertations on how pleasure is not the good, is their failure to recognize that in certain places the hedonists meant something very different from a feeling, or from a total subjectively pleasant experience, by the word pleasure. The great idealists never refute the seventh or eighth doctrine. In their hearts they believe it, and in their writings they vaguely express it. When in a few instances they catch a glimpse of it in a book by a hedonist they cry out that this is not hedonism.⁴² If the doctrine, that pleasure, as the object of positive interest, is the good, is not hedonism, at least it is a theory which has been held by many hedonists. They probably thought that it was hedonism. And I think that it is hedonism. I call it this partly because so many hedonists believed it, and partly because in it feeling or hedonic tone is the worth fundamental.

In thus defending hedonism I am not proposing that we adopt its language generally. The 'interest' terminology is better. I doubt not that pleasure is too ambiguous a word to be used at once freely and accurately and gracefully in literature. If to be clear you have to specify which of eight or more senses you mean every time you use the naughty word, you inevitably sacrifice at least beauty of expression. All that I contend is that, contrary to the opinions of many philosophers, the hedonistic theory of value, as expounded by its great protagonists, contains a very high percentage of truth.

42—Bradley, F. H., *Ethical Studies*, p. 93. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1927 (first edition 1876).

Mackenzie, J. S., *A Manual of Ethics*, p. 232. Pub. Clive, London, 1927 (fifth edition).

CHAPTER III.

THE MAGNITUDE AND COMMENSURABILITY OF VALUE.

I—General Principles

The secondary values which are generated by one man's interests are not accurately commensurable with the secondary values generated by the interests of another man. Every good is a good for someone, and any good with which it can be very precisely compared, or, in general, very significantly compared, must be good for the same person. All values are, however, quantitative, and can in fact, under certain circumstances, be compared very accurately, in regard to their magnitude, with other values of the same person. The magnitude of the value varies exactly as the quantity, extent, intensity, strength, magnitude, or size (these are all synonymous in this connection) of the feeling which generates it. The more a man wants or likes a thing the more value it has for him. Every intent-feeling has a certain strength. There is no unit for measuring this, as there is none for measuring the value or goodness which it generates. It is never possible to say how many times stronger one feeling is than another. Mathematical accuracy is impossible here. But it is possible to say whether one feeling is stronger than another or weaker than another or quantitatively equal to another. All of a man's feelings might conceivably be brought into situations in which the relations of their strengths would thus be demonstrated. And since we can conveniently divide most goods into physical units (tho we cannot divide their goodness or value into any units) it is generally possible to say pretty exactly how much of any one good is the equivalent in value of a given amount of any other. And we can also generally determine how much of it is a trifle more than equivalent, and how much is a trifle less.

The situation in which the relative strengths of feelings and the relative magnitudes of the thereon dependent secondary values, are most clearly demonstrated, is the case where the feelings conflict, and an act of preference, involving sacrifice, is necessary. If a man wants to add to his stock of phonograph records, and has enough money to buy only one, and is interested, say, in six records, he will choose the one toward which he has the strongest positive feeling-attitude, or, as we might say, toward which he has the most favorable attitude, or the one that has the most value to him. This particular record, then, has more value than any other record, unless he was at the moment of choice quite indifferent as between two records and picked one arbitrarily, knowing that he might just as well have taken the other. If he was thus indifferent he knew it and another person could probably tell it by the way he acted. When he picks one he sacrifices the other records, which he also wants, to this one. Supposing he does not choose arbitrarily he sacrifices the lesser to the greater good. If, having picked the one he likes best, his funds are augmented so that he can afford another, he will take the one

which he likes best from among the remaining five, and it will be clear that its value will be less than that of the first one chosen, unless, as I have suggested, he chose in the first place arbitrarily, in which case its value will be equal to that of the first one chosen. But its value will be (in the absence of further arbitrary choices) more than that of any other record. And so a hierarchy of goods may be established thru acts of preference.

Conceivably any value may be measured against any other of the same man in an act of preference. The value of a phonograph record will be measured against the value of a lawn mower if a man has to choose between having the one or the other. And the value of a carpet will be measured against the value of a friendship, if a man finds that he has to choose between having the carpet and losing the friend on the one hand, or losing the carpet and having the friend on the other hand. W. S. Gilbert and Sir Arthur Sullivan on one occasion seem each to have measured the value of the other's friendship against the value of a carpet, and found the carpet more valuable (true, the price of the carpet was \$2,500).

Wicksteed has expressed this idea in a passage which is worth quoting at length.¹ "—the heterogeneous impulses and objects of desire or aversion which appeal to any individual, whether material or spiritual, personal or communal, present or future, actual or ideal, may all be regarded as comparable with each other; for we are, as a matter of fact, constantly comparing them, weighing them against each other, and deciding which is the heaviest. And the question, 'How much of this must I forgo to obtain so much of that?' is always relevant. If we are considering, for example, whether to live in the country or in the town, such different things as friendship and fresh air or fresh eggs may come into competition and comparison with each other. Shall I 'bury myself in the country,' where I shall see little of my dearest friends, but may hope for fresh eggs for breakfast, and fresh air all the day? Or shall I stay where I am, and continue to enjoy the society of my friends? I start at once thinking 'how much of the society of my friends must I expect to sacrifice? Will any of them come and see me? Shall I occasionally be able to go and see some of them?' The satisfactions and benefits I anticipate from a country life will compensate me for the loss of some of their society, but not for the loss of all of it. The price may be too high. In such a case as this the terms on which the alternatives are offered are matter of more or less vague surmise and conjecture, but the apparent dissimilarity of the several satisfactions² themselves does not prevent the comparison, nor does it prevent the quantitative element from affecting my decision. Using the term price then in its widest extension, we may say that all the objects of repulsion or attraction which divide my energies and resources amongst them are linked to each other by a system of ideal prices or terms of equivalence. We may conceive of a general 'scale of preferences' or 'relative scale of estimates' on which all objects of desire or pursuit (positive or negative) find their place, and which registers the terms

1—Wicksteed, P. H., *The Common Sense of Political Economy*. Macmillan, London, 1910, p. 32-33.

2—This use of 'satisfaction' might be taken to mean pleasure in the eighth sense. Wicksteed, for all his careful analysis, is ambiguous at times, after the manner of economists and hedonists.

on which they would be accepted as equivalents or preferred one to another." Wicksteed then proceeds to show how even the best of us have certain inconsistencies in our scale of values, so that we might prefer A to B and B to C, but not A to C. "A man might be willing to give a shilling for a knife because he thought it cheap, and might refuse to give a shilling for a certain pamphlet because he thought it dear, and yet if he had been offered the direct choice between the pamphlet and the knife as a present he might have chosen the pamphlet. That is to say, he would prefer the knife to a shilling and would prefer a shilling to the pamphlet, and yet he would prefer the pamphlet to the knife." (p. 33). Wicksteed then points out that these are lapses from reason, and that if we were perfectly intelligent about what we wanted we would not do such things. "The obscure impulses and associations which affect our choice, and interpose themselves between the realities with which we are dealing and our estimate of them, yield in an erratic and irregular manner to the light of reason, lingering here when they have retreated there; and thus inconsistencies of every kind are introduced into our scale. But the greater the range of that scale that is present to our minds at one and the same time, and the more precise our mental estimates, the fewer will be our inconsistencies. The man of alert intelligence and sound judgment will reduce them to a minimum, and the wider and more consistent the range of our consciously realized alternatives is, the more economical will the administration of our resources be.

"A man's actual scale of preferences then may depart to any extent and for any reason from the ideal of wisdom, and may be full of inconsistencies and vacillations. But such as it is, it connects the various objects of his desire by a system of prices, and his successive acts of choice, whether purchases or other selections, are constantly revealing fragments of it, as he determines that at this price he will select this alternative and reject the other."

Wicksteed here uses price in the sense of exchange value or the quantity of anything that is or will be exchanged for a given quantity of something else. Price and preference mutually imply each other. Every sale and barter is a preference. We actively prefer what we get to what we give up. And every preference is an exchange of some sort. We want two things, and by giving up or not taking one we get the other.

All the goods of life beckon us on (I speak metaphorically). We spend ourselves and our resources in pursuing and in enjoying them. In every waking hour we are doing something in preference to something else. We prefer what we are doing, at the time, to other things which we might be doing. If we did not we would quit what we are doing and do some of them. We keep at what interests us most, that is, what has the most value to a present or short range anticipatory interest. No interest holds the center of the stage permanently. As we enact each interest a time comes when the value of its object falls, at least temporarily. The principle of diminishing utility applies almost everywhere. We eventually come to the point where the value of what we are doing or using or pursuing or buying falls below the average minute's worth of our time or dollar's worth of our money or foot-pound's worth of our energy. We thereupon switch over to something else which is more worth while. The essential idea in this is expressed by the economists in their notion

of a margin of consumption,³ which is in substance that dollars are used successively to beat down the marginal utilities of various goods in such a way as to keep the marginal utilities of dollar's worths of all goods about equal. This quantity of utility (it is what I would call secondary value, and what economists sometimes call subjective value), to which the utility of a dollar's worth of everything we buy tends and approximates, marks the margin of consumption. If the utility of a dollar's worth of anything falls below this we stop buying or consuming it until the utility rises again. If the utility rises above this margin we assiduously buy and consume the thing until, in accordance with the law of diminishing utility, its marginal utility has fallen to or below the margin of consumption.

We are continually making choices which measure very accurately our feelings, not toward a friend as a whole, not toward music as a whole, not toward food as a whole, but toward limited quantities of these. It is the present and the short range anticipatory interest in small units of these which are measured in most of our choices. Occasionally, however, a choice will determine the fate of a whole major interest and of the value of its objects extending as far into the future as we can look; and such a choice will accurately measure its strength. The lesser choices which we are continually making give only a rough estimate of the strength of the larger interest. The more time and energy we choose to spend in the company of a friend, or the more often we choose to listen to a particular piece of music, the more, in all probability, do we like these. But indications of this sort may be deceiving. I do not think that the amount of time we spend sleeping is any accurate measure of the degree in which we like it. I doubt if one man will get eight hours a night regularly because he likes it one seventh more than the man who only gets seven hours. Of course the number of hours is partly involuntary, but not wholly so.

The resources which we spend in getting the various goods of life are simply other goods which we possess, and are all commensurable in each man's ideal system of prices in the same manner as are the goods he wants. A man's money is obviously a good, tho only an instrumental one except so far as he inclines to be miserly. His other material wealth is plainly a collection of goods. His time and energy and labor are also goods which can be sold to others who need them or used by himself both instrumentally and in directly valuable forms. Time and energy are accurately commensurable with money. A man ought to know how much money his time is worth. He is foolish if he performs certain labors, which he could hire a man to do while he was making in some other line of work more than enough to pay the man. And he is foolish if he hires a man to do some work when he could do it himself at less cost, i. e., by using time and labor of his own which is worth less than what he is paying the man. Resources are things that we have and that we relinquish in fixed quantities in preferring some fixed quantity of something else to them. In that preference the resource appears on the scale of prices, and its units take their places in relation to all other things that we have feeling-attitudes toward.

3—See Ely, R. T., *Outlines of Economics*. Macmillan, N. Y., 1923. p. 132-133.

Perhaps a Pragmatist or a Behaviorist would contend that these feelings of which I speak are nothing but preferences, since they hardly show up at all in overt behavior except in an act of choice. But the view of the matter for which I am contending is that preference merely constitutes the best kind of evidence to demonstrate the relative strengths of feelings, and that even apart from any preferences the feelings would still exist and have perfectly definite quantitative aspects, and there would be genuine differences between the quantities. To assert that a man values one thing more than another is not meaningless in the absence of conflict between his interests in the two things. An act of preference always means or implies a difference of intensity between two feelings. And a difference of the strengths of two feelings will always mean and imply and determine a preference, if there is conflict. But such a difference means more than merely preference. A man may like one thing better than another without ever performing any act of preference between them or between any part of them. If he thinks of the two together he will realize that he feels more strongly toward one than toward the other. And if then he says, 'I like this better than that', he has given good evidence for this state of his feelings (unless he is a liar). Or if he does not think of the two together, and does not know how he feels toward either except when he is face to face with it, he may still feel toward one more strongly than toward the other, and thus give to one a greater value than to the other without ever knowing about this difference in their values. His feelings, and their respective strengths, are, however evidenced, and even if un-evidenced, facts of his experience, and are not identical with any behavior, implicit, explicit, laryngeal, or otherwise. The difference between their strengths is then a fact even if unknown to the man himself or to anybody else.

If this is true of the relations between the values of one man, it would seem also to be true of the relations between the values of different men. And I think that such is the case. I think that all values of different men and perhaps of all animals have definite quantitative relations. And my earlier statement to the effect that it is only those values which belong to one person that are very accurately or significantly commensurable with each other, refers to the two facts that, firstly, as between different people no accuracy whatever is possible in judging what these relations are, and, secondly, that generally there is no use of accurate knowledge as to what they are.

First let us consider the lack of accuracy in comparisons of values as between different people. If the differences are great some comparison is possible. If X shows that he likes A, and Y shows that he dislikes B it is clear that A's value to X is greater than B's value to Y. If X likes A and Y shows a complete indifference to B, it is clear that X's feeling is stronger than Y's, and that A's value to X is greater than B's to Y. And if X likes A and Y likes B, but X devotes much more attention, time, money, energy, or other resources to the process of getting possession of A or to the enjoyment of A, than Y does for the sake of B, then it is very probable that A's value to X is greater than B's value to Y. But if the outward and visible signs of X's interest in A, and of Y's in B, are not markedly different, no exact measure is possible of the difference, if any, in their respective

feelings toward A and B. Nor is it ever possible to tell exactly how much of A would have a value to X just about equivalent to the value of a certain amount of B to Y. And herein we have the crucial distinction between comparing two feelings in two souls, and comparing two feelings in one soul. It is possible to tell very nearly exactly how much of A has a value to X equal to the value to X of a given quantity of B. A quantity of A which is a trifle smaller than the marginal unit of A that X would choose in preference to a given unit of B, has a value to X equal to the value of that unit of B. When units are small, measurements of great accuracy can be made in a case like this. But X-and-Y together cannot make one identical act of preference which will give this measurement. They might if they were partly or wholly identical. But they are not, as I trust we may confidently assume. A's value to X and B's value to Y cannot be judged as to their quantities by any one act of preference. The indication, given to anyone who attends to the matter and cares to pass judgment, of these quantities and of the difference between them, is the degrees of attention and of activity and of time and of other resources devoted respectively to A and B by X and Y. Also what X and Y might say about how much they liked A and B respectively would constitute relevant evidence. But no evidence of this sort can give any accurate notion of the relative strengths of the feelings nor of the values. This type of evidence is relevant also for comparing the strengths of two feelings of one man, and it is no more accurate there than it is when applied to the comparison of feelings between two men. It may be deceiving in any case. A man might feel very strongly about something and not give any proportional indication of it in his overt behavior. Or he might put on a 'scene' and be just acting, either for fun or else for some ulterior purpose.

Bearing upon this matter of guessing the strength of the feeling from the outward behavior of the man, it is pointed out by economists that as between two persons expenditure of equal amounts of money does not indicate that equal utilities are involved. When a poor man spends a dollar it is likely to mean a greater sacrifice than that which the rich man makes when he spends a dollar; and the poor man's dollar probably buys something which has a greater utility to him than the utility of the thing bought by the wealthier person to that person. For the poor man has fewer dollars, and each one probably counts for more in his life. But even this is not a universal rule. If two men each bought a pound of tea and paid the same price, we could not, by comparing the wealth of the two men, compute accurately how strong the feeling of each was in relation to the feeling of the other. We could not say, if one was three times as wealthy as the other, that a pound of tea actually meant a third as much to him as to the other, just because the prices of the two pounds were the same. The poor man might not be so greatly attached either to such money as he had or to the tea that he bought with it, while the rich man might be greatly attached both to his beverages and to every dollar as it came or went or lingered. Every man knows how much he values a dollar at the time that he values it. Other people who judge of how much he values it can only go by overt activities and other attendant circumstances, which, I repeat, may be deceiving. B. M. Anderson correctly interprets the

bearing of these considerations upon his problem of 'social value', when he asserts⁴ that the only measure of value applicable generally and uniformly thruout society is 'price' or exchange value, a very different thing from the secondary value, as well as from the primary value, of which I have treated. He says truly that there is no common measure of feeling magnitude, and means that there is none either of the secondary values relative thereto; tho this would not seem to be a necessary implication of his view that one man can share another's emotional life (p. 125).

The problem of comparison of feelings in two souls is not made easier if one of the parties whose feelings are being compared is the judge. For he will have to judge by behavior alone in order to know what the strength of the other man's feeling is, even tho he can get at his own feeling apart from overt behavior. Thus he can never determine the difference accurately. Unless he is both of the men he can not tell exactly which feeling is the stronger if they are anywhere near equal in strength.

So nobody can tell exactly what relation the magnitudes of two intent-feelings bear to each other if they dwell in two different persons. If they are very different this fact is ascertainable. But if they are nearly the same in intensity there is no way of telling whether they are exactly alike or whether one is a trifle stronger or whether the other is a trifle stronger.

And further it is not important that we should be able to tell exactly. Rough estimates are important at times, and are possible. But what may look like an accurate judgment of this nature is only a balancing of the secondary values of the judge, and need be no more than an accurate balancing of these.

A father may have to choose between getting a foot-ball for one son or a pair of boxing gloves for another. He may want to spend his money where it will do the most good in the family. Then if he can tell that one boy wants the foot-ball more than the other boy wants boxing gloves, he will have a stronger interest in giving the foot-ball to the one than he will in giving the boxing gloves to the other. Whichever way he acts he will act in accordance with his own stronger interest. He never can act voluntarily in any other way. But here his chief interest is to have his preference correspond to or reflect the relative strengths of the respective feelings of the two boys. He cannot make it do this accurately. If there is a great difference in the likings of the two boys it is easy to decide what to do. If one boy wants the ball very much and the other shows an indifference to the gloves, the feeling of the father in favor of the ball becomes stronger and determines the choice, and there is no difficulty at all in making the decision. But if they both want their athletic supplies very much, he can only guess which wants them more, and all that he has to go by is what they do and what they say. And both of these may be deceiving. So he cannot be sure.

But it is not so very necessary that he should be sure. He will make his guess and act accordingly. And if he has fairly good judgment no irremediable evil will be done. Later on he can get something for the boy who lost out this time. All society is enabled to exist by means of such approximate justice as he is able to do. Perfect justice is not possible for man, and we can and do get on without it.

4—Anderson, B. M., *Social Value*, p. 183.

Exact mensuration of other people's feelings, if it were possible, would generally be a work of supererogation in a busy world.

The father may ignore or partly ignore the existing relative strengths of the boys' wishes and decide according to his own interest in what each son should be or do. He may want one boy to be a boxer more than he wants the other to be a foot-ball player. To the extent that considerations like these determine his preference the existing feelings of the boys are irrelevant. But if he is unselfish in this, as he well may be, he is heading the one boy for boxing, and perhaps, tho with less vigor and determination, he is heading the other boy for foot-ball, because he thinks that later on they will genuinely enjoy these things. He is still comparing their feelings but not necessarily any feelings that they are now experiencing. He is trying to gauge what the relative strengths of their feelings will be perhaps ten years hence. This is very difficult, and liable to gross error, but it is not impossible in a rough way. Of course he may judge selfishly and try particularly to make the one boy a boxer and perhaps try also, tho with less determination, to make the other a foot-ball player, simply because his own idea of himself is that he is such a person as would or should have such athletes for sons. And he might buy the gloves in preference to the foot-ball because he would rather be the father of a boxer than the father of a foot-ball player. But whether he is selfish or unselfish, it remains inevitably true that the decision to buy, say, the boxing gloves, is his decision and is immediately determined by whichever feeling in him is the stronger. Whatever he decides is his greatest interest at the time. In this sense a man always decides in accordance with his own greatest interest. And in this sense a man is selfish in every voluntary action. But this is a Pickwickian sense of selfishness.

In another kind of situation this problem arises of the quantitative relation between the strengths of the feelings in different souls. A judgment may be passed to the effect that one man enjoys life more than another and that his life is richer and fuller and more worth while on the whole. Generally, of course, when a man, X, says that the kind of life that Y lives is better than the kind of life that Z lives, X is saying that he would rather live as Y does than as Z does. This is merely expressing a preference of his own and is no comparison of the way Y and Z actually feel. It is perhaps an attempt at a comparison of how X thinks he would feel, if he acted as Y does, with how he thinks he would feel if he acted as Z does. But the judgment amounts really to an admission that Y has what X now wants, and that Z has what X does not now want. The feeling in X's soul toward what Y has is stronger than the feeling in X's soul toward what Z has.

But if X is in a more scientific frame of mind, and is not merely expressing envy or contempt, he may mean that Y's life is more valuable to Y than Z's is to Z. And such a judgment might be warranted. If it seems clear that Z has been thwarted in most of his major interests, and that Y has succeeded in expressing most of his with some adequacy, it is fairly safe to conclude that the objects of Y's interests have more value to Y than have the objects of Z's interests to Z, and that there is a greater quantity of positive feeling-tone, whether intent-feeling or non-intent-feeling, in Y's experience than in Z's. But any judgment of this nature is a bit dogmatic. X

has no first hand information as to what Y's and Z's real major interests are. He infers the existence and nature of these interests from the behavior of the men. And such inferences are fallible.

It might be rational for X to wish that he were Y instead of Z. Only if he did he would probably forget that in case the impossible actually happened and he became Y this wish and preference, as expressing X's nature, would vanish when X's nature vanished, and that in becoming Y he would acquire a new scale of preferences, which might even include a preference for being X as over against being Y. It would all depend on the actual state of Y's feelings, which X simply could not know in detail as long as he was X.

II—R. B. Perry's Treatment of Commensurability.

In Chapter 21 of Perry's valuable study⁵ we find the theory put forth that there are three criteria by which values can be compared. These are the standards of intensity, preference, and inclusiveness. Perry denies that any genuine commensurability is possible as between these standards. It is never possible, he says, to get a quantitative comparison of the value of a thing resulting from a certain intensity of interest taken in it, with that resulting from a preference for it, or with that which is due to the multiplication of interests in it. "It appears to be meaningless, —, to say that what an object loses by a decline in intensity can be offset by a rise in the order of preference. —only—where there is equality in respect to one dimension, increase in the other dimension yields an increase of the total." (p. 643) And "It is evident that the same condition which precluded the multiplication of intensity and preference will preclude the multiplication of intensity and inclusiveness. — We are limited, as in the previous case, to the conclusion that where interests are equally inclusive, the more intense the better; and where they are equally intense, the more inclusive the better." (p. 650) And "—while preference and inclusiveness both measure value, they do not measure it in the same way." (p. 652)

The view which I shall maintain in opposition to all this is that the criterion of intensity is the same as that of preference, and that inclusiveness as he uses it is no measure of value at all. This would imply that there is only one standard of value for each man, and that all of his values are commensurable by that standard. This standard is the strength or intensity of his feelings, and this strength is exhibited in, and is accurately ascertainable from his preferences.

Perry, in his chapter on the Highest Good, immediately following his chapter on Commensurability, seems in one place to admit my contention that all of one man's values are commensurable. He also practically denies it in the same paragraph. But in spite of his ambiguities his statement is significant. He says that, once an integrated and harmonious personality has been achieved, then "relatively to the choice of the person as a whole, all objects—find a place in one order." (p. 668) This I take to be the actual state of things. And since all of a rational human being's choices

5—Perry, R. B., *General Theory of Value*. Longmans Green, N. Y., 1926.

do in a sense express his total personality, it follows that all of a man's goods are commensurable.

All of a normal person's choices express his whole personality in the sense of harmonizing with it, and of involving the activity of all relevant parts. When Perry speaks of the 'choice of the person as a whole' I doubt if he means that the whole personality is necessarily active in such a choice. I doubt if any man's whole personality can ever be brought into action at one time. There is too much of it. What I would mean by this phrase, and what I hope and would suppose that he means by it, is that the choice is made by as much of the personality as is likely to be affected by the act resulting from the choice. Interests not affected will play no part in the situation. The choice is not strictly made by the whole personality but it is in harmony with the whole personality. It conforms to a fragment of the one ideal scale of values which the man at that moment has, the portions of that scale may be ignored as irrelevant. Such a choice is simply a rational choice. It is the kind of choice that rational human beings are continually making every day. It is the choice that does not violate any interest unless to express an interest that is stronger. It is a choice which, in enacting one interest, takes into consideration all other interests which are likely to be affected by it, to help them as much as possible, and to hinder them as little as possible. To be making such choices continually is to have an integrated personality.

I do not deny that there may be certain disintegrations in the lives of some people which might preclude the commensurability of certain feelings both of which occurred within one epidermis. This clearly happened in the extreme case of Miss Beauchamp.⁶ As between certain opposed tendencies in her originally unified personality she simply lost the power of preference. Both the contestants became so boisterous when the synthetical function of her brain brought them face to face, that nothing could be done but to keep them apart. This is another way of saying that she had two personalities instead of one. Always keeping feelings apart in two personalities makes them incommensurable whether they are in two bodies or in one. Feelings only get measured when they meet in conflict in one mind.

But such things as befell Miss Beauchamp do not befall most people. There may be genuine temporary dissociations in otherwise normal folks, but they are exceptional. Even where there are inconsistencies in one man's scale of preferences, so that his choices are not rational, they may still be choices made by the man himself. In the illustration which Wicksteed gave of a man who would prefer a knife to a shilling and a shilling to a pamphlet and the pamphlet to the knife, we really have a case where the man's personality changes. This is not an inconsistency in one scale of preferences. It is a case of two different scales occurring at different times. At one time he has one strength of feeling toward a shilling and at another time he has another. Or it may be that his feeling changes toward either or both of the other objects. A man's interests are constantly changing in the intensity which they have when in active operation, and it is still in every case the same man who is

6—Prince, Dr. Morton. *The Dissociation of a Personality*. Longmans Green, N. Y., 1906 (Copyright 1905.)

interested and who exercises the preferences, whether they are rational or irrational (the interests are also constantly varying from this active strength to zero and back again as they pass from the active to the latent form and back again, but this is irrelevant to the ideal scale of preferences). New knowledge is constantly making alterations in each man's system of interests. And this is not the creation of a new dissociated personality. There is still commensurability, i. e., choice, between each new interest and all the rest, some of which are old ones. And when an odd situation makes a temporary irrational alteration the same rule holds. The choice expresses the whole personality of the man as it then is. Thus practically all the choices of normal people, dealing as they do with all their values, conform to that condition which Perry lays down as necessary and sufficient for commensurability.

But in the earlier chapter he teaches a very different doctrine. He treats the conflict of interests like an inhibition of a weaker interest by a stronger. It is as if we were dealing with dissociated personalities, and as if the person, in whose body both the interests had their source, was not both interests; that is, was not interested in the objects of both the interests. If a man is not interested in the object of an interest which is dependent upon his nervous system, then we are dealing with a pathological division of personality and not with the regular thing that is met with in most people's lives. But this, Perry here suggests, is what the conflict of interests means. And he is careful to distinguish this from preference. When a preference is expressed for one thing rather than another there must be, he says, one interest which has both the things as its objects. Preference and the conflict of interests are made two radically different things, each giving a measure of values. And the measure given by one standard, he maintains, is incommensurable with the measure given by the other. "—a conflict of preference, like conflict of interests, is a datum of value." (p. 640.) He means that these are two data of value. My contention is, of course, that these are not two data, but are one datum.

As to the conflict of interests we find that "It might be supposed that when one interest inhibits another, the object of the one has somehow been preferred to the object of the other. But preference implies a preferring interest. What interest, then, has in this case preferred the one object to the other? Not the inhibiting interest, for that is bent exclusively upon its own object; not the inhibited interest, for that is not allowed to manifest itself at all. Nor does inhibition imply an act of preference on the part of the total self. The first interest excludes the second, but there is no preference between the object of the one and the object of the other, such as occurs in personal choice. Inhibition, instead of providing for such choice, renders it impossible by silencing one of the interests which is an indispensable party to its occurrence. If the plaintiff expels the defendant from the court this does not bring a decision but simply prevents a trial." (p. 634)

In the last two sentences here quoted he suggests that preference involves at least two interests in conflict. But this suggestion is not developed. His almost constant assumption is that preference is exercised by one interest only among several objects of that interest. In another place, in the following chapter (p. 667), he speaks of the place of an interest on a preferential scale. This is also at variance

with his assumption, in the chapter on Commensurability, that an interest is what prefers certain of its objects to others. If the interest is itself on the scale it is not that interest which is doing the preferring. If Perry's real meaning is that in preference there are two interests in conflict and that a third single interest exercises a preference between them or between their objects, then he is on the right track but has not made his meaning as clear as he should. The questions may then be asked, Does the third single interest decide according to the strengths of the conflicting interests or is it able to throw its weight into the contest and actually determine the victor itself? Is it really a separate third interest which has an existence and a force of its own apart from the other two? And if so, are their objects its objects? Or are they its objects? Is there an interest in the two particular interests, in every preference? Or are there two interests taken in each object, one the particular interest which has no other object than this one, and the other the third interest which is interested both in this object and in the other? These questions I shall attempt to answer later.

Following the paragraph which I have quoted above in regard to inhibition, Perry goes on to say that it is a fundamental feature of interest that it should exhibit preference among its eligible objects, as well as preference for its eligible objects as over against other objects in the environment with which it is not concerned. There is no suggestion that a preference could represent a conflict of interests, except in the two places I have just noted (on pages 634 and 667), and in some incidental illustrations the implications of which are not developed. In one of these (p. 634) he says that we must choose when a highwayman offers the alternatives of 'your money or your life.' Would he maintain that money and life are both the objects of the same interest, the one more and the other less eligible? If not, his formulations of his theory deny the possibility of any choice in a case like this. If one's interest in his life simply inhibits his interest in his money and throws it bodily out of court and out of mind then it would seem that there is no trial, no weighing of alternatives, and no preference.

What he says about inhibition may be true about inhibition. But then the conflict of interests is generally not a case of inhibition. True he does not say explicitly and in so many words that the conflict of interests is a matter of inhibition. But I do not see how any other interpretation can be put upon his words. If an interest is intense, he says, this means that it inhibits other interests. Its exclusive possession of the organism is what constitutes its intensity. (p. 631) This would certainly seem to indicate that the clash of different interests is conceived after the manner of an inhibition rather than after the manner of a choice. I have already quoted the passages where he says that "——a conflict of preference, like conflict of interest, is a datum of value". (p. 640) Surely he means that they are different data. And he nowhere discusses any third manner, in which the interest or interests in two objects might compete with each other, in addition to the two forms of (1) conflict between two interests involving inhibition, and (2) preference exercised by one interest as between its several objects.

What Perry ignores is that in the conflict of a man's interests the man himself is all his interests. He himself is interested in all the objects of interests whose source is in his nervous system, barring

pathological dissociation. Perry treats the conflict of interests as if it never occurred except in cases of divided personality. But on the contrary it is one of the most frequent phenomena of the daily life of normal people. Every choice involves a conflict of interests and every conflict of interests in one soul produces a choice, which measures their intensity. The conflict is not generally a mere inhibition. It is no mere forcible eviction of the weaker party before the trial begins. It is in a sense the forcible eviction of the weaker party after the trial is over. The trial is where the two contestants meet and where their relative strengths are determined; and thus where it is decided which one is the weaker and must submit to eviction. The man who judges is both the parties to the suit. He is interested in both the objects. And he cannot have them both. Then he will take the one that he wants the most. He will take the one in which he has the strongest interest, or toward which he has the strongest intent-feeling. I think that Perry is right in saying that if there were merely one interest in X and another interest in Y, and no interest which had them both as its objects, then even if both interests had one nervous system as their physical basis, there would be no choice. I think that choice as between two objects does imply a unitary interest in them. But this unitary interest which gives choice in the conflict of two interests is not something, apart from the two, which descends upon them from above. It is made up of the integration of the two. If there are two interests with one soul or personality as their source, there is choice when they conflict. For to say that they arise in one soul is to say that one self is interested in both of their objects. And this is to affirm that unity of interest in the two objects which is necessary for there being a choice between them. The mere fact that it is one person who is interested in both X and Y means that there is a supervening unity of interest generated out of the two particular interests. It might perhaps be called a higher level interest-created in the union of the two. Any two interests which one person feels together, are, by the very fact of their being felt together by one person, integrated; and there is a single interest which emerges out of them. This unity is expressed by the true proposition that one person is interested in both the objects. The continuing duality of the more particular interests is expressed by the true proposition that both of the objects are objects of the interests of one person. Any two interests, then, which conflict in one soul, are, at the same time, both two interests and one interest. It seems to me very remarkable that this should be so. But it also seems to me undeniable. If it were not so,—if it were not for the synthetical unity of apperception and of feeling, operating in every soul, that makes two interests one and also leaves them two, and thus makes choice possible,—the species would not have survived, and there would be nobody to wonder at the marvel, and no marvel to be wondered at. So I exercise my natural piety and doff my hat to the Darwinian Theory as modified by the more recent discoveries of Weismann, De Vries and others.

It is not really possible to define what constitutes a single interest in any final way. Give any interest the number one, and it may, nay it will, unless it is a man's whole personality, turn out to be also some fraction, which cannot however be stated with mathematical accuracy. If a man has an interest in phonograph records I

suppose that Perry would regard this as one interest, and would regard the various records that the man likes as various objects of this interest. Perry would, I think, say that these were objects which could be arranged upon a scale of preference. The man would certainly prefer certain ones to others and would have in mind some idea of the order in which probably quite a number of records stood in his estimation. This would be the order of their values to him. But in a case like this it seems to me futile to deny that he has an interest in each record, which is not wholly identical with his interest in any other record. He has a certain interest in a certain record. An interest in any other record is another interest which has its source in the same soul that is the source of the first one. If he prefers record X to record Y then his feeling toward X is stronger than his feeling toward Y. There are two feelings with different strengths. And there is one feeling that emerges from the two and in a sense includes them both. There is an interest in these phonograph records. That is, the same self likes them both. And all his particular interests in phonograph records make up a unitary interest. All the records are its object, and it has them on a scale of preference. They are all eligible objects and it selects among them. It selects according to the strengths of the particular interests. The strengths of these particular interests are in a measure conditioned and determined by each other and by all the other interests that the man has or is. The place of an interest in the whole system is partly determined by its strength. But its strength is partly determined by its place in the system. Changing valuations in one phase of a man's life may by themselves produce changing valuations in another phase.

There can be a unitary interest with a number of objects arranged on a scale of preference even when these objects are very dissimilar, and are not ordinarily grouped into one class like that of phonograph records. If you choose between your money or your life that implies, I think, that there is one interest which embraces both the interests which have them as their objects. These two interests form a higher unity of interest in the same way that two interests in phonograph records do. And the choice here is just as much a matter of the relative strengths of the two interests as it was there. In fact all the interests of a man's personality integrate to form his personality, which is one interest, and is on the highest level possible. This is not an interest in his personality. It is not an interest which has his personality as its object. It is properly called his personality interest or just his personality. Its object is all the objects of his subordinate interests. To say that the same man is interested in all of the objects of all of the interests which arise in one nervous system is to say that they all form one integrated soul or personality. To say that certain interests all have one soul for their source is to say that one identical man or self is identical with all of them. It is he who is interested in the objects of all of them. He is all of them. He, as they, is interested in all their objects.

It is this fact and this fact alone which gives that accurate commensurability which is found as between the interests of one man. When a physical quantity of one good will be preferred to a fixed physical quantity of another, whereas a slightly smaller amount of the first will be rejected in favor of the other, then the feeling of the man in favor of the other is equal to his feeling for a quantity

of the first which is in between the two quantities of it mentioned. And the degree of accuracy in this measurement is determined by the amount of difference between these two quantities. It may be very small. Perhaps it can never be zero. But no measurements, even of the lengths of physical objects, can be made with perfect accuracy either. There is always a certain margin of possible error which cannot in any way be eliminated. The exact length of a bar of iron can never be discovered. But we can get very close; and so with the measurement of the strengths of feelings.

Perry's two standards, then, of intensity and preference, turn out to be only one standard, which is applicable to all the interests of one personality, but cannot be used in the comparison of feelings dwelling in two personalities, whether these dwell in one body or two.

His standard of inclusiveness is no measure of value at all. He says that "while preference and inclusiveness both measure value, they do not measure it in the same way. Increase, in the sense of inclusiveness, does not imply increase in the order of preference." (p. 652) He is right that they do not measure it in the same way. Greater inclusiveness does not mean preference or a stronger feeling for one thing than for another. His basic fallacy is shown in his assertion that "The object which James and John both like is better than the object which either or both dislike, because the latter contains no more good than the former and some evil." (p. 646) But really it is not better. It does not necessarily have any more value to either James or John on account of its having value to the other. It has more values, of course. But this is very different from having more value or being better. If James and John both like it it has two values. These are not accurately commensurable with each other. And they cannot be added together in any significant sense. If James valued X because it was sweet, and also valued it because it was prettily colored, then he would have two interests in X, one on account of one aspect of it, and another on account of another aspect of it, and this would mean that X was better than if he had only one of these interests in it. If James likes things that are sweet and pretty, then X is better for James on account of its being both sweet and pretty, than it would be for him if it were only either sweet or pretty but not both. His two interests can be added together significantly to make one stronger interest because they both dwell in one soul. But if two feelings dwell in two souls they cannot be significantly added so as to make their object better. 'Better' means that one feeling is stronger than another. The two feelings in James and John cannot be added so as to make one feeling which is stronger than either of these feelings taken alone. If men's souls flowed together they might be so added. But really they do not flow together.

Again Perry says, "—given objects of equal beauty, the more that enjoy them the better." (p. 651) But I ask, better for whom? If ten people are now enjoying them, whereas only one did before, then it is better by nine different standards of preference-intensity, and not by one standard of inclusiveness. For each one who can enjoy the objects of beauty, it is better, other things being equal, to enjoy them than not to enjoy them. And if he likes to have the others join him then it is better for him if they do. But if they bother him, the more who enjoy the objects of beauty, the worse is the situation for him.

In general, of course, it is true that the more who can enjoy a good the better. But that is because people are normally socially inclined and benevolent. It is better for you and for me and for the next man because you and I and the next man prefer that more people should be happy, especially if it is with our kind of happiness. Unless he threatens us, or has injured or insulted us, we love our fellow man, partly because of certain instinctive factors in our natures, and partly because we have been taught that we should do so. To anyone who loves his fellow man, it is better that his fellow man should be happy. But to anyone who hates him it is worse. It all depends upon the point of view. The happiness of others, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or the greatest happiness of all, have in themselves no claim upon the favorable interests of anybody who is not interested in them or who is actively opposed to them. They are genuinely good to certain persons who desire that they should be realized; this goodness is due to the existence of these desires. They are the summum bonum to anybody who desires everything else that he may desire only as a means to them. But to normal people they are not the summum bonum.

There is one sense in which the multiplication of interests belonging to different people in one object does increase its value. When all the men wore high silk hats to business, many a business man valued this type of head gear more than he does now. Other people's interests may make something the style and then an individual will value it more, and thus it will have more value, to him, than if others were uninterested in it. By a sympathetic social contagion we are often brought to care for things to which we would have been indifferent in the absence of certain social stimuli. But this is different from saying that the mere multiplication of interests in one thing as such makes the thing more valuable.

Perry also applies his standard of inclusiveness to the mere multiplication of interests of different people in different objects. If Jeremy likes pushpin and James likes poetry, Perry would say that pushpin-and-poetry are better than either pushpin or poetry. The two together constitute a more inclusive aggregate of goods. And he calls this 'better' than a less inclusive aggregate. But this is a misuse of the word 'better'. By this principle the more people in the universe the better, so long as they are all reasonably happy. But whenever anyone says that it would be better if the population were increased he is saying no other than that he wants it to be so. That there should be an increase in population is sometimes a rational ideal. Great nations and large cities have certain advantages. Life in America is now better for the white population than it was three hundred years ago, and partly because we are more numerous. Famine and various enemies are less menacing. But a great number of people, as such, is no good. If crowding is pushed too far a genuine mutilation results for which mere magnitude as such does not in the least compensate. There is a certain population which would best serve the interests of the average citizen. And the average citizen ought to desire that that number should be reached and held and not exceeded. To desire that there should be great numbers of people, except as a means to some ulterior national purpose, is folly. But Perry's standard of inclusiveness implies that such a desire is rational, as being aimed at that which is naturally 'better' or perhaps even 'best'.

In this discussion of inclusiveness and in the following and final chapter on the Highest Good, Perry gets to speaking of good and evil as if they really belonged intrinsically to the objects which actually only borrow them. He seems to forget that value is a function of interest. He seems to forget that good and bad are meaningless unless you can specify for whom. He thinks, for instance, that it would not be just right to buy the eternal happiness of millions of people at the price of the eternal torture of one lost soul (p. 670-672), and that even if he himself, Perry, felt callous about that forlorn one, still his feelings would have nothing to do with the rights or wrongs of the case. "The evil of the lost soul is pure, stark, unmitigated, and unrelieved." (p. 672) But for whom? Simply for the lost soul and those who may sympathize with him. For anyone who does not sympathize it is no evil at all. The sorrows of the ants that we trample thoughtlessly under foot do not trouble our dreams or our consciences. Probably this is because we never catch the anguished look upon their faces as they die. There probably is no anguished look there to catch. Our tramlings are a pure, stark and unmitigated evil to the ants, but not to us. Millions of men (all mankind) do buy their happiness (such as it is) at the cost of what are unmitigated evils to such living things as mosquitoes, cockroaches, rats, bed-bugs, rattle-snakes, deadly disease germs, etc., who must die that we may live. None of these pests meant to be pests. They just awoke to life with the natures which Nature gave them. Innocent of malice, it was their destiny to pester us, and often to fall before our superior power, in order that we might be comfortable. And so perhaps with the lost soul. But not necessarily. It all depends upon the feelings and sympathies of the one, whoever he might be, who was to decide whether the millions should be happy at the expense of the one, or whether some other disposition of the case should be made.

Again, Perry lays it down without qualification that the fulfillment of two interests is better than the fulfillment of only one or neither of them. By the standard of inclusiveness I suppose it is so. But would it have been better if in 1914-1918 the Germans had fulfilled both their interest in sinking the British fleet and their interest in overwhelming the Allied armies in France, rather than doing only one, or neither of these? The question immediately arises, better for whom? Not better for the Allies, surely. Perhaps not better for the great mass of humanity. Better for the military class in Germany, yes. But who sympathizes with them now? It is not profitable to discuss what would be better and what would be worse unless we specify for whom. And when we specify 'for whom' we are judging, not by any standard of inclusiveness, but by the standard of preference-intensity.

CHAPTER IV.

FEELING AS THE BASIS OF DUTY.

The theory that feeling, and particularly intent-feeling, is the value fundamental, has certain implications in regard to duty and moral obligation.

The terms duty, obligation, and 'ought,' have two rather different meanings. In the first they mean just interest or desire. In the second they apply to an instrumentality in the service of an interest. The first is categorical and the second is hypothetical.

As an illustration of the first, we sometimes say that, while we ourselves may not care about doing something, nevertheless if another man wants to he ought to. We would say this perhaps in the case where he was being influenced by our social example to refrain from doing what would have no evil consequences to us if done by him. If the consequences of an act can be safely ignored, then the urgency of someone's interest in doing it constitutes a categorical imperative, dictated by feeling rather than by reason. This use of the word 'ought' expresses the combination of the original innocence with the continual and insistent push and drive of any impulse. The original innocence, inherent in all impulses and interests, is only lost when they obstruct, either in themselves or by their consequences, some other interest. The push is always there. Each impulse by itself claims to be absolute and asserts its imperative categorically. But every interest that is a subordinate interest in an integrated personality, that is, one which dwells in the same soul with other interests whose "I" is the same as its, will, under some conditions of conflict with them, yield more or less gracefully, and acknowledge its limitations. When such deference is uncalled for we are dealing with a categorical imperative, not of reason, but of feeling. A man's total unified personality (if he has one) is of course such an imperative.

This kind of 'ought' is not very important except as applied to the whole personality. There is almost always conflict within the soul. Consequences can seldom be ignored or wholly approved. But there are occasions when it is true that, to assert that a man wants to do something, is the equivalent of asserting that he ought to do it.¹

The hypothetical imperative is what we deal with chiefly when we speak of men's duties and obligations. A man ought to do anything which is a comparatively effective means to an ultimate end or to ultimate ends which he predominantly desires. If a man wants to keep thin and can do so by regular exercise, he ought to exercise

1—I am indebted to Professor E. B. McGilvary of the University of Wisconsin for this notion of a categorical imperative of feeling. I am not sure that he would wholly approve of my formulation of it.

regularly. If he does not care how fat he is, and if he does not care about the consequences of obesity, he need not exercise. The ultimate goal of his desire is the condition of the obligation. Given that goal as an actual end of his endeavor, the obligation is binding. If a man wants the approval of society he ought to conform to the standards which it requires. If he does not care about the approval he need not. Of course all normal men do care about the approval of some people, so there is always an obligation for the normal to live up to some standard.

Thus all obligation, categorical and hypothetical, is a matter of the feelings of the individual himself.

It is nevertheless true that some moral principles are nearly universal. The explanation of their near-universality is three-fold. The first two of the reasons are very closely related, but I think that they call for separate emphasis. The first is that there is much similarity in the basic feelings of all men, due to a common heredity. Our interests are in some cases congenitally similar. This makes men of different nations and tribes, which may never have heard of each other, behave somewhat in the same manner, and desire the same kinds of things. And in this connection one of the most important things that all normal men desire is the approval of certain other people who constitute their group. And this desire is one of the chief factors in producing social pressure, which is the second explanation of the similarity of men's feelings on some subjects. The approval of our fellows is largely secured by a process of living up to the standards which they set up. Within any group there are certain rules and requirements which every member has to take account of, and in a measure conform to and uphold, and which each one generally comes to believe in and to wish to uphold. These standards, which most of the citizens are anxious to preserve, are imposed upon any individuals who may be unwilling, and much uniformity is achieved.

Were it not for these two factors of congenital similarity of interest, and social pressure, men would not have cooperated sufficiently to survive. Thus it is the principle of natural selection that in large measure explains the uniformity of human morals.

The third factor making for this uniformity is the similarity of conditions within all groups. For instance, every group needs leadership, and every group needs loyalty, and every group demands that its members shall cooperate. Men with similar natures, reacting to similar conditions, generally feel similarly.

But, as I have suggested, this widespread similarity of feeling and of ethical precept is not quite universal. Due to variations in training, or to ordinary quarrels, or to a fluke in heredity, there are occasionally people, and also whole nations of people, whose interests vary considerably from those of the generality of mankind or from those of other nations. And with everybody there are certain individual differences, more in some cases and less in others. All these differences of interest are responsible for conflicts of ideals, some of which are serious and can only be settled by force. Social cooperation between the two individuals or groups may break down completely or nearly completely. Most or all of what is good for one is then bad for the other and vice-versa. Cooperation, however, will seldom break down entirely. Enemies may agree as to treatment of non-combatants or as to care of the wounded on the battle-field, and

two competitors may agree to treat each other in a gentlemanly fashion when they meet socially. Almost all men who are enemies have also certain agreements. And almost any two people who co-operate will also in a measure clash. Nobody is exactly like anybody else and nobody is wholly different from anybody else. But we are nearly all so much alike in certain fundamentals that some moral rules are binding almost universally.

Let us first consider the matter of obligation in the field of art. The assertion that some art is of a higher order than other art amounts to the assertion that there is a certain obligation to cultivate the higher in preference to the lower. This assertion seems to imply that the higher is better than the lower apart from any considerations of the strength of the interests taken in them. If higher and lower have any meaning here, a man who cultivates jazz in preference to so-called good music, because he likes jazz better, ought really to cultivate the good music instead because it has more value. And then what has become of our contention that the quantity of value that a thing has depends upon the strength of the feeling-attitude directed toward it? The problem here presented cannot be answered in a sentence. It is generally true that the interest in so-called good music is higher, and that the interest in jazz is lower. But this higher and lower, with their implication of greater and less value, is only significant in relation to a certain state of a man's interests or to a capacity which he may have to develop into this state. In relation to any other state of his interests, or in case of his incapacity to develop this state, so-called good music does not have a greater value than jazz, and is not in any proper sense of the word 'higher'. It might be better for the man who actually prefers jazz to cultivate better music. But it might not. It depends upon his nature and the capacities of his nature. It depends upon his ability to develop a genuine liking for good music. If he does not like so-called good music, but if he could enjoy it by spending some time in listening to it and studying it, and if he is interested in enriching his life with added enjoyable elements, and if cultivating an interest in it will not interfere with other matters which are ultimately more important, then he ought to cultivate the interest, and good music is better and higher for him. But if study would not enable him genuinely to enjoy it, or if he does not care about enriching his life, or if trying to enrich it in this way would obstruct other interests which are stronger than his ultimate interest in good music would be, then he ought not to and it is not higher for him. In other words he ought to if it is to his interest in the long run to do so, and he ought not to if it is not to his interest in the long run.

Good music is higher and better than jazz because it satisfies more fully. It expresses more of one's personality. We like it more. And where for any man it does not satisfy more fully, and expresses less of his personality, because he does not understand it or perhaps has not that aspect of personality which it expresses, and where a man does not and will never like it as much as he likes jazz, then for him it is not better nor higher than jazz. Higher and lower, better and worse, do not dwell in any objects of interest independently of these interests. But 'higher' does properly qualify what we call good music. It does not do so universally. It does so only in relation to most people. This means that good music does express, in artistic

form, interests in most human hearts that are deep and strong.

If a parent is dealing with the education of his son the case is somewhat different from that which is presented to a mature man guiding his own life. It is legitimate, for a man who wishes his son well, to try to cultivate in the boy an appreciation of good music, provided the child will eventually enjoy it, and provided that greater interests are not sacrificed. Here it is not always a necessary condition that the boy should have an interest in enriching his own life. If he does not in the least like to practice his music or study about it, and if he does not want to add to his capacity for enjoyment along this line, it may still be legitimate for the parent to insist upon his continuing with it. In thus insisting the parent is certainly doing an injury to the boy at the time. He is partly spoiling the youngster's joy in life, and there is no compensation to any interest which is actively functioning in the boy's nature. But when the boy grows up he may enjoy the music. The injury which the father does to the boy when young may be instrumental in producing a more than compensatory good later on for the man whose self will have grown out of, and be partly identical with, the self of the boy. The future good will more than compensate if the grown man then feels that it does. His then past sufferings will hurt him then, and his then present enjoyments will delight him then. And he will then know whether the good that was achieved was worth the price, to him. A parent who wishes to have his son still love him ten, twenty, thirty years hence, must be careful in imposing this, as in imposing other forms of drudgery. The discipline of this ungrateful study must not be pushed too far. And it is always a delicate question where to stop. It must stop when it is clear that the boy will not develop a mature interest in music, and it must stop when it makes him too unhappy in the present. But some degree of this type of injury to an existing personality is justified by its often being instrumentally valuable from the point of view of what that personality will become ten years hence. Without the imposition of some drudgery whose meaning is not fully grasped by the child, most children would grow up utter barbarians and would probably be unhappy themselves. They would become unadjusted to civilized society, and would be great nuisances to other people. Drudgery wisely imposed is bad for the child but good for the man whom the child will become. The parent probably is and should be more interested in the success of the ultimate interests of the future man whom his son will become, than in the immediate welfare of the boy. Where the two conflict he should, and generally will, prefer the former. The gratitude of the grown man will be worth more to him, if he is normal, than the gratitude of the boy.

The dangers that the parent runs in tinkering, as he almost must, with his son's personality, are that he may make a bad mistake in forecasting the grown man's interests which he is trying to provide for, and that the discipline which he imposes may make the boy so unhappy as a boy that other evils will result in later life. If a parent does either of these things he is doing a great wrong, and is guilty of an utterly unjustifiable parental tyranny. But when he avoids these dangers he is providing for the higher interests of the man to be. The good music whose structure the boy is taught in a measure to understand, is a higher, that is, a greater, good, not to the boy, but to the man who will grow out of the boy, and also to

the father who cares about the man who will grow out of the boy. Higher and lower make a valid distinction when applied to interests and values and pleasures, but they never escape from their relativity to the state of somebody's interests either as those interests are, or as they will be. There is no obligation upon anybody to do anything which it is contrary to his own ultimate interest to do.

It seems easier to recognize the relativity of aesthetic than of moral obligation. People feel some difficulty in justifying all virtue by feeling. In morals it seems that actual conformity to a standard is demanded even if the party does not want to conform. A man who commits a crime is not forgiven when he pleads that it was to his own long-run interest to commit it. Can we say that a man whose interests run counter to those of the majority of decent law-abiding citizens is right in violating the moral rules which those people have adopted to express and to protect their interests? I think that we must admit that, if he really wants to do what he does, and is willing to take the consequences of his acts, he is right from his own point of view. Right and wrong is always relative to some one point of view. It may be right from his point of view and wrong from some other. He may have an obligation to do what is a genuine wrong to others and what these others have an obligation to try to prevent him from doing. A man ought to commit bigamy, murder, forgery, and arson, if he wants to, and if he wants, or is indifferent to, the probable consequences of his acts; in other words, he ought to if it is to his interest in the long run. Doing what is in accord with one's interest in the long run is what living a rational life consists in. But if the criminal is living what is for him a rational life (as he may be; I do not say that he is; I say that it is possible that he should be; it all depends upon the actual state of his feelings) it does not follow that other people should stand idly by and commend his rationality. All the decent people in society have an interest in preventing and in suppressing crime. In the long run it is to their interest that such acts as the criminal performs, however rational they may be for him who does them, should be stopped. It may be rational for a mosquito to bite a man. At least it is not irrational. If she had self-consciousness (I believe it is only the ladies that bite us) and acted deliberately according to the nature which she has, and which now she fulfills, doubtless rather blindly, she would still poison us, tho perhaps more circumspectly and with less danger to herself. Reason in an animal which was congenitally hostile to man would only make it more hostile. Rationality would not bring it into harmony with our interests. What is rational for any animal is a matter which is relative to its own instincts and interests. Be cause of the structure of the mosquito's body and because of the nature of her instincts, and because of the nature of man's skin and blood, her interests and ours are opposed. We meet each other only to poison and to crush.² We do not hesitate to kill a biting insect, merely because it is honestly fulfilling its naturally appointed function nor because it does not mean to do any harm and does not know that it is doing any harm. And we do not hesitate, merely because a criminal in committing a crime may have been acting according to his nature and his true interest, to punish him. He was acting

2—I am here using an illustration from Santayana, G., *Reason in Science*, p. 223.

contrary to our interest, and that is enough. We must deal with any hostile nature, animal, vegetable, or mineral, so as to prevent it from destroying us. We are obliged to do this if we want to continue to live and enact our various interests; and we almost always do want to do so. The dominant people in any society want to do so, or if not they do not long remain dominant.

If the criminal was sincere and rational in his act and was willing to take the consequences of his crime, then it is clear that he prefers crime-plus-punishment taken together, to neither. Then in getting the punishment he is getting an integral part (that part which itself has the most direct objective unpleasantness) of a whole that he prefers. He has doubtless a direct negative interest in the punishment. But his instrumental interest in it is positive. In order to commit the crime he has to take it also. And this positive instrumental interest is stronger than the negative direct interest in it. Otherwise he would not have chosen it. So in a sense he is getting what he wants when he is electrocuted. Of course, after the crime he may feel that his act was not worth the punishment. He will then regret his deed, and will admit to himself that he made a mistake. He acted foolishly. He injured his own more permanent interest thru not knowing what it was or would be, or thru ignoring it in a moment of passion. Then the crime was wrong from his own point of view. He ought not to have done it. He violated his own major interest. And this is probably what most criminals admit to themselves when they get caught. Their acts are generally quite wrong from their own point of view. Perhaps they are always so. This is a question of fact which I cannot settle. I am simply contending that if the criminal's actual feelings were in a certain state, in which they might conceivably be, his act would be right from his point of view.

The police, the courts, and the penal institutions are maintained at great expense to keep crime in check. The methods which they can use are confinement or other bodily punishment, re-education, and execution. The second is not used much and perhaps cannot be used much. Mature people cannot very easily make a complete change in their habits. A man who is trained for one line of work can switch over to an entirely different line only with great difficulty. It is as hard to go from sea-faring to the legal profession, or vice-versa, as it is to turn from a career of crime to one of plodding daily labor, or vice-versa. If reformatories do very little reforming it is not to be wondered at.

But bodily confinement and execution are things which the publicly constituted authorities can inflict upon a criminal pretty effectively if they can catch him. The former of these will prevent him from doing any harm at least during the period of his sentence, and the possibility of this will constitute something of a threat to him and to others, which will at times act as more or less of a deterrent. Execution is both a threat to the incipient criminal and an effective way of putting an end to a career of crime.

In all dealings with criminals the basic thing which should be kept in mind is the need of diminishing crime. This need is the only justification there is for the expenses involved in supporting the police and the prisons and the judges. It is infantile to take as ultimate such current notions as those of an abstract justice, or of retribution, or of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Retri-

bution may often be justified as a means to prevention. But it is not the final controlling principle. Anger and the lust for revenge are some of the instinctive things provided by evolution for a man's protection. If an animal does not attack when he is attacked he may be eaten. If his enemy gets off unscathed he may attack again. If we do not destroy or injure those who threaten or injure us, we may slip over into the category of those unfit to survive, which is much less fun than ranking with the fit. But it must be admitted that pugnacity and resentment are only very roughly adapted to securing the protection of the man who experiences them. They will often get him into danger which a person of milder propensities would have avoided. In the *primaeval* forest they were an awkward make-shift, tho they did serve their purpose after a fashion, as our presence here, with them as part of our biological inheritance, testifies. In the Great Society they are quite inadequate. They do not sufficiently protect. Instinctive resentment is not the principle which those social institutions which are organized for our protection should aim to follow. This instinct is indeed one interest which has a certain place in a rational life. It may properly be given a certain limited expression. But it is only one interest among a great many. And it tends to demand more sacrifice than it is worth. It is very likely, when uncurbed, to spoil many things whose value in the long run is greater than is the value of its completely successful expression.

The one ultimate guiding principle which should be followed, in all dealings with crime, is that crime should be abolished or diminished in the interest of the protection of the law-abiding citizens. Their feelings of resentment should be largely ignored except so far as these are likely to lead to acts of violence on their part, which, again, it is to everybody else's interest to prevent. Putting a murderer in jail is partly justified by the fact that it prevents the family of the victim from taking private vengeance and thus causing still more disorder and perhaps starting a feud. It prevents private vengeance partly by putting the murderer where it is hard to get at him, and partly by satisfying, in a measure, the feeling of vengeance, felt by the family of the victim, thru the punishment which it inflicts.

It is a fundamental principle in morals and criminology that it is never rational for anybody to punish anybody else unless the punishment is for the advantage of the man who does the punishing. Tho a criminal has done the vilest deed imaginable, if it is to nobody's interest and advantage to punish him, anybody who punishes him is a fool. The rule is, that, if they are able, people ought to punish other people (as they ought to do anything else) only if it is to their interest to do so.

In the matter of punishment it is very important to determine who is to blame. If a wrong has been done and a man is not to blame for it, it will do no good to his punishers to punish him. Punishment will not tend to prevent him from breaking the rules again. He has not shown any inclination to break the rules at all. Jailing him will rather tend to make a criminal of him, which will be bad for the society in which he lives. But if he did the deed intentionally, or if he did an act intending the crime to result from it, or if he did an act carelessly, the natural and probable consequences, or (as the lawyers say) the proximate consequences, of which, were the wrong which was done, then he is to blame. (The exact meaning of 'prox-

imate' is not clear in the decisions. Its precise definition would determine exactly how careless a man would be permitted to be as to the consequences of his act, and still not be held responsible for them. This cannot be exactly defined.) If he is to blame, then those authorized should punish him, largely for the sake of preventing him from deliberately willing such a crime again, or from being again so careless as to let it happen.

In the case of moral blame for acts not amounting to criminal offences, and where the penalty is the disapproval of the the act felt and expressed by certain persons or perhaps by the whole community, we are dealing with instinctive resentment felt by a group against one who violates the rules which it has established for its protection and welfare. Moral praise and blame, as Westermarck said, are only gratitude and grudge. They are the honoring of those who support the principles which we regard as helpful to our long-run social interests, and the condemning of those who have violated these principles.

If we are correct in basing moral acts and moral judgments upon feeling, it follows that the widely held doctrine, that a man is never under obligation to do what he is unable to do, is false. This theory treats duty as if it were always imposed upon a man from above by a superior person who stood ready to punish in case the man disobeyed. A person in authority would be foolish and unjust to punish a man for not doing what he could not do. It would be scandalous if a man were punished by any living being, God or man, for the non-performance of the impossible. If he were so punished he could still say, 'there was no need of my trying to obey'. One chief function of punishment is to change the will of the victim. His omitting to obey in this case was not an aberration of his will.

The case of a man who will be punished if he fails to do something may be an illustration of duty, but it is not a good illustration to exhibit the generic nature of it. In such a case it may not be a man's duty to obey, and there are cases of duty where no superior person is attempting to direct an inferior. A man is under obligation to obey a master if he wants directly to help the master, or if his interest in serving is only instrumental, that is, if he simply wants to avoid the punishment which the master will inflict in case he disobeys. Obeying is a means to an end in which he is interested. If a man does not want to help the master and does not mind such punishment as the master is able to inflict, he is under no obligation whatever to obey.

A man may, then, have an obligation to do what he is unable to do. If he wants to support his family he must hold his job and keep his health. But perhaps he cannot. The obligation remains while his interest in supporting his family remains. If a criminal wants to avoid going to jail and wants the approval of the more respectable section of society, he too must get into some steady work and stay with it. But perhaps he cannot. The obligation is temporally co-extensive with the interest.

If a man has failed to do his duty we generally blame him. If he does his duty we generally approve, or, if it was in the face of difficulties, we applaud. But there is no necessary connection between moral praise and blame by others and the doing and not doing of one's duty. We condemn the man who, thru a dissolute manner of life, fails to provide for those dependent upon him. He has neglected a

duty. This neglect of duty is a matter of the relation of his dissolute behavior to his ultimate interest in his family and in their welfare and in their affection for him. He is interested in these things, and his dissolute life, instead of being a means to the satisfaction of his interests, is a real obstruction. We blame him probably on several scores. We sympathize with the family, that is, we are actually interested in its welfare and are pained at its suffering. We blame him as the cause of this thwarting of our interest in its welfare. And if, in society generally, men neglect their duties, that is not so good for all of us. Our lives and happiness often depend upon other people's doing their duties. We are, then, in general, desirous that anybody who belongs to our society should do his duty. When the man in question neglects his duty he thwarts our interest, and we resentfully condemn him.

The deeds and fortunes and interests of other people are frequently matters of intense interest to us. And what may superficially appear to be a cold and abstractly rational judgment of moral praise or blame is actually the expression of a deep feeling of gratitude or resentment. If we were not interested we would not pass the judgment.

The tendency which many people have to cling to notions of absolute duty, and absolute good and bad in morals, displays a laudable interest in maintaining standards of decency in social intercourse. But this tendency is pernicious from the purely theoretical point of view. And I doubt whether morality will decline when people in general are taught the awesome truth that virtue is founded on their own long run interests. One of the troubles with ethical theory and with moral teaching in the past has been the failure to recognize the existence of men's long run interests, which are actual, positive intent-feelings that have as their objects the social order, the man's own community, his future career and reputation, his own health, and the welfare of his family. When one speaks of interest the traditional moralist thinks of immediate interests and selfish interests. But there are other interests than these. When a man performs the drudgery necessary to fight his way to success in any line of work, or when he does any duty in the face of great obstacles, the traditional moralist thinks that he does not like what he is doing. But the man is actually enacting a major interest. He does what he does because, on the whole, he likes it. The directly unpleasant factors in it he likes instrumentally. He does them voluntarily, and every voluntary act is dictated by some interest and is itself or is a pursuit of, his own pleasure, in the eighth sense of that word.

Even in self-sacrifice, and even when self-sacrifice involves giving up one's own life, the act is the enactment of an interest, and, as John Hill Burton said, it is "the pursuit of pleasure—the doing of that which it pleases a man to do—the doing that which volition suggests." Men who have died voluntarily are no exception to the rule in regard to all voluntary action. If a man prefers to die rather than live in disgrace, or rather than anything else, then his positive feeling-attitude toward his own death in the very near future is shown to be stronger than his positive feeling-attitude toward his-life-and-the-disgrace. He does what he likes the best. He can do nothing else voluntarily. The pleasure-pains, which determine the values of the alternatives, and determine the choice, are feelings which actually exist in his soul at the moment of choice.

No other feelings than those which are actually present (I do not mean here merely the feelings whose objects are present, which constitute what I call 'present interests') can determine a choice directly, or create actual values. Past and future feelings did and will create values. They do not do so now. All the values that things have are due to actually existing interests whose sources are in the present.³ The objects of these interests may be past, present or future. What I call retrospective, present, and anticipatory interests have, when actually existing and giving value to their objects, a source which is in the present. So the fact that an anticipatory interest has for its object the cutting off in the near future of all further experiences and interests of the self which is the source of the interest, is not contradictory. This anticipatory interest, taken in this object, is not one of the future interests the cutting off of which is the object. This interest is not concerned with cutting itself off. It now exists but it will find its natural consummation and will naturally and resignedly cease in the moment of death. There is no interest in extending it beyond that moment.

Failure to realize that it is a man's own long range interests which determine his duties vitiates the conclusion drawn by Pepper in his very interesting study of the ethical theories of Santayana and Bosanquet.⁴ Pepper makes a complete duality between immediate values, which are felt, and which the Epicureans talked about; and moral standards, which are not felt, and which the Kantians have philosophized about. He asserts that Santayana fails to get these two things together (p. 108), and further that there is no way of getting them together (p. 107, 108, 118). I shall contend, on the contrary, that, as I have argued, moral standards arise from feelings which are immediately given in experience, and also, that Santayana expresses substantially the value theory herein expounded.

Pepper states correctly (p. 112) that Santayana derives moral standards from the organization or integration of interests.⁵ But Pepper incorrectly interprets this to mean that all the interests of the whole universe must be integrated in order to get a standard. Santayana's meaning is that all the interests of one soul must be integrated in order to get a standard. Only those interests of others need be considered which are the objects of interests of that soul. Pepper insists rightly that all of the interests in the universe cannot be organized into a harmonious whole such as would give one standard. Actually the morality of any interest does not necessarily depend upon its relation to the interests of other people, and never depends directly upon its relation to any of these. There is an ultimate selfishness in every animal life which Pepper recognizes

3—R. B. Perry (op. cit., p. 129-130) repudiates this principle, and repudiates Hobbes whom he accuses of expounding it, tho' Perry's basic theory of value seems to me to be anything but repugnant either to this principle or to much of the philosophy of Hobbes. Incidentally it should be noted that while Hobbes ought to have asserted this principle, he does not do so. Perry is wrong in imputing it to him, and both Perry and Hobbes are wrong in not asserting it.

4—Pepper, S. C., *The Equivocation of Value*. U. of Cal. Pub., Philos., Vol. 4, p. 107-132. Berkeley, 1923.

5—Reason in Science, p. 249, 261.

(p. 117), and which, as he sees, Santayana recognizes (Reason in Science, p. 246, 248, 258, 260, 261). This prevents any man from admitting the justice of the defeat of his own ultimate interests in order to help out any universe-wide integration in which he happened not to be interested. Any scheme of things whatever which violates a man's ultimate interests is bad for him. And it is right for him to try to alter it. His effort is right from his own point of view. It is morally right. If a universe-wide system of interests had legitimate authority over the individual's conscience then a so-called ethical or universalistic hedonism, such as Pepper (p. 113) incorrectly imputes to Santayana, would be true.

But universalistic hedonism is a hopeless attempt to beautify the original Epicurean doctrine. The ancient doctrine of egoistic hedonism looks a bit gross as traditionally stated. No doubt it needs to be polished up a little. But adopting the 'ethical' brand of hedonism is not the right way to do it. For this repudiates the essential Epicurean insight. It gives up the human perspective. It gives the happiness of others a claim on our interests irrespective of the natural bent of our interests, and this the happiness of others does not have. Nothing has it. We need not love anything which we do not naturally love, unless as a means to something else which we do love. There is no moral *a priori* such as Rashdall mentions. The happiness of others is good to us (if at all) because we like it, and for no other reason. The way to rehabilitate and embellish hedonism so that it can function gracefully in polite society is, not to change it from its egoistic to its universalistic form, but rather to show that the pleasure in the case is at the opposite end of the interest from that at which it is commonly supposed to be located. The intent-feeling at the source of interest is what determines directly all value, and all good and bad, right and wrong, duty and obligation. It is a man's own feelings which decide what values are for him. These feelings are all located in his self. In judging by them and in only pursuing things toward which they are directed, and in never pursuing anything merely because someone else likes it, he is being wholly selfish in a Pickwickian sense of the word selfishness. Metaphorically speaking, all a man's voluntary acts are the pursuit of his own pleasure. They are what he wills. They are aimed at what he wants. To say that all voluntary acts are the pursuit of a man's own pleasure is a tautology, and therefore must be true. And it is, further, significant, as all tautologies are significant, in that it asserts that two expressions are synonymous. It asserts that the phrase 'a voluntary act' and the phrase 'a pursuit of pleasure' are synonymous. And this assertion is no tautology, tho it is quite true. The attempt to establish universalistic hedonism is like perfuming the pig sty to alleviate the pangs of a few weak stomachs. If anyone cannot reconcile himself to the essential Pickwickian selfishness of never wishing for anything which it is not his own self that wishes, he should immediately forsake the modern interest-theories of value.

It seems to me that Santayana is fairly clear in saying that he does not mean anything like universalistic hedonism. He says, "Any task imposed externally on a man is imposed by force only, a force he has the right to defy so soon as he can do so without creating some greater impediment to his natural vocation" (Reason in Science, p. 248). And again he says that the decision of a moral-

ist as to what those things are in which pleasure ought to be found (i. e., as to which things a man ought to want) will, if the moralist is rational, "express his own nature—on which alone honest ideals can rest—without attempting to speak for the deafening and inconsistent convocation of the whole sentient universe. Duty is a matter of self-knowledge, not of statistics. A living and particular will—cannot for a moment renounce its autonomy without renouncing reason". (p. 258) And again he asserts that my business "is to clarify my own intent". (p. 260) And also "Utilitarianism took up false ground when it made right conduct terminate in miscellaneous pleasures and pains". (p. 260) "The true conscience is rather an integrated natural will, chastened by a clear knowledge of what it pursues and may attain". (p. 261)

Santayana is surely not proposing any universalistic hedonism. Some of his other statements are not perfectly clear, and, taken apart from what I have here set forth, might seem to incline in this direction. But it seems to me undeniable that the truth at which he was driving is the same as that at which I am driving, namely, that it is only in that integration of interests which makes a personality, that valid moral standards and obligations and duties are set up. The interests resident in other souls cannot figure at all in this integration. They are wholly irrelevant in this connection. But every interest, whose source is this soul, is relevant. Any or all of these may establish ends, the means to which become matters of duty for that person. The strongest interests make certain ends the most valuable of all, and the means to these are a man's paramount duties. Pepper (p. 112, 113) misinterprets Santayana's suggestions about a rational mind's taking into consideration all relevant interests when it acts, to mean that all the past, present, and future interests in the universe are relevant and have a right to be present in that integration in which the moral standard is generated. But such is not the case, and such is not what Santayana means. The only interests of other people that are at all relevant to the moral standards and conduct of a man are such interests as he takes an interest in. Many a flourishing interest, dwelling in another soul, is irrelevant to a man's duty, because he has no interest in it. But no interest which flourishes in his own soul is wholly irrelevant to his duty.

And while other people's interests may be relevant, they are so only indirectly and as objects of his interests. If he has an interest in the success of the interests of one whom he loves, then the success of those interests bears upon his duties. But it bears upon them differently from the way in which the interests whose source is the man's own soul, bear upon them. It is a major interest in the man's own soul which constitutes the happiness of the loved one an end, and thus which makes the various means to that happiness a matter of duty for him. The happiness and success of the other person can generate no duties for him in the absence of his interest in these. But given his interest, these are ends the means to which it is his duty to produce. These interests of the other are relevant to his moral life. They are the ends, or some of the ends, in relation to which his duties exist. But surely this is a different kind of relevance from that which the interests, whose source is his own soul, have to his duties. The interests in his own soul (some of them) are what constitute the success of these other interests the

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ends which they are. This is rather a fundamental difference. And Santayana is not as clear as he should be about it. It is indeed difficult to be clear about it.

Duty and moral obligation are firmly based on human interest. Social duties are genuine and binding and largely mutual because we are interested in our fellows and because they are interested in us. Each soul is isolated from direct contacts with any other. But the indirect contacts are many and various. Moral obligation for a man depends only upon his own interest. But the deeper interests of most men are very similar. And the deeper interests of one man are generally capable of enactment pretty much harmoniously with those of others. Brotherly love is the best rule except on certain occasions when cooperation is impossible. Men and mosquitoes are so very differently constituted and so naturally opposed to one another, that they probably will never cooperate. But men are not constituted by nature so diametrically opposed to each other as this. When they fall out with each other it is often due to a misunderstanding. And seldom do their quarrels involve an utter antagonism; human enemies usually have something in common, and find themselves actually cooperating for certain ends. In the late unpleasantness (1914-1918) both of these principles were exhibited. All of the governments kept the support of the people as long as they did only because the people believed the official propaganda. And tho there was much slaughter, prisoners were not put to death, and the victors did not, in their hour of triumph, kill off the male population among the vanquished, nor enslave the women and children. It was to the interest of the Allies not to destroy their enemies completely. In economic competition and in the division of the loot gained in any business among those who have helped to secure it, there are genuine conflicts which, unlike most international conflicts, are not due to any misunderstandings. All the parties are generally pretty clear eyed about the actual state of things. But here the conflict is limited to only a small part of the personalities of the parties, except occasionally in open industrial warfare. Unless there is a violent strike or a racketeer's war going on, men in one community, whose economic interests conflict, are also actively cooperating as citizens. I do not think that conflicts between men can ever be wholly eliminated. But they need not be deadly, and they need not involve the whole of the conflicting personalities. Thus while I think that it will always be true (while there are as many as two living things on earth) that some things which are genuinely and ultimately good for one will be similarly bad for another, I do not think that this is necessarily an intolerable situation. It should not cause serious grief to any soul which loves his fellow man. The human animal normally can stand a certain amount of fighting and a certain amount of defeat, and still be happy enough to call life on the whole worth living. Most people enjoy a certain amount of fighting, and would rather have it, at the risk of some defeat, than avoid both occasional defeat and all fighting.


Moral principles will never be utterly universal. And if they ever were they would still not be absolute. They would be even then, as now, relative to the interests which generate them. Their essential obligatory nature is not taken away from them by their dependence upon interest. Rather it is interest alone which has ever given them, and can ever give them, their obligatory nature.

THE
Scholastic Philosophy
Explained

REVISED EDITION

BY

Rev. Henry H. Wyman, C.S.P.



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TO THE
STUDENTS OF AMERICA

THIS ESSAY IS DEDICATED WITH THE HOPE THAT IT
MAY LEAD THEM TO A DEEPER KNOWLEDGE OF THE
DIGNITY AND VALUE OF LIFE.

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The Scholastic Philosophy Explained.

BY REV. HENRY H. WYMAN, C.S.P.

I.

A PLEA FOR CERTITUDE IN PHILOSOPHY.

 IN my younger days I loved to speculate at random,¹ but, as I grew older, the fascination of independent thought became less, because I found that the goal of my dreaming, like the will-o'-the-wisp, ever receded further from me. And how could it be otherwise? I had no fixed starting-point, as one must have (and can have only) in the recognition of self-evident truths. Had I not discovered this, I should, in all probability, like many others, have explored many fields, and found all of them unsatisfactory.

I was not educated in the Scholastic system of philosophy. Mine was "the men for the system," not "the system for the men," philosophy, to quote a familiar classification, and the mature conviction which today leads me to advocate the latter, and discard other systems, is the result of a deep and thorough study of the best writers on Scholasticism.

As the topic of this essay indicates, I claim that there is a possibility of arriving at certitude in philosophy. By this I mean that natural or rational certitude is just as attainable in intellectual science as it is in the other ab-

¹ The writer is a convert to the Catholic faith.

stract or physical sciences, such, for instance, as astronomy. If we make strictly logical deductions from self-evident truths, they are certainly true. Furthermore, it is clear that certitude admits of degrees, according to the order of the premises from which it is logically derived.

There are also in this science conclusions which are only more or less probable, according to the probability of the data from which they are logically derived. This, so far as I am aware, actually constitutes the only "cock-sureness" which the advocates of the Scholastic Philosophy have often been accused of claiming.

The contention between the Scholastics and their opponents must, therefore, in the last analysis, be reduced to the one question: Are there self-evident truths? If not, it would be useless for us to consider, or compare systems of philosophy. But none of us really acts on the hypothesis of their denial. As Wilfrid Ward puts it: "We eat and walk and converse with our neighbors, we kick stones with Dr. Johnson, without being disturbed by the skeptical idealists." We cannot argue or reason with anyone who doubts, or requires a demonstration of truths that are self-evident.

I am well aware that a philosophy based on these principles, and rigidly expressed in dialectic form, affords but little gratification to the minds of those who are ever seeking new things. I am ready to admit that its conclusions are reached without the excitement of discovery; they are the old, plain, and trite truisms which have been dinned into our ears ever since we listened to and obeyed our teachers and superiors; nay, more, we accepted them before we ever heard of logic or metaphysics. Is it any wonder, then, that in this age of progress and discovery, restless and youthful investigators who have sapiently explored the phenomena of matter, impatiently cry out: "Must we philosophers always keep in the old peripatetic paths of the Schoolmen? Can we not get some new starting-point, and discover new and hidden secrets in the spiritual realm?" We might, perhaps, if the mind were

not designed by the Creator to be the "organ of truth," if intellectual error did not endanger faith, if acceptance of Divine teaching did not enter into the awful probation upon which salvation depends. We are always confronted with the terrible alternative: "*Quicumque vult salvus esse, ante omnia opus est ut teneat Catholicam fidem*—Whoever will be saved must before all things hold the Catholic faith." Can it be that some of us would be rash enough to try to ride two horses going in opposite directions at the same time?

The questions discussed in the old system are, we are well aware, not those which receive due recognition from the modern secular mind; but long before the formularies of the Faith were set forth, earnest, serious minds painfully groped through the dry processes of defining such ideas as *substantia*, *persona*, *accidens*, *materia*, *forma*, etc., and left such an intellectual inheritance to those who afterwards received the light of revelation, that their very terms are enshrined in the Creeds of the Church for all time. On this account, these old philosophical distinctions must be understood by us, if we would make our Faith intelligible to a modern skeptic. Our fathers in the Faith used the old philosophy as the handmaid of theology; by means of it the Church framed the unchangeable dogmas of the Faith. Can it be that some of us would like to preserve the divine superstructure after destroying the natural foundation upon which it is built? This, in my opinion, is what agnostic philosophers are trying to do.

Practically everyone has a philosophy of some kind. But if each one had, for himself, a philosophy constructed on a *different* foundation from that of every other, would the claims of a *common* faith be more easily accepted by the unbelieving world than they are at present? This is the practical question which we have to answer when we are tempted to discard the traditional philosophy. To discard the rational basis of faith is like "throwing away one's legs to stand on crutches."

How are we getting on, as it is, in the work of extend-

ing the Faith? Is there any body of religious teachers in the world that exerts an intellectual influence on men comparable to that of the Catholic clergy? Yet all of them have been trained in the Scholastic Philosophy. The results of this training, moreover, are not to be measured merely by the work of today, but by the triumphs of centuries. Other leaders of thought have held sway for a decade or generation, only to be superseded by those who could better satisfy the vanity of their disciples. The Catholic Church has always stood at the head of every great intellectual movement which has elevated mankind. Naturally speaking, this is due to the fact that her children most earnestly seek to know scientific truth scientifically, and to profit by it practically. And her system of education, which has been developed by the accumulated wisdom of ages, is, I think, in no danger of being set aside.

Empirical and metaphysical knowledge ought to be co-ordinated accurately—not confused. This is what Cardinal Mercier, Professor De Wulf of Louvain, and other able exponents of Scholasticism are trying to accomplish. Unfortunately, mediæval philosophy is too little known at the present time. As Henry Adams says: "With the Middle Ages, something passed out of life which we have ever since been trying to run down and recapture; something vital and indispensable."

It must however be remembered that there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as a "Catholic philosophy." I am therefore only pleading for the rational philosophy which is required for right-thinking and is ordinarily designated as the "Philosophy of Common Sense."

II.

THE OLD APOLOGETIC.

The science of Christian apologetic is receiving probably more attention today than any other department of Christian theology. Those who have studied most carefully the attitude of modern thought towards the ancient Faith, and the motives which underlie its reluctance either to affirm or to deny the evidences of Christianity, have thought, for the most part, that, while the traditional system of philosophy has not lost and can lose none of its force or efficiency, there may be a danger lest some Catholics, by yielding to the spirit of the age and following the Protestant apologetic, may be led eventually to substitute mere *credible-hypothesis* for the older and approved *moral-certainty*.

Yet the credible-hypothesis defence of religion is not new, but has always been recognized as of great value in establishing the claims of Christianity. It was fully understood and developed before the Cartesian doubt ever assailed the old and impregnable foundations of philosophy. It is valuable in disarming opposition and dispelling ignorance and prejudice, but, as its advocates frankly confess, it can go no further than to prove the fact of Revelation to be credible; it cannot induce the admission that it is indubitably true, and hence fails to furnish an adequate preamble of faith.

It seems a great mistake in philosophy to suppose that suspension of judgment can ever produce stable equilibrium in thought. The mind cannot rest upon any object less certain than a fact. In order therefore to satisfy reason, we must have a system of philosophy based on reality, one in which objective reality determines certitude; otherwise the validity of all the external proofs of Revelation may be questioned. There is no doubt that

the fact of Revelation can be demonstrated by reason—*"cum recta ratio fidei fundamenta demonstret; ut recta ratio fidei veritatem demonstret, tueatur, defendat*—Right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith; right reason demonstrates, safeguards, and defends the truth of the faith."²

Our greatest and, I may say, only advantage in apologetic over our opponents is that we have a solid, immovable foundation in philosophy and theology, whereas they have only changeable theories. Moral certainty in its own order excludes reasonable doubt. The faculty of reason may be and often is distorted, either unconsciously or willfully; men are always free to dissent from every conceivable truth, but they can no more escape the responsibility and consequences of their assent or denial than they can undo existence itself. Our real power of carrying conviction to the minds of others consequently depends more upon the certainty of what we affirm than upon anything else.

Certainty is furthermore necessary for moral obligation, and is essential to natural theology. Without rational certitude there could be no natural law binding in conscience; yet while admitting fully this essential distinction between the assent of reason and faith, we must also avoid the error of supposing that they can be exercised independently, or that one can be enhanced to the loss of the other. Leo XIII. implies this in treating of the relation of the natural to the supernatural virtues in his Encyclical on "Americanism." Hence the impossibility of contradicting by reason what we assent to by faith becomes manifest. For instance, the certainty of rational assent to the historical proofs of the Divinity, the Resurrection, and the Ascension of Our Lord is necessarily involved in the acceptance of these divine facts as articles of faith.

The real issue that we have to meet may therefore be reduced to a conflict between self-evident truths and

² Vatican Council.

rationalistic doubt. We know where we stand; while Rationalists are dodging for a foothold amid quicksands. What, then, is the essential attitude of the Church in this crisis? Is she filled with fear and alarm lest she may be shorn of her past prestige by a new system of thought which will supersede her sovereign claims to be heard and obeyed by all mankind? Certainly the present state of apologetic science does not suggest such an attitude on her part, but rather indicates that she has entered upon a new era of aggressiveness in maintaining every jot and tittle of her ancient supremacy. The Scholastic Philosophy, which for nearly three hundred years has been ignored by some of her greatest apologists, has in less than fifty years been restored to its former high position in her seats of learning. And, as a consequence, new generations of priests are everywhere combating Rationalism with irresistible power, and are manifestly winning back men of right reason and good will to the unchangeable standard of truth.

Now while the fact of Revelation is demonstrable to reason in the abstract, the concrete reason is so often hampered by temperament, prejudice, worldly interest, and passion, that it becomes inoperative. Logic, then, does not really prove; evidence does not convince. This is undeniably the mental state of vast numbers who, in our day, have laboriously unlearned the very axioms of philosophy.

What is the best remedy for this grievous condition? Must the will be counted on to determine an assent beyond the power of the evidence to enforce? Would not this supposition make apologetic unscientific from the very start? In other words, by the substitution of mere credible-hypothesis for indubitable proof we are, I think, liable to confirm our opponents in the opinion that faith cannot be supported by rational proofs. Inquirers after truth are always on guard and intently watching for some loophole to escape from the authority of faith.

To avoid any possible misunderstanding as to the real

distinction between credible-hypothesis and moral-certainty and the relation of rational evidence to faith, I desire to define, as clearly as possible, my meaning. "Evidence assures us that God has spoken through man, and it can lead the mind from the human instrument to the Divine Author; but it can never produce Divine Faith, or take the place of the Faith in the heart of man." I am simply upholding the following declaration promulgated by Gregory XVI. on September 8, 1840: "*Ratio cum certitudine authenticitatem revelationis, Judaeis per Moysen et Christianis per Jesum Christum factae, probare valet*—Reason can prove the authenticity of the revelation made to the Jews through Moses and to Christians through Jesus Christ." This proposition in no way refers to the supernatural certitude of faith which alone by its authority can lead the intellect to the full knowledge of revealed truth called faith. Apart from the act of faith, the allegiance of the intellect is normally according to the laws of evidence.

Again, it must be remembered that between credible-hypothesis and moral-certainty there is, philosophically, all the difference that there is between probability and certainty; and if we explicitly limit the preamble of faith to the former, we may, to say the least, seem to favor the following proposition condemned by Innocent XI. on March 2, 1679: "*Assensus fidei supernaturalis et utilis ad salutem stat cum notitia solum probabili revelationis, imo cum formidine, qua quis formidet, ne non sit locutus Deus*—Assent to supernatural faith holds with only the notion of a probable revelation with the fear which anyone may have that God has not spoken."

We can safely lead men to accept the Faith only by inducing that allegiance to reason which God, its Author, has ordained. "*Rationis usus fidem praecedit et ad eam hominem ope revelationis et gratiae conducit*—The use of reason precedes faith and by the aid of revelation and grace leads to it."³ Father Isaac T. Hecker, in his

³ Encyclical of Gregory XVI., Sept. 8, 1840.

Aspirations of Nature, emphasizes nothing more strongly than this method. He says: "Not a single step can be made in the advance toward truth without the open or tacit admission of the unerring authority (of reason)."

The unfaltering defence of unquestionable authority has always been, and always will be, the most persuasive moral force among men. Our age has not changed human nature; no age or outward circumstances of civilization can change it. Even when it persistently revolts against the twofold authority of reason and revelation, it only declares the majesty of the truth it defies.

The external proofs of Revelation should not be given a secondary place, as if they were insufficient, because we find ourselves facing unconquered minds and wills not ready to command the acceptance of propositions which they have been taught to question. The Divine policy demands acceptance of the external proofs of Revelation just as much as it does that of the truth revealed through it. By first convincing the reason we can ultimately reach the whole man—his heart, his temperament, his affections, his religious nature. This is the method of the old apologetic, and is, I believe, as efficacious today as it ever has been in the past. By it I was led to the truth, and have ever since followed it in the practical warfare of apologetic as a missionary. It was once my privilege, while a Protestant, to hear one of Father Hecker's inimitable lectures. His subject was "The Religious Condition of Our Country." From it I learned the never-to-be-forgotten lesson that Catholicism is indubitably true. In dealing with non-Catholics he abhorred the shadow of a compromise; if he could not convince a hearer of the inerrancy of reason and the infallibility of the Church, he considered his subject's conversion hopeless. If he had only endeavored on that occasion to present the fact of Revelation as a mere credible belief, I should, no doubt, have agreed with all he said, but I should not have become, as I thereupon did become, convinced of the sovereignty of the truth he spoke.

Christian apologetic has been essentially the same in every age, because the dogmas which it defends are unchangeable; on the other hand, the errors over which it has triumphed have been most diverse; and this fact, as history shows, has only developed its intrinsic strength and shown the corresponding weakness of its opponents. Its history is analogous to that of dogma, and establishes it as a positive science essentially bound up with the teaching of Christianity and the Church. During the martyr period it was just as authoritative and rational as in the Patristic age, when it employed Greek philosophy so intelligently that higher critics attribute large portions of it to a Greek origin. But this feature only witnesses to its triumph and the utter inadequacy of sophistry to combat it; the earliest apologists of this period had been driven into the arms of Christianity by the failure of the highest heathen philosophy to satisfy the aspirations of their minds and hearts. Out of this contest there gradually arose a Christian school of philosophy which has lived on and increased until the present day, and far transcends in certitude and sublimity the whole pantheon of alien thought.

"Demonstratio evangelica" was but another name for "Christian apology" in the days of St. Athanasius, and *apologia* in those days meant precisely the opposite of what is now commonly understood by the English word "apology." It is a misfortune that we have not a better term to apply to this full-panoplied, age-tried mistress of thought.

While it is true that Christian philosophy attained the zenith of its influence in the Scholastic period, it did not come to a standstill then. Its various contests with Humanism, Subjectivism, and Individualism have removed much of its useless subtlety, and strengthened its foundations, thus preparing the way for the neo-Scholasticism so wisely recommended by Leo XIII. in his Encyclical, *"Æterni Patris,"* of August 4, 1879.

III.

A SCIENTIFIC THEISTIC ARGUMENT.

Forty-five years ago Professor J. Lewis Diman, in his celebrated course of lectures at the Lowell Institute of Boston,⁴ forecasted with wonderful accuracy the contest which is being waged today between religion and the latest scientific theories of Ernst Haeckel. He says: "In our day materialism has assumed a new meaning, and in the conception of an indestructible and ceaselessly acting energy, underlying the phenomena of the external world, we seem to have the dividing line between the material and the spiritual almost wiped out." Furthermore, he reduces the whole issue to the old problem "whether we have any certain knowledge beyond that derived, either directly or indirectly, from experience;" and whether, "from the things that are seen, we can argue with any assurance to the things that are unseen."

Nowhere have I found a more subtle exposition of this scientific doctrine than in Mr. W. H. Mallock's article on the "Two Attacks on Science,"⁵ which has suggested the following reply:

Before all things it is necessary for us to survey carefully the scope into which this discussion leads us, and having tried to do so, I cannot view "the science of the universe" which he sets forth except as a metaphysical conception. I hold, with Professor Diman, that the idea of "a primeval force or mind-matter," is just as metaphysical as that of a first cause. Now there is no metaphysical explanation of facts derived from experience which does not of itself prescribe limits to and depend-

⁴ *The Theistic Argument*, by J. Lewis Diman. Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co.

⁵ *The Forinightly Review*, August, 1905.

ence on them individually and as a whole. Furthermore, finite or limited existences cannot have in themselves the cause of their limits or dependence. On this account right reason demands that the cause of their existence, which cannot be in themselves, must necessarily be out of themselves and self-existent. The theistic argument therefore in the last analysis resolves itself into this proposition, *viz.*: the existence of "*ens ab alio*—created being"—necessitates or presupposes the existence of "*Ens a Se*—Self-existent Being."

The validity of the whole theistic argument ultimately hinges upon this conclusion, which stands or falls with every other *a posteriori* argument from effect to cause; hence it cannot be reasonably questioned.

There is in this argument no vicious circle because the conclusion is drawn solely from the nature of finite existence by the exclusion of every other adequate explanation of its origin. Actual contingency is in itself an indubitable proof of the existence of an absolute cause. The fallacy by which so-called science now assails this truth, is found, upon examination, to be only an adroit attempt to reduce the infinite and finite to one substance, a theory evidently vitiated by a disguised contradiction: *Ens a Se* and *ens ab alio* can no more be identical than *esse* and *non esse* (existence and non-existence).

However, it should be remembered that the true theistic argument is only an intellectual judgment formed by the analysis of the essential nature of finite existence. It involves no direct perception of the essence of God; for by it we simply know that God exists, not *what God is*. Even the highest finite conception of what God is, can only be formed by discursive reasoning in an analogical manner. This process is well illustrated by our notions of time and space. As Father Hewit says: "Real space as being a definite relation between definite really existing things is a finite relation, contingent on the existence of the related objects, and had no existence before they began to be. . . . Knowing, as we do, actual existences,

and apprehending, as we must, that they have their origin from infinite, necessary being as first cause, we are incapable of fixing any necessary limit to the possible number or extent of existences in the finite order; and therefore are unable to confine the notion of ideal space within any necessary limits." So also with regard to the notion of time; if there were no contingent finite universe, there would be no actual time. Nevertheless the notion of possible time cannot be disassociated from actual; hence the idea of eternity or limitless time is indirectly involved in the notion of actual time."⁶

The very idea of *Ens a Se* furthermore presupposes the exclusion of all negation, limitation, or composition separable from it. Yet the finite mind cannot fully grasp its Being under one conception, but is obliged to separately consider the attributes or qualities of the Divine Nature; and this indirectly and ultimately includes perfection as essential to the nature of infinite being. Omniscience, omnipotence, infinite holiness, etc., are consequently necessary attributes of God. In a word, every perfection belongs essentially to that Being from which every finite existence sprang; otherwise its partial existence in creatures could not be reasonably accounted for.

Hitherto I have considered only a metaphysical proof of God's existence, now I propose to consider the bearing which late discoveries in physical science have on this question. Mr. Mallock seems to think that the progress of science has engendered difficulties which appear well-nigh insoluble, and before which the old philosophy and theology may be compelled to surrender.

Astronomy, for instance, has reversed the old notions of the physical cosmos. He says: "The first great blow, generally felt to be such, which science inflicted on religion, was that which destroyed the old geocentric astronomy. It was felt at once that if the earth was merely a paltry ball, wheeling and spinning with other balls around

⁶ *Problems of the Age*, by Rev. A. F. Hewit, C.S.P. New York: The Paulist Press.

a body incomparably larger, the Deity's great white throne on a superterrestrial firmament with the localized court of heaven and other allied conceptions, sank to the level of symbols which, if treated as facts, were absurdities."⁷

Before we can rightly estimate the force of this objection to the religious conception of the supernatural facts of Christ's Resurrection and Ascension and of the truth of His declaration of the final resurrection of all mankind and their future spiritual and corporal existence, we must first clearly understand the Divine teaching concerning the mode of such existence. "By the resurrection of Christ is meant the actual reunion of His human soul with His human body, and the resuscitation of that body to a glorified life." The recorded appearances of Christ to His disciples after His Resurrection show that His mode of life after death, as manifested to them, was wholly inconceivable by natural reason. He was instantaneously present and absent by turns. Their testimony of His first appearances, early on the Easter morning, on the journey to Emmaus, in the upper-room when the doors were closed, and in fact all the manifestations of Himself during the forty days previous to His Ascension, show that the life, which He was then enjoying, and which He promised would be the inheritance of His disciples, can in no way be invested with those limitations which belong to our present mode of existence. Furthermore, His Ascension from Mount Olivet to the right-hand of God the Father, although seen by the physical eyes of His disciples and known by them to be a physical fact, was certainly not a continuous journey through space such as we make in going from one place to another. Evidently they knew that in His glorified state He was not subject to the limitations imposed on them by time, space and matter. It was therefore impossible for them to have imagined His throne in glory as having any real resemblance to those on earth, or as being circumscribed by any physical laws governing the natural universe. There-

⁷ *The Fortnightly Review*, August, 1905.

fore, neither the geocentric nor the heliocentric systems of astronomy can really touch or modify in the least degree our belief in these supernatural facts.

The progress of science cannot really affect the question of the truth or falsity of a supernatural mode of existence. Ptolemy could have claimed as reasonably to have proved its impossibility by his science as Copernicus or Galileo, by theirs. Dionysius the Areopagite must have found as many difficulties in reconciling faith with science in his time as Ferdinand Brunetière in our own day.

Like astronomy, geology has changed our notions of the age of the material universe, but has not touched the doctrine of creation which alone adequately explains the origin of finite existence, nor has it contradicted, but rather sustained, the account of the periodic origin of its different parts. The opinion that the six days of creation were indefinite periods of time, was held by St. Augustine and other approved doctors of theology long before the science of geology began. Again, the Scripture doctrine of the human family and of its descent from a single pair best explains the physical and moral unity of mankind. Furthermore, the necessary relation of the creature to an all-perfect Creator makes it impossible to assign the cause of sin or moral imperfection to any agency except human free-will; and an inborn tendency to sin can only be explained by the actual sin of progenitors.

The theory that imperfection is due, not to a fall from perfection, but to the slowness and incompleteness of human progress toward it, is incompatible with the doctrine of creation by an all-perfect Supreme Being; and is derived from the false idea of the identity of infinite and finite being. Furthermore, if it be denied that the *abuse* of free-will was the origin of moral imperfection, it becomes impossible to assign to the *right use* of this faculty the power to retrieve this misfortune. Again if the essential distinction between right and wrong in the moral order is denied, that of the difference between existence and

non-existence in the metaphysical order falls with it. "*Omne ens est verum et bonum*—Every being is real and good."

The real progress of all human knowledge has been slow, and none more so than that of religious truth. As Newman shows, the development of Christian doctrine from a complete and final revelation delivered on the birthday of the Church, has involved innumerable contests and defections from the Faith; yet, on the whole, these evils have only more firmly established its claims and proportionately increased its influence in the world. True natural science, although man's greatest temporal benefit, has not had a more propitious history than religious knowledge. Crass ignorance, like unbelief in religion, has unfortunately withstood its progress at every turn.

The conflict between scientists and theologians is often more apparent than real. For instance, the *natural* process of Evolution does not preclude the possibility of *miracles*, such as the Virgin-Birth of Christ, His Resurrection, and the special supernatural origin of Adam, the head of our race. Mendel, who discovered evolution in the plant kingdom, never had a doubt concerning any supernatural fact recorded in the Bible.

IV.

A SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

I have previously shown the fallacy of a scientific attempt to reduce the absolute and contingent to one substance. I shall now endeavor to prove the existence of a determining principle of life (soul) in man which essentially distinguishes him from all lower forms of existence. The special nature and attributes of the human soul are commonly denoted by its faculty of forming abstract ideas and moral conceptions.

A new method of apologetic has been proposed by Mr. W. H. Mallock on the plea that "Scientific Monism" has completely overthrown this distinction, and "proved beyond all doubt" that matter of itself performs all the functions usually ascribed to mind or soul. According to this theory, we have "first, matter commonly called lifeless, but really consisting of atom-cells (or electrons) full of inward activity; then, matter which lives in the sense recognized by the biologist, but which is by the biologist not recognized as thinking; then, matter which thinks, remembers, and even purposes—which performs the functions of mind—but without personal consciousness; and, lastly, matter which is mind, with a personal consciousness emerging from it. . . . Science presents us with a description or quasi-pictorial record already practically complete in all its salient features of a process beginning, let us say, as the movements of some cosmic nebula and results at last automatically in the mind and in the personality of man." Although Mr. Mallock admits that this scientific theory of existence has its "obvious limitations," he seems to think that the apologist should "accept it as unassailable."⁸

⁸ *The Reconstruction of Religious Belief*, by W. H. Mallock. New York: Harper Bros.

But the true apologist cannot thus postulate an effect without a cause; he must seek not only an adequate final cause of all existence, but adequate secondary causes for all effects; otherwise he is compelled either to admit the existence of an uncaused effect or to infer that the simple and the complex are identical. If all existence is essentially composite, as those who hold that matter of itself performs all the functions commonly attributed to mind or soul, the apologist is hopelessly adrift on a sea of contradictions.

But, on the other hand, if he recognizes the essential difference between material and mechanical agencies and the agency of human thought and purpose, he finds an adequate cause of all psychological facts. He also recognizes that the soul, by its union with the body, acts through the senses, and that consequently all ideas are clothed with imagery; yet he sees that the difference between the abstract, concrete, moral, and spiritual is unmistakably clear and certain; hence he rightly concludes that there must be a principle of human life distinct from any material force or activity, and that simplicity, spirituality, and indivisible unity of nature are just as necessary to it for abstract thought and moral conception, as organism in matter is necessary for sensation; and that, therefore, mind and matter cannot possibly be identical.

St. Thomas Aquinas shows most clearly the essential difference between the intellectual and sentient faculties of the soul. He says: "Sense is cognizant only of singulars, but the intellect is cognizant of universals. Sensory knowledge extends only to bodily things, but the intellect takes cognizance of things incorporeal, such as wisdom, truth, and the relations of objects. No sense has reflex knowledge of itself and its own activity; the sight does not see itself nor see that it sees; but intellect is cognizant of itself and knows that it understands."⁹

Again, by recognizing the essential distinction between

⁹ *The Summa of St. Thomas: Of God and His Creatures.* English translation. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co.

soul and body he finds an unmistakable proof of the freedom of the will, because before any moral choice can be made, an intellectual judgment must be formed and the agent be determined by a conception of the essential goodness or evil of it; furthermore, he infers that if there were no essential difference between right and wrong, conscience would not be a factor of the soul. Mr. Mallock himself admits that Scientific Monism makes it "impossible to construct any kind of theory by means of which human life, considered as a part of the universe, can be credited with any element of freedom;" it is clear then that intellectual cognition and free volition make a mere "material determinism" of their acts impossible.

Finally, from the simplicity, spirituality, and unity of the soul's nature, the apologist concludes that it is *per se* indestructible or immortal; its annihilation at the death of the body would destroy the purpose of its existence; again, science shows that matter is indestructible; and Monism in particular denies the possibility of any sort of annihilation. Its capacity for knowledge and goodness, not attainable in this life, shows most clearly that its nature must be everlasting. No one has shown more clearly than Mr. Mallock that, without it, life would not be worth living.

Now a close examination of his volume on the *Reconstruction of Religious Belief* reveals a careful criticism of "current science" by which it is successfully refuted according to its own principles.

A summary of these criticisms is now in order:

1. If it can be shown that a purpose, even though not understood by ourselves, really pervades the universe, the belief in God, freedom and immortality can be maintained.

2. If the arguments which lead to the denial of moral purpose are carried out fully, they will react on themselves and lead to a conclusion diametrically opposite to that which they have hitherto been supposed to prove.

3. Evolution, as Spencer conceives it, fails to assign a cause for the development of the definite heterogeneous

from the indefinite homogeneous; and, as Haeckel conceives it, it only accounts for some facts by sequence and others by casualty.

4. If cosmos were the cause of human thought and purpose, there would be a contradictory power of determinism in it, by which good and evil, happiness and misery, would have the same cause.

5. A belief that God is good possesses a practical quality, which the belief that He is indifferent or evil cannot; the latter belief is opposed to the common sense of mankind.

6. If the existence of a personal God be admitted, there is no difficulty in believing in the existence and immortality of the human soul. On the whole, he concludes that, although the problem of God's existence, freedom of the will, and immortality cannot be solved by science or philosophy alone, belief in them is practically necessary; otherwise life would not be worth living.

From the foregoing analysis of Mr. Mallock's constructive arguments in favor of religious belief, it is evident that he does not regard the negative conclusions of "current science" as impregnable; hence his attempt to introduce order amid a confusion of ideas, has attracted attention from thinkers of every school; but those who think that "science" has solved the "riddle of the universe" find as little satisfaction in his positive opinions as Catholics do in his negations.

This book may, perhaps, help unsettled minds to find a securer rest in Theism and immortality. But, I regret to say that it cannot do much more. Agnosticism will no doubt be greatly weakened by it; for life can never become meaningless to those who are at all interested in its problems. The problems, however, which he has most successfully solved, are not ones which ever have or ever can puzzle those who have sat at the feet of Aristotle and St. Thomas. Their system of constructive philosophy has no need of reconstruction; reason cannot go back of the axioms of the Scholastic Philosophy without stultify-

ing itself; the axe cannot be laid below the root of the tree. On the other hand, the initial step in every other system of thought is a deviation; modern reconstructive philosophy may be compared to a tangle of by-paths, beginning and ending in a wilderness of doubt. The argument which Mr. Mallock so ably uses to show that the Reformation has led to doctrinal disruption in religion, might be applied with equal force to show that reconstruction in philosophy has only led to a similar result in thought.

The question at issue is finally reduced to the credible-hypothesis or to the moral-certainty basis of belief. And the former theory either makes apologetic doubtful from the very start, or presupposes an assent beyond the power of the evidence to enforce. "Reason," says St. Thomas, "would not believe if it did not see that it is necessary to believe." *Gratia supponit naturam*. Supernatural assent to a divinely revealed religion requires rational assent also. Obscurity of faith is, as a rule, proportionate to dimness of rational religious conviction. As Father Hecker used to say: "Faith is essentially intelligent." Until Mr. Mallock recognizes that harmony between natural sciences and supernatural belief is essential, he can never arrive at certainty in anything.

APPENDIX.

ARCHÆOLOGY AND THE BIBLE.

Recent investigations in archæology seem to confirm the opinion that Babylonia is one of the cradles of civilization. There are few archæologists who do not admit that its chronology coincides fairly with the Biblical after the time of Abraham. The writer of the Pentateuch deals largely with contemporary history; and it cannot reasonably be supposed that what he wrote about the persons or events of his time would have been accepted by his own nation as inspired, if they were not in accordance with known historical facts. This also makes it hard to suppose that he would have given an account of the Creation and Fall of man, the Deluge, and the general outline of the genealogies from Adam to his own time, unless these points had already been the common possessions of his people by tradition.

Moreover, if such events as the first chapters of Genesis narrate did actually take place, it cannot reasonably be supposed that they could have been forgotten. God in speaking to Adam established a perpetual covenant with his descendants, and His words to Noah and Abraham would have no meaning if they were not in fulfillment of His promise to man in the beginning. Repeated revelations thus kept the first fresh in the minds of succeeding Patriarchs. On the other hand, if there were no living tradition of those events and genealogies, it is hard to see how they could have been incorporated in actual Hebrew history and universally accepted by that nation as equally authentic with contemporary facts.

The first genealogies of the Bible give names of ancestors which probably had been transmitted by tradition;

otherwise there would not have been in those days such rational and historical evidences for the facts of Revelation as in subsequent ages. Yet it must be remembered that chronology is the most uncertain element in the earliest period of human history and cannot be definitely settled either by Scripture or science. The latest discoveries in Babylonia, however, reveal a civilization which some modern scientists think would have required for its development a longer period from Adam to Abraham than has been commonly thought by Scripture scholars in the past.

Before discussing this interesting question it is well for us to consider what the newly-found monuments reveal concerning the events which Scripture relates as having transpired during this period. Professor A. H. Sayce, of Oxford University, in his book on *Monument Facts and Higher Critical Fancies*, shows quite conclusively that the resemblance between the Babylonian Epic of the Creation and the first chapter of Genesis is most striking. Professor Friedrich Delitzsch, of Berlin, in his famous lecture on *Babel and Bible*,¹⁰ says: "Most probably there is a connection between the old Babylonian picture of the 'Sacred Tree and Serpent' and the Biblical account of the Fall of man."

The Babylonian description of the Deluge conforms even more closely to the inspired Biblical account of the Flood, and Dr. Delitzsch is authority for the statement that the Babylonians divided their history into two great periods—"Before the Flood, and after the Flood." In general, it may be said that the Bible and Babylonian accounts of the Creation and Fall of man and of the Deluge do not differ from each other much more than the canonical and apocryphal Gospels. And the latter surely testify that Christ actually lived upon the earth.

The question which now interests Biblical students and archæologists is that of the age of mankind up to

¹⁰ *Babel and Bible*. English translation. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co.

Abraham. According to some critics, the civilization of Babylonia at this period was already so old that it cannot be reconciled with Bible history, if the latter be taken as a consecutive record of humanity from the creation of the first man. But if we analyze the grounds for their conclusions, we shall find that the theory of evolution largely determines their judgment on this question. They assume that human progress has always been gradual and uniform, and that man was originally undeveloped in all his faculties.

An opposite idea of man's first estate is given by the inspired account of the Creation. The traditions of Eden transmitted by our first parents thus furnish an adequate explanation of the vigorous growth of the human family during the first period as described in Genesis. According to the Scripture account of this period, the moral atmosphere of humanity darkened very rapidly after the divine law ceased to be the ruling force in society.

The descriptions of the building of the Ark, as given in both the Scripture and Babylonian accounts, indicate a high degree of civilization: such a task would tax the human resources of our own day. After the Flood there must have been every incentive to induce the survivors to exert all their skill and energy in restoring the ruin that had been wrought. Hope and ambition would naturally combine to cause the advent of a new era which would restore what had been lost.

We may easily find a parallel in the stupendous leaps of modern progress. Four hundred and fifty years ago there was not a white man on the whole Continent of America; and if we count the many millions now living upon it, most of whom are in the vanguard of civilization; if we trace the power which man has utilized from steam and electricity, and the increment which the small and widely distributed wealth of a century ago has since produced, we might be tempted to say that the capabilities of man are immeasurable; and that, if the evidence of such a phenomenon could be viewed in the dim distance which

separates us from ancient Babylonia, it would be deemed fabulous.

Or to take a more striking example: If Commodore Perry on the day that he visited the coast of Japan had heard a prophesy that within the first decade of the twentieth century, the Japanese nation would hurl back Russia and astound the world by the most wonderful military and naval achievements of the age, he would have regarded it as a fanciful dream.

The changes which have taken place in the world before our very eyes ought to make us cautious in our judgments as to what has taken place in past ages of which we have as yet obtained only a glimpse. On the whole, according to all human experience as far as we know it, the age of the world seems as indefinite as ever. Our best course is, on the one hand, to avoid special pleading in defence of the old chronologies; and, on the other, to beware of accepting too readily computations which even the greatest savants have made from a too precise arithmetic.

Genesis gives only the origin of *our* race. For all we know, other races of men, perhaps without a supernatural destiny, may have existed and become extinct before the creation of Adam and Eve. Such eminent and orthodox theologians as Fathers A. Tanquerey and Leslie J. Walker consider this opinion tenable.

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
13

THE

MONEY MANIA.

AN APPEAL TO THE YOUNG PEOPLE.

BY
REV. JESSE B. YOUNG, A.M.



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THE MONEY MANIA.

A UNION battle-flag at Gettysburgh, waving in the gloom and glare of a terrific night-engagement, was repeatedly shot down. As often as it fell the staff was spliced and held aloft again. Finally it lodged without the breast-work. The Confederates had watched it with eager, covetous gaze. A sergeant, lying in their ranks not far in advance of the spot where it fell, resolved to secure the trophy at any cost. Rising and running toward the banner, he passed across the death-swept slope unharmed; but as he neared the prize and reached forth to seize it, the color-guard rose from the intrenchments and fired. **HE FELL DEAD, HIS HAND JUST TOUCHING THE FLAG!** Risking all upon the venture, he had lost, perishing in the very moment of apparent victory.

The reckless folly and unhappy fate of those who imperil every thing in the pursuit of riches are strikingly illustrated in this incident. In the hazardous race for wealth thousands are staking health, life, character, domestic enjoyments, and all their interests, in time and eternity. After sacrificing these, many find their efforts ending in failure, despair, and death. The few who for a while succeed, only come face to face with the harassing and perplexing question of old: "What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"

The search for wealth and the possession of it alike are

girt with peril. To seek money and yet not love it; to get riches honestly, and not fix the heart upon them to be diligent in business and at the same time fervent in spirit, serving the Lord; to enjoy and rightly use the legitimate results of financial skill and energy, without being either stingy or extravagant; how difficult a task this is, let them say who have faithfully tried to accomplish it.

Is there time, in the present restless, busy, money-making age, to glance at some of the *outgrowths* and *tendencies* of the love of gain? a passion which, though world-wide in its scope, exhibits its rankest phases and fruitage in our own land.

The nation is consumed by a frenzied desire for gold. Multitudes, old and young, have scarcely a hope or ambition beyond the sudden acquisition of great wealth. The Americans are putting their best life and strength into their efforts to get rich. Here and there may be found a man whose consecration to higher objects in life is so perfect that he has "no time to make money;" but the rarity of such a character renders him the phenomenon of the age. The attention of the generation which he serves is drawn toward him for an hour, as though he belonged to another planet, and then eyes, head, and heart are absorbed anew in the quest for gain. Is it in vain to call a halt in this race? to sound a note of warning in the ear of our young men and women? to ask, whither are we tending? what are the results born of this endless, toilful, desperate struggle for riches?

MAMMON is the well-chosen Scripture word representing the god of wealth. Literally signifying "any thing in which one confides or believes," it is fittingly used to designate gold as the object upon which the affections and faith of multitudes are fixed. Those who trust in uncer-

tain riches are not merely the followers, but the votaries, the *worshippers* of *mammon*. He is their all in all, their *god*. Covetousness is, therefore, rightly called *idolatry*. Hence the difficulty that hinders the salvation of those who, at any risk or sacrifice, determine to be rich. They must be cured of idol-worship before they can enter heaven. To be rich, we are told, is an estate of danger. The desire for riches pierces the heart with many sorrows. He who came to seek and save the lost declares a miracle of divine power necessary in order that a rich man may be saved. More obstacles seem to be in his pathway than in any other.

The very worst crimes interposed no peculiar barrier in the way of guilty men and women who sought the Saviour while he was upon the earth. When, however, the rich young ruler, of irreproachable reputation and lovable character, comes to Christ with eagerness and apparent sincerity, asking the way to eternal life, we behold him halting at the terms laid down and going away sorrowful, "for he had great possessions." He loved these more than he loved the Master. His riches were a greater impediment in his path to heaven than public and profligate transgressions.

The Lord over and over again, with varied illustration and solemn emphasis, bids his followers take heed and beware of covetousness. "Ye *cannot* serve God and mammon." The one service shuts out the other from the heart. "The cares of this world and the deceitfulness of riches," are the thorns that choke the word of life, and it becometh unfruitful. "How hardly," he says, "shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of heaven." It is *possible* for them to be brought in, for "with God all things are possible," even the salvation of the rich. The mightiest display of the power of divine grace is pre-

sented as taking place when a lover of money is saved from the worship of gold and the service of self, and, with all his possessions, is brought in complete consecration to the feet of the Redeemer.

THE OUTGROWTHS

of this uncurbed greed of riches are to be noted on every hand. They are manifested not merely in the vortexes of society, or in the centers of commerce, but in village and country through all the land, in ways and occupations numberless, legal and illegal. A vast fortune is the object of eager, burning desire on the part of a great multitude which no man can number. What sacrifices are made, what labors performed, what crimes committed, at the bidding of this master-passion of the soul! To get wealth the business man almost divorces himself from wife and children, scarcely taking time to eat and sleep under the same roof with them; hoping, vainly in most cases, after a while to have an opportunity to enjoy his home and become acquainted with his family. Day and night, perhaps even on the Sabbath, he applies himself with unceasing zeal to his wasting task, until softening of the brain, or a broken heart, or paralysis strikes him into the grave, or renders him a tottering imbecile, with wrecked ambitions, blighted hopes, and prostrated life-powers.

The love of money is the mainspring of the iniquitous traffic in drink, fevering the blood, crazing the brain, inflaming the passions, demonizing the whole man. It lies at the foundation of the trade in obscene publications, as vile and reeking with putrescent filth as though they had been scooped out of the very sewers of hell. For gain the gambler, the burglar, and the assassin ply their precarious livelihoods, and women sell themselves to a life of shame. To obtain riches is frequently an essential object in matri-

monial alliances. There are those who descend to the meanest of all ways of amassing wealth—they seek to *marry a fortune!*

The frequent use of the word *embezzlement* in public prints of late represents one phase of demoralization bred by this lust for lucre. The integrity of a man possessed by this passion becomes an easy prey to temptation. Not only are the usual shrewd and mean practices and tricks of trade carried on; but, in the hope of suddenly becoming rich, and with the intention, perhaps, of repaying at an early day, trust funds are fraudulently misapplied. Peculation and speculation mark his course to ruin. Whence the mania for investments in oil, that bewildered the sober judgment of many during the war? Whence the wild enterprises of joint-stock companies, the flourishing gift and lottery schemes, and the insane proceedings that occur so frequently in the various boards and exchanges in our commercial cities? Whence comes the stench of bribery and corruption that arises from the political arena, where men sell their votes, their honor, themselves, for gold?

These are but a few instances, out of many that present themselves on all sides, of the eager haste to be rich that characterizes the era in which we live. Even our *educational* interests are more or less affected by this state of things. Young men, too generally, are overanxious to begin a course of money-seeking at the earliest possible age, with but meager, if any, mental discipline. If they do consent to spend a little time in the cultivation of the mind, how often the aim is to obtain, not culture, or high intellectual training, or accurate scholarship; but what is called a *practical education*—that is, one that will bring in an almost immediate *financial* return for their labor. They are unwilling to make an investment of money, time, and toil, even in developing their intellects and acquiring

knowledge, unless they can count up their gains therefrom in dollars and cents! But we have not the space to pursue further this fruitful branch of our theme.

THE TENDENCIES

of this craving for opulence claim consideration. It is a passion that is not exhausted like others by excesses in youth or over-taxation in age. *The pursuit of wealth begets an insatiable desire for more.* The ambition to be rich does not die when other ambitions are blighted, nor loosen its grasp as the weight of increasing years bows the frame and relaxes the strength. It still brings forth fruit in old age. The avaricious man becomes more grasping as he grows older. "He that loveth silver shall not be satisfied with silver; nor he that loveth abundance with increase."

Where is the man in pursuit or in possession of riches who will say, "I have enough; my hopes are fulfilled; the ambitions of my youth are satisfied." There are, at every stage in the race, greater fortunes to be made, larger gains to be won. The modest sum which in early life was regarded as an ample estate is found in a few years to be far below the demands of the soul. The love of money grows with what it feeds upon, until it becomes all-absorbing and voracious, consuming the very life of its victim.

"It glows; it flames; it never says, Enough—
More is more fuel—'till the shriveled soul,
Alive but wrapped in cerements of death,
Breathes out itself upon that funeral pyre."

While thus remorseless and engrossing in its demands, it is at the same time *utterly unsatisfying*. Only one out of ten (according to accurate statistics) who engage in this struggle for riches becomes wealthy. The other nine disastrously fail.

Those who obtain vast possessions are unhappy, unless at the same time they are "rich in good works," and "rich toward God." A reputed millionaire said not long ago to a friend who congratulated him on his success: "I was happier when I earned a dollar a day as a laborer. Then I had no harassing cares. I could sleep at night and enjoy the society of my family. Now I have no rest. Business absorbs my thoughts and life. I am in constant and perplexing anxiety." Soon afterward the man of wealth suddenly died—smitten with disease of the brain. The man who looks to his wealth to satisfy his soul is hewing out for himself "broken cisterns that can hold no water." Girard, with his immense fortune, was notably unhappy. Nathan Rothschild lived in constant dread of assassination, sleeping with loaded pistols under his pillow, and armed servants within call. Riches multiply sorrows and toilsome cares, bringing "temptations and snares and many foolish and hurtful lusts."

Nothing is more uncertain and unsatisfying than the hopes based upon earthly possessions, which may in a moment take unto themselves wings and fly away. In the morning of life, before the eyes of the runners in this race the *mirage* glitters with brilliant and enticing visions along the horizon's edge; but, at the evening hour of famishment and fatigue, the grateful shade and inviting streams all disappear. Their splendors were printed only on the fading cloud, and in the season of extremest need they have vanished.

The word *miser* illustrates the tantalizing nature of the pursuit of wealth. The ancients noted the hard lines and greedy, famished look in the face of the stingy man; they beheld his barren, cheerless existence and unhappy end, and to him they applied the name *miser*. He, they said, is *the miser-able man*. All other forms of wretched-

ness shall be graded and known by their resemblance to this condition of *misery*.

The pursuit of gain, unchecked and misdirected, sears and deadens the tenderest feelings of the soul. No other passion so withers and blights the affections, or develops such a selfish and cruel forgetfulness of the claims and needs of the suffering and the poor. The sympathies that were intended to bind the world into one family are turned to stone; the heart becomes an arid waste, "greedy as the sea and barren as the shore." The eye is blinded to the wretchedness of the needy; the ear closed against the appeal of the destitute; the soul hardened to resist all the cries of pain and want.

The sterile granite rock, making no return for what it receives, eagerly drinking in the gentle and constant ministries of the sunshine, air, and rain, but giving forth no sweet odor, or exhalation of moisture, or green blade, or fragrant blossom, is a faithful image of the life that is marked by crafty barrenness and greed. How many of those who have wealth take note of the needs, and endeavor to lighten the burden of penury? A few dollars would rescue a street waif from his horrible associations; would inspirit deserving men and women dying in hunger and want; would save precious lives that are now being crushed out by hopeless, galling poverty, and its accompaniments of disease and crime. For want of money our asylums, hospitals, benevolent societies, and workers among the poor, are forced to narrow their aims and plans, and refuse aid to multitudes who are in deepest suffering.

The nations of the earth are ready to receive the Gospel. Doors are opening in every land. Over *none* of them is written as of yore, "Ye may not enter here." The fields are white unto the harvest. Hosts of devoted laborers are

offering themselves for mission work in foreign lands, but, for lack of means wherewith to send and support them, their services are refused.

How many fortunes have been made by devouring widows' houses, and grinding the faces of the poor? Each disaster or blunder in business is carefully noted. Under the guise of friendship, loans at exorbitant rates are made upon coveted property, which, by foreclosure and sale in a time of helpless embarrassment for the debtor, is obtained for a fraction of its value. Go with me into the mansion of the perpetrator of such cruelties, and behold the spoils wrested from the hands of the poor. This costly painting represents the earnings of a widow, placed in the hands of this man for safe keeping; that statue was purchased with an orphan's patrimony; and yon service of plate, with money gained by the forced sale of the property of a rising business man, whose losses ruined him. The elegant furniture was bought with bonds wrongfully withheld by the so-called owner of this wealth from his own brother.

As we stand there amid riches and luxury, there seem to be marks of blood and tears all around! The cries and moans of those who have been defrauded and destroyed rise up on every side. And men boast of such deeds as shrewd business transactions, or try to excuse them by the plea that every man must look after his own interests. They fear not God, neither regard man. They glory in their *shame*. The common impulses of humanity are often destroyed from the heart that is occupied with the search for gold. The orphan's imploring hand; the widow's falling tears; the anguish of those who are dying in starvation and age; the claims of the toil-worn seamstress; the needs of a world lying in darkness and the shadow of death: all fail to attract the attention, or enlist the sym-

pathies, or stir the conscience of men and women whose hearts are seared by the love of riches.

Even during the life-struggle of the nation a few years ago there were thousands who were moved by no higher impulse than the greed of gain. An imperiled government; a great people rising up in defense of its liberties; a nation in mourning for its dead; a land drenched in blood and bathed in tears; *they beheld in this awful spectacle only an opportunity to make money!* They made traffic of the nation's needs, and sought to enrich themselves by coining her very life-blood into gold. As prowlers upon the battle-field come forth in the darkness to rifle the bodies of the wounded and slain, so these human hyenas sought to prey upon and plunder the prostrate form of their bleeding country. Nowhere else may we find instances of such remorseless and engrossing selfishness as in the history of those who, at any cost, are seeking

"Gold, gold, gold, gold,
Bright and yellow, hard and cold."

This passion is one of the most deceitful of those that infest the heart. Hiding away under various disguises, it would cloak its infamies under the excuse of diligence, frugality, prudence, laying up for a rainy day, the duty of providing for one's own household, etc. Other sinners plead *guilty*, but how rarely does the miser or spendthrift confess his crime. Men and women whose lives are marked by close-fisted greed, delude themselves by the imagination that they are, nevertheless, maintaining a consistent Christian profession. No other plainly-denounced and heinous crime is borne with as is this crying offense. It is the last sin to be acknowledged to one's self—the last to be confessed before man and God.

The race for wealth often involves a reckless and wicked waste of money. Whether gold is hoarded, or squandered

in riotous living, the principle of action is the same: the property that ought to be used in doing good is employed entirely for *self*.

Luxurious displays, dress and adornments, and needlessly expensive habits of living, are instances in point. Young people are not willing to begin at the foot of the ladder, as their parents did, and, by honest industry and careful economy, make their money before they spend it. They would start in the style, and with the equipage of the wealthy. Men are often goaded into ruinous expenditures by ambitious wives or extravagant daughters, who desire to surpass the lavish parade of their neighbors. Vast sums are put into jewelry, parties, furniture, watering-place expenses, and foreign tours, that ought to have been invested in the payment of debts, or made the foundation of a permanently prosperous business, or filled up the needy treasury of the Lord's house.

This course, once begun, is seldom stopped short of bankruptcy or suicide. To start at this extravagant rate is like getting into the rapids of Niagara, or becoming engulfed in the swift-rushing, wrathful circles of a whirlpool. The victims become fairly insane in their eagerness to obtain a *sudden* fortune. Rushing heedlessly into all sorts of speculations, violating the plainest principles of business, assuming tremendous financial risks and obligations, they do not usually awake to their situation until they are upon the brink, or have fallen into the pit of destruction.

In the early days of gold-hunting in California fights and murders were common at the gambling-tables. Before the blood had been wiped up or the victim removed, the cards would be shuffled again, and a voice would be heard: "The game is making up, gentlemen. Who'll take another hand?" So, in the gaming operation of brokers'

boards, the desperate schemes to control the market in wheat, or gold, or "Erie;" the attempts to "bull," or expand the price of one stock, and "bear," or reduce the value of another; while multitudes are utterly ruined, the unfortunates are trampled under foot or hustled out of the way, and the heartless cry sounds forth, "Who'll take another hand?"

The panic and failures of 1873 were but the natural result of extravagance and folly. As a nation, we were living on borrowed capital, mortgaging our future resources to satisfy artificial and prodigal desires, and estimating every thing at fictitious and inflated values. *There had to be a day of reckoning.* Happy will we be if the lesson lasts during the life of even one generation.

The race for wealth involves oftentimes the *ruin of children*. This is one of the saddest and most demoralizing features in the facts we have been noting. Brought up in luxury and idleness; arrayed from infancy in costly, showy apparel; taught to despise labor and look down with contempt upon the laborer; they grow up with profuse tastes and habits, regarding wealth as the one thing needful, and a rich marriage as an indispensable part of their life-plans. Many breathe, in the very atmosphere in which they live, a love of indolence and dissipation, and an unlimited supply of spending money paves their way to destruction. Those alone who *earn* money usually know the value of it. An inherited fortune is, in the majority of cases, the sure forerunner of ruin.

Many parents hold before their offspring an *unjust standard of character*. Men are measured by their riches. These cover a multitude of sins: ignorance, boorishness, drunkenness, even uncleanness and the lowest vices. In common language people are "worth" as much as they possess.

These are some of the *pernicious tendencies* that endanger the character and happiness of those engaged in the search for riches. Will the young men and women who are brought face to face with these truths abandon themselves to a course of godless and baneful money-seeking? Opportunities such as never kindled the hopes or fired the ambition of man are placed before you: will you relinquish them all for the sake of gold?

A field, such as never in all the past gladdened mortal eye, invites you to enter and work. Our broad and beautiful continent is to be made the home of the highest type of devout and cultured manhood and womanhood. What privileges abound here to achieve usefulness and honor, and imitate the example of Him "who went about doing good."

A thousand pressing claims and piteous cries press in upon the soul as we ask, "What shall I do?" The boundaries of science are to be enlarged; systems of education are to be perfected; children are to be trained; politics is to be purified and literature advanced; the poor, the insane, and the criminal masses of our population are to be elevated and properly cared for; the Gospel is to be spread through the earth, the whole world lifted into the smile of God and the favor of heaven! Will you turn from these and a hundred other fields of doing and getting good, to spend your life in drawing a muck-rake through the mire in search of paltry lucre?

To have riches, or to seek them, is not wrong *in itself*. Wealth, honorably obtained and wisely used, is the source of invaluable blessings to man; but dishonestly made, meanly hoarded, or extravagantly wasted, it is one of the greatest curses that can befall a human being. The tendencies and temptations that beset the seeker of money are so full of peril and treachery, that multitudes of those

who devote themselves to the getting of pelf are drowned in perdition.

Wealth, if secured, brings to its owner weighty responsibilities. Well may the man who has money and sees his brother in need ponder the solemn words of Scripture: "To him that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin." How shall the prosperous and the rich fulfill their obligations and escape the dangers that threaten them? By consecrating themselves and their possessions to the service of Christ, and using their means, as stewards of his bounty, in doing good. "If riches increase set not your heart upon them." Keep the soul fresh and tender by kindness to the poor, incessant prayer, and constant, but judicious, giving. Gauge your gifts by the goodness of God, the love of Christ, who gave himself for you, and the needs of the destitute and deserving. And in all your life, "Remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he said, It is more blessed to give than to receive."

THE END.

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